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Abstract
This central topic of this thesis is the relationship between categorisation and analogy
in cognition. Questions of what a straightforward representation of a concept or
category is, and following from that how extra-categorical associations such as
analogy and metaphor are possible are central to our understanding of human
reasoning and comprehension. However, despite the intimate linkage between the two,
the trend in cognitive science has been to treat analogy and categorisation as separable,
distinctive phenomena that can be studied in isolation from one another. This strategy
has proved remarkably effective when it comes to the cognitive modelling of extra-
categorical associations. A number of compelling and detailed models of analogy
process exist, and there is widespread agreement amongst researchers studying
analogy as to what the key cognitive processes that determine analogies are.
However, these models of analogy tend to assume some kind of fully specified
category processing module which governs and determines ordinary, straightforward
conceptual mappings. Indeed, this assumption is required in order to talk about
analogy and metaphor in the first place: few theorists actually define analogy and
metaphor per se, but all agree that analogical and metaphoric judgements can be
defined in contrast to ordinary categorisation judgements.
This thesis reviews these models of analogy, and evidence for them, before
conducting a detailed exploration of categorisation in relation to analogy. A theoretical
and empirical review is presented in order to show that the straightforward notion of
categorisation that underpins the distinctive phenomena approach to the study of
analogy and categorisation is more apparent than real. Whilst intuitively, analogy and
categorisation might feel like different things which can be contrasted with one
another, from a cognitive processing point of view, this thesis argues that such a
distinction may not survive a detailed scientific examination.
A series of empirical studies are presented in order to further explore the 'no
distinction' hypothesis. Following from these, further studies examine the question of
whether models of analogical processing have progressed as far as they can in artificial
ii
isolation from categorisation, a process in which the processes that are normally
deemed 'analogical' appear to play a vital role.
The conclusion drawn in this thesis is that the analogy / categorisation division, as
currently formulated, cannot survive detailed scientific examination. It is argued that
despite the benefits that the previous study of these phenomena in isolation have
brought in the past, future progress, especially in the development of cognitive models
of analogy, is dependent on a more unified approach.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
Introduction
'We talk of process and states, and leave their nature undecided.
Sometime perhaps we will know more about them - we think. But that is
just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.'
(Wittgenstein 1953, pl02).
1.1 Modelling Concepts
Cognitive science has a strong interest in concepts, both literal and metaphoric:
accounting for how the 'stuff of experience' is represented, manipulated and combined
in the mind is a central concern of the field. The central aim of this thesis is to provide
the groundwork for the investigation and modelling of human conceptual skills. Since
in cognitive science conceptualisation is usually equated with categorisation, I shall
acknowledge at the outset that no specific, complete model of categorisation will be
presented. Indeed, although the process of categorisation is central to the concerns of
this thesis, much of the material presented will not obviously address categorisation at
all. Instead, much of the focus of this thesis will be on an 'extra-categorical' cognitive
process: analogy.
The path chosen is not as quixotic as it might at first appear. A key tenet of science is
that one should go beyond appearances, and seek out the causes or structures that
underlie phenomena. And, as the remark from Wittgenstein at the head of this chapter
seeks to show us, there is a pattern to the way in which problems regarding the
understanding of mental processes1 arise. The most important step in the production
of such problems is the one that usually goes unnoticed: the deciding that one
1
Wittgenstein actually considers the way philosophical problems concerning mental processes arise,
though his analysis seems equally applicable to psychological problems.
1
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manifestation of cognitive ability results from one process, and that another,
apparently separate ability results from another. Wittgenstein's remark is a caution
against the way that such assumptions can commit one to a particular way of looking at
a matter, and also the way that the adoption of particular questions will - necessarily -
preclude certain answers. What Wittgenstein seeks to warn us against is, in effect,
becoming slaves to our own assumptions.
The contention at the heart of this thesis is that investigations of human conceptual
abilities have relied too much on appearances. Because it appears, intuitively, that
analogy and metaphor on one hand, and categorisation on the other, are different
things, researchers have tended to treat them as manifestly different cognitive abilities.
These assumptions, misplaced or otherwise, have not precluded fruitful progress in
the quest to understand our conceptual abilities. Indeed, I shall argue that there is an
extent to which these assumptions have helped research into analogy. However, in the
end, it may turn out that what our assumptions of separateness preclude are just those
answers that we are seeking.
"Extra-categorical" cognitive processes, such as analogy and metaphor, tend to be
defined in relation to "straightforward categorisation." Yet despite the intimate linkage
between analogy and metaphor on the one hand, and categorisation on the other (an
intimacy manifest in these definitions), because at face value they appear to be so
different from one another, the trend in cognitive science has been to treat analogy and
categorisation as separable, distinctive phenomena that can be studied in isolation from
one another.
This strategy has proved remarkably effective when it comes to the cognitive
modelling of extra-categorical associations. A number of compelling and detailed
models of the analogy process exist, and there is widespread agreement amongst
researchers studying analogy as to what the key cognitive processes that determine
analogies are. However, these models of analogy tend to assume some kind of fully
specified category processing module which governs and determines ordinary,
straightforward conceptual mappings. Indeed, this assumption is required in order to
talk about analogy and metaphor in the first place: few theorists actually define analogy
and metaphor per se, but all agree that analogical and metaphoric judgements can be
defined in contrast to ordinary categorisation judgements.
Whilst analogy has proven to be a cognitive science success story (Forbus, Gentner,
Markman and Fergusson, 1998, argue that analogy is one of the cognitive science
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success stories), the same cannot be said for categorisation research. The history of
categorisation modelling is one of false dawns and set backs. At present, there is
much agreement amongst researchers about how categorisation shouldn't be modelled,
and none about how it should.
In this thesis, I shall argue that these differing histories are not unrelated; rather, there
is a deep connection between the two. I shall argue that appearances have enabled
analogy research to benefit from ignoring the problems involved in providing a
'straight' account of categorisation, whereas research into 'straight' categorisation has
been unable to ignore the endless flexibility and plasticity of human conceptual
abilities, of which analogy and metaphor are prime examples. The contention of this
thesis is that analogy research has gone as far as it can on the unjustified - and I shall
argue, unjustifiable - assumption that it is a distinct, separable process from
categorisation. I shall argue that this distinction is based upon appearances, and that it
cannot withstand detailed scientific scrutiny. Further, I shall argue that removing this
distinction can allow progress made in studying analogy in isolation to inform the real
question: that of explaining the processes that underpin all human conceptualisation,
analogy, metaphor, and categorisation.
1.2 The Approach Taken
1.2.1 Cognitive Models
The central concern of this thesis is, then, mental representation, and the processes that
interact with mental representations in human conceptualisation. The goal of research
in this area is a working cognitive model of these conceptual process, thus it seems
reasonable, at the outset, to outline a theoretical framework in which such a model can
be situated and evaluated.
To take the problem of existing theories first: given that the theories and models
discussed in this thesis are strongly computational, it follows from this that a key
methodological component of the modelling process is that ideally any theory
produced should be in some way amenable to computer implementation. The desire of
researchers in this area is to articulate a psychologically plausible cognitive theory of
conceptualisation that can be implemented as a model within a computer, and to show
that this resultant model adequately demonstrates the theory.
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As Johnson-Laird (1983) notes in respect to this ambition, like clocks, cognitive
models need neither be wholly accurate nor correspond completely with the
phenomena they seek to model to be useful. What is important, at the level of
description at which they are proposed, is that models capture, in an appropriate way,
the essence of whatever particular aspect of conceptualisation they seek to model. That
is, the model should possess a 'relational structure' that corresponds to that of the
particular aspect of the phenomenon modelled - at a similar level of description - such
that the behaviour of humans carrying out that aspect of cognition is appropriately
mimicked by the model. So, for instance, it might be that if we are modelling a
particular aspect of conceptualisation, what is important is that our model capture the
process that underpins the part of conceptualisation we are interested in, rather than
being some kind of replication of conceptualisation per se. Models will tend to only
embody essential or interesting features of whatever it is they are meant to represent.
As Goodman (1976) notes,
"scientists and philosophers... have been forced to fret at some length
about the nature and function of models. Few terms are used in popular
scientific discourse more promiscuously than 'model'. A model is
something to be admired or emulated, a pattern, a case in point, a
prototype, a specimen, a mock up, a mathematical description - almost
anything from a naked blonde to a quadratic equation - and may bear to
what it models almost any relation of symbolization."
Goodman (1976, p 171)
There is a gap between our ordinary and our pre-theoretical treatment of 'models' and
'modelling.' My claim here, which owes much to Johnson-Laird (1983) is that in
trying to understand a given phenomenon, humans construct some kind of internal
model of it, and that their theories are attempts to express - in language - these
'theoretical models'.
One problem with this introspective, internalistic method of understanding is that many
of the workings of our theoretical models may rely on assumptions or intuitions that
we cannot fully externalise or explain (this point is especially acute in theorising about
conceptualisation, as will be discussed further in Chapter 3). In the following review,
a functional, rather pragmatic approach to this problem will be adopted: to at least close
this 'intuition-gap' it will be assumed that theories ought to be describable in terms of
an effective procedure, i.e. they should be described in terms of a step-by-step process
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that could be implemented in (and carried out by) some processor. If a theory is so
described, then any reliance on intuitionistic or magical steps can be exposed or
avoided; intuitive, magical steps will not be amenable to being performed by the
processor as prescribed.
1.2.2 Cognition And Computation
Effective procedures, then, should specify how some function is to be carried out at an
appropriate level of description. This in turn relies on a key assumption underlying the
models described here (and indeed, of cognitive science in general), namely that the
mind, and by extension, cognition, is in some way computational in nature; that
cognitive functions are computational functions.
As Lee (1987) observes, this use of computation is not intended to be seen as some
useful model of cognition (as if there were some helpful analogy to be drawn between
the two), but rather the general claim in cognitive science is that "cognition literally is
computation - in some sense" (Lee, 1987, p. 35). On this view, mental activity is
(and mental functions are) regarded as computational, as the execution of algorithms.
Thus the construction of cognitive models (which attempt to illustrate or explain some
aspect of cognitive activity) will in effect entail the specification of an appropriate
algorithm or program (I assume here that an algorithm provides an effective procedure
for a computational function). In keeping with the majority of work discussed herein,
this is the approach that has been adopted in this thesis.
1.2.3 Computation And Cognition
There are a number of methods for evaluating models proposed within this paradigm.
In the evaluative framework described by Keane, Ledgeway and Duff (1994), separate
evaluative levels are advocated for the evaluation of theories and models. Firstly, the
'informational constraints' proposed by a theory are distinguished. Effectively, these
are the theory's functions. In, for example, analogy, this corresponds to the level at
which analogy is characterised, describing what needs to be computed to produce the
appropriate output given certain inputs, i.e. such and such a correspondence should
be found in, say, the analogy between the solar-system and an atom.
These informational constraints are considered separately from constraints at the
"algorithmic" or "behaviouraF' level, which are specifically concerned with comparing
the performance of given algorithms that implement informational constraints. This
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framework holds that algorithms can be compared with one another, or with the
observed behaviour of people in a given task, in order to reduce the number of
potential algorithms for a given function (or set of functions); i.e. behaviour
constraints can be used to reduce the set of possible programs that could be produced
to satisfy the informational constraints.
An example of a behavioural constraint that one might use to evaluate an algorithm for
analogy is the consideration of working memory limitations. According to behavioural
constraints, human working memory can easily become overloaded. Thus algorithms
that reduce - or do not at least propose excessive - processing load should be preferred
over those that do propose excessive processing load, even though the latter might
satisfy informational constraints as well as the former.
Whilst the adoption of considerations such as behavioural constraints can provide a
pragmatic method for evaluating candidate algorithms, it should be borne in mind that
the statement that 'cognition is computation' does not entail a direct identity relation
between natural and artificial computation. Identity statements regarding the way that
an algorithm is implemented in the mind versus the way the way it can be coded in a
computer are invariably speculative, owing to massive differences in the media of
implementation. Moreover, the need for some caution here is best illustrated by the
fact that even behavioural constraints can only be expressed in informational terms.
For example, Keane, Ledgeway and Duff (1994) specify working-memory constraints
and the influence of background knowledge as behavioural constraints on analogical
mapping models. However, they can only specify the criteria for these constraints in
informational - functional - terms.
This is a standard problem in theorising about mental processes. There is very little
established theoretical bed-rock on which further theories can be based. The very
nature of cognition seems to result in a scenario where the algorithms for implementing
one set of informational constraints are evaluated against another set of informational
constraints, whose algorithms remain, in turn, unspecified and unanalysed.
I do not, however, wish to argue here that the consideration of behavioural constraints
is not worthwhile. It may be right that when a number of algorithms are specified for
the same process, those with fewer processing demands should be preferred to those
which make a massively heavy load on a processor. However such considerations
seem ultimately to depend a lot on intuition. Moreover, in cognitive modelling, it is
rare that theories tally sufficiently at the informational level to enable a final
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differentiation at the behavioural level. Given this, and the inherently functional nature
of the paradigm - cognitive psychology - that provides the data for the specification of
cognitive models, it would appear that the most important level of comparison between
theories is at the informational level. What do the theories propose, and how well
does this fit the functional requirements of the evidence?
The approach adopted herein is that it is only once theories and models have been
analysed at this level, and it is clear that two or more proposals are informationally
equivalent, that the further levels of analysis proposed by Keane, Ledgeway and Duff
(1994) should come into play.
Thus the approach adopted here is that ultimately, theories and models must be judged
on the adequacy of the explanations they provide, at the level of description
appropriate to the phenomenon under consideration. According to this view, a good
theory and its corresponding model should:
• lay down explicit constraints on the scope of a given phenomenon;
• detail the interactions of the mental process described with other processes;
• define its operations; and
• be consistent with the available empirical data.
It is these basic criteria that will form the basis for much of the evaluation in this
thesis.
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1.3 Thesis Outline
As stated above, this thesis begins with a consideration of analogy (Chapter 2), since
analogy is the most successfully modelled of the areas of conceptualisation explored in
this thesis. Chapter 2 examines the way analogy has been characterised in cognitive
science research, and then details the two main theories of analogical recall and
mapping in the literature. The workings of these models, and the main differences
between them are laid out and explored. A consensus emerges from this review
concerning the crucial role that similarities at a structural level between match items
play in analogy.
The chapter then attempts to make explicit the critical conceptual assumptions that
underpin all theories of analogy (and metaphor). Chapter 2 shows how analogy is
widely defined in contrast to straightforward conceptual categorisation, and how all
models of analogy rely upon reference to externally defined conceptual categories in
their operations.
Chapters 3 and 4 explore theoretically these basic assumptions about the distinction
between analogy and categorisation. In Chapter 3, I present a rigorous re-analysis of
the theory of concepts attributed to Wittgenstein (1953). Wittgenstein's philosophical
treatment of concepts has long been held to be foundational in the field, even though
no detailed account of his actual views has been hitherto available.
The theoretical picture of concepts that emerges from a detailed reading of
Wittgenstein's arguments is much at variance with the view of concepts and categories
that has held sway in cognitive science research over the past 30 or so years. Chapter
4 presents a detailed review of the results of this research, and shows that despite this
variance, Wittgenstein's account is compatible and consistent with these results.
Furthermore, this chapter shows how the theoretical framework established by
Wittgenstein can provide the theoretical glue required to make sense of the mass of
data that has emerged from work in this area.
A particular picture of concepts and categories emerges from Chapters 3 and 4. This
picture seems incompatible with the kind of account needed to validate a contrast
definition of analogy. However, Chapter 2 shows that such a picture is essential to
current characterisations of analogy in cognitive science. Furthermore, the review in
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Chapter 4 shows how similarities at a structural level seem to play a key role in
categorisation. In Chapter 5,1 explore empirically the idea that seems to follow from
this: that from the point of view of cognitive processes, the distinction between
categorisation and analogy may be an artificial one. Three studies are presented in
Chapter 5 which in various ways probe the distinction by presenting participants with
materials usually used in analogy research to carry out categorisation tasks. The
results of these experiments provide some support for the 'no distinction' hypothesis.
Chapter 6 presents a re-evaluation of the theories of analogy examined in Chapter 2 in
the light of the evidence from Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Particular attention is paid to the
analogical theories' external appeals to conceptual categories: if analogy and
categorisation are the same process, then can such appeals be made? Two studies are
presented that explore this question, and their results provide further support for a 'one
process' account of analogy and categorisation. These results appear to show that in
analogy, semantics can be mapped by use of a further, parallel analogical process,
rather then by a substantively different process.
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the research presented, summarises what has been
achieved, and attempts to illustrate both the limitations of the presented work, and
future avenues that should be explored. The implications of the 'no distinction'
hypothesis for models of human conceptualisation are discussed.
CHAPTER 2 - COGNITIVE MODELS OF ANALOGY
Chapter 2
Cognitive Models of Analogy
"There is no word which is used more loosely, or in a
greater variety ofsenses, than Analogy" (Mill, 1882, p. 393)
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I present a review of the two foremost cognitive theories (and models)
of analogy, Gentner's 'Structure Mapping' theory (Gentner 1983; 1989) and Holyoak
and Thagard's 'Multi-Constraint' theory (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995). Many other
theories and models of analogy exist in the literature (e.g. Indurkhya, 1987; 1992;
Keane, Ledgeway and Duff, 1994; Hofstadter, 1995), however, the two theories that
are the expository focus of this review are the most thoroughly developed, widely
disseminated and closely related to a corresponding programme of empirical cognitive
investigation of those that have been proposed.
To ensure that these two theory and model pairings can be clearly contrasted and
analysed, some sacrifice has had to be made concerning the breadth of this survey in
relation to its depth. This sacrifice has been made necessary as much of the later work
described in this thesis is based upon the findings of studies reviewed in this chapter,
and it has been necessary, therefore, to describe these studies in some detail.
However, in order to best offset any possible deficiencies that this lack of breadth may
result in, other theories will be discussed and described where they further illustrate
points of contrast between Gentner's 'Structure Mapping' theory and Holyoak and
Thagard's 'Multi-Constraint' theory.
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2.2 What Is Analogy?
Analogy is much discussed and analysed in the cognitive science literature; what is
meant by analogy is, however, rarely - if ever - stated. For example, Hoffman
(1995), despite his stated aim to 'deconstruct, and then reconstruct, the concept of
analogy' (p. 11), never actually offers a definition of what he means by 'analogy'. In
this section, I shall review some of the characterisations of analogy given in the
literature, and attempt to form a working definition of analogy.
Typically, characterisations of analogy are couched in terms of inferences and
domains: Spellman and Holyoak (1996, p. 308) say, "analogical reasoning typically
involves using a comparatively well-understood source domain as the basis for
drawing inferences about a less well-understood target domain." Markman (1997, p.
373) largely concurs, describing analogy as "a powerful cognitive mechanism that
permits two domains to be seen as similar on the basis of connected systems of
relations that hold between them." Similarly, Clement and Gentner (1991, p.89)
argue, "in an analogy, a familiar domain is used to understand a novel domain in order
to highlight important similarities between the domains, or to predict new features of
the novel domain."
All of which rather begs the question of how one defines domain, and the criteria one
uses to decide whether mappings are inter- or intra- domain, since by these lights these
are clearly the key factors that determine whether something is an analogy or not.
Other characterisations of analogy try to be more specific on the point. Gentner and
Gentner (1983) offer a more structured and specific characterisation of analogy. They
argue that an analogical statement such as:
1. The hydrogen atom is like the solar system
clearly doesn't indicate that all of a person's knowledge about the solar system should
be transferred and attributed to the atom. Rather, it indicates that only some aspects of
a person's knowledge should be transferred. Gentner and Gentner observe that whilst
this may suggest that analogy is some kind of 'weak similarity' statement, where only
some characteristics are transferred, such a characterisation would fail to distinguish
between an analogical statement like (1) and literally a similar statement, such as:
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2. There is a system in the Andromeda nebula that is like our solar system.
Gentner and Gentner argue that what is important in distinguishing between analogical
and literal similarity statements is that whilst both convey similarities between two
elements of comparison, the literal similarity statement (2) embodies an intention to
convey similarities between both object and relations in the comparitors, whereas in
the analogical statement (1) there is no intention to convey similarity between objects -
e.g. the atom and the sun - but there is an intention to convey similarities between
relations (e.g. orbital and perhaps other relational information).
Thus Gentner and Gentner distinguish analogical statements from literal similarity
statements by distinguishing between the kinds of similarity the two propose. Taken
in tandem with less precise comments about domains elsewhere, it seems reasonable to
say that the overall picture of the concept of analogy that emerges from the literature is
best summarised by Holyoak and Thagard (1995, p217) who note that analogy and
metaphor "always connects two domains in a way that goes beyond our normal
category structure" (pp 217): literal similarity - or categorical - statements propose
similarities at object and relational levels, whereas analogies propose similarities at the
relational level only. In the light of this, a reasonable working definition might be (to
paraphrase Markman, 1997):
Analogy permits two concepts to be seen as similar on the basis of connected
systems of relations that hold between them.
2.3 Similarity - Based Retrieval
The focus of this thesis is upon analogical reasoning - in particular, analogical
mapping - and its relationship to categorisation. Similarity-based retrieval - the
process by which similarity-based remindings happen - has been included within its
scope because:
• the processes are intimately related: it is in the very nature of two analogous
items that they share some kind of similarity; I shall argue that analogy is a
subset of the broader area of similarity-based transfer;
• especially in the area of explaining how an 'analogous representation' is
accessed from memory in order, say, to further some explanation, the two
problems have been treated as overlapping in the literature.
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However, it should be noted that this thesis deals with similarity based transfer only in
so far as treatments of the subject directly illuminate theories and models of analogical
reasoning.
2.4 Rule Induction
Some treatments of analogy in the literature have tended to confine themselves to the
very simple problem of the "A is to B is to C as L is to M is to ?" variety: the induction
of a single rule from one set of cases and the application of it in another (often termed
derivational analogy. Sternberg, 1977; Rumelhart and Abrahamson, 1973; Mitchell
and Hofstadter, 1989; Mitchell, 1993, Hofstadter, 1995). These examples, by
limiting mapping to one clear relation, give little insight into how people interpret
complicated explanatory analogies, which yield a number of potential mappings. I
shall argue later in this thesis that this form of analogy is a particularly poor basis for
the study of analogical mechanisms. This applies particularly to the central concern of
this thesis: the relationship between analogy and categorisation in cognition.
Derivational analogies make especially heavy assumptions about the content and nature
of the conceptual representations that underpin individual elements within them: in
particular, about the way A, B, C, L and M must be represented in order to infer
anything about ? in "A is to B is to C as L is to M is to
Models resulting from such theories have little or nothing principled to say about the
kinds of constraints that act upon the selection of any particular set1 of mappings
which leads to their accounts of analogy being seriously incomplete (this question will
be further discussed and illustrated later in this thesis).
Since this study is concerned with high-level analogical mechanisms - the imprecise,
but meaningful relationships that can exist between complex structures - rather than
1 Hoffman (1995) refers to the "semantic flexibility" of such analogies. This semantic flexibility
results in their representations being dependent on what their constituent words are interpreted to
mean. And these meanings are massively unconstrained in derivational analogies, with words
occurring individually, in no particular context. Take for example fridge : food :: pocket : ?? - if we
assume the hidden rule is 'contains', then ?? might be anything one might plausibly find in a pocket,
such as 'handkerchief. However, suppose we remember the idiomatic expression 'cold cash'. We
might then assume ?? is cash, and the rule is 'keeps cool', and hence reject 'handkerchief (see
Hoffman, 1995, for many more illustrations of the endless ambiguities inherent in derivational
analogies).
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simple low-level rule inductions, this review will deal only with those theories that
attempt to provide explanations for high-level analogies. However, it should be noted
that whilst models of high-level analogical reasoning can also be applied to rule
inductions (Burns and Holyoak, 1994), existing models of rule-inductions have not
been shown to be capable of simulating high-level analogical reasoning.
2.5 Analogical Reasoning
It is widely accepted that analogy is a central cognitive process. The use of existing
information in order to explain novel concepts or generate new ideas occurs with great
frequency over many levels of cognitive activity, from the metaphors of everyday
speech to the classification of visual perceptions (in a classic 'Peanuts' cartoon Charlie
Brown asks Schroeder what he can see in the clouds - Schroeder's rather sophisticated
response - "Bucephalus?" - causes Charlie Brown to reject mentally the ideas he had
formulated, 'ducky' and 'horsey').
The problem of analogy can be broken down into a number of basic sub-processes :
• Accessing: i.e. the problem, mentioned above, of explaining how an analogy
is accessed from memory. How is it that the stored understanding of two
analogous processes in memory- say the workings of the solar system and the
hydrogen atom - enable us to select one as illustrative of the other?
• Mapping: how does the person to whom the analog has been presented map
their prior knowledge of the solar system onto their, perhaps somewhat hazy,
knowledge of the hydrogen atom in order to gain a firmer understanding? What
common properties must be mapped between two domains for them to be
considered analogous?
• Inference: following on, what properties and relationships in the solar system
can be inferred as also pertaining to the atom? Which inferences are valid, and
which invalid, and why?
Other sub-processes can include: the representation of initial start states or problems -
the way that an individual represents a problem can affect the success or otherwise of
subsequent analogising (Clement, 1988; Novick, 1988); adaptation of base analogies
(changing the problem representation to explore different analogies, Keane, 1994);
subsequent learning (including schema induction, Gick and Holyoak, 1983); and
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verification. The latter, verification is often considered to be a separate sub-process of
analogy. However, since it would appear that some element of verification is an
essential part of any psychological sub-process it will be considered wherever
appropriate. Moreover, it would appear that verification - as an analogical process -
can easily be given too much prominence: an over-concentration on what counts as the
right analogical transfer can lead to a tendency to demand a spurious kind of precision:
foo is an analog of bah, and any model must always make the right transference from
foo to bah, regardless of how foo and bah are represented. Analogical mapping is
necessarily contingent upon representations, and hence any description of analogy is a
description of a contingent process. Losing sight of this, and demanding a spurious
precision from a psychological theory or a computational model, can lead to features
that are inherent within the analogical process being seen as problems when they
appear in models and explanations of it. The relative imprecision of the analogical
reasoning process is an important aspect of its nature, and any explanation of the
process of analogy must capture the nature of these problems.
In this review chapter I shall concentrate on two of these analogical sub-processes,
mapping and retrieval. These have received most attention in the literature, and are
generally seen as the core of the analogy process. Moreover, as I hope to show later
in this thesis, the specification of these processes, and especially that of mapping, has
wide reaching implications for the way analogy, and hence other proposed sub-
processes, are seen in relation to wider cognitive processes.
2.6 Analogical Mapping
2.6.1 Gentner's Structure Mapping Theory
Gentner (Gentner, 1983; Gentner and Gentner, 1983) proposed the Structure Mapping
Theory as an attempt to explain how it is that two domains can be considered
analogous, and in particular how it is that correspondences between analogs2 from two
domains can be mapped.
2 For the current discussion, I shall use "analogs" to refer to items from separate domains that are
perceived to be analogous. The theoretical basis for this 'definition', and its sustainability in the light
of a theoretical and empirical evaluation, will be considered in chapters 3 and 4.
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Structure mapping proposes that the mapping and inference between two domains can
be achieved by assigning correspondences between objects and attributes and then
mapping predicates with identical names. In order to do this, Gentner assumes a
predicate like representation (figure 2.1), distinguishing between objects, object-
attributes and relations.
• Object-attributes are those predicates that have one argument and describe
object properties, e.g. RED(lobster).
• Relations are divided into a hierarchy of orders. Relations between objects,
e.g. UPSETS(stomach,lobster) form the lowest order of relations. Predicates
which describe different levels of relationships between relations e.g. CAUSE(
UPSETS (stomach, lobster), DRINKS (alka-seltzer,diner)) then form the higher
orders, with each higher order of predication implying a greater















Figure 2.1: Predicate representations of the solar system and a hydrogen atom
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The theory itself comprises two parts: mapping rules, and the systematicity principle.
Mapping rules state that:
• attributes of objects are not mapped
• relations between objects are preserved
Whilst the systematicity principle requires that:
• complex higher order relations (e.g. CAUSE above) are mapped preferentially
followed by relations that constitute the higher order arguments.
This latter theoretical constraint is intended to capture the notion that analogy conveys a
system of connected knowledge, rather than an assortment of independent facts:
"structure mapping stems in part from the observation that useful
analogies, such as those used in science or education, involve rich,
interconstraining systems of mappings between two domains, rather than a
set of independent correspondences"
(Clement and Gentner, 1991, pp 91-2)
Finally, as a background assumption, the theory embraces the idea of 'canonical
conceptual representation.' As a result of this assumption, only predicates with
identical names are mapped onto one another, with the assumption that non-identical
but conceptually similar predicates will be matched elsewhere according to established
conceptual higherarchies. Gentner et al (Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus, 1993;
Forbus, Gentner and Law, 1995) describe the canonical conceptual representation
assumption thus:
'SME's constraint of matching identical predicates assumes canonical
conceptual representations, not lexical strings. Two concepts that are
similar but not identical (such as "bestow" and "bequeath") are assumed to
be decomposed into a canonical representation language so that their
similarity is expressed as a partial identity (... "give")'
(Gentner Ratterman and Forbus, 1993).
In practice, this identicality constraint is effectively a third mapping rule: structure
mapping theory insists that mappings only occur between predicates of the same name.
Thus the question of whether, say ORBITS and REVOLVES_AROUND are matching
predicates is settled outside of the theoretical parameters of structure mapping theory.
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Gentner et al assume that the match between ORBITS and REVOLVES_AROUND is
settled by these canonical conceptual representations, and thus the mechanisms by
which they are matched can be assumed - i.e. the existence of an appropriate
mechanism is taken as a background assumption - by both their theory and model.
The psychological plausibility of the structure mapping theory was tested in Gentner
and Gentner (1983) by comparing the performance of test participants in the domain of
simple electric circuits when taught using one of two different analogies.
The first of these was the analogy between electricity and circuits and water and
hydraulic systems. It was posited that this would best enable students to predict the
behaviour of circuits with two batteries in series or parallel, rather than those with
varying resistor combinations, since the relationship between batteries and hydraulic
reservoirs has more correspondence than that between water flow through restricted
pipes and electrical resistors.
The second analogy compared electricity to crowds of people moving through
passages. In this case, the correspondence between resistors and narrow passageways
is strong, whereas there is less correspondence in relating a battery voltage by how
hard people push, thus it was expected that this analogy would present problems in
enabling the prediction of the consequences of battery combination.
Gentner and Gentner's experiments backed up the structure mapping hypotheses - a
higher proportion of correct answers to battery combination questions were observed
in participants taught using the hydraulic model, and a corresponding higher
proportion of correct answers to resistor combination questions were obtained by
participants taught using the teeming crowds analogy.
On the whole, these early experiments lent some credence to the notion that the
structure of a base analogy can affect the structure of a corresponding mental model
when used in teaching, though these experiments were not sufficiently sensitive to
really test the principle underlying the structure mapping theory.
One drawback of these early experiments is that they are open to the criticism that they
use too arbitrary a representation (Carrol and Mack, 1985). The primitives used in the
examples are chosen selectively, and the inclusion of a larger range of domain relations
would result in the matches appearing far less sound than they do. For example, it is
claimed that Gentner can give no account as to why HOTTER_THAN in figure 2.1
should not be mapped onto the atom representation. Holyoak (1985) argues that
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expanding the representation in order to utilise the systematicity principle will be of
little help, since on another expansion the relation HOTTER_THAN will form part of a
higher order system (involving the warming of planets, conditions for the existence of
life, etc.). However, as Gentner (1997) observes, this argument largely misses the
point: structure mapping explains why HOTTER_THAN is not mapped given these
representations. It might well be that provided with representations expanded in the
way that Holyoak proposes, HOTTER_THAN would be mapped, and different
inferences would be supported - that would all depend on those representations, and
what mappings resulted from their comparison. Given the intimate relationship
between analogy and the way an intended analog is represented, this is not surprising.
Holyoak claims that his general objections are indicative of a serious problem. If a
theory (or model) uses no goal or domain information, and relies purely on structural
inferences to explain analogy, he claims it will have trouble when, given a number of
networks of higher-order relations between domains (i.e. several causal networks),
giving an account as to why one particular set of mappings was selected for, and
considered relevant to, making the analogy.
2.6.2 Holyoak And Thagard's 'Multi-Constraint' Theory
Of Analogical Transfer
Holyoak and Thagard's theory (Holyoak, 1985; Holyoak and Thagard, 1989; Thagard
et al, 1990; Holyoak and Thagard, 1996) attempts to bring these broader
considerations into a theory of analogy (though it should be noted that it is concerned
primarily with problem solving). To some extent this theory has been developed in
competition with Gentner's structure mapping theory. It attempts to capture the
intuition held by some researchers that goals play some part in the analogical process,
particularly in mapping (Gentner's theory precludes any such influence). The scope
and ambition of this theory has changed considerably over time: what is presented here
is a sketch of its latter incarnation.
Holyoak advocates an explanation of analogy in terms of a goal-driven processing
system, and that mappings be controlled by the system's goals:
"Within the pragmatic framework, the structure of analogy is closely tied to
the mechanisms by which analogies are actually used by the cognitive
system to achieve its goals." (Holyoak, 1985, p76).
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Holyoak and Thagard see the analogical mapping problem as one of explaining how
the large number of possible mappings between domains can be evaluated and a subset
of these used for the transfer of information between domains.
They suggest that this subset emerges from an attempt to balance the different
influences upon the mapping process. More specifically they regard the process as an
attempt to simultaneously satisfy several constraints (described in full below). The











Logical compatibility ensures that mappings are only considered if they are between
entities of the same "type". Thus, in the solar-system / hydrogen atom analogy the
predicate MORE_MASSIVE_THAN cannot be matched with the object electron.
Similarly, a mapping between the predicates HOT and REVOLVES_AROUND will
not be considered as they take different numbers of arguments. This primarily
syntactic constraint is intended to ensure that mappings between different levels of
description are not attempted. For example single-argument predicates, such as HOT,
tend to be purely descriptive, specifying a particular attribute of an object. Multi-
argument predicates describe relationships between objects, and so can be considered
to represent a higher level of description. The argument is that mappings between
different levels of description are not going to be productive and this constraint serves
to eliminate any potential mappings of this kind.
A further hurdle potential mappings must overcome in this model is the role identity
constraint. This assumes that the base and target domains can be divided at a higher
level of description than that at which the mapping takes place. In the use of analogy
in problem solving, upon which the authors focus predominantly, this means the
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domains may be redescribed in terms of a start state, the problem goals, and the
operators that can be used to try and achieve these goals. Role identity then limits
mapping to relations and objects that appear in the same part of the domain definition.
This provides a weak pragmatic influence in that elements can only be considered for
mapping if they play a similar role in both domains. These constraints are intended to
limit the number of potential mappings that are considered in the evaluation phase,
which utilises the next set of constraints.
Holyoak and Thagard assume that each element in the base domain will map onto one
and only one element in the target domain, and vice versa. Thus there will be
competition between members of the set of potential mappings between one base
element and a number of possible target elements, i.e. ifHOTTER_THAN in the base
maps onto HOTTER_THAN in the target then it cannot map onto
LESS_MASSIVE_THAN in the target. Hence any factor which serves to increase the
level of support for one particular mapping will consequently act to decrease support
for all the others.
Relational consistency acts to ensure that any mappings between the base and target
domains must be consistent. Thus if mappings between structural elements receive
support, mappings between the structures themselves, and any other elements, are also
supported. For example support for the mapping between sun and nucleus applies to
the mapping between the higher order relations MORE_MASSIVE_THAN in the base
and target as well; correspondingly the mapping between planet and electron will also
gain support. This corresponds quite closely to Gentner's systematicity principle.
Two possible influences upon the mapping process rely on information other than that
found in the basic domain representations. These are the pragmatic and semantic
constraints:
2.6.2.2 Pragmatic Constraints
The importance of an element (object or relation), whether in the base or target
domain, is another consideration in the mapping process. An element's importance is
defined in terms of how useful the element is in satisfying the current goal (or subgoal)
of the "analogiser". Thus any mappings involving these "useful" elements will receive
more support than those involving less useful elements. When our example analogy is
used to explain the relative motion of sub-atomic particles, mappings involving
YELLOW and HOTTER_THAN are going to be less favourably considered than those
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involving REVOLVES_AROUND, since the former are not utilised in satisfying any
explanatory goals. Pragmatic information can come from either the base or target
domains. For example the information that an element is an important constraint on
any potential problem solutions is likely to come from the target domain. Alternatively
information regarding the contribution a particular element can make in actively
producing a solution will come from the base domain in most cases.
A considerable body of evidence has been built up to back the idea that pragmatic
factors have a role to play in analogical reasoning (Spellman and Holyoak, 1992;
1996). However, whilst there is evidence that goals can influence the analogical
reasoning, any evidence that goals affect analogical mapping is far less clear.
Spellman and Holyoak (1996) say of their findings with regards to pragmatic
influences: "it is no doubt possible to develop an account of the present results (or any
other pattern of mappings) in terms of some pre- or post- mapping process" (Spellman
and Holyoak, 1996 p. 343). Such an architecture was described by Gentner (1989)
allowing pragmatic constraints to influence analogical reasoning, but not analogical
mapping. This architecture accommodates the idea that goals and plans will act to
select certain aspects from a particular problem under consideration, and that these will
be used to seed a search of long-term memory for a suitable analog. Once this is
found, it can serve as a base for subsequent mapping with the original target problem.
Any output mappings will then be evaluated against pragmatic goals and plans to
gauge the success or otherwise of the analogy (with the process being iterated if
necessary).
This architecture allows Gentner to let structure mapping theory reflect the pragmatic
factors which have been shown to influence analogy (in terms of problem
representation and output evaluation) whilst preserving a wholly structural account of
mapping.
Keane (1988) makes the observation that an obvious lacuna here is the lack of a
precise statement of the way pragmatic influences work within the proposed cognitive
architecture. However, whilst this is indicative of the want for detail in Gentner's
account and architecture, it is also a wider indicator of the absence of any statement of
an effective procedure for the influence of pragmatics in theories that advocate their
influence. The level of detail in the evidence for pragmatic factors collected so far does
not provide any revealing or specific clues as to the process by which pragmatics
influence analogies. Certainly, this evidence is of the wrong level of description to
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resolve any debate regarding the influence of pragmatics on analogical mapping.
Again, as Spellman and Holyoak (1996) note of their findings with regards to
pragmatic influences: "it is [...] possible to develop an account of the present results
[...] in terms of some pre- or post- mapping process" (Spellman and Holyoak, 1996
p. 343), such as the model proposed by Gentner (1989). Despite this, Spellman and
Holyoak make the claim that "the obtained pattern [from their study] can be explained
parsimoniously in terms of an inhibitory mechanism for control of selective attention,
which influences a process of mapping by constraint satisfaction" (Spellman and
Holyoak, 1996 p. 343).
Clearly however, in so far as an effective procedure for the way pragmatics influence
analogical mapping is still wanting, this debate is still very much open; and no such
procedure is forthcoming in the literature describing pragmatic influences on analogy.
The answer to the question of whether pragmatic factors play a part in analogical
mapping seems to be determined at present by the intuitions of whoever is theorising
about them - or at least by their intuitions regarding cognitive parsimony - as indeed
are the details of how this part is played.
2.6.2.3 Semantic Constraints
Holyoak and Thagard suggest that the most useful mappings are likely to come from
elements which are semantically similar. In the solar-system / atomic structure
analogy, predicates with identical names can be regarded as more similar than those
with different names. In more complex examples the method of determining relative
similarity is more difficult.
Holyoak and Thagard (1989) argue that a requirement of strict identity between
corresponding relations - as proposed in structure mapping theory - is unsatisfactory,
since people can readily find mapping between non-identical relations (Holyoak and
Thagard 1989; Burstein, 1986). According to structure mapping theory, only
predicates with identical names are mapped, thus if the planets of the solar-system
were represented as SMALLER_THAN the sun, and electrons as LESS_MASS_THAN a
nucleus, then structure mapping theory would not allow a mapping between the two
relations. On the other hand, whilst multi-constraint theory specifies a preference for
mapping identical relations, it can also capture less direct semantic similarities in order
to model the semantic similarity between SMALLER_THAN and LESS_MASS_THAN.
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Holyoak and Thagard argue that this shows a significant weakness in Gentner's
theory:
"with its emphasis on structure to the exclusion of all other constraints,
[structure mapping theory] does not simply discourage mappings between
non-identical but semantically similar items; it does not even permit them."
(Holyoak and Thagard, 1995, p. 258)
Holyoak and Thagard are, however, vague as to what semantic similarity comprises.
Nor, as with goals above, do they translate evidence that semantic similarity plays a
part in analogical reasoning to an effective procedure for the role of semantics in
analogical mapping. Thus, in multi-constraint theory, the semantic similarity
constraint is regarded more as a heuristic than a firm rule, and can be applied in
differing strengths at various stages of the mapping process.
Holyoak and Thagard make no claim as to any particular model of semantics. They
merely observe that in representations of analogical comparitors, object similarity can
"potentially be reduced to predicate similarity: two objects are similar to the extent that
they serve as arguments of similar predicates. Predicate similarity may in turn be
analysed in terms of feature overlap (Tversky, 1977)" (Holyoak and Thagard, 1989,
p. 301).
2.6.2.4 Discussion
Holyoak and Thagard (1989) reduce the logical compatibility and role identity
constraints to restrictions on the building of the mapping network, and these
restrictions are regarded as less rigid than the constraints of isomorphism (the
uniqueness and relational consistency constraints), and general pragmatics (semantic
similarity and pragmatic centrality). Thus multi-constraint theory largely involves a
computation of structural similarities between two comparitors, since as far as
pragmatic and semantic constraints are concerned, Holyoak and Thagard state, "for the
present purposes [of developing multi-constraint theory into a cognitive model of
analogy] it will simply be assumed that the mapping component can receive a
numerical index of the degree of semantic similarity between two predicates, and of the
pragmatic centrality of elements of the analogs" (Holyoak and Thagard, 1989, p.
306).
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2.6.3 ACME - The Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine
ACME (Holyoak and Thagard, 1989) is a program which models this process as a
constraint satisfaction network. This constraint satisfaction network is used to
evaluate the potential mappings. It comprises nodes which represent mappings, and
links which reflect potential support for these mappings. The logical compatibility and
role identity constraints are used to determine the mapping nodes created, and then the
uniqueness and relational consistency constraints are utilised in order to specify the
links that are made between them.
Thus, in keeping with the logical compatibility constraint, mappings are limited to
predicate - predicate matches, where the predicates are of the same arity, and object -
object mappings. The role identity constraint is implemented by restricting mappings
to those elements in the corresponding parts of the specification, limiting start
conditions to maps with start conditions, and goals to maps with goals, etc.
Each node will exhibit a certain level of activation, the level of which is governed by
the amount of support it is receiving at any given time from neighbouring nodes. Thus
in addition to its mapping information, each node has an activation value which reflects
this support, an output value (which is the same as the activation value when the
former is positive, and zero when it is negative), and a change value, which reflects
the difference between the node's current activation value and its activation value on
the previous cycle (this information is used in determining when the network has
settled).
A node is connected to its neighbours by links, which are either excitatory in situations
where the node is receiving positive support, or inhibitory where support is negative.
The choice of whether links should provide positive or negative support is governed
by the uniqueness and relational consistency constraints. Thus nodes for competing
alternative mappings are connected by inhibitory links, whilst nodes which represent
mappings of elements from the same structure would gain support (since nodes are bi¬
directional, such support will be mutual).
Each link has an associated weight, which can be varied in order to modify the amount
of support it can provide. In the case of excitatory links, this weighting is positive,
whilst for inhibitory links it is negative3.
3To perform an evaluation, the activation values of the mapping nodes are set to a value of 0.1, and
the output value of the semantic and pragmatic nodes is set to 1. The activation value of each node is





Figure 2.2: A Problem for the Early ACME (from Holyoak and Thagard, 1989, p 311).
However, in order to overcome some difficulties encountered using the earlier version
Holyoak and Thagard (1989) added a new component, propositional identifiers. The
mappings and links created in the above fashion encounter difficulties when they are
used in circumstances like those illustrated in figure 2.2. If the evidence provides high
activation to the object mapping units a-x and b=y, then intuitively this should suffice
to establish that predicate D maps to M. However, in ACME the D=N argument will
receive more support because the D=N mapping node will receive support from both
N(x,z) and N(w,y), since final evaluation depends upon possible proposition
correspondences.
To avoid this undesirable outcome in later versions of ACME (Holyoak and Thagard,
1989) propositions are labelled with identifiers, and proposition mapping-units have
been introduced, which have excitatory connections to both the corresponding
then calculated according to the formula
new = current * (1-decay) + enet (max - current) + inet (current - min)
where
new = new activation value
current = current activation value
decay = constant defining the rate at which the activation of a node will decrease with no input
enet = sum of all excitory inputs on the node
inet = sum of all inhibitory inputs to the node
{net = X o, * wIt o2* w2, on* w„, where o = output and w = weight on each link to the node)
max = maximum permitted activation value
min = minimum activation value
The calculations for each node are repeated until the network has settled (either because the change
value of each node has fallen below a threshold, or a predetermined number of cycles have been
performed).
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predicate-mapping units and the object-mapping units. Thus, in the example in figure
2.2, links between the proposition identifiers T1 and Sn are created, which results in
the mappings T1=S2 and T1=S3 becoming competing mappings: thus the link
between them will be inhibitory, with the result that T1=S1 will be the favoured
mapping.
It is worth noting here that, regardless of the intentions of Holyoak and Thagard, the
addition of propositional identifiers further strengthens the dominating influence of
structure in the ACME mapping process (White and Bma, 1990).
2.6.4 Evaluating ACME
The first obvious criticism of Holyoak and Thagard's model is that it is limited in
scope. It only applies to situations in which an analogy is used within the context of
some pre-existing goal that provides the analogiser with an idea of the kinds of
inferences and matches that need to be made. A common use for analogy is in learning
and teaching, and in this context it is difficult to give a satisfactory account of how
goals can influence particular mappings. Indeed, the selection problem re-emerges. If
an analogy offers two potential sets of mappings and inferences, a goal based upon a
desire to understand will not provide the analogiser with any grounds for choosing one
set of mappings over another (this point will be further examined below).
A second cause for concern is the dominating role played by structural considerations
in ACME. If Holyoak and Thagard are right in their assertions that pragmatic and
semantic factors are necessary to analogical mapping, then the unsatisfactory
implementation of these factors in ACME (an arbitrary weighting that has little real
significance on the settling of the network, White and Brna, 1990) must undermine
support for the system. Moreover, the inadequacy of Holyoak and Thagard's
description of the way these factors influence the mapping process - in neither case are
these constraints given a theoretical description that could be realised in terms of an
effective procedure - provides little indication of how this implementation might be
improved.
However, Holyoak and Thagard claim - and their simulation results confirm - that
ACME has provided psychologically plausible results in the course of analogical
experiments (Holyoak and Thagard, 1989; 1995). This leads to a quandary: whilst
Holyoak and Thagard's theory stresses semantic and pragmatic factors, their
implementation ultimately utilises structural information in determining mappings. If
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their theory is right, then their implemented model is inadequate; on the other hand,
given that their model provides psychologically plausible output, the weight of
evidence suggests that their theory over-stresses the importance of pragmatic and
semantic factors.
This leads to a further problem. The inclusion of pragmatic and semantic factors in
Holyoak and Thagard's model was partly prompted by a desire to avoid the problems
encountered by Gentner's structure mapping theory: the over-reliance upon
representation, and the fact that structural considerations alone give one no basis for
choosing between two equally structurally viable interpretations of an analog.
However, Holyoak and Thagard's model is ultimately structural. Its implementation,
ACME - the model is the most formal statement of the theory - ultimately relies on
structural factors in determining mappings. Thus it should be noted that to a large
extent, these criticisms apply as equally to Holyoak and Thagard's model of analogical
mapping as they do to Gentner's.
2.7 Relational Structure And The Selection Of
Mappings
If analogy is characterised as being a process whereby a partial similarity match is
made between certain common features of different domains, then there must be an
account of the factors that influence the deciding of which commonalities are mapped
and which are disregarded. To take the plumbing/electricity example, a number of
relations could be mapped: both are distributed in networks from central supply
companies (all of which are newly privatised natural monopolies...). Both can be
used in cooking; degree of pressure determines flow rate, etc. What account can be
given for people's observable fluency in performing the correct analogical mappings?
This then is the selection problem: given that two domains might have a number of
causal networks in common, each available for mapping, how is the appropriate
analog structure selected?
Clement andGentner (1991) sought to add further support to the claim that relational
structure is, in fact, the key selection constraint in analogical mapping. The value of a
given match depends not only upon the component match itself, but on other matches
to which it is connected; the systematicity principle.















Figure 2.3: More and less analogous elements within two representations
According to the theory (restated in Clement and Gentner, 1991), the attributes of the
objects of the first analog in figure 2.3 are not mapped, whilst the relations UPSETS
and DRINKS are mapped preferentially because they play a part in the higher order
relation CAUSE. The support for the mapping of LIVES_UNDER receives less
support (despite the fact that our cricket fan might wish his team to go live under a
rock) since it does not play a part in any higher order relation.
Clement and Gentner argue that systematicity does in fact provide an account of
selection. To back up this position, they point to studies such as that by Holyoak and
Koh (1987), which varied the degree of structural correspondence between analogous
problems and, consistent with the systematicity principle, they found that when the
4 It is interesting to note that intuitively, the efficacy of this analogy does not appear to alter if
DRINKS(alka_selzer,diner) is changed to EATS(alka_selzer,diner), or even perhaps
SEEKS(alka_selzer,diner). This does, at surface level at least, seem to illustrate the divergence
between semantic and structural factors in analogical mappings that Holyoak and Thagard argue for.
Whether this insight should be carried through at a theoretical level will be discussed at greater length
below.
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causal networks describing the source and target problems differed, participants were
less likely to transfer the solution from source to target.
Base: The Tams Target: The Robots
Version 1 Version 2
Consume minerals with
underbellies
Gather data with probes Gather data with probes
Exhaust minerals in
one spot and must
relocate on the rock
Exhaust data in one
place and must relocate
on the planet
Internal computers
overheat when gather a lot
of data










Robots cannot pack probes






function on new rock
So probes can't function on
new planet
So probes can't function
on new planet
Note. Key facts are shown in italics. Matching causal information is shown in boldface. In
experiment 2, italicised facts were removedfrom the target.
Figure 2.4: Relational structures of the base domain (the Tarns) and the target domain (the Robots).
From Clement and Gentner (1991). It should be noted that in the actual experiments, efforts were
made to avoid the extensive surface similarities in sentence structure that are included here in order to
aid comprehensibility.
This evidence suggests that the criticisms voiced by Carrol and Mack (1985) - that the
elements used in representations in structure mapping theory are incorporated too
selectively - might in fact apply equally to the way people perform analogical
transference as to the way it is represented in the structure mapping model, and as such
this might actually lend weight to the psychological plausibility of the theory, rather
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than detract from it. The evidence suggests that in order for people to perform
analogies, it is important for them to be presented with a base that is properly
represented. The solar-system / atom analogy would break down if someone using it
to teach Rutherford's model of the atom chose to concentrate on inappropriate details
in the base (the heat of the sun, the size of the planets, their colours, etc.) to the
exclusion of relational details. If the appropriate relations were glossed over, or others
emphasised, then the analogy would not work. Put simply, structure mapping theory
utilises selective representations in explaining analogy because people use selective
representations in performing analogies.
In order to further test the claim that systematicity can act as a selection filter during
analogical transference, Clement and Gentner performed three experiments that looked
separately at two of the components of analogical mapping:
• matching existing information in the base and target, and
• inferring new information about the target that follows from the analogy with
the base domain.
The first tested whether systematicity constrains the matching process. A novel set of
analogies were created. Each consisted of a base and a target passage describing
objects or organisms on fictional planets. Each passage contained two main
paragraphs, one describing a causal structure that matched between base and target,
and one that did not match. Participants could choose which of two facts (lower-order
relations) to map from base to target domain. In all cases, both facts were equally
acceptable as independent matches. However, facts varied as to whether they were
part of a shared causal network (relational structure). It was suggested that if
systematicity plays a part in the matching process, then participants would show a
corresponding preference for those matches that are embedded within a matching
causal system rather than those where causal systems are unconnected.
The base of one analogy involved creatures called Tams who live on a distant planet.
Encyclopaedia-like passages were given to participants, the essential elements of
which were:
Paragraph 1: The Tams live on rock and can grind and consume minerals
from the rock through the constant action of their underbelly. However,
periodically they run out of minerals in one spot on the rock and must
relocate. At this time they stop using their underbellies.
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Paragraph 2: Although at birth the Tarns have rather inefficient
underbellies, eventually the underbellies adapt and develop a texture that is
specially suited to the rock the Tam lives on. As a consequence, a grown
Tarn's underbelly cannot function on new rock.
So each paragraph has a key fact and a causal antecedent. The key facts in this domain
are:
1. The Tams sometimes stop using their underbellies
2. The Tarns' underbellies cannot function on new rock.
The analogous domain was called "The Robots", and described robots who used
probes to gather data from planets. Figure 2.4 gives an outline of both domains. The
left column shows the two causal structures of the base, with each key fact shown in
italics, and the causal antecedents shown in boldface. The central column shows
version 1 of the Robot domain which, like the Tam domain contains two causal
structures. The key facts in the target match those in the base:
1. The {Tarns, Robots} sometimes stop using their {underbellies,
probes}
2. The {Tarns', Robots'} {underbellies, probes} cannot function on new
{rocks, planets};
however, although the key facts in the target match those in the base, only the first key
fact is linked to a causal system that is matched by the base domain, which Clement
and Gentner call a shared-system key fact. They predicted that participants would
prefer this shared system fact in mapping to the other key fact, which does not share a
causal antecedent.
The second and third experiments explored the notion of systematicity acting as a
constraint upon inferences carried over from the base domain to the target. Two facts
were present in the base domain that were equally plausible as inferences about the
target, but only one fact was linked to a causal system shared by both the base and the
target. It was expected that participants would not just select any base fact, but would
rather infer a fact that follows from a shared causal network. Experiment 3 differed
from experiment 2 in that the base story was presented before, but not during, the
inferencing tasks, hence participants had to rely on their memory of the base in
choosing their inferences.
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Experimental results supported these predictions. In the first experiment, participants
preferred the matching fact that was embedded within a matching causal system,
whereas the control group, who saw only the target domain showed no preference for
the shared system fact. Clement and Gentner claim that this is evidence that the
systematicity principle does constrain matching; "analogical matching is not merely a
feature-by-feature decision: Analogical matching concerns systems of predicates, not
individual predicates". Experiment 2 also provided support for systematicity, in that
participants rejected inferences that resulted from isolated correspondences (despite the
fact that such predictions matched well with the base) in favour of those that were
supported by a larger causal (i.e. systematic) network. Indeed, the experiment
showed that some participants explicitly sought such systematicity in the generation of
their inferences.
Experiment 3, in which participants had to rely on their memory representations of the
base domain, provided still further (although somewhat weaker) support for
systematicity, though the non-availability of the base representation during mapping
and inference did result in poorer results than in experiments 1 and 2. However, the
results of these experiments does support the hypothesis that systematicity does act as
a constraint in the selection process; that the choice of which lower-order relations to
map is not determined just by the independent relations themselves, but by the
interconnections amongst such relations.
2.7.1 Modelling Constraints On Analogical Mapping
Gentner et al's experiments lend credence to the idea that systematicity does act as the
main constraint in analogical selection and mapping. As Clement and Gentner argue,
"a preference for coherent systems of common information appears to be a
psychologically real constraint on analogical mapping". However, whilst the
assembled evidence does partially cover some of the criticisms levelled against the
structure mapping theory, it does not eliminate the suspicion that the systematicity
constraint is just one of a number of constraints acting in analogical transfer. There is
a neatness in the representations used in the experiments that rules out the possibility
of competing causal networks, and thus the problem of what acts as a constraint in
selection on such occasions is avoided. Indeed, if an analog offers up two competing
possible modes of transfer with a similar level of systematicity, then the systematicity
principle cannot act as a constraint in the selection of one or the other.
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One answer to this - mentioned earlier - might be to accept this, but question whether it
really is a problem at all. One could simply observe that an analog which leads to such
a juncture is a poor choice of an analog (this relates to the earlier criticisms of
representations such as Carrol and Mack, 1985). There is considerable psychological
evidence that the choice of representation is crucial to analogy (e.g. Holyoak and Koh,
1987). If, when presented with a representation that supports two different,
potentially contradictory analogical inferences or mapping networks, the systematicity
principle points to two equally valid mappings without preferring either, then this may
in fact be a psychologically valid resolution of the initially poor choice of analogy.
Indeed, to return to the earlier Holyoak objection to Gentner's structure mapping
theory (Holyoak, 1985), it might well be that an expansion of the representations of
the solar-system and the atom along the lines he describes will simply lead to a
situation in which the two examples are no longer seen to be analogous. Given that
the success of any analogy is contingent upon the way in which the putative analogs
are represented, it is not a failing of a theory that it cannot provide accurate mappings
in a situation where candidate analogs are presented in such a way as to render any
analogous similarity between them deeply obscure. Certainly, this would appear to be
Gentner's position (Gentner, 1997).5
Another approach is to argue that the relations within each description are important
relative to some goal (White, 1987), and that this is not captured by the structure
mapping theory. White cites the example of Rumelhart and Norman (1981), who used
three different analogies to explain the workings of a text editor. The first used the
5 This point is perhaps best illustrated by considering a bad analogy. In 1980, the New England
Journal ofMedicine published a letter from Dr. Stephen E Levick. Dr. Levick's letter noted that over
the years, his aluminium cooking pots had become pitted and worn. He explained that the cookware
was undoubtedly releasing metal into the food cooked in it. He also noted that the Bantu tribe in
South Africa brew beer in iron pots, and absorb so much iron that their cells become filled with it,
leading to a variety of ailments. Levick concluded his letter, "The iron pots of the Bantu may have
their counterparts in the aluminium pots of industrialised nations, with aluminium-induced dementia
[Alzheimer's] as the analogous disease. Large numbers of people in our aluminium-using society
may be victims of slow aluminium poisoning from several sources. Corrosible aluminium cookware
may be a nontrivial source" (McGee, 1990, p 251). The widespread concern that exists about the use
of aluminium cookware is testament to the efficacy of Dr. Levick's analogy. However, had he altered
his representation, it may not have worked so well. Tomatoes (extreme takers up of aluminium owing
to their acidity) generally contain 1 milligram of aluminium per serving. This increases to 2
milligrams after cooking in aluminium. But this increase pales into insignificance against the 10
milligrams or so of aluminium that anyone who eats raw vegetables will consume per day. Had
Levick added these facts to his representation, his analogy with the Bantu may not have proved so
memorable; indeed, it might not have even proven to be effective at all.
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analogy of a secretary to explain how the editor responded to instructions. However,
this analogy led to people thinking that the editor was intelligent, and could distinguish
text from commands. A second, using a tape-recorder as an analog for append,
caused confusion with regards to text deletion, requiring a third analog, between
deletion and card index to convey the idea that when something is deleted, every thing
else shuffles up.
White observes that different analogies were required for each explanational sub-goal,
and argues that "it appears that the relations within each description will play a part in
the analogical process depending on their importance relative to the current goals. If
syntactic information alone was used the difference in goals could have no effect on
the analogy." (White, 1987, p 22).
However, this doesn't really count as an argument against structure mapping. Indeed,
the carry over of the misconceptions that in turn require a further analogy in order to
rectify them could be explained as structure mapping in action. In the first instance,
the students carry over systematic structures about secretaries irrespective of the goals
of their instructors. Thus whilst the goal of removing misconceptions acted as a
constraint - for the instructors - in the selection of the second analogy, it can be argued
that it did not act as a constraint on mapping, and this seems to be backed up by the
fact that students transferred a number of plausible relational networks, requiring the
third analogy. At each stage the increasing complexity of their view of the text editor -
i.e. the relational representation of it - allowed more accurate selections as the effect of
the systematicity principle would increase in accordance with the amount of relational
information in their text editor representation, and so accordingly, less systematic
mappings would be rejected, and a more accurate picture would develop.
In many of the arguments advanced in the literature in support of pragmatics in
analogical reasoning, the evidence seems to indicate that pragmatic factors have a clear
and demonstrable effect on the selection and representation of analogs. What is less
clear is exactly what role (if any) pragmatic factors are supposed to play in mapping.
Yet a clear statement of the role that these factors play is essential to the development
of a theory of analogical mapping that expresses an effective procedure and is
amenable to implementation within a computational cognitive model. At present, the
only positive argument in favour of including pragmatics in analogical mapping is that
of parsimony: pragmatic factors play a part in analogical reasoning, therefore
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pragmatic factors play a part in analogical mapping. As I noted earlier, this all boils
down to a question of which intuitions a given theorist holds.
Holyoak and Thagard argue that including pragmatic constraints in mapping is the
most parsimonious way of reflecting the influence that the evidence shows that these
factors have on analogical reasoning. However, from the point of view of developing
principled cognitive models of analogy, there may ultimately be a price to pay for this
parsimony. In a series of articles Cooper and colleagues (Cooper and Shallice, 1995;
Cooper, Fox, Farringdon and Shallice, 1996) have pointed to the need for greater
methodological stringency in cognitive modelling, especially in regard to the question
of determining exactly how theories relate to models. They argue for a principled
distinction between those aspects of a model that are clear embodiments of theory
(those aspects that are implementations of an effective procedure) and those aspects of
models that are either notation, or are details of the implementation that were required
in order to get the model to run. Cooper et al call this the A/B distinction: theoretically
motivated aspects of a model are described as being above the line; implementational
details, and specifics of notation, are said to be below it. They argue that cognitive
models should make explicit which aspects of a cognitive model are above the line and
which are below it if cognitive models are to be amenable to meaningful inspection and
analysis, and if the results of running cognitive models are to be treated as meaningful
output from theories.
Insofar as pragmatic and semantic constraints are implemented in ACME, it would
appear that, in Cooper et al's terms, they are quite clearly B elements. That is, they are
below the line of implemented theory. The theoretical motivation behind the inclusion
of these constraints has not been stated clearly enough, nor the process that they are
supposed to implement sufficiently well-defined, for the semantic and pragmatic
constraints to be said to embody theory. Moreover, the semantic links in ACME are
quite clearly notation: ultimately, the decision as to whether a strict enforcement of
predicate identity is going to be made is in the hands of the person programming the
network. In representing the atom <-> solar-system analogy, the programmer can
either choose to represent REVOLVES_AROUND as ORBITS in both cases, or else they
can use REVOLVES_AROUND in one case, and ORBITS in the other, and then hand code
a link between them. In either case, the rationale and the procedure that determines the
mapping between the two predicates is clearly external to the ACME model (it is, in
fact, in the mind of the programmer).
CHAPTER 2 - COGNITIVE MODELS OF ANALOGY 37
There is then, a lack of theoretical support for, or a statement of, any theory for
semantic and pragmatic constraints in terms of an effective procedure. It follows then,
that to date, the only analogical mapping constraints that are both stated as a theory
containing an effective procedure, and have supporting evidence for that procedure,
are structural constraints. Below, I describe the structure mapping engine, SME, a
cognitive model of structure mapping theory.
2.7.2 The Structure Mapping Engine
The structure mapping engine (SME; Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner, 1989) is a
computer implementation of the principles of the structure mapping theory, which
simulates the process of interpreting and making predictions from an analogy. SME,
uses systematicity extensively: both in evaluating a candidate mapping, and in deriving
inferences.
SME first determines all plausible matches between the representations to be mapped
by use of a set of match hypothesis constructor rules, and the likelihood of any match
existing is established by use of match evidence rules (these rule sets can be changed
to allow SME to be run in various different "modes"). At this stage the program may
well have a set of mutually inconsistent matches, with a numerical value representing
the evidence for each match.
In the next stage these local matches are collected into global mappings - sets of
consistent predicate (relation) mappings. SME finds the largest possible sets of
matches between predicates, and generates candidate inferences for them. The
candidate inferences are those object correspondences which must be true for the set
match to be plausible. For example, if there is a predicate connected to the base set,
but not present in the target system, then that predicate will become a candidate
inference in the target.
In the final step, the global matches are considered structurally to see which match has
most support in terms of systematic structure. The probability of any global match
depends upon:
• the strength of evidence for the individual local matches it comprises;
• the strength of its candidate inference;
• the amount of systematicity (inter-relatedness) in its structure: this is
implemented in a trickle-down algorithm in which the evidence for a given
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match is increased if there are also matches amongst its parent predicates
(Forbus and Gentner, 1989).
SME has been run with apparent success on examples from a number of different
domains, (Forbus, Gentner, Markman and Fergusson, 1998; Gentner, Ratterman and
Forbus, 1993; Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner, 1989). The chief criticisms of
these successes have been the restricted domain descriptions upon which SME has
operated. In the case of human analogical reasoning, or any possible real world
applications to which SME might be put, domain descriptions will be more extensive
and complex (though as my earlier remarks indicated, if this were only to lead to SME
suggesting a number of - possibly contradictory - mappings, i.e. confusion, then this
might not necessarily impugn its claims to psychological plausibility).
From a psychological point of view, the model has three principal features:
• the same processes that are used to form mappings also generate inferences;
• semantics and goals are not required in the formation of coherent matching
structures, nor in the generation of inferences
• the model embodies clearly articulated theory only.
As we noted in the discussion above, these features have more psychological
plausibility than might first appear.
Just as Gentner's (1989) architecture (described earlier) specifically excluded
pragmatic factors from analogical mapping, so Gentner and colleagues specifically and
explicitly exclude semantic factors from their model. Thus the actual predicate
representations of comparitor objects input to SME are treated as notation. Gentner
(Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus, 1993; Gentner Forbus and Law, 1995) assumes that
semantic reconciliations take place outside the analogical process: 'SME's constraint of
matching identical predicates assumes canonical conceptual representations, not lexical
strings. Two concepts that are similar but not identical (such as "bestow" and
"bequeath") are assumed to be decomposed into a canonical representation language so
that their similarity is expressed as a partial identity (here, roughly, "give")' (Gentner,
Ratterman and Forbus, 1993 p. 553); conceptual matters are thus explicitly extrinsic
to both structure mapping's theory and models (although, it should be noted that
Gentner et al provide no clue as to how these decompositions into the canonical
representation language take place).
From a cognitive modelling point of view, SME possesses a pleasing simplicity. By
focusing upon only one factor in mapping, namely the one that evidence shows is the
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factor that is most important to - if not the only factor in - analogical mapping, it offers
the possibility of gaining an insight into the influence of that factor in the mapping
process. Whereas Holyoak and Thagard try to model every possible constraint leading
to mapping, creating a muddied picture of the role of individual factors, SME can also
enable one to gauge the role of factors other than structure by measuring any
performance gap between the purely structural SME implementation of analogical
mapping and other models which embody other theoretical constraints.
2.8 Comparing The Two Theories And Models Of
Mapping
It would seem, from the foregoing, that many of the theoretical criticisms of Gentner's
structure mapping theory result from the problematical nature of analogical reasoning,
rather than from any deficiencies in Gentner's account of it. Moreover, there are real
problems in giving an adequate account of the factors, included within Holyoak's
constraint satisfaction theory, which have been proposed in order to provide an
account of analogical mapping that incorporates a "richer" notion of semantics and
pragmatics.
As the discussion of the models of the various theories showed, there is a great deal of
convergence between SME and ACME, to the extent that it can be argued that ACME
is in actuality more of a model of structure mapping theory than it is of constraint
satisfaction theory (at least in so far as the latter is proposed by Holyoak and Thagard),
since influence of constraints other than structural considerations is marginal (and
arbitrarily controlled within the model).
None of this counts as evidence against or in favour of either theory as an account of
analogy. However, since both camps claim experimental support for their models,
and since both models are ultimately structure mappers, it would appear that, to date,
what evidential support models of analogy do provide is in favour of Gentner's
structure mapping theory. The role and influence (if there is any) of specific mapping
constraints other than those which rely upon structural information remains largely
unexplored in any theoretically precise way.
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2.9 Accessing Analogies
2.9.1 Theories Of Retrieval
The question of accessing analogies is closely bound up with judgements of similarity.
Analogy is merely one of a number of ways by which two things might be adjudged
similar. Accordingly, in general, accessing models for analogy are based upon the
more general principle of similarity based retrieval.
Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993) distinguish differing categories of similarity
match:
• Literal similarity matches include both common relational structure and
common object descriptions;
• Surface matches are based upon common object descriptions, with some
shared first order relations;
• Analogy, as described earlier, a match based upon a common system of
internal relations.
Thus this account, in keeping with earlier work, defines similarity in terms of degrees
of correspondences between structured representations. The new feature, however, is
that Gentner and Forbus argue that similarity based access from long-term memory
relies more on surface similarities and less upon structural commonalities than
mapping. Gick and Holyoak (1980) observe that people often fail to access potentially
useful analogs, whilst Ross (1984; 1987) showed that whilst people engaged in
problem solving are often reminded of prior problems, these remindings are usually
based on surface rather than structural similarities between solution principles.
Holyoak and Thagard accept Gentner's argument for the influence of semantic
similarity on the retrieval process. However, whilst they accept that semantic
similarity acts as the dominant constraint in retrieval, they argue that it does not act
alone.
Thus Holyoak and Thagard carry their template of constraint satisfaction over to their
model of retrieval, i.e. they see three basic kinds of constraint acting as pressures on
the selection process: semantic similarity, isomorphism (informally treated, so that it
refers to structural similarity) and pragmatic considerations.
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Base Story
Karla, an old hawk, lived at the top of a tall oak tree. One afternoon, she
saw a hunter on the ground with a bow and some crude arrows that had
no feathers. The hunter took aim and shot at the hawk but missed. Karla
knew the hunter wanted her feathers so she glided down to the hunter
and offered to give him a few. The hunter was so grateful that he pledged
never to shoot at a hawk again. He went off and shot a deer instead.
Literal similarity
Once there was an eagle named Zardia who nested on a rocky cliff. One
day she saw a sportsman coming with a crossbow and some bolts that had
no feathers. The sportsman attacked but the bolts missed. Zardia realised
that the sportsman wanted her tailfeathers so she flew down and donated
a few of her tailfeathers to the sportsman. The sportsman was pleased.
He promised never to attack eagles again.
True Analogy
Once there was a small country called Zardia that learned to make the
world's smartest computer.
One day Zardia was attacked by it's warlike neighbour, Gagrach. But the
missiles were badly aimed and the attack failed. The Zardian government
realised that Gagrach wanted Zardian computers so it offered to sell some
of it's computers to the country. The government of Gagrach was very
pleased. It promised never to attack Zardia again.
Figure 2.5 (part 1): Example stories from Ratterman and Gentner (1987).
CHAPTER 2 - COGNITIVE MODELS OF ANALOGY 42
Mere Appearance - With First Order Relations
Once there was an eagle named Zardia who donated a few of her
tailfeathers to a sportsman so he would promise never to attack eagles.
One day Zardia was resting high on a rocky cliff when she saw the
sportsman coming with a crossbow. Zardia flew down to meet the man,
but he attacked and felled her with a single bolt. As she fluttered to the
ground Zardia realised that the bolt had her own tailfeathers on it.
False Analogy
Once there was a small country called Zardia that learned to make the
world's smartest computer. Zardia sold one of its supercomputers to its
neighbour, Gagrach, so Gagrach promised never to attack Zardia.
But one day Zardia was overwhelmed by a surprise attack from Gagrach.
As it capitulated the crippled government of Zardia realised that the
attacker's missiles had been guided by Zardian supercomputers.
Mere Appearance (Attributes only) - Ratterman and Gentner, Experiment
2
There once was a sportsman who loved to hunt. He liked to have the
animals he caught stuffed and mounted. His pride and joy was an eagle
he had killed with just a crossbow and a bolt. He had been hiding in the
top of an elm tree when he shot her.
Figure 2.5 (part 2): Example stories from Ratterman and Gentner (1987).
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Gentner and Landers (1985) and Ratterman and Gentner (1987) (see also Gentner,
Ratterman and Forbus, 1993) examined the role of structural and semantic factors in
access. Gentner and Landers' experiment had two purposes:
1. to test the prediction that shared systematic structure determines the subjective
soundness of a match;
2. to see whether the accessibility of analogies (and other similarity matches)




Shared Literal Similarity Mere Appearance
Not Shared True Analogy False Analogy
Table 2.1: Breakdown of story attributes.
The study was designed to recreate the conditions of natural long-term memory access:
participants were given approximately 30 stories to read and remember; one week later
they read a new set of stories, reporting any cases where a new story reminded them
of any of the originals. The stories were designed to embody three basic kinds of
similarity match:
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i. mere appearance (MA) - the base and targets shared object descriptions, for
instance a hawk in the base related to an eagle in the target and first order
relations (i.e. ATTACKED(x,y) for SHOT_AT(x,y);
ii. true analogy (TA) - the base and target shared first order relations and higher
order relations (e.g. relations between relations: CAUSE(S(x,y),R(y,z)) in the
base was CAUSE(S'(x',y'),R'(y',z')) in the target);
iii. false analogy (FA) - where only first order relations matched.
(See also figure 2.5 and table 2.1).
Gentner and Landers found that the proportion of mere appearance matches was far
greater than the true analogy matches, which in turn outnumbered the recalled false
analogy matches. This result suggested that surface commonalities significantly
influence memory access. However, when the same participants were then asked to
rate the inferential soundness of their matches, the true analogy matches were rated to
be significantly more sound than the MA and FA matches.
The Gentner and Landers study threw up an interesting insight - it showed that the
kinds of matches that participants consider most sound were not the kinds of match
that most promote access - but it raised a number of questions for which it offered no
solutions. As well as suggesting that surface commonalities had a significant role to
play in memory access, it also seemed to show that higher order relations played some
role, since false analogy matches were retrieved much less than true analogies. The
results obtained did not explain how, or even whether, surface attributes and higher
order relations combine to promote access, nor did they isolate the aspects of surface
similarity which most significantly influence access.
Ratterman and Gentner set up a number of experiments to address some of these
questions. The first was intended to investigate the respective roles of surface
commonalities and higher order relations in access. In order to do this, they replicated
the Gentner and Landers study, adding another match type:
iv. literal similarity (LS) - the base and target have commonalities at all levels (see also
figure 2.5 and table 2.1).
From the results of the Gentner and Landers study, Ratterman and Gentner expected
that LS matches would be recalled frequently in the reminding task.
One problem with the Gentner and Landers study is that it did not eliminate the
possibility that retrieval was in fact simply dependent upon the overall similarities
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between the matches (i.e., the MA matches were just more similar to one another than
the TA and FA matches). In order to clarify this, Ratterman and Gentner added a
similarity rating task in order to test whether retrieval could be predicted simply by
similarity ratings. Thus Ratterman and Gentner were testing 3 parameters:
1. accessibility (recall)
2. inferential soundness
3. the degree of similarity between base and target (see table 2.1).
By repeating the Gentner and Landers study in this way, Ratterman and Gentner
discovered:
1. accessibility: literal similarity and mere appearance led to significantly more
remindings than true analogy and false analogy, supporting the results of the
Gentner and Landers tests.
2. soundness rating: again the results of the Gentner and Landers tests were
verified, with the TA and LS matches being considered significantly more
sound.
3. similarity rating: participants rated the LS matches significantly higher than the
TA matches, and both significantly higher than MA and FA, which were given
equally low ratings. Moreover, the pattern of similarity ratings mirrored those
for soundness ratings.
Since the results of the recall task on the one hand, and the similarity and soundness
ratings on the other, varied markedly, Ratterman and Gentner concluded that different
aspects of similarity govern the different processes, with surface matches playing the
major part in recall, and structure being most significant in judging soundness and
similarity.
A second experiment was designed to further analyse the role of surface
commonalities, examining which aspects of the mere appearance matches lead to their
accessibility, and whether object descriptions could promote access on their own. A
second set ofmere appearance matches were created (see figure 2.5), in which all the
first order commonalities from the first set were removed. The study was then run
again, with the new mere appearance (attribute only - MAAO ) matches included along
with the first MA set (renamed MAF - mere appearance (first order)), LS and TA
matches.
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In the second experiment recall test, the LS and MAF matches were recalled
significantly more than the MAAO matches, which in turn were recalled significantly
more than the TA matches (recall of both the latter sets was poor). As with experiment
1, this ordering was in contrast to participants' opinions as to soundness and
similarity.
Ratterman and Gentner concluded from these experiments that whilst similarity based
recall is not only influenced by common object descriptions (since the biggest gain in
recall comes from object descriptions and first order relations) there is a clear
dissociation between the kinds of similarity that are inferentially reliable and the kinds
of similarity that enable memory access.
Accordingly, the Gentner et al similarity based transfer process is decomposed into
two sub-processes that are qualitatively different
• Accessing a similar {base) situation in long-term memory, based primarily
upon surface similarity
• Creating a mapping from base to target using structural commonalities.
Holyoak and Thagard's conjecture is that the role of isomorphism in retrieval might be
more important than Gentner supposes. As Gentner notes (Gentner and Forbus,
1991), her findings were not that structural similarities do not contribute to retrieval,
but rather that such similarities have a much greater effect on mapping once two
analogs are present than they do on similarity based retrieval. (Ratterman and Gentner
(1987) had observed that structural similarities led to a non-significant increase in
retrieval in two studies, and small but significant increase in a third.)
The key point of note here is that according to Gentner, analogical access is probably
based upon qualitatively distinct processes from analogical inferencing (in which she
includes mapping). Holyoak and Thagard's conjecture is based upon their
disagreement with this notion, and upon their corresponding re-emphasis of the
accepted (albeit slight) role played by isomorphism in retrieval. They do not present
any new evidence that isomorphism plays a greater role than that noted by Gentner.
Indeed, the results of Holyoak and Thagard's own experiments with retrieval implied
that:
"semantic similarity ... dominates reminding for novice candidates"
(Wharton, Holyoak, Downing, Lange, Wickems and Melz, 1994, p 98)
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Their argument for the importance of pragmatic considerations (goals) consists of the
following: the purpose of analogy is to help accomplish the goals of the problem;
clearly a retrieval system attuned to increase the retrieval of analogs relevant to goal
accomplishment would contribute more to effective problem solving than a retrieval
system that lacked sensitivity to goals. Again, however, no direct psychological
evidence is offered to support this. Indeed, as Thagard et al (1990) note, a problem in
this area is that it is difficult to distinguish effects of goals that reflect particular
constraints from the effects that can be attributed to consequences of other constraints
such as structural similarity.
Indeed, it could be argued that the view of problem solving espoused by Holyoak and
Thagard is particularly vulnerable in this area. Firstly, it seems impossible to give an
account of the role of pragmatic factors in analogy that could not be explained equally
in terms of mappings between structures in the problem definition. Moreover, the
specification of goals is a key component of problem solving; in some accounts,
defining the problem is what problem solving is. In many cases analogy is used in
order to assist in the definition of goals (Holyoak and Koh, 1987). In such cases a
structural explanation will be less open to criticisms of circularity than one in which a
goal (to find a problem definition?) is used to select an analog which will help
accomplish the goals of the problem (provide a problem definition?).
2.9.2 Implementations Of Theories Of Retrieval
The two competing theories of analogical access described above have been
implemented as computer programs:
2.9.3 ARCS - Analogical Retrieval By Constraint
Satisfaction (Holyoak And Thagard)
Holyoak and Thagard have implemented their ideas in an experimental system, ARCS
(Thagard, Holyoak, Nelson and Gochfeld, 1990). ARCS uses a localised
connectionist network in order to apply semantic, isomorphic (structural) and
pragmatic constraints to selecting potential analogs from memory. The initial stage of
the algorithm (figure 2.6) uses semantic constraints to form a suitable subset of
memory over which the matching network is built. The concept of semantic similarity
is based upon a mixture of a thesaurus and WordNet (Miller, Fellbaum, Kegl and
Miller, 1988), a database of words and lexical concepts, which are used for
CHAPTER 2 - COGNITIVE MODELS OF ANALOGY 48
determining semantic similarity between the stored words - in this case the vocabulary
of the predicate representations.5
The procedures of ARCS are carried out by use of a constraint satisfaction network
similar to ACME (described in section 2.6.3, above). The settling of the network
provides an ordered set of retrieval hypotheses, based upon the activation levels at
their nodes.
Given a pool of memory items I,..In, and a probe P,
1. For each item I,, include it in a matching network if there are any similar
predicates in I; which are semantically similar to predicates in P. The matching
network implements semantic and structural constraints.
2. Create inhibitory links between units representing competing retrieval
hypotheses to ensure competitive retrieval.
3. Install pragmatic constraints by creating excitatory links between a special
pragmatic node and every predicate marked by the user as important.7
4. Run the network until it settles.
Figure 2.6: The ARCS Algorithm (summary taken from Law, Forbus and Gentner, 1994)
2.9.4 MAC/FAC
MAC/FAC (for "many are called, few are chosen"; Gentner and Forbus, 1991) uses a
two-stage retrieval process based upon Gentner's retrieval theory. It comprises MAC,
a crude, computationally cheap matching process used to select a limited number of
candidates for more expensive matching using FAC (which is SME, described in
6 Whilst this hardly amounts to a scientific account of the way semantic links are managed, it does
have the beneficial effect of replacing semantic links dependent upon the idiosyncratic, ad hoc
assumptions of the network programmer with semantic links based upon a standardised set of ad hoc
assumptions.
7
Thagard et al accept that the psychological evidence for this node is limited - 'part of the problem is
that it is difficult to distinguish effects of goals that reflect a special pragmatic constraint from effects
that can be interpreted as consequences of other general constraints involving semantic similarity and
structural consistency... as in ACME... we treat pragmatic factors as an additional pressure to
semantic similarity and structural consistency' (Thagard et al, 1990, p 267).
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section 2.7.2), in order to apply structural constraints to select the best match(es) (see
fig 2.7).
Since there is little agreement as to the structure of long-term memory, MAC/FAC
assumes only that there is a stage at which a limited number of memory items8 are
selected from a pool according to their similarity to a probe (target). This memory item
(or items) is a potential base analog. Both the MAC and FAC stages consist of a
matcher, which is applied to every input selection, and a selector, which uses the
evaluation of the matcher to select which comparisons are produced as the output to
that stage.
Given a database M ofmemory items I,..In, and a probe P,
1. [MAC Stage] In parallel, for each item I in M compute the dot product of the
content vectors for I and P. Return as output the maximum and every item
whose score is within pl% of it.
2. [FAC Stage} In parallel, for each item I in the MAC output, run SME with I as
the base and P as the target. The FAC score for each pair is the structural
evaluation score of the highest ranked mapping. The top-scoring match, plus
any others within p2% of it, are output.
(Typically, pi = p2 = 10%)
Figure 2.7 The MAC/FAC Algorithm (Law, Forbus and Gentner, 1994; Forbus, Gentner and Law,
1995)
The MAC stage matcher is used to estimate how well FAC will evaluate comparisons,
in order to filter down candidates into a number suitable for the more extensive (and
computationally expensive) processing in FAC.
MAC computes the numerosity of the comparison, that is, it estimates the number of
match hypotheses that FAC would generate in comparing the probe to a given memory
item. If few local matches are hypothesised, then the best global interpretation can be
assumed to be small. However, numerosity is not a perfect measure, since having a
large number of local matches is no guarantee of a large global match (for instance
match hypotheses may be ungrounded because of a lack of correspondence in their
8 Some kind of conceptual 'instance'.
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arguments). The MAC process calculates numerosity by use of content vectors, which
are n-tuples, each component number of which corresponds to either a predicate, a
function or a connective in a structure description9. MAC matches by introducing a
probe, whose content vector is computed. A score is generated for each item in the
memory pool by taking the dot product of its content vector with the probe's content
vector. These scores are sent to the MAC selector, which returns as output the best
match, and everything within n% of it.
The FAC stage computes literal similarity according to structure mapping,
implemented using SME, currently with appropriate rule sets to map literal similarity
rather than analogy. Literal similarity is used rather than analogy in order to achieve
the highly observed frequency of surface remindings, most of which would be rejected
if FAC were strictly an analogy matcher.
Since MAC is only sensitive to predicate overlap, and FAC is structure sensitive, FAC
will reject much of MAC's output; the filtering provided by MAC acts to cut down the
number of matches FAC is required to do.
2.10 Discussion
2.10.1 Comparing The Two Theories And Models Of
Processing
The divergence between the theoretical models of analogical processing appears to be
wider than the gap between implementations. Whilst the structure mapping theoretical
model embraces two distinct processes, one for analogical accessing, and one for
mapping and inference, the multi-constraint theory position is that a single account can
9* P = the total set of functors (predicates, functions, connectives) used in the descriptions that
constitute pool items and probes.
• a content vector = an n-tuple of numbers, each component corresponding to a particular member of
P.
• Given a description D, the value of each component of its content vector indicates how many times
the particular corresponding member of P occurs in D.
• Members of P not present in D are assigned the value 0.
Thus, for example, if there were four instances of IMPLIES in a story, then the value for IMPLIES in
its content vector would be 4.
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be given. When these models are then implemented, this gap narrows, since it is
debatable whether ARCS amounts to two processes in practice.
As mentioned in discussion earlier, this divergence between theory and practice should
cause some alarm to the multi-constraint theory advocate, since if the theory is right, it
cannot be correct to claim that the output from the implementation fully supports it, at
least in a competition with the structure mapping theory. In practice the success of
ACME in simulations, given its structure dominated mappings, offers more support
for the structure mapping theory than it does for multi-constraint theory. This leaves
the theoretical implications of multi-constraint theory unproven. Constraint
satisfaction might indeed be a better model of the analogical process, but whilst ACME
practices what is in effect structure mapping, and the accessing element in ARCS uses
mainly semantic considerations, then positive results from experiments will add to the
psychological plausibility of Gentner's two stage model rather than multi-constraint
theory.
On the other hand, in defence of multi-constraint theory, constraint satisfaction isn't a
single process; it embraces a number of processes, including those described within
Gentner's model. As Ratterman and Gentner (1987) acknowledge, the evidence
implies that accessing does involve structural (first order) relations as well as the
simple surface commonalities utilised by MAC/FAC. Gentner's two process model
fails to capture this constraint, whilst Holyoak and Thagard's model does. Yet
according to both theories there is very good evidence for supposing that first order
relations do play a role in accessing.
This divergence can be reconciled to some extent if we see the two theories as offering
different granularities of description. According to this view, Gentner's theory gives a
coarse grained description of analogy, focusing upon the main process in a particular
analogical sub-process, whereas Holyoak and Thagard's is a finer grained model,
aimed at capturing all of the constraints that influence analogical reasoning, albeit,
perhaps, at the expense of the conceptual clarity provided by an overview.
On this view, the Holyoak and Thagard, and the Gentner models are best seen as
different but complementary aspects of a notional larger model, rather than competing
and contradictory versions. The evidence suggests not that there are two totally
distinct analogical processes, but rather that two different constraints play the dominant
role depending upon the task in hand. The Holyoak and Thagard model is based upon
the former notion, whilst the Gentner model captures the latter (see figure 2.8).
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Gentner's Structure Mapping Theory
Theory Model Evidence
Mapping
Structural V V V
Pragmatic X X ??
Semantic X X 7?
Retrieval
Semantic V V V
Pragmatic X X X
Structural V X V
Holyoak and Thagard 's Multi-Constraint Theory
Theory Model Evidence
Mapping
Structural V V V
Pragmatic V 7 ??
Semantic V ? ??
Retrieval
Semantic V V? V
Pragmatic V 9 X
Structural V V V
Figure 2.8: The main points in each theory summarised in tabular form.
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2.11 Implications For The Cognitive Modelling Of
Analogy
2.11.1 Retrieval
Neither model of retrieval matches perfectly with the evidence. MAC/FAC doesn't
capture all of the constraints which the evidence suggests influence analogical retrieval,
as it does not model the role that first order relations were found to play in recall by
Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus.
ARCS can model the structural constraints on retrieval which receive support from the
psychological evidence, but in addition, it also models constraints which receive
minimal (i.e. speculative) or non-existent support as well.
At present, it would appear that if MAC/FAC could be extended in order to account for
the role of first order relations in retrieval, then it could broadly model all of those
constraints which the evidence indicates are important influences on analogy
(experimentation with such a model might be useful in determining how close the
available evidence comes with respect to painting a complete picture of analogy - for
instance, the relative performance of a model like this might ultimately be useful in
determining the necessity and plausibility of the extra constraints proposed in ARCS).
2.11.2 Mapping
2.11.2.1 Structural Factors
As far as mapping goes, structural constraints receive support from both theories, and
from the great deal of empirical work that has been done exploring analogy. Both
models employ structural constraints to determine analogical mapping, although these
constraints differ in some details. These structural constraints are neatly summarised
by Keane, Ledgeway and Duff (1994) as follows :
• Matches only between entities of the same type: attributes are matched with
attributes, objects with objects and two-placed predicates with two-placed
predicates. So in foo(A,B), the predicate foo would never be matched with the
object C.
CHAPTER 2 - COGNITIVE MODELS OF ANALOGY 54
• Structural consistency: if the propositions foo(A,B) and foo(C,D), are matched,
then their arguments are matched correspondingly (i.e. A with C, and B with
D).
• Favouring systematic matches: when faced with alternative sets of matches, the
mapping with the highest-order of connectivity should be preferred.
Holyoak and Thagard (1995) argue that the similarities and differences between the
structural constraints in their theory and those posited in structure mapping theory can
be best illustrated by comparing Gentner's theory with the three main constraints
posited by multi-constraint theory. They claim that multi-constraint theory captures
Gentner's insight regarding the importance of systematic structure (in ACME,
interconnected systems will have more mutually supporting links than an isolated
relation), but in a more flexible manner. As implemented in SME, Gentner's theory
rigidly enforces one-to-one mappings and structural consistency—potential mappings
which violate these constraints are not made. In contrast, ACME, whilst preferring
one-to-one mappings (by using inhibitory links to discourage many-to-one mappings)
nevertheless will allow violations (in ACME, some structural constraints are seen as
'soft' constraints).
Moreover, because both theories clearly express their structural constraints as effective
procedures, it is possible to carry out empirical studies in order to ascertain which
particular structural constraints are to be preferred. Spellman and Holyoak (1992),
found that a minority of participants in their study did make many-to-one mappings (as
allowed for in multi-constraint theory but not in structure mapping theory). In making
an analogy between the start of the Gulf War and the start of World War II, 9% of
participants mapped Kuwait onto two or more of Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia,
whilst a few made mappings between Kuwait and things like "countries Hitler
invaded", re-coding the multiple items to preserve one-to-one mappings.
It was not possible, given the way Spellman and Holyoak's study was conducted, to
determine whether participants were in fact making many-to-one mappings, or whether
they were making a series of isomorphically consistent one-to-one mappings, and
reporting an overall analogical mapping based on an aggregation of these individual
mappings; or indeed, whether participants were grouping objects (as described above)
prior to mapping, computing a one-to-one mapping, and then reverting to a
representation with multiple items in reporting their analogical mapping (Spellman and
Holyoak, 1997).
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In recent work, Markman (1997) has provided evidence to show that whilst analogical
inferences are heavily constrained by structural factors - as both theories predict - in
studies where materials allow for potential many-to-one mappings in generating
inferences, participants appear only to make one-to-one mappings between individual
analogs, even when they go on to report overall analogical mappings based on
aggregations of individual mappings.
Whilst the question of whether one-to-one mappings should be considered as a hard
constraint in analogical mapping has not been settled for certain - there is still a lot of
space for further empirical study - it should be stressed that it is the fact that both
theories express the structural constraints they propose in terms of detailed effective
procedures that makes this kind of subsequent empirical validation possible.
2.11.2.2 1AM (The Incremental Analogy Mapping Engine)
Another theory of analogical mapping that shares many features with SME and ACME
(and also has a base in empirical studies of human analogising) is modelled in IAM
(Keane and Brayshaw, 1988; Keane, Ledgeway and Duff, 1994). In addition to
possessing many interesting features in its own right, in respect of the three constraints
discussed here, IAM represents a kind of 'half-way house' between SME and ACME,
since it enforces a very similar structural constraint to SME, whilst also allowing the
influence of semantic and pragmatic constraints in the manner of ACME.
IAM's structural constraints are implemented according to the summary above,
however, the manner of their implementation differs widely from SME (Keane and
Brayshaw, 1988; Keane, Ledgeway and Duff, 1994). In IAM, a mapping is formed
from a sub-set of the predicates / elements in a base domain, rather than from a
computation amongst all such elements (as carried out by SME).
LAM selects the group of predicates that have the greatest higher-order connectivity
between its elements (the seed-group), and, having done this, it chooses an element
from the seed-group and finds the best match between this element and all the elements
in the target (the seed-match). This seed-match is then used to 'grow' the mapping of
all of the elements in the seed-group: all of the legal matches between the remaining
elements in the seed-group and the target are found, and a set of unique set of one-to-
one matches is formed. Like ACME, IAM uses serial constraint satisfaction to find
these matches, applying structural, pragmatic and semantic-similarity constraints.
Again, as with ACME, pragmatic and semantic-similarity constraints are realised by
CHAPTER 2 - COGNITIVE MODELS OF ANALOGY 56
manipulating weightings in the network. However, rooting the search in one element -
LAM favours relational elements taking multiple objects as seed-elements - and
resolving ambiguities produced in mapping by reference to that element, enables IAM
to produce one-to-one matches of the kind produced by SME, and avoid the many-to-
one matches that can sometimes be generated by ACME, in a manner that is
particularly efficient computationally.
Depending on task demands, and the success of the matches grown from an initial
seed (Keane et al report that assessing whether more than half of the seed-group
predicates have been matched successfully proves to be sufficient in gauging this),
IAM may either backtrack and try other seed-matches from the seed-group, or else, if
none of the mappings produced is optimal, go on to map other groups of predicates in
the base domain (although Keane et al 1994 note that in practice this latter step tends
not to be necessary).
Keane, Ledgeway and Duff (1994) report that IAM has successfully emulated the
analogical performance reported by SME and ACME in simulations (Falkenhainer et
al, 1989; Holyoak and Thagard, 1989). Moreover, Keane et al argue, with evidence,
that the efficient nature of the algorithm used to implement IAM is to be preferred on
behavioural grounds to those employed in SME and ACME.
2.11.2.3 Pragmatic Factors
As noted earlier, whilst there is considerable evidential support for the role that
pragmatic factors such as goals and plans play in the overall analogical reasoning
process, there is no evidence to decide the question of which of the in-mapping or pre-
and post- mapping accounts is correct (and where evidence has been sought to clarify
this, it has failed to do so, e.g. Spellman and Holyoak, 1992; 1996; Keane, 1988;
1996). This problem is best illustrated by considering the way that pragmatic
constraints are implemented in models that incorporate them, such as ACME or IAM:
in both of these models, predicates or nodes that are considered pragmatically useful
are highlighted in the representation of the analogy, and this highlighting is used to
focus mapping. However, no theoretical claims are made for the particular way that
representations are highlighted (the markers are simply implementational details), and
no theoretical claims about the way pragmatic markers are processed. Thus it seems
fair to say that from a theoretical standpoint, there is nothing to distinguish a
highlighted structure in ACME or IAM from a decision to highlight a structure in SME
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by embedding it within a higher order structure that described its pragmatic usefulness.
In either case the effect would be the same, and in either case, from the behaviour of
the models, it seems more accurate to see pragmatics as a constraint acting upon
representation building rather than mapping (or at least, there seems to be no
theoretical or evidential evidence to prefer an account of pragmatics acting directly
upon the mapping process).
Since there is no in-mapping account that can be described in terms of an effective
procedure, and since structural factors in mapping receive such massive theoretical and
empirical support, at least one advantage of a or pre- and post- mapping account from
a cognitive modelling perspective is that it enables a model of analogical mapping to be
specified with A/B factors clearly and explicitly noted, whereas this will not be the
case for a model which tries to implement pragmatics without any clear,
operationalised idea of how pragmatic factors influence analogical mapping. Again,
however, this is clearly an area where further study is needed.
2.11.2.4 Semantic Factors
Perhaps the most interesting area of debate in analogy - from a wider cognitive
perspective - is the role semantic factors play in analogy. In the introduction to this
chapter, I examined the way analogy is typically characterised in the cognitive science
literature. Typically, analogy is defined as some kind of mapping that permits two
concepts to be seen as similar on the basis of some relational similarity that holds
between them.
Theories differ in that structure mapping theory assumes that the process that
determines conceptual reconciliation between semantically similar predicates is external
to the analogical mapping process, whereas multi-constraint theory posits some kind
of interaction between the two. However, neither theory subscribes to a particular
theory of semantics, or conceptualisation.
Clearly, if one could specify a categorisation model that could act to determine
conceptual reconciliations during the on-line processing of analogies, then this could
act as a module that could be added to either model in order to determine empirically
which is more accurate. On the other hand, given the way that analogy is
characterised, failure to specify exactly what counts as a particular concept - so that
literal similarity comparisons can be distinguished from analogical ones - might have
deep theoretical consequences for theories of both analogy and categorisation.
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2.12 Whither Analogy?
Ordinarily we accept distinctions between category membership and analogy according
to the tacitly realist terms used in the definitions of analogy described earlier. In
categorical judgements, relating a new representation of an object to some kind of
stored category representation, objects are felt to be similar to one another in a way in
which those objects in judgements of analogical association are not. If two objects are
considered to be members of a category, the classification is real; if they are considered
to be analogous, it is not. Consider, for example an analogy between a theory and a
building (Lakoff and Johnson 1980): we might talk of "the foundations of a theory";
"we might wish to buttress a theory with more facts"; "theories that we construct can
also collapse". From an everyday, psychologically realist viewpoint, an igloo and a
castle and a skyscraper really are similar in a way that buildings and theories are not.
The research into analogy described above has accepted this tacit realism, as indeed
has much research into metaphor. Holyoak and Thagard (1995) describe a world in
which "we think we see things as they really are", and analogy is used in order to
recycle our existing knowledge of the real world to formulate new bits of 'real'
knowledge. (Similarly, in the case of metaphor, Ortony (1979) makes a distinction
between literal and non-literal similarities: 'encyclopaedias are like dictionaries' is true
in a literal (real) way, whereas 'encyclopaedias are like goldmines' is only true in a
metaphorical (non-real) way. Whether the notion of literal similarity might be
problematic or not is barely examined, since the real problem to be addressed is
metaphor.)
Analogies, in the research described above, are defined as being distinct from
categories, the nature of which are left unexamined. Tacitly, categories are presumed
to be real. But without an account of categorisation, distinctions between analogy and
metaphor reliant upon a contrast with categorisation fail to do any distinguishing at all.
Analogy is consistently defined in contrast to categorisation (Clement and Gentner,
1991; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995). In order to make a contrast definition one needs
an account of at least one of the contrasting elements. Without an account of
categorisation, a definition such as:
"In an analogy, a familiar domain is used to understand a novel domain in
order to highlight important similarities between the domains, or to predict
new features of the novel domain." (Clement and Gentner, 1991, p89)
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might be more accurately reformulated along the lines of: 'in analogy, a stored
representation is used in order to highlight important similarities between it and a new
representation of an object or concept, or to predict new features in the new
representation of an object or concept', none of which would be out of place in a
definition of categorisation.
As I described in section 2.2, the distinction between categorisation and analogy is
difficult to draw. In the following two chapters, I shall argue that an account of
categorisation sufficient to make the kind of distinctions put forward in the cognitive
science literature cannot be given. Following from that, in the rest of this thesis, I
shall go on to explore the hypothesis that at cognitive levels of description there may
be no clear distinction to be made between analogy and categorisation at all.




66. Consider for example the proceedings we call "games". I mean
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic-games, and so on. What
is common to them ad? - Don't say: "There must be something common,
or they would not be called 'games'" - but look and see whether there is
anything common to all. - For, if you look at them you will not see
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a
whole series of them at that. To repeat, don't think, but look!
Wittgenstein (1953, §66, p31).
3.1 Wittgenstein, Concepts And Categories
Although we perceive the world through our senses, we do not inhabit a world of
sense impressions. Rather, as Indurkhya (1997) very vividly describes, we live in a
world of concepts:
"When I look around, I do not 'see' the patterns of activity of the retinal
cells in my eyes; I see trees, birds and rivers... When we act on our
environment, we act upon this world of concepts. We plant a tree, bathe in
a river, move a log across a field, etc." (Indurkhya, 1997, p. 8)
Most, if not all, cognitive activities involve this process of converting the mass of data
we receive from our senses into 'meaningful' concepts. This process works - in broad
terms - by grouping, or clustering sense impressions into larger wholes (or
representations). As Indurkhya puts it, it works "by reducing the myriad of sense
impressions into a handful of meaningful concepts and categories" (Indurkhya, 1997,
p. 8). Although any given dog will form a different image on the retina, or even the
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same dog at different times, still we are capable of grouping all these sensations
together under a single label - 'dog'.
We can also impose concepts on sense data. As gestalt psychology has shown, when
sensory stimuli comprise two flashes of a dot in close proximity, what we 'see' is a
smooth and continuous motion of the dot from the first position to the second position
(Kolers, 1972; Kolers and Green. 1984). Similarly, our sensory data can be
deconstructed, for instance, in the way that continuous streams of sound are separated
into individual words when a listener parses sentences.
Concepts are a vital aspect of cognition. As with analogy, cognitive science has a
strong interest in categorisation. Accounting for how the 'stuff of experience' is
represented, manipulated and combined in the mind is a central concern of many
researchers in the field. Moreover, as can be quickly gleaned from even the most
casual perusal of the relevant cognitive science literature, Wittgenstein's analysis of
concepts and categories in the Philosophical Investigations1 (1953) has had a great
influence on the approaches taken in this area.
Before reviewing the current state of the art with regards to the cognitive modelling of
categorisation in the chapter following, I will in this chapter lay out a theoretical
framework within which the question of modelling concepts and categories can be
considered. At the beginning of my review of cognitive models of analogy, I
discussed the lack of any clear working characterisation of analogy in the cognitive
science literature, and sketched out a rough map of the area covered by the concept of
analogy as it is used in the cognitive science literature. Here, I shall attempt to develop
a similar framework - though, for reasons that will become clearer as I develop this
position, not a definition - for exploring categorisation. This framework is based on
an analysis of concepts and naming presented by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical
Investigations (1953).
In spite of the powerful influence of Wittgenstein's analysis, no clear statement of his
position appears in the cognitive science literature. It is worth noting that, Backer and
Hacker's (1980) fine, albeit slightly impenetrable exposition excepted, the relevant
sections of the Philosophical Investigations have been surprisingly little discussed in
the philosophical literature. Indeed, a recent guide to the Philosophical Investigations
1 For the sake of convenience, I shall often abbreviate Philosophical Investigations to PI in the
discussion that follows.
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aimed at academic philosophers (M. McGinn, 1997) completely ignores these sections
altogether.
It is worth stating at the outset of my attempt to present a detailed exposition of
Wittgenstein's arguments relating to concepts and categories, that 'concepts' and
'categories', as they are studied in cognitive science were not the focus of
Wittgenstein's investigation; rather, Wittgenstein's concerns ran somewhat parallel to
those of cognitive science's in this regard. In this chapter, I shall endeavour to show
thatWittgenstein would have rejected the conception of concepts that he is held to have
put forward, as indeed he would have rejected the very conception of 'concepts' as
they are generally treated in cognitive science. Therefore some elaboration will be
required in order to bring these two views of concepts together so that they might be
compared and contrasted.
Wittgenstein is often presented as an opaque, difficult to interpret, and rather obscure
philosopher, which sometimes leads to the Philosophical Investigations being seen as -
and treated as - a philosophical pick 'n' mix; a series of gnomic quotables to be
plundered in support of a thesis. As a philosopher, Wittgenstein can be seen as a
mirror, in whose writing a reader can see what she wishes to see. I shall endeavour to
show, by examining in detail the arguments that Wittgenstein presents, that PI sections
§66 to §82 lay out a clear, if intricately connected, series of arguments, which, with a
certain degree of elucidation, can be seen to systematically detail Wittgenstein's
theoretical treatment of categories and categorisation in what is - for Wittgenstein - a
fairly straightforward manner. What emerges from the close reading of Wittgenstein's
text that I present is at considerable variance with the account of Wittgenstein's
position that has been generally accepted in the literature.
There are a number of reasons for this, perhaps the most important being that whilst
Wittgenstein is often cited as a founding influence in cognitive approaches to concepts
and categorisation, his concerns - and more importantly his methods - were markedly
different to those of researchers in the modem cognitivist tradition. Whilst much
categorisation research has been concerned with category representation - the encoding
and structuring of objects together in some form of internal representation system (see
Komatsu, 1992 for a review) - Wittgenstein was more concerned with word use, with
the way that labels are used to pick out objects in the world as a part of the process of
communication. In doing this, Wittgenstein was concerned with trying to specify the
way in which the use of concepts and categories in communication imposes constraints
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on theoretical accounts regarding their nature - the 'looking' in §66 (quoted at the head
of this chapter) - strongly emphasising the need to fully understand the problem before
tackling any solution to it:
'We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature undecided.
Sometime perhaps we will know more about them - we think. But that is
just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.'
(Wittgenstein 1953, pl02).
Wittgenstein was at pains in the Philosophical Investigations to start from as
theoretically neutral a position as possible in his pursuit of an account of
categorisation. In contrast, to start to examine categorisation from a standpoint which
assumes stored conceptual representations, and processes of matching stimuli to them,
is to start that investigation with an a priori commitment 'to a particular way of looking
at the matter'. Thus, another factor that appears to elude cognitive science accounts of
categorisation that attempt to incorporate Wittgenstein's theoretical standpoint is that in
the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein doesn't just present some theoretical
insights into human categorisation. Buried in his arguments is a thorough critique of
the phenomena under examination - human concepts and categories, and the way
words are attached to these - and the constraints that this critique imposes on any
methodology for their study.
What follows is an attempt to elucidate those arguments in Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations relevant to the study of concepts and categories, and
outline the constraints on the concept of concept that these investigations yield. The
account developed will then be contrasted with the commonly held view of
Wittgenstein's position in the cognitive science literature. I do not claim that the
position I establish below is Wittgenstein's: as I acknowledged above, the questions
asked by researchers in cognitive science are markedly different from those considered
by Wittgenstein (for an excellent 'straight' exegesis of Wittgenstein's arguments see
Baker and Hacker, 1980). Rather, my claim is: firstly that the position established
here is consistent with the overall thrust of Wittgenstein's arguments; and secondly,
that an analysis based on these arguments has much to offer contemporary debates
regarding categorisation. Accordingly, having established a 'Wittgensteinian account
of categorisation', in the following chapter I shall then evaluate the extent to which
current theories of categorisation can accommodate the theoretical constraints
established by this reading of Wittgenstein.
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3.2 What Family Resemblances Are Not:
The accepted interpretation of Wittgenstein's account of concepts and categories in
cognitive science is nicely summarised by Lakoff (1987a; though accounts which
broadly concur with this can be found in Khatchadourian, 1966; Rosch and Mervis,
1975; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard 1986; Komatsu,
1992).
Lakoff acknowledges Wittgenstein as the first theorist to notice what he terms a major
crack in classical theories (e.g. Katz, 1972) of concepts and categories. These theories
maintain that categories have clear boundaries and that they are defined in terms of
common properties amongst a category's members, with these definitions perhaps
being couched in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for the determination of
category membership (i.e. possession of properties X, Y and Z are both necessary
and sufficient for an object to be considered an example of category N).
Lakoff notes that in PI §66, Wittgenstein argues that categories such as game cannot
be accounted for according to the classical theory because there are no common
properties that are shared by all games:
66. Consider for example the proceedings we call "games". I mean
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic-games, and so on. What
is common to them all? - Don't say: 'There must2 be something common,
or would they not be called 'games'" - but look and see whether there is
anything common to all. - For, if you look at them you will not see
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a
whole series of them at that. To repeat, don't think, but look! - Look for
example at board games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass
to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group,
but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we next
pass to ball games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. -
Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is
there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think
of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child
throws his ball at a wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared.
2 The emphasis is Wittgenstein's.
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Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the differences between
skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-
roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other
characteristics have disappeared! And we can go through many, many
other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up
and disappear.
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network
of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.
67. I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities
than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between
members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament,
etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. - And I shall say:
'games' form a family.
And for instance, the kinds of number form a family in the same
way. Why do we call something a "number"? Well perhaps because it has
a - direct - relationship with several things that have hitherto been called
number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other
things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in
spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread
does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole
length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.
But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all
these constructions - namely the disjunction of all their common
properties" -1 should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One
might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread - namely the
continuous overlapping of those fibres". (Wittgenstein 1953, p31-2).
Lakoff draws two key theses from these passages:
*1: "Games, like family members are similar to one another in a variety of ways"; and
*2: "That [family resemblances], and not a single well defined collection of common
properties is what makes game a category" (Lakoff, 1987a, pp 16-17)
From a close reading of §66 and §67, *1 would appear to be a fair statement of
Wittgenstein's views. However, it is difficult to reconcile interpretation *2 with what
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Wittgenstein actually says. In §66 Wittgenstein explicitly states that 'you will not see
something that is common to all [games]'. Rather, he argues that what games have in
common is the now notorious family resemblances:3 'a complicated network of
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes
similarities of detail'. Lakoff, (and cognitive science literature in general) take this to
be Wittgenstein's characterisation of what a category is. Consistent with Lakoff s
position, Rosch and Mervis (1975) describe family resemblance relationships as
consisting of a set of items in which
each item has at least one, and probably several, elements in common with
one or more other items, but no, or few, elements are common to all
items... Members of a category come to be viewed as prototypical of the
category as a whole in proportion to the extent to which they bear a family
resemblance to (have attributes which overlap those of) other members of
the category. Conversely, items viewed as most prototypical of one
category will be those with least family resemblance to or membership in
other categories. (Rosch and Mervis, 1975, p. 575)
In fairness, this description does appear to capture an important aspect of
Wittgenstein's description of 'categories': however, what appears to escape Lakoff,
Rosch, Mervis and other interpreters is the extreme negativity of this characterisation.4
In PI §67 Wittgenstein explicitly condemns the vacuousness of accounts like this as a
characterisation of concepts or categories. Saying that the common theme that runs
through a category is the continual overlap of family resemblances is directly
analogous to saying that the common thing that runs through a thread is continuous
overlapping of the fibres that make up the thread, and Wittgenstein dismisses both of
these accounts as empty gestures: 'Now you are only playing with words.' There is,
he says, no thing that runs through a thread in the form of overlapping fibres, a thread
simply is a series of overlapping fibres. Or to put this another way, as Baker and
Hacker (1980) note, saying that the continuous overlapping of fibres is something
3 'Family resemblances' may well evoke something different in late twentieth century commentators
than perhaps it did in Wittgenstein: it seems reasonable to assume that the product of a small nuclear
family will have a different conception of family resemblance than someone from a complex,
sprawling family unit whose numerous siblings embraced a wide range of diversities of age, taste,
ability and even religion.
4 "From the text it is obvious that the main thrust of this whole discussion is negative and critical"
(Baker and Hacker, 1980 pp 327).
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running through a thread makes the contrast between there being and there not being
some thing running through the thread unintelligible.
Wittgenstein does not claim that family resemblances, and not a single well defined
collection of common properties is what makes game a category; he attempts to show
how empty this view is as a definition. His view here suggests a serious challenge to,
rather than an endorsement of, Lakoff s formulation: if family resemblances are the
common thing that run through game, just as overlapping fibres are the common thing
that run through a thread, then what is this thing supposed to be?5 How is it supposed
to do whatever it is it is supposed to do? How long, Wittgenstein would appear to ask,
is a piece ofstring?
3.3 The Length Of String - Categories And
Boundaries
This question - 'how long is a piece of string?' - becomes important once the second
part of Lakoff's exposition is introduced. Wittgenstein, as Lakoff notes, argues that
the boundaries of categories are not fixed.
68. "All right: the concept of number is defined for you as the logical sum
of these individual interrelated concepts: cardinal numbers, rational
numbers, real numbers, etc.; and in the same way the concept of a game is
the logical sum of a corresponding set of sub-concepts." - It need not be
so. For I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits in this way, that is use
the word "number" for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so
that the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier. And this is
how we do use the word "game". For how is the concept of a game
bounded? What still counts as a game, and what no longer does? Can you
give the boundary? No. You can draw one, for none has so far been
drawn. (But that never troubled you when you used the word "game"
before.)
5 Goodman makes a similar point with regard to the explanatory power of unembellished "similarity":
he argues that saying that two things are similar without stating the respects in which they are similar
is entirely vacuous. 'To say all a's are alike in being a's amounts simply to saying that all a's are a's.
The words "alike in being" add nothing; similarity becomes entirely superfluous.' (Goodman 1973 (p
439)).
CHAPTER 3 - CATEGORISATION - WITTGENSTEIN'S CHALLENGE 68
"But then the use of the word is unregulated, the 'game' we play with
it is unregulated." - It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no
more than there are any rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or
how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too. (Wittgenstein
1953, p32-3).
Lakoff seizes upon the discussion of the category number. Historically, says Lakoff,
numbers were first taken to be integers, and then 'numbers' were successively
extended to include rational numbers, real numbers, complex numbers, transfinite
numbers, and all of the other numbers that mathematicians are wont to invent. But the
concept of 'number' is not bounded in any natural way, and it can be limited or
extended depending upon one's circumstances and purposes. Lakoff says that in
mathematics, intuitive human concepts like number must receive precise definitions:
Wittgenstein's point, he claims, is that different mathematicians give different
definitions, depending upon their goal. Thus although the category number can be
given precise boundaries in many ways, 'the intuitive concept is not limited in any of
those ways; rather, it is open to both limitations and extensions' (Lakoff, 1987a, pp
17).
The question therefore, on Lakoff's account, becomes one of how those limitations
and extensions are governed - what factors determine the boundaries of categories in
given circumstances. Lakoff answers this question in relation to game by saying that
game's boundaries are governed by resemblance to previous games in appropriate
ways: a new thing can be a game if it is suitably similar to previous games. Lakoff
gives the example of the introduction of video games in the 1970s as a recent case in
history where the boundaries of the game category were extended on a large scale.
Once again, subtle and not-so subtle discrepancies can be distinguished between
Lakoff's characterisation of Wittgenstein's views and the content of Wittgenstein's
stated arguments. In §68, Wittgenstein says that one 'can give the concept 'number'
rigid limits in this way, that is use the word "number" for a rigidly limited concept,' -
Lakoff s claim that in mathematics number must receive precise definitions appeals to
this - 'but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a
frontier.' Here, Wittgenstein is not talking about the extensibility of borders, but
something far more radical: 'You can draw [a boundary], for none has so far been
drawn. (But that never troubled you when you used the word "game" before.)'.
Wittgenstein isn't talking here about the extensibility of boundaries; he is talking about
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their absence, a point developed in PI §69 to §73: categories do not have, or need,
boundaries at all. In the context ofWittgenstein's overall discussion of categories, this
is a vitally important point: it is one thing to seek to determine the length of a piece of
string whose length isn't fixed (we might add a temporal dimension to our answer, for
instance); it is quite another thing to seek to find out how long a piece of string is when
the string is of no particular length at all.
69. How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that
we should describe games to him, and we might add: "This and similar
things are called "games'". And do we know any more about it ourselves?
Is it only other people that we cannot tell exactly what a game is? - But this
is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been
drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary - for a special purpose. Does
it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all! (Except for that special
purpose.) No more than it took the definition 1 pace = 75cm. to make the
measure of one pace usable. And if you want to say "But still, before that
it wasn't an exact measure," then I reply: very well, it was an inexact one.
- Though you still owe me a definition of exactness. (Wittgenstein 1953,
P33).
In §69 Wittgenstein is emphatic. One can draw a boundary, for a special purpose, but
it is just that, a drawn boundary. Important in the context of the special purpose, no
doubt, but arbitrary to the concept or category in question. But we do not need to
draw boundaries, because we can happily use concepts where none have been drawn;
categories do not need boundaries to be usable. To further iterate this point,
Wittgenstein considers the state of a user of a category (concept) who cannot specify
that category's boundaries: is the user ignorant of those boundaries? - No, the user
does not 'know the boundaries because none have been drawn'. Not knowing the
boundaries of game is not a state of ignorance - it is reflective of the boundariless state
of game.
§69, at least, seems to offer little support for the extensibility of boundaries as
opposed to the lack of them; §70 serves only to reiterate and strengthen the
boundariless case Wittgenstein makes in the Philosophical Investigations :
70. "But if the concept 'game' is uncircumscribed like that, you don't
really know what you mean by a 'game'." - When I give the description:
"The ground was covered with plants" - do you want to say that I don't
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know what I'm talking about until I can give a definition of plant?
My meaning would be explained by, say, a drawing and the words
"The ground looked exactly like this." - Then were just this grass and these
leaves there, arranged just like this? No, that is not what it means. And I
should not accept any picture as exact in this sense.
Somebody says to me: show the children a game. I teach them to roll
die for money, and the other person says to me "I didn't mean a game like
that" Did he, when he gave me the command have to have in mind the
exclusion of a game of dice? (Wittgenstein 1953, p33). 6
This section thus underlines the boundariless point: one might draw a boundary
(picture) in order to help understand a concept - to pin down a category - but this
doesn't tell you exactly what was meant, since the concepts to be understood aren't
fixed in that way. This point is crucial to Wittgenstein's argument: understanding
concepts involves conceptual understanding; it does not concern some 'exact'
understanding of states of affairs in the world (whatever such an understanding might
be). At the end of §69, Wittgenstein commented that if one were to say to him that 'a
pace' is not an exact measure, he would accept that it was an inexact measure, but he
would also challenge his interlocutor for a definition of 'exactness'. In §70, he returns
to this theme: even if he drew a picture of what he meant by 'the ground is covered
with plants', and then said that what he was referring to 'looked exactly like this' he
would not mean by its looking 'exactly like this' that he meant that there was just this
grass and these leaves, all arranged just like this. He would not accept any picture as
being exact in this sense. This is because he isn't using - and we don't use - exact in
that way. Exact is just another concept (categorising 'things that are exact'), which,
whilst we can bound it in the special way, such as is envisaged by someone saying
that 'a pace' is not an exact measure (defining exact in such and such a way), such a
definition is not what exact is. One might say 'my desk is exacdy five paces from the
door', which would be another example of exact; one in which 'a pace' is an exact
6 Lakoff suggests that this last paragraph should be read as indicating that Wittgenstein is suggesting
that some category members are more central than others (see also Rosch, 1978), the idea being that
dice is not a very good example (is atypical) of game. A more natural reading of Wittgenstein's
intentions here is not that he wishes us to think of dice as a particularly atypical game, but rather that
it is not an appropriate game to teach children, and that there is nothing in 'game' that rules this
notion of appropriateness either in or out. (Thanks to Ulrike Hahn for the translation of this
paragraph.)
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measure (though in this case, 'exact' is not used in the same way, and with the same
sense as by the interlocutor in respect of the plants in §70).
In §69 and §70 Wittgenstein makes use of this instinctive temptation to claim that
boundariless categories are not exact, and therefore presumably problematical in use,
to demonstrate the way in which we readily employ concepts - in this case exact -
without boundaries unproblematically. One can make these points about category and
concept as well. Wittgenstein's family resemblances 'definition' of these concepts is
analogous to his discussion of exact above: a characterisation of how of category and
concept are used (pre-theoretical 'concepts'), rather than some theoretical definition
that states explicitly what these terms can stand for (i.e. as theoretical constructs). As
Baker and Hacker (1980) observe, 'it is explanation, not definition, that is the correlate
of understanding': being able to explain what a concept like game is is a criterion of
understanding it (and as I shall show below, Wittgenstein is quite clear about what this
does and does not entail); but someone's being unable to define a concept is not a
criterion for determining that they do not understand it.
This thesis - that categories don't have boundaries - is vital to Wittgenstein's position,
as witnessed by his working through another formulation of it in §71:
71. One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred
edges. - "But is a blurred concept a concept at all?" - Is an indistinct
photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to
replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often
exactly what we need?
Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area without
boundaries cannot be called an area at all. This presumably means that we
cannot do anything with it. - But is it senseless to say: "Stand roughly
there"? Suppose that I were standing with someone in a city square and
said that. As I say it I do not draw any kind of boundary, but perhaps
point with my hand - as if I were indicating a particular spot. And this is
just how one might explain to someone what a game is. One gives
examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. - I do not,
however, mean by this he is supposed to see in those examples that
common thing that I - for some reason - was unable to express; but that he
is now going to employ those examples in a particular way. Here, giving
examples is not an indirect means of explaining - in default of a better. For
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any general definition can be misunderstood too. The point is that this is
how we play the game. (I mean the language game with the word
"game".) (Wittgenstein 1953, p34).
Again, Wittgenstein's rejection of boundaries - and not just the idea of fixing upon this
boundary rather than that one - seems to be both clear and unambiguous. We don't
have to define boundaries in order to use concepts, nor is it clear that definite
boundaries are always what we need; these points can be further drawn out if we
contemplate §71 in conjunction with §76:
76. If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknowledge
it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in my mind.
For I did not want to draw one at all. His concept can be said to be not the
same as mine, but akin to it. The kinship is that of two pictures, one of
which consists of colour patches with vague contours, and the other of
patches similarly shaped and distributed, but with clear contours. The
kinship is just as undeniable as the difference. (Wittgenstein 1953, p36).
Categories - concepts - do not have boundaries, and by drawing boundaries we do not
capture categories, we create something new - call them bounded categories (in §68
Wittgenstein calls them 'rigidly limited' concepts, so we might call our bounded game
a rigidly limited game) - which have some kind of kinship with our natural categories,
such as game, but a rigidly limited game is markedly and importantly different to
game. (To return to a point made earlier, using concepts differs markedly from the
pursuit of trying to form a theoretical view of them as constructs).
To return to family relations, these are the fibres that make up the threads that are
categories; but Wittgenstein explicitly states that the length of these threads cannot be
determined.
3.4 Categories, Essences And Schemas
Wittgenstein develops and expands the difference between the idea of an extensible
boundary and the idea of no boundary throughout §72 to §83. However, yet another
key thesis in Wittgenstein's account of categories was introduced in §71 above: in
explaining what a game is, observes Wittgenstein, one gives examples of instances of
games, and one intends those examples to be taken in a particular way. What one does
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not do, in giving these examples, is to expect the person to whom one is explaining
'game' to see the common thing - whether it be a core, schema or essence - which one
cannot actually see oneself. It is true, says Wittgenstein, that when we give these
examples our subject might see kinships between the examples, but these kinships are
not in any way essential (to reverse the formulation of §76 - whilst applying the same
logic - the differences between the instances will be just as undeniable as these
kinships). Giving these examples, says Wittgenstein, is not an indirect explanation; it
is the explanation. We don't give a general definition, but this is not because we can't
think of one, but because there is none to give.
This theme is developed in turn in §72, §73, §74, §75 and §76.
72. Seeing what is common. Suppose I show someone various multi¬
coloured pictures, and say: "The colour you see in all these is called
'yellow ochre'". - This is a definition, and the other will get to understand
it by looking for and seeing what is common to the pictures. Then he can
look at, and point to, the common thing.
Compare this with a case where I show him figures of different
shapes all painted the same colour, and say: "What these have in common
is called 'yellow ochre'".
And compare this case: I show him samples of different shades of
blue and say: 'The colour that is common to all these is what I call 'blue'".
(Wittgenstein 1953, p34).
Wittgenstein has already argued in §66, in respect of games, that if one looks at a
category - that if one looks at games - one will not see any single thing that they have
in common. Here, he questions the way that 'commonalities' are supposed to be
garnered in the first place. In the first example, the commonality is easy to spot:
provided the only common colour in the pictures was yellow ochre, and provided that
the subject had grasped the meaning of colour, then she will be able to grasp what
yellow ochre is - the colour that is common in all the pictures.
In example two, the subject could not proceed in the same way: although the figures all
have colour (yellow ochre) in common, they also have other commonalities, such as
being figures. Thus the subject could as easily learn to apply 'yellow ochre' to yellow
ochre or to figures, or even to sample (all of the samples are samples after all) from
this example. Nothing in the definition picks out the particular commonality that
'yellow ochre' is supposed to pick out.
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Finally, in example three, there is no a priori colour commonality to the pictures;
rather, the commonality can only be perceived if an observer already has the concept
'blue' (otherwise, she would see a riot of various 'colours'; not having any example of
what 'not blue' is, she might also think that 'blue' just meant 'colours'). Since
understanding this example is crucially dependent upon an understanding of 'blue', it
follows that the example could not serve as a explanation of, or a definition of what is
- or isn't - 'blue'.
These points are then further expanded in §73:
73. When someone defines the names of colours for me by pointing to
samples and saying "This colour is called 'blue', this 'green'..." this case
can be compared in many respects to putting a table in my hands, with the
words written under the colour samples. - Though this comparison may
mislead in many ways. - One is now inclined to extend the comparison: to
have understood the definition means to have in one's mind an idea of the
thing defined, and that is a sample or a picture. So if I am shown various
different leaves and told "This is called a 'leaf", I get an idea of the shape
of a leaf, a picture of it in my mind. - But what does that picture of a leaf
look like when it does not show us any particular shape, but 'what is
common to all shapes of leaf? Which shade is the sample in my mind of
the colour green - the sample of what is common to all shades of green.
"But might there not be such 'general' samples? Say a schematic leaf,
or a sample ofpure green?" - Certainly there might. But for a schema to be
understood as a schema, and not as the shape of a particular leaf, and for a
slip of pure green to be understood as all that is greenish, and not as a
sample of pure green - this in turn resides in the way that samples are used.
Ask yourself, what shape must a sample of the colour green be?
Should it be rectangular? Or would it then be the sample of a green
rectangle? - So should it be 'irregular' in shape? And what is to prevent us
from regarding it - that is, from using it - only as a sample of the
irregularity of shape? (Wittgenstein 1953, p34-5).
Wittgenstein poses here a number of questions, albeit perhaps non-obvious ones, that
are raised by the introduction of a generalised schema to serve as the basis for a
I
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category. (I should note that the objections Wittgenstein raises here apply to the idea
of generalised category schemas in general, and not to some particular form of
schema). Firstly, there is the question of the form that the generalisation should take;
what shape should a generalised leaf be? Intricately linked to this is the question of
how schemas are supposed to be used. Even if we can answer the first question - how
we, say, generate a generalised temperature for ice-cream - we are still left with the
related question of explaining how such a generalisation is used in practice. Which
particular aspects of the schema are general, and which are not, and how in use are we
supposed to know which is which. We might rephrase this question as asking which
parts of the schema represent 'the generalised concept', and which are
implementational details of the representation of this generalisation; if we relate this
back to our earlier discussion of the A/B distinction, the question is how is the
possessor of a concept schema to distinguish between those parts of the schema that
are 'conceptual information', and those parts of the schema that are just aspects of the
media for representing that information. Is the generalised green shape a schema for
green or a schema for generalised shape? Which raises the further question: provided
one could generate answers to these very challenging questions, what is supposed to
be intrinsic to such a schema that would cause it to be used differently to an example of
that which it was supposed to be a generalisation of? In §74, Wittgenstein explicitly
claims that there is no such intrinsic feature in a schema, and thus that such a schema
could not operate any differently from yet another sample of some thing:
74. Here also belongs the idea that if you see this leaf as a sample of 'leaf
shape in general' you see it differently from someone who regards it as,
say, a sample of this particular shape. Now this may well be so - though it
is not so - for it would only be to say that, as a matter of experience, if you
see the leaf in a particular way, you use it in such-and-such a way
according to such-and-such rules. Of course there is such a thing as seeing
this way or that; and there are also cases where whoever sees a sample like
this will in general use it in this way, and whoever sees it otherwise in
another way. For example, if you see the schematic drawing of a cube as a
plane figure consisting of a square and two rhombi you will, perhaps,
carry out the order "Bring me something like this" differently from
someone who sees the picture three-dimensionally. (Wittgenstein 1953,
P35).
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Johnson-Laird (1983) offers a different interpretation of §73, claiming that it shows
that Wittgenstein had adopted a Kant-like (1787) approach to schemas, arguing that 'a
schema is not an image, but a model that underlies the ability to form an image'
(Johnson-Laird, 1983, p 190). Seizing on Wittgenstein's comment that 'for a schema
to be understood as a schema ... in turn resides in the way that samples are used'
Johnson-Laird claims that Wittgenstein is arguing that schemas do act as representative
samples 'in the same way as mental models acts as representative samples' (Johnson-
Laird, 1983, p 190): according to Johnson-Laird, Wittgenstein argues in this section
for a view of schemas that are 'not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but the
typical or default characteristics of the items [they] subsume.'
As with the standard view of family resemblances, this interpretation sits ill in the
context of the broader argument advanced in these passages. Wittgenstein introduces
the idea of schemas here not because he advocates them as a basis for the mental
representation of concepts, but rather in order to show how despite possessing a
certain theoretical seductiveness, schemas cannot provide answers to questions about
the mental representation of concepts: 'this may well be so - though it is not so'.
As I noted earlierWittgenstein's position in objecting to the idea of schemas as a basis
for concepts is far more systematic than Johnson-Laird's isolated example indicates.
Wittgenstein details a list of requirements that schemas would have to fulfil if they are
to act as a basis for categories:
• What form is a schema supposed to take: what shape is a generalised leaf?;
• Which aspects of a schema are generic, and which are not, and how do we
explain the distinction between generic and non-generic aspects of the representation in
the use of the proposed schema?
• What is supposed to be intrinsic to a schema that would cause it to be used
differently to examples of whatever it was that it was supposed to be a generalisation
(or model) of?
Wittgenstein makes quite clear in §71 - 74 that he feels that there simply are no
satisfactory answers to these questions. Wittgenstein, in these passages, is quite
clearly not advocating schemas as a theory of category representation; rather he is
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seeking to demonstrate - convincingly - that schemas alone cannot provide an account
of how concepts are represented.7
3.5 Samples And Similarities: Beyond The Boundary
So far the general focus of this discussion has been on what Wittgenstein says
categories, and by extension categorisation, are not. In doing this, however, I have
introduced some aspects ofWittgenstein's account of what it is to 'know' a category -
what having a concept of something is - in the discussion of the sections from the
Philosophical Investigations above. In §69, Wittgenstein remarked 'How should we
explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe games to him,
and we might add: "This and similar things are called "games'". And do we know any
more about it ourselves?'; in §71 '[how might one] explain to someone what a game
is[?] One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. -1 do not,
however, mean by this he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing that
I - for some reason - was unable to express; but that he is now going to employ those
examples in a particular way'. Wittgenstein argues that we learn game from examples
of games, and that our understanding of game is dependent upon how we re-employ
these examples.
This is one of the ways in which Wittgenstein's thesis that 'meaning is use' is
introduced in the Philosophical Investigations. It should be noted, however, that
'meaning is use' does not express the rather banal truism that meanings are determined
by how we use concepts (or words), but rather it expresses the more fundamental idea
that there simply is no more to meaning than how the examples which comprise a
category are used. This is clear as even in the brief remark above: the concept of game
is no more and no less than the way 'game' and examples of games are used.
7 Some similar points are made by Winograd and Flores (1986) with respect to the use of simple
frames to represent concepts. With respect to frames, they note 'if we look at the literature on frame
systems [for an answer to such questions] we find a mixture of hand-waving and silence. Simple rules
don't work. If, for example, defaults are used precisely when there is no explicit (previously derived)
information to the contrary, then we will assume that one holds even when a simple straightforward
deduction might contradict it. If analogies are treated too simply, we attempt to carry over detailed
properties of one object to another for which they are not appropriate (pi 17)'. There is a strong
parallel to be drawn between the way frames are used in artificial intelligence, and the role schemas arc
supposed to play in cognitive theories of categorisation.
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75. What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean, to
know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to
an unformulated definition? So if it were formulated I should be able to
recognise it as the expression of my knowledge? Isn't my knowledge, my
concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations I could give?
That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of game; showing
how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these;
saying that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and so on.
(Wittgenstein 1953, p35).
There are no boundaries, common essences or anything else says Wittgenstein: the
'common things' that we - for some reason - are unable to express. Rather, categories
simply comprise samples (connected by the network of commonalities alluded to in
'family resemblances') and rules governing the use of these samples (use is made
possible by our grasping that the samples are to be 'taken in a particular way').
Rundle (1996) claims (taking §75 in isolation) that Wittgenstein uses this point to
establish the idea that definitions are not something we consult, but that his arguments
do not 'exclude definitions from another role, namely that of specifying the various
features of things we look to in making our classifications' (pp 67). Rundle takes the
difference in meaning between 'bottle' and 'jar' as an example: 'although this question
may never have engaged us explicitly, it takes very little reflection to conclude that we
use 'jar' when the width of a container's opening is close in size to the body of the
container, whereas with a bottle we have a neck which tapers to a relatively narrower
opening... it is clear that it is width of opening (amongst other things) that guides us
in the use of these terms' (pp 66-7). Not only is this interpretation clearly at odds with
Wittgenstein's arguments in the sections foregoing this passage - Wittgenstein is at
pains to demonstrate that game cannot be given any such definition - but as studies by
Sloman Malt, Shi, Gennari and Wang (1997a; 1997b) and Labov (1973) demonstrate,
it is also clearly at odds with empirical data regarding the way people actually use the
terms 'bottle' and 'jar'. Labov found that drawing the kind of distinction Rundle
envisages between membership and non-membership for simple physical object
categories such as cup and bowl was less than straightforward; the differences
between cup and bowl vary along a continuum, and different participants put the cut
off point on the continuum in different places. Moreover, this point could be altered
by context: if participants were asked to imagine an object which is otherwise half-way
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between a cup and a bowl as containing mashed potato, then participants showed a
marked preference for considering the object to be a bowl.
Further evidence is provided by Sloman et al, who found in their study that there was
a clear distinction between naming and the kind of perceptual similarity Rundle
invokes; names used to describe objects in their study did not appear to be governed
by perceptual similarity relations and that names did not "exert a strong influence on
the shape on conceptual similarity space, or on object locations in that space. Learning
to call [a] blue smurf a "juice box" may make that object a member of the linguistic
category "box" without making it seem more similar to rectangular things made of
cardboard." (Sloman et al, 1997b, p239). 8
The key point Wittgenstein is seeking to establish here is not that one be able to specify
the relevant commonalities, - 'What does it mean to know what a game is? What does
it mean, to know it and not be able to say it?' - since it might be, as with game, that
one cannot. Rather, what is important is the way commonalities are considered:
knowing 'examples of various kinds of game' and also 'how all sorts of other games
can be constructed on the analogy of these'. Wittgenstein is differentiating here
between that which we can specify, the examples of games (or bottles and jars) that we
have encountered previously, and the underlying process by which these previously
encountered samples can inform both our understanding of new samples, and of the
terms game- or bottle, or jar - in general.
Wittgenstein is also making the point that knowing how we make these considerations
- our being able to specify or describe the underlying cognitive processes - is not
relevant to our understanding of game (just as being able to specify our capacity for
language is irrelevant to conversation). This is further illustrated in much of the
remainder of the Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein's concern for
underlying processes - such as saying how samples are to be taken in such and such a
way - is a key motivation for the considerable amount of time devoted to
Wittgenstein's extensive working through of the idea of 'rule following,' where
Wittgenstein takes great care to show that following rules is a cognitive process that
8 Sloman et al go on to say "... In that sense, it [the blue smurf] may not be thought of as a box even
though it is called a box" (p 239): I note this, since it seems firstly to beg the question of what a box
is - in Wittgensteinian terms one might say: 'Alright, but now you owe me a definition of "box"' -
and also because it begs the further question of how one might 'think about' something that one calls
a "box" without thinking of it as a box!
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most definitely isn't conscious or deliberate, but is rather instinctive and innate (c.f.
McGinn, 1983; Baker and Hacker, 1983).
3.6 Representation And Process
As I noted above, in §76, Wittgenstein argues that 'if someone were to draw a sharp
boundary' around a concept, he could not acknowledge that concept as being identical
to the concept that he possessed whose name corresponded to it; and that the
differences between such a bounded concept and a 'natural concept' would be as
significant as any similarities between them. Taken together, §76, 77 and 78 develop
an argument that firmly opposes the idea of definitions (and fixed category
representations) altogether:
76. If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknowledge
it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in my mind.
For I did not want to draw one at all. His concept can be said to be not the
same as mine, but akin to it. The kinship is that of two pictures, one of
which consists of colour patches with vague contours, and the other of
patches similarly shaped and distributed, but with clear contours. The
kinship is just as undeniable as the difference.
77. And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the degree
to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred one depends upon the
latter's degree of vagueness. For imagine having to sketch a sharply
defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one. In the latter there is a
blurred red rectangle: for it you put down a sharply defined one. Of course
- several such sharply defined rectangles can be drawn to correspond to the
indefinite one. - But if the colours in the original merge without a hint of
any outline won't it become a hopeless task to draw a sharp picture
corresponding to the blurred one? Won't you then have to say: "Here I
may as well draw a circle or a heart as a rectangle, for all the colours
merge. Anything - and nothing - is right." - And this is the position you
are in if you look for definitions corresponding to our concepts in
aesthetics or ethics.
In such a difficulty, always ask yourself: How did we learn the
meaning of this word ("good" for instance)? From what sort of examples?
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In what language games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word
must have a family ofmeanings.
7 8. Compare knowing and saying:
how many feet high Mont Blanc is-
how the word "game" is used-
how a clarinet sounds.
If you are surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it,
you are perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like
the third. (Wittgenstein 1953, p36).
These sections underline the arguments developed so far: not only can we not bound
category space, but any attempts to do so will be pointless, necessarily unsuccessful.
One cannot use a bounded 'definition' or 'representation' to characterise an unbounded
phenomenon. A sharp picture cannot characterise a blurred picture; they are simply
two different pictures. Concepts are learned by the examples that typify them, and
Wittgenstein has already argued that no common thread between these examples can
define a given concept or category. Not only will any definition necessarily not
capture the concept, but there is no end to the variety of definitions which one could
equally validly (or rather invalidly) put forward; 'I may as well draw a circle or a heart
as a rectangle, for all the colours merge.'
It seems reasonable to conclude from this that Wittgenstein is not arguing for a
treatment of concepts and categories, but rather that he is trying to undermine our pre-
theoretical attachment to a particular idea of what concepts and categories are in order
to demonstrate that in asking what a concept or category is in this way - with a
particular determinate answer in mind - we are asking the wrong question. Asking
what a concept or category is is like asking how a clarinet sounds, not like enquiring
after the height of mountains (that is to say, it is like asking the height of mountains in
general, and not the height of a particular mountain).
This is a vitally important, and often overlooked, aspect of Wittgenstein's treatment of
categories: namely that to Wittgenstein, if we ask the question 'what makes a category
a category?' we should not expect to find an answer, not because the answer is
somehow 'beyond our ken', but because we are asking - fundamentally - the wrong
question. Elsewhere in the Philosophical Investigations (p. 308) Wittgenstein
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examines the way in which problems about mental processes9 and states arise. He
argues that the most important step in the production of such problems is the one that
goes unnoticed - the first one:
'We talk of process and states, and leave their nature undecided.
Sometime perhaps we will know more about them - we think. But that is
just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.'
(Wittgenstein 1953, pl02).
Wittgenstein's arguments, as examined so far, do not advocate a particular view of
categories - what has become known loosely as 'family resemblance theory' - but
rather they represent a thorough attempt to eliminate the temptation to see the question
of how humans categorise things - how it is this or that 'thing' are considered to be,
say, 'games' - in terms of determinate, or even necessarily determinable, 'categories'.
To Wittgenstein, the problems involved in explaining how categories are defined stem
not from the phenomenon under examination, but the way this phenomenon has
traditionally been defined; hence, perhaps, the famous 'don't think, but look!'
(famously criticised as being an inadequate basis for studying categorisation by Medin
and Ortony, 1989). If we 'think', i.e. if we assume that the existence of things called
games entails the existence of categories - defined in some as yet to be determined way
- in virtue of which the things can be considered games, we are not exploring
categorisation: we are predetermining what it can be. And since categorisation does
not conform to the picture we have attempted to impose upon it, we find that our
subsequent attempts at exploration are difficult and frustrating (one might draw an
analogy between this process, and that of exploring a lost continent with a map one
had drawn before one set out). However, argues Wittgenstein, if we 'look', we will
find that categorisation does not conform to our pre-theoretical expectations: the
existence of things called games does not entail the existence of 'categories' if what we
mean by category is some determinate thing in virtue of which those things can be
considered games. For if we look, we see that the use of concepts such as 'game'
precludes the existence of simple category representations in virtue of which such
things can be considered games, since 'game' is used in such a way that there is
nothing in particular in virtue of which 'games' are games. Rather, there are a number
9 As I noted earlier, Wittgenstein actually considers the way philosophical problems concerning
mental processes arise - his analysis does, however seem equally applicable to psychological problems
and questions.
CHAPTER 3 - CATEGORISATION - WITTGENSTEIN'S CHALLENGE 83
of things - samples - in virtue of which 'games' are games - '[a] word must have a
family of meanings' - and some process - the 'appropriate ways' of taking these
samples - by which they contribute to the category (or categories) game.
3.7 Discussion
The broad outline ofWittgenstein's argument can be summarised as follows:
1. That categories have no necessary or sufficient defining characteristics: rather
that kinships - "family resemblances" - can be traced across categories (§65-7);
2. That these category spaces are unbounded - i.e. there are no boundaries to the
space across which "family resemblances" can be traced (§68, 69, 70, 71, 73);
3. That learning a category such as game does not involve extracting an essence
or schema from instances. (§71-83)
4. In learning a "category" such as game, one learns examples (instances) and
appropriate ways of using these examples (§69,71, 73, 81, 82)
Taken together, these arguments don't amount to a quibble about the constitution of
categories; rather, I have sought here to show that Wittgenstein was rejecting
altogether the idea of categories or concepts as definitive, determinable, theoretical
constructs. He seeks to demonstrate in the Philosophical Investigations that the idea
that there is a thing (some specific representation, even when called a category) that
can determine whether a game is a game makes as much sense as the idea that there is
some thing that runs through a whole thread - namely the continuous overlapping of
those fibres; and this is an idea that Wittgenstein rejects as a vacuous play on words.
What is a category, a game? How long is a piece of string? It isn't that the answer to
these questions is hard to find, but rather that the questions make no sense (are
nonsense).
Another way of seeing this same point is to view Wittgenstein's argument as a
challenge that any strong theory of category representation - i.e. a theory couched in
purely representational terms - would have to meet. In order to explain what a
category is, such a theory would have to explain how a category essence or schema
can be a determinant of categories which have no necessary or sufficient defining
characteristics, but rather kinships of "family resemblances" that can be traced across
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them, and whose category spaces are unbounded - i.e. there are no boundaries to the
space across which "family resemblances" can be traced. It would appear that
Wittgenstein felt - with very good reason - that these are challenges that cannot be met.
In the following chapter, I shall examine the empirical evidence that has been collected
regarding categorisation and the current state of cognitive models of categorisation. I
shall attempt to show that Wittgenstein's critique, as presented here, is consistent with
the empirical evidence10, and then explore the implications this has for analogy and
categorisation.
10 Moreover, I shall argue Wittgenstein's treatment of 'concepts' can provide the theoretical glue to
bind the mass of psychological evidence together.
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Chapter 4
Categorisation II
Theories and Models of Categorisation
4.1 The Challenge
What emerged from the foregoing examination of Wittgenstein's theoretical analysis is
not any kind of working definition of categorisation, but rather a fundamental
challenge to our common concept of concepts. Wittgenstein's arguments throw into
question the very idea that a given category embraces a determinate, identifiable
concept.
If Wittgenstein is right, then the consequences for a view of cognition that embraces
distinct, separable processes of categorisation and analogy could be far-reaching. As I
argued in chapter 2, in cognitive science analogies have traditionally been defined as
being distinct - somehow - from categories, the nature of which are left unexamined
with respect to such definitions (although it has been assumed that concepts and
categories are somehow specified and represented in a way analogies are not).
I mentioned earlier that without an account of categorisation couched in terms of
specifically - and discernibly - represented concepts and categories, a distinction
between analogy and categorisation which is reliant upon a contrast of analogy with
categorisation won't actually do any distinguishing at all. Without such an account of
categorisation, a typical definition of analogy such as the one mentioned in chapter 2 :
"In an analogy, afamiliar domain is used to understand a novel domain in
order to highlight important similarities between the domains, or to predict
new features of the novel domain"
(Clement and Gentner, 1991, p 89).
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would be equivalent to:
"In PROCESS, a stored representation is used in order to highlight
important similarities between it and a new representation of an object or
concept, or to predict new features in the new representation ofan object or
concept."
where PROCESS could equally validly be replaced by analogy or categorisation, since
there would be no way of distinguishing between the two.
In this chapter,1 I shall examine current knowledge and perspectives regarding
categorisation in the light of Wittgenstein's arguments. Does the empirical evidence
match Wittgenstein's analysis? Can that analysis shed some light on the mass of
existing data? Or are there empirical findings that offer up the possibility of our
retaining a determinate, theoretical view of concepts, thereby salvaging the traditional
analogy - categorisation distinction?
4.2 Definitions And Boundaries
Wittgenstein's first two sets of arguments attacked variations on what is usually
referred to as the definitional or 'classical' view of concepts (see Smith and Medin,
1981), which holds that concepts possess definitions specifying features necessary
and sufficient for the concept.
Wittgenstein argued:
1. Categories have no necessary or sufficient defining characteristics: rather that
kinships - "family resemblances" - can be traced across particular categories
(§65-7); and
2. The spaces these categories cover are unbounded - i.e. there are no boundaries
to the space across which "family resemblances" can be traced (§68, 69, 70, 71,
73);
'I am indebted to Ulrike Hahn for the many discussions that have influenced many of the ideas
articulated here. In particular, two review papers Dr. Hahn and I wrote collaboratively have helped
determine the shape of this chapter. I have no wish to claim sole authorship over what is very much
joint work, and hence, for the purposes of this thesis, I shall reference these papers as I would the
work of any other outside author.
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As these two arguments are jointly aimed at an earlier view of concepts put forward by
Frege (1952; a variant had been previously held by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus,
1922) they are best considered jointly.
Frege characterised concepts in terms of sets of defining attributes, distinguishing
between a concept's intension and its extension. In the psychological literature, this
distinction has generally been interpreted and expressed as follows; the intension of a
concept is the set of attributes that define what it is to be a member of the concept, and
the extension is the set of items that are members of the concept. Thus, on this basis,
a concept's feature-definition is the summary description of the entire class used in
every instance of categorisation, which proceeds simply by checking for the presence
of these features in the instance in question, and a concept's class-definition is a list of
all those instances that have been encountered that possess these features. If we take
the concept bachelor, its intension would include characteristics such as male,
unmarried and adult, and its extension would be the set of male, unmarried, adults in
the world. This defining-characteristics view is often supplemented by a "nesting
assumption": that a subordinate concept (e.g. robin) contains nested within in it the
defining features of the super-ordinate (bird)-, see for example Collins and Quillian
(1969; 1970).
Thus, according to the definitional view, concepts are defined in terms of a set of
conjunctive attributes, each of which is necessary, and all of which are jointly
sufficient for an item to be recognised as being an instance - or member - of that
concept or category. As what is and what is not a member of a category is therefore
clearly defined, clear-cut boundaries between what counts as a member and non-
member of a category can be posited.
4.2.1 Definitions
As Ramscar and Hahn (1998a) argue, despite some evidence that definitions can form
the basis for categories in empirical studies using artificial stimuli (e.g. Bruner,
Goodnow and Austin, 1956), Wittgenstein's analysis of the definitional view is
confirmed when studies transfer their focus from artificial concepts in controlled
experiments to our everyday concepts (i.e. the concepts for which we typically have
words). When it comes to typical, everyday concepts, definitions appear inadequate,
as do theories that are based upon them.
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Ramscar and Hahn observe that of the difficulties the definitional view encounters with
everyday concepts, the most serious is the one highlighted by Wittgenstein in regard to
games: almost all everyday concepts appear to be indefinable (Fodor, Garrett, Walker
and Parkes, 1980; Fodor 1981). It simply hasn't been possible to formulate necessary
and sufficient conditions for a given item's being a game; or a chair, or a bowl, or a
smile. Moreover, if some form of the definitional view is correct, it seems reasonable
to assume that people should, if asked, be able to name the features for all the
members of a concept, and generate fairly similar features sets that are in some way
congruent with a definitional feature-set for that concept. Yet studies by Conrad
(1972) and Rosch and Mervis (1975) have shown that this is not the case; participants
list a range of non-necessary attributes instead. Rosch (1973) found that participants
rated the typicality of category members differently (e.g. robin is a more typical bird
than canary), and that this typicality could be used as a predictor in the times
participants took to confirm statements (e.g. "a robin is a bird"); these results again sit
ill with the apparent democracy of a defining-characteristic definition of a concept.
These problems with definitions are further illustrated by Ramscar and Hahn's
observation that common dictionary "definitions" of almost all terms are not really
definitions at all, in that they do not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
category membership. Instead they typically do no more than provide some relevant
information about category members in order to help the dictionary user attempt to
identify which concept is intended (Ramscar and Hahn, 1998a).
4.2.2 Boundaries
Further evidence contra the definitional view comes from examining the boundaries of
categories. The definitional view implies that these are distinct, and that they should
cleanly separate instances from non-instances. However, consistent with
Wittgenstein's arguments, this turns out not to be the case.
Theoretically, there are many other arguments against category boundaries that can be
laid alongside Wittgenstein's. Ramscar and Hahn (1998a) use a thought experiment
originally put forward by Black (1949) to illustrate how determining a category's
boundary almost always involves a degree of vagueness. If one is asked to imagine a
series of 'chairs' differing in quality by least noticeable amounts, one can end up
imagining something like an ordered sequence which moves from a Chippendale chair
on the one end to a lump of wood at the other end. A 'normal' observer should find it
I
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extremely difficult to point to the dividing line between 'chairs' and 'non-chairs' along
this continuum2. As Black makes clear, this uncertainty over category boundaries can
be generated for any term whose application requires the use of a 'sense', or bounded
meaning; that is to say, such uncertainties apply to all 'material' terms.
Another factor that casts doubt on the idea of clearly specifiable boundaries is noted by
Lakoff (1987b). Even when concepts do appear to have definitions, these definitions
generally hold only with respect to a range of 'background assumptions'. Varying
these assumptions immediately produces unclear or borderline cases:
"The noun bachelor can be defined as an unmarried adult man, but the
noun clearly exists as a motivated device for categorizing people only in the
context of a human society in which certain expectations about marriage
and marriageable age obtain. Male participants in long-term unmarried
couplings would not ordinarily be described as bachelors; a boy abandoned
in the jungle and grown to maturity away from contact with human society
would not be called a bachelor." (Fillmore (1982), quoted in Lakoff
1987b)
Background factors, such as the social conventions concerning marriage, will, in
general, hold to varying degrees, such that, the argument goes, the definition of
bachelor can meaningfully be applied if background conditions are sufficiently similar
to the conventions concerning marriage current in the West. But even then, to take as
an illustration the particular marital circumstances of the Pope, it is still far from clear
that the simple definition 'unmarried male' is sufficient to explain all of the correct and
incorrect applications of the concept bachelor.
Alongside these further theoretical analyses, Ramscar and Hahn point to compelling
empirical evidence that suggests that many - if not all - natural language categories do
not have clear boundaries. Studies such as the one noted in chapter 3 by Labov (1973;
1978) which focused on cup-like containers, examining the variability that was
inherent in the use of terms such as cup, bowl, mug etc., between participants and
between contexts lends empirical support to the boundariless analysis. Labov found
that there was no clear boundary between membership and non-membership for simple
2The difficulties posed by continua are old, as illustrated by the sorites (heap) and phalakro (bald man)
paradoxes, which originate with the Megarian philosophers in the early 4th century BC, (Barnes,
1979)
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physical object categories such as cup and bowl, but rather, confirming Black's
thought experiment, participants responses indicated that the differences between cup
and bowl vary along a continuum, with different participants putting the cut off point
on the continuum in different places. Moreover, this point could be altered by context:
if participants were asked to imagine an object which is otherwise half-way between a
cup and a bowl as containing mashed potato, then participants showed a marked
preference for considering the object to be a bowl. However, as Ramscar and Hahn,
(1998a) note, Labov's interest was primarily in formalising the variability found, and
hence his results are not presented with the detail experimental psychologists might
want. These results receive more formal support from those of McCloskey and
Glucksberg (1978) who presented a study of 540 exemplar-category pairs (e.g.,
apple-fruit) which revealed not only substantial between and within participant
disagreement over category membership (the latter measured over successive test-
sessions) but also showed levels of disagreement to correlate with independently
derived typicality ratings. For example, McCloskey and Glucksberg's participants
were certain that chair belonged to the category furniture, and that cucumber did not.
However, McCloskey and Glucksberg found that there was much between-participant
disagreement as to whether book-ends belonged to the category furniture, and even
that individual participants differed in their judgements from one session to another.
4.2.3 The Case For Definitions And Boundaries
Consistent with Wittgenstein's first two sets of arguments, what evidence there is in
the literature does tend to confirm the view that categories have no necessary or
sufficient defining characteristics; rather some as yet unspecified kinships - family
resemblances - can be traced across categories. Moreover, there is also confirmation
that the boundaries of the spaces these categories cover cannot be specified - i.e. there
are no clearly bounded spaces across which "family resemblances" can be traced.
However, it is worth noting (perhaps with some amazement) at this juncture that
despite the oft-made claim regarding the influence of Wittgenstein on the study of
concepts and categories, and the extensive empirical activity in this area in the past 25
years, very few studies have actually directly addressed these two points (which as I
argued above, are vital elements in the theoretical challenge Wittgenstein presents).
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4.3 Defining Essences
Wittgenstein's final two sets of arguments reject the idea of some abstracted schema in
preference for an account based on previously encountered examples. As I noted in
Chapter 3, he claims that:
3. Learning a category such as game does not involve learning or extracting any
essence or schema from the instances (§71-83);
4. In learning a "category" such as game, one learns examples (instances) and
appropriate ways of using these examples (§69,72,73,74,81,82).
Whilst, as Komatsu (1992) notes, the vast majority of experimental results do not
directly indicate anything about conceptual representation: separating form, content and
the processes acting on concepts is an invidious business (best illustrated by
Wittgenstein's remarks on schemas above) the issue of whether or not a particular
learning process involves the abstraction of some core essence - be it a schema, a
theory or a prototype - or not has been central to experimental psychology. Because a
number of excellent reviews of theories of categorisation and conceptual structure
already exist (Smith and Medin, 1981; Komatsu, 1992), I propose, in the following
two sections, to eschew exhaustiveness, and will not attempt to present an exegesis of
every theory of categorisation that has ever been presented. Instead, I shall focus on
the theories with widest common currency: the prototype theory (Rosch and Mervis,
1975; Rosch, 1978; Hampton, 1979); the exemplar theory (e.g. Medin and Schaffer,
1978; Nosofsky, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, Nosofsky, Clark and Shin, 1989,
Shin and Nosofsky, 1992; Kruschke, 1992; Lamberts, 1996); and the theory (or
explanation-based) theory (Carey, 1985; Medin and Murphy, 1985; Gelman and
Markman, 1986; Keil, 1989; Medin and Ortony, 1989; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997).
The exemplar theory - which loosely, states that category membership is computed
according to a comparison with known category members - is compatible with the
account of Wittgenstein's views presented above, whereas the prototype theory and
the 'theory' theory3 are compatible with the contrary notion of determinate, specifiable
concepts.
3 Which has been proposed to an extent - c.f. Medin and Ortony (1989) - in response to a
dissatisfaction with both the'traditional' Wittgensteinian view, and prototype and exemplar accounts.
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4.4 Prototypes As Essences
"Prototype" - as a theoretical term - has been used loosely. As I noted in chapter 3, the
prototype - or family resemblance - account of categorisation has usually (and, in the
light of the foregoing discussion, erroneously) traced its roots back to Wittgenstein's
'account' of categorisation in the Philosophical Investigations. In this review, I shall
use prototype to refer exclusively to those theories that equate category representation
with the storage of central tendencies for categories.
The prototype account is probabilistic, in the sense that most of the features (or
characteristics) associated with a concept are in some way likely to be found in
instances, but this likelihood is not absolute. Instead, a family resemblance structure
is proposed: instances of a category are thought to resemble one another in the way
that members of a family do (Rosch and Mervis, 1975). Thus, according to this view,
some members of a family will be very typical, as they will share many features
(probabilisitically) with many other family members, whereas some family members
may be very atypical because they share only a few features with other family
members.
The features that are central to prototype accounts of categories can be summarised as
following:
1. Centrality of typicality: the degree of typicality is the central conceptual
mechanism; understanding a concept is understanding typicality, and the
probabilities related to it.
2. Abstractness: each attribute specified for a concept is shared by more than one
instance of a concept; thus by abstraction, category coherence is governed by an
overlapping network of shared attributes.
3. Weighted attributes: attributes are 'weighted' according to their relevance to
judgements of category inclusion; when a sufficient weighting of attributes is
possessed by an instance (which thereby exceeds some threshold), it will be
considered to be a member of a given category (Rosch and Mervis, 1975). The
more weighted attributes an instance possesses, the more typical it will be judged to
be.
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4. Combinational weighting: concepts are defined by combinations of attribute
weights. Attribute weights are independent, but are combined through adding
(Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Smith and Medin, 1981); Komatsu (1992) notes that in
consequence, as implied by the thresholds described in point 3, instances and non-
instances of a concept can be neady partitioned using a linear discriminant function.
If one has to plot a set of objects by the combined weights of all their attributes, all
instances would fall on one side of a category's boundary line (with all noninstances
falling on the other side of that line).
5. Retention ofcentral tendencies: the corollary of the foregoing, therefore, is that
knowing a concept involves being in possession of summary knowledge of the
central tendencies of instances of a given category, and hence, not being in
possession of representations of individual instances.
4.4.1 Prototypes, Family Resemblances - And
Wittgenstein
The gulf between prototype accounts of categorisation on one hand, and
Wittgenstein's theoretical account of the nature of family resemblances on the other, is,
I hope, readily apparent even before I formally contrast the two. Prototype theories
are, in essence, attempts to enumerate and formalise an account of categorisation that
Wittgenstein explicitly condemned as vacuous - 'now you are just playing with words'
- in the Philosophical Investigations.
From the point of view of this critique, I shall argue the chief failing of prototype
theories of categorisation is that they violate Wittgenstein's criteria for determining
what knowing a concept entails, whilst simultaneously failing to meet the important
challenges that are implicit in these criteria.
4.4.1.1 Boundaries
Firstly, prototype theories are unable to meet Wittgenstein's challenges regarding
definitions of boundaries. As Komatsu (1992) argues, without an account of what is
required to determine a priori constraints upon the level of - or the nature of - the
similarities that are shared by category instances, it is unclear exactly what principled
account can be provided by prototype theories of which similarities are to count in
deciding the boundaries between concepts, and how these are to apply. Take, as an
example, a killer whale and a mouse. Killer whales and mice do not appear to share a
vast quantity of similarities, but presumably they share enough for both to be
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considered mammals. However, a killer whale also appears to share as many
similarities with a shark, which is a fish. Without a principled account of how
similarities are to be determined to be particularly category salient, this tends in turn to
beg the question of why a killer whale is a mammal and not a fish? (Or at least, why
killer whales and sharks belong to different categories.)
Komatsu notes that presumably a prototype account would predict that the summed
weights of killer whale attributes lead to its being more similar to other mammals than
fish, and hence a killer whale is categorised as a mammal. However, in determining
these weights, we need first to know how common these attributes are to both
mammals and fish, which necessitates the categorisation of mammals and fish prior to
the categorisation of killer whales. Yet presumably the determining of weightings in
mammals involves a computation of the similarities across all mammals - including
killer whales - which begs the question, given the similarities between killer whales
and fish, of why a particular boundary was drawn - between killer whales and similar
fish - in the computation of those weightings. To put this in a form that makes the
circularity more explicit: a prototype-style categorisation of killer whales as mammals
is contingent upon the categorisation of mammals and fish, but categorisation of
mammals and fish assumes a prior categorical separation between killer whales and
similar fish, which is dependant upon how both in turn are categorised...!
One attempt to avoid this apparent circularity has been to argue that certain
partitionings of the world (including, one would assume, mammals and fish) are
privileged, in that they arise naturally from the interactions of our perceptual apparatus
and the environment, and are therefore more immediate or direct (Rosch, 1978;
Anderson, 1990). According to this argument, similarity weightings are constrained
ecologically, reflecting a natural partitioning in the world that is imposed by our
perceptual systems.
I noted earlier Wittgenstein's famous observation that any talk of "processes" and
"states of affairs" in the world will entail an a priori commitment to a particular way of
looking at matters (Wittgenstein 1953, pl02). Choosing what is to count as facts of
the matter - which categories are 'ecological' - when it comes to categorisation will act
as a powerful a priori determinant of the picture of the process one will uncover. Thus
taking on board a different set of a priori facts will radically alter this picture. The
argument from ecology described above ignores any consideration of the idea that all
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classification systems are ultimately human constructs (indeed, it is an example of
letting one's immersion in one such system blind one to any alternatives).
Consider the following example from 'Ontology', (Moby Dick, Melville, 1851),
where the central character, Ishmael, examines all of the reasons put forward by
Linnaeus for classifying whales as mammals:
First: The uncertain, unsettled condition of this science of Cetology is in
the very vestibule attested by the fact, that in some quarters it still remains a
moot point whether a whale is a fish. In his System of Nature, ad 1776,
Linnaeus declares, 'I hereby separate the whales from the fish.' But of my
own knowledge, sharks and shad, alewives and herring, against
Linnaeus's express edict, were still found dividing the possession of the
same seas as the Leviathan.
The grounds upon which Linnaeus would fain have banished the whales
from the waters, he states as follows: 'On account of their warm bilocular
heart, their lungs, their moveable eyelids, their hollow ears, penem
intrantem feminam mammis lactantem,'4 and finally, 'ex lege naturae jure
meritoque.'51 submitted all this to my friends Simeon Macey and Charlie
Coffin, of Nantucket, both messmates of mine in a certain voyage, and
they united in the opinion that the reasons set forth were altogether
insufficient. Charlie profanely hinted that they were humbug.
Be it known that, waiving all argument, I take the good old fashioned
ground that the whale is a fish, and call upon holy Jonah to back me.'
To Melville's Ishmael, a whale is in fact a fish: Linnaeus's definition of fish versus
mammals does not tally with reality as he sees it, just as most people, even today,
choose to believe that oaks are more similar to pines than they are to cacti, and to
categorise them as such, even though this runs contrary to the taxonomies of biologists
(Dupre, 1981; see below for further discussion). The idea of ecological privilege is
easy to state; it is far less easy to justify.
Historically, when it comes to looking at concepts ecologically, the distinction between
categorisation and analogy at the heart of this investigation is a recent one (just as the
4 "Penetrative reproduction, and females who provide milk by means of breasts" - Melville clearly
adhered to the Victorian dictum that delicate matters were best discussed in a classical tongue.
5
"Justly and properly, according to the law of nature" (Thanks to Robin James for these translations.)
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fact that a whale is a mammal is a recent development in human classification;
historically, whales have been fish for a far longer time than they have been
mammals!). As Thomas (1984) argues in his detailed account of changes in natural
kind categories in England in the period 1500 - 1800, the conceptual revolution begun
by Linnaeus resulted in a common biological system based on heredity. However, the
system that it replaced was based far more on analogy. For much of the early modern
period, 'the universal belief in analogy' resulted in much of the natural world being
categorised and understood by analogy with human social structures, which led to a
radically different partitioning of the world from the one we now employ (as instanced
by Ishmael's fictional insistence that a Whale is a Fish).
Thomas notes that Bees had Princes, Potentates, Kingdoms and Dominions (Warder,
1716; Rusden, 1679, quoted in Thomas, 1984 p62); they were ruled over by 'a fair
and stately bee, having a majestic gait and aspect' (Levett, 1634, quoted in Thomas,
1984, p62). Cranes followed a captain; Rooks had a parliament; Storks and Ants and
Beavers were avowed republicans. As Thomas shows, this picture of the natural
world fed back recursively into concepts of human society: King Henry VII once
ordered the execution of all mastiffs, after they had baited a lion, 'being deeply
displeased ... that an ill-favoured rascal cur should with such violent villainy assault
the valiant lion, king of all beasts' (Caius, 1576, quoted in Thomas, 1984, p 60)).
Further, as Thomas shows, there is little evidence for a view that Linnaean and post-
Linnaean taxonomies necessarily refine our view of the world: in many cases, these
taxonomies replaced subtle categorisations distinguishing on a range of features with a
single crude catch-all based on heredity.
The important issue here is not whether the Linnaean way of construing the world is
right, or whether other 'pre- Linnaean' conceptual schemes are wrong. If certain
conceptual schemes are ecologically privileged, then one would expect historical data
to confirm this. But there is little historical evidence that backs any claims for a
privileged partitioning of the world, and there is much that seems to directly contradict
it. All that different 'ecological' conceptual schemes such as these reflect is the
differing attitudes to pre-theoretical ideas of categorisation that they embody (Lakoff,
1987a, provides numerous examples of the way these analogical taxonomies have
remined in the language, illustrating how the Linnaean revolution may be less complete
than we generally believe). My claim here is simply that if we wish to explain the
cognitive processes that actually underpin categorisation, then an important aspect of
I
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our explanation will involve describing the cognitive processes that underlie all
conceptual systems. An account of categorisation should not be constrained by a
particular set of pre-theoretical or metaphysical attitudes to a particular set of
categories; rather, it should provide a framework that can account for the cognitive
processes that determined prior classification systems, and the mechanisms by which
our current view of the world evolved.
Ecological constraints cannot provide any principled answer to the circularity inherent
in prototype accounts of category boundaries; even as Neisser (1987) argues for
ecological constraints in this respect, he notes the limits of their utility: since very few
adult concepts rely exclusively on perceptual similarities - the exceptions are few,
notoriously colour (Berlin and Kay, 1969; though see Davies, Corbett, Laws,
McGurk, Moss and Smith, 1991, for evidence that even colour may be problemattical
in this respect) - any account of categorisation that hinges exclusively on perceptual
similarities will ultimately prove to be inadequate.
4.4.1.2 Definition And Representation Of Prototype Essences
There are problems inherent in defining and representing prototype essences (reviewed
at length by Komatsu, 1992). The following are particularly noteworthy in the light of
Wittgenstein's discussion. Firstly, because prototype theories posit representations of
central tendencies that are context-free, they cannot explain how levels of family
resemblance - relevance weights - are affected by context (an effect demonstrated by
Barsalou, 1985; Roth and Shoben, 1983). Secondly, not all concepts have prototypic
characteristics: Hampton (1981) showed that whilst certain abstract concepts (e.g.
'science', 'instinct', 'work of art', 'belief') do have prototypic characteristics, many
others do not. Thirdly, prototype accounts cannot account for the kind of knowledge
people have about concepts: people know about relations between attributes, and not
just attributes alone, which allows them to make reasonable guesses about the meaning
of new terms on the basis of exposure to a single instance (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett
and Thagard, 1989; Malt and Smith, 1984). Finally, whilst prototype accounts
assume that a concept only represents information about the central tendencies and
weight of attributes for a given category, there is evidence that participants who learn a
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category also learn information regarding the variability of instances of that category
(Barresi, Robbins and Shain, 1975; Homa and Vosburgh, 1976).6
4.4.1.3 Wittgenstein And Prototypes
Wittgenstein described family resemblances as playing with words. Moreover, as I
noted in chapter 3, taken together, his arguments amount to a rejection of categories as
a unitary theoretical construct. There is nothing in prototype theory that, at present, or
in principle, indicates that prototypes can or could serve as the basis for a unitary
category representation: prototypes posit category boundaries, but can neither justify
where they should be, nor why they should be there; they posit that people represent
only information about the central tendencies and weights of attributes for a given
category, yet cannot account for the knowledge people have about concepts, nor the
categorisation inferences people can make; and, as Gleitman, Armstrong and Gleitman
(1983) demonstrate, the insight at the heart of prototype theories may not even be any
indicator of category structure or representation.
Wittgenstein did not claim that family resemblances are what makes game a category; I
have tried to show that in the Philosophical Investigations he attempted to demonstrate
how empty this view is as a definition. Wittgenstein asks, if family resemblances are
the common thing that run through game, just as overlapping fibres are the common
thing that run through a thread, then what is this thing supposed to be, and how is it
supposed to do whatever it is it is supposed to do; How long is a piece of string?
Prototype theories do little more than attempt a passing answer to the first question -
specifying central tendencies and weights of attributes for categories amounts to no
more than measuring any number of lengths of string - they provide no insights into
the deeper questions posed by Wittgenstein. Nor, in the light of his challenge, do
prototype theories provide any compelling reasons to maintain the pre-theoretical
attachment to concepts and categories that are determined by unitary representations, in
the way prototype theories propose.
'Another argument against prototype theories claims that there is evidence that prototypes are not
indicators of conceptual structure. Gleitman, Armstrong and Gleitman (1983) show that it is possible
to get typicality effects even for "clearly defined" concepts such as odd number. Moreover, these
judgements will predict reaction times in the tasks usually considered indicative of prototypicality.
However, it is debatable whether this evidence should be considered as indicative of a problem with
prototype theories, or whether it reveals that even "clearly defined" concepts such as odd number, or
triangle have a more complex representational structure than one might assume; and that one's
assumptions about their being represented by simple, clear definitions might be far from accurate.
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4.5 Theories As Essences
Another approach which aims to provide an account of categories as determinable
constructs is the 'theory' or explanation based view of categories (Carey, 1985; Medin
and Murphy, 1985; Gelman and Markman, 1986; Keil, 1989; Medin and Ortony,
1989; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997; see also Komatsu, 1992 for a review). Medin and
Ortony's influential treatment of the 'theory' theory is particularly relevant to this
discussion, since it claims to argue for a theoretical treatment of categories in direct
response to Wittgenstein's arguments.
Medin and Ortony - adopting the traditional psychological interpretation of
Wittgenstein - feel that Wittgenstein's "don't think, but look" advice may have been
taken too literally. Criticising prototype theory, and the problems inherent in equating
category concepts with undifferentiated clusters of properties noted above, Medin and
Ortony argue that an adherence to "don't think, but look" involves the abandoning of
what is, they claim, the important notion that category membership might be dependant
upon intrinsically important (even if relatively inaccessible) features.
Medin and Ortony argue that this may, theoretically, be far too much to bear,7 and
instead they advocate a re-evaluation ofWittgenstein's claims, arguing that:
on the basis of readily accessible properties that can be seen, people
presumably will not judge whales to be similar to other mammals.
However, if they think about the fact [my emphasis] that whales are
mammals not fish, they will probably acknowledge that with respect to
some important, although less accessible property or properties whales are
similar to other mammals. If one cannot appeal to hidden properties, it is
difficult to explain the fact that people might recognise such similarities...
there might be a price to pay for looking rather than thinking. (1989, pp
179- 180)
Medin and Ortony's claim is that Wittgenstein's arguments do not give enough weight
to the consideration that similarity judgements are made between representations of
objects, and not between the actual objects themselves, since presented objects are
perceived and interpreted in terms of concepts that are already known to the individual
making the similarity judgement.
7 That is, too great to be borne by a theory of category representation.
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Accordingly, Medin and Ortony argue in favour of a treatment of representations
which is rich enough to allow them to show how similarity performs its various useful
functions in categorisation. Taking the similarity between whales and bears (being
mammalian) as an example, they argue that only an account of representations which
embraces the notion of both deep and surface similarities
can account for why people might believe that two things with very
different surface properties (e.g. whales and bears) still are instances of the
same category, and therefore why they might judge them more similar to
one another than they would on the basis of surface properties alone.
(1989,p 180)
This notion of deep similarity is central to Medin and Ortony's thesis of Psychological
Essentialism, which holds that similarities between surface features (the kinds of
properties listed by participants in typicality experiments, e.g. Rosch & Mervis, 1975)
are often constrained by deeper core elements of concepts, which might be termed
essences. According to Medin and Ortony, these deeper constraints are vital to
understanding how concepts cohere, and hence if one specifies concepts purely by
reference to surface features, one is missing out a vital element of conceptual
representation.
Medin and Ortony argue that the objections which have turned philosophical
essentialism into a position of embarrassment need not apply to psychological
essentialism. Traditionally, philosophical essentialism has been dogged by the
objection, first noted by Aristotle, that what makes something what it is cannot be
independent of how that thing is described. If one wishes to argue that an object x has
an essence E, in virtue of which it is an X, and not a Y, then one faces the problem of
x's Xness being contingent upon its description D. The same object might be a rock, a
paperweight, an ashtray, a door-stop or a weapon depending upon how it is described,
thus x will need to have as many essences as there are true descriptions D (or to put in
another way, E is essential to D rather than x). All of which severely undermines the
notion of there being a particular E in virtue of which x is an X.
Psychological essentialism attempts to avoid this pitfall by denying that the essences it
posits have any metaphysical status. Rather than maintaining that objects have
essences, Medin and Ortony argue that people believe that they do, and that their
representations of things reflect this belief;
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since a major task for cognitive psychology is to characterise knowledge
representations, psychological theories about them have to be theories of
psychological reality, not metaphysical reality. Thus, if people believe that
things have essences, we had better not ignore this fact in our theories of
knowledge representation. (1989, p 183)
There is some evidence that people might ordinarily believe that things have essences:
Rips (1989) showed that participants are unwilling to change classifications when
surface qualities are changed, because they believe that category membership depends
upon further intrinsic properties; our ordinary scientific culture embraces a form of
essentialism with its claims to be getting at the 'underlying reality' of phenomena.
Accordingly, Medin and Ortony do not claim that objects have essences, or that people
believe that they know what these essences are, but rather they insist that in spite of
this people believe that objects have essences, and that cognition is affected by this
belief.
Medin and Ortony maintain, however, that psychological essentialism is not a return to
classical necessary and sufficient condition categorisation by another means.
According to psychological essentialism, people believe that concepts have necessary
and sufficient conditions because they believe that concepts have an essential nature,
but they do not necessarily believe that these necessary and sufficient conditions are a
concept's essential nature. "Furthermore, the essential nature may not generate
necessary and sufficient conditions at all" (Medin & Ortony, 1989, pl84); i.e. it might
be believed that being able to fly is part of the essence of a bird, even if not all birds
fly.
4.5.1 A Knowledge Representation Scheme For
Psychological Essences
4.5.1.1 The Essence Placeholder
Medin and Ortony propose that a key element in people's representations of concept
knowledge is what they call an essence placeholder, which might contain a selection
from:
• necessary and sufficient conditions for concept application;
• a more complex, even if potentially incoherent "theory" relating to the concept;
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• a belief that experts may know, or be trying to establish, what the essence of a
given concept is.
The beliefs contained within the essence placeholder act to constrain the use of surface
properties in making similarity judgements.
4.5.1.2 The Identification Procedure
A common defence of the classical account of categorisation has been to argue that
categorical essentialism embraces not only core essences, but also an associated
identification procedure, i.e. a set of protocols used for relating accessible surface
properties to perhaps less accessible underlying essences. Thus, goes the line of this
defence, typicality criticisms of classical categorisation apply to these identification
procedures, not to the underlying essences (though given that it is identification
procedures which govern actual classification decisions, this defence can never explain
why essences shouldn't fall foul of Occam's Razor, given their negligible explicatory
impact in such accounts of categorisation).
Although this approach falls a long way short of offering a defence for classical
categorisation, Medin and Ortony believe that a similar line of argument can help in
explaining and strengthening the psychological essentialist position. They argue that if
we abandon the messy metaphysical realism of classical categories in favour of
psychological realism - the idea that linguistic practices tend to embody a naive
metaphysical realism even though this may not be sustainable in fact - then
identification procedures can play an explicatory role in psychological essentialism.
This goes as follows: embodied in our linguistic assumptions about the world is the
idea that, for example, there are connections between being male and typical male
characteristics (facial hair, height and weight differences as compared to women), and
that these connections result from deeper underlying principles, even if we do not have
access to those principles. Later, discoveries by geneticists confirm the realist
suspicion embodied in our linguistic and categorical practice.
Thus in Medin and Ortony's account, identification procedures are not distinct from
the underlying category essence, but rather they form a continuum, with surface
identification procedures and realist beliefs at one end, and, say, genetic theories about
the deeper underlying principles for maleness which bear out these beliefs at the other
(and presumably, although Medin and Ortony do not make this explicit, in some cases,
underlying theories/principles might also act as an identification procedure).
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Identification procedures are used in everyday categorisation, however, it is with
reference to the deep underlying principles that categories are made coherent.
4.5.2 Essentialism And Realism
A deep problem to note in Medin and Ortony's argument is that despite their claims to
the contrary, in practice, in order for psychological essentialism to validate facts about
categorisation in the way they want it to do, Medin and Ortony over-stress the
relationship between psychological and metaphysical realism. It can appear, from their
account, that there is a strong link between psychological essentialism and
philosophical essentialism. In stating:
our third tenet is that organisms have evolved in such a way that their
perceptual (and conceptual) systems are sensitive to just those kinds of
similarity that lead them to deeper and more central properties. Thus
whales, as mammals that look more like fish than other mammals, are the
exception that proves the rule: Appearances are not usually deceiving...
psychological similarity is tuned to those superficial properties that are
likely to be causally linked at a deeper level. This is particularly likely to
be true of natural kinds. (Medin and Ortony, 1989, p 186)
Medin and Ortony seem to be seeking to ground psychological realism in a wider
metaphysical realism. Unfortunately, as I argued above, the whale is not an exception
that proves any rule. Whales are mammals because of the conventions of biological
taxonomy, which picks on certain causal factors (biological heredity) in its
classifications.
However, biological taxa fit poorly with our everyday natural kinds (Dupre, 1981);
and it is unlikely that Medin and Ortony's account (which tilts in the direction of
Putnam and Kripke's naturalistic theories of semantics (Putnam, 1975a; 1975b;
Kripke, 1972)) can account for such massive disparity. For example, the various
things that we normally classify together as 'trees' belong to a number of different
species; pine trees are conifers, whereas in fact oaks are angiosperms (flowering
plants). Medin and Ortony's story might still hold water if angiosperms and conifers
were in fact both subspecies of tree, but they are not. Daisies and roses, the former
being by no stretch of the imagination trees, are also angiosperms.
To return to the fictional example of Melville's Ishmael, raised earlier: to Ishmael a
whale is in fact a fish; the biological definition of fish versus mammals does not tally
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with reality as he sees it, just as to most people, naive psychological reality causes
them to believe that oaks are more similar to pines than they are to cacti. Medin and
Ortony's position is that 'psychological similarity is tuned to those superficial
properties that are likely to be causally linked at a deeper level'. The problem lies in
deciding what counts as an essential causal link. To Ishmael, the key causal links are
those which bind 'sharks and shad, alewives and herring,' to whales, and not those
that connect whales to bears. Ishmael may or may not have a theory about fish,
however, it is clear that he does not have the further belief (with which Medin and
Ortony seem to wish to endow him in order to accommodate a philosophical position
put forward by Putnam, 1975a; 1975b; and Kripke 1972) that experts may know, or
be trying to establish, what the essences of his concepts are. Where he is aware of an
expert, in this case Linnaeus, he seems in no mood to cede the determination of his
concept to him. Like the participants reported in Rips (1989) his underlying theory is
resistant to transformations of certain superficial properties in the objects in his
classification; except that in this case, those properties he considers superficial are
those biologists consider essential.
Clearly there are common causal reasons for the similar structures of pines and oaks.
It is just that these are not captured by our biological conceptions of reality. Biological
conceptions of reality (a descendent of the Linnaean view discussed above, which
conforms loosely to what Nagel, 1986, describes as the physical conception of reality)
consider the causal factors which link oaks and pines to be less essential than the
causal factors which link oaks and cacti. Any object might have a number of causal
essences, since differing causal factors may have resulted in that object possessing
numerous different features. To a biologist, features such as flowering and heredity
make roses and cacti and oaks share a causal essence. To others, the environmental
stimuli which resulted in the similar surface properties in oaks and pines - sap, woody
trunks, etc. - are more essential.
In this light, it becomes difficult to see what distinguishes causal essentialism from
philosophical essentialism (described by Medin and Ortony as 'a philosophical orphan,
banished to the netherworld of Platonic forms'). Strongly reminiscent of
philosophical essentialism, psychological essentialism cast in these terms - i.e. without
making concomitant claims to philosophical essentialism - will result in a situation
where an object will have as many causal essences as there are different true
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descriptions of it. Thus psychological essences share with philosophical essences the
embarrassing property of being non-essential.
This theoretical conclusion is further backed by evidence from results from two of the
few studies to subject the 'theory' theory to empirical scrutiny, Braisby, Franks and
Hampton (1996) and Malt (1994). Braisby, Franks and Hampton showed that
participants employed natural kind terms in a way that is not consistent with
essentialist expectations and predictions; natural kind terms were used in ways that
were sensitive to context, and which revealed patterns of apparent self-contradiction.
Braisby, Franks and Hampton presented participants with counterfactual scenarios in
which the various 'essential' properties of cat, water, tiger, gold, bronze, lemon and
oak were 'scientifically revealed' to be something other than participants might have
previously imagined, and then measured the effect that this had on participant's
category judgements. Braisby et al conclude that their participants responses reveal
that:
'the conventional content and use of natural kind terms varies
systematically with context ... and not that conventional content and use
are invariably associated with essences, as predicted by essentialism.'
Malt (1994) too provides empirical evidence that casts doubt on the central idea of
essences as bases for category representation. Malt's study found that the assumption
(Putnam, 1975a) that FLO is the essence of water did not stand up to empirical
scrutiny, and that judgements of the amount of H2O in a liquid were very poor
predictors of whether it was water or not.
This does not mean that one has to reject entirely the intuition that the way that we see
the world is somehow connected to the way that the world is. Boyd (1989; 1990)
argues that causally important properties are 'contingently clustered', not according to
necessary and sufficient conditions, but probabilistically. The clustering of such
terms, on Boyd's account, results not from mere coincidence, but rather from a causal
'homeostasis', where the presence of some properties tends to favour the presence of
others, or where there are properties which underlie certain clusters. These clusters
can be loose or tight, and they pick out natural kinds to the extent that they are tight.
The resultant 'kinds' will be natural to the extent that they are causally important in
explaining phenomena associated with kinds picked out by the cluster. Thus there
might be multiple causal clusters underlying a number of roughly similar things: one
set of causal clusters underpins properties like sap, woody trunks, branching patterns
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etc. of trees, in contrast to the cluster of causal features which determine definitions of
angiosperms. According to an account like this, the fact that a whale is a mammal is
no more reason to consider whales more similar to bears than fish than the fact that a
whale is a fish is a good reason to think whales and 'sharks and shad, alewives and
herring,' more similar than whales and bears: both facts are contingent upon which
homeostatic cluster is considered essential.
4.5.3 Non-Realist 'Essentialism'?
Medin and Ortony do not need to embrace metaphysical realism. Their original
criticism of Wittgenstein (or at least the traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein) was
that the comments they attribute to him do not give enough weight to the consideration
that similarity judgements are made between representations of objects, and not
between the actual objects themselves, since presented objects are perceived and
interpreted in terms of concepts.8 The ideal behind psychological realism is non-realist
at heart, since it considers that how people believe the world to be is more important
than how the world might really be. Thus what is important is people's
representations of things, not the things themselves. Such an account does not need to
take any problematic realist notions on board. Causal 'essences' can be only
occasionally, contingently, essential, as in Boyd's model, or else they are merely old
fashioned essentialism by another name. Indeed, it is hard to see how they could be
otherwise: consider Ishmael's categorising whales as fish, which clearly contradicts
the 'natural' fish and mammal categories. This is just one example of the many
categorisation judgements that individuals make which run counter to the realist 'facts'
as established by science. It is not easy to see what role metaphysical realism is
supposed to play in psychological explanations of the judgements made by these
individuals in these case. Psychological explanations of categorisation should be
concerned with explaining the psychological processes involved in given
categorisation decisions - for example, providing a psychological account of why a
given individual might categorise whales as fish - rather than attempting to address the
metaphysical validity of such decisions.
8 Medin and Ortony (1989) cite no evidence in support of this claim; and I can find nothing in the text
of the Philosophical Investigations that suggests that Wittgenstein viewed conceptual judgements as
determined by anything other than the interactions of mental representations. However, it is worth
noting thatWittgenstein had strong views on what form such representations could not have.
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Psychological essentialism is based upon the intuition that people believe that objects
have essences, and that this belief about essences affects our interactions with the
world. It is not based upon the idea that these beliefs (however true the facts of the
matter of their being held may be) are true beliefs. It can be true that people have the
belief without the belief being true, and the causal effects of the former are independent
of the latter. Medin and Ortony accept in their knowledge representation for
psychological essentialism that theories (as contained within an essence placeholder)
may not be coherent. Rather than adopting a realist standpoint, and arguing that
evolution must have prepared us to see features indicative of objects' essences, one
might be better off adopting a more non-realist (yet psychologically realistic?)
perspective. The realist position - of whatever persuasion - would lead one to expect
to find coherency in people's theories about essences; the evidence points to
inconsistencies and incoherencies in everyday notions of essences. A realistic, non-
realist approach would address the question of how it is evolution has provided us
with the wherewithal to recognise and pragmatically make use of causal clusters,
which may contradict amongst one another, according to the contexts in which we find
ourselves.9
If we return to Medin and Ortony's knowledge representation, the belief, contained
within an essence placeholder, that experts may know, or be trying to establish, what
the essence of a given concept is, is at best superfluous (witness Ishmael's - albeit
fictional - scant regard for the labours of Linnaeus), and at worst reintroduces realism
through the back door. Recasting psychological essentialism in the non-realist terms
which seem most appropriate to it, an essence placeholder would contain a selection
from:
• conditions for concept application;
• a causal, even if potentially incoherent "theory" relating to the concept.
The further belief posited by psychological essentialism:
• that experts may know, or be trying to establish, the essence of a given concept
9 Such an approach would also - essentially - treat the question of conceptual (or category) 'essences'
as a matter for empirical investigation, rather than assuming them at the outset as a theoretical
imperative.
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would be rejected as superfluous - individuals may have such beliefs, but it is hard
to see how these beliefs can give their mental representations of concepts a
particular coherent structure.
4.5.4 Theories And Essences - What Is Essential?
As I detailed above, however, Wittgenstein's arguments in the Philosophical
Investigations amount to more than a rejection of necessary and sufficient conditions
as a basis for categorisation (the traditional psychological view): in the course of his
discussion, Wittgenstein presents a number of substantial objections to essences and
schemas (whether "theoretical" or not):
• Firstly, the lack of necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership
makes essence or theory definition problematical, to say the least (the point
Medin and Ortony acknowledge and seek to address);
• Secondly, there is the question of what form an essence representation or
schema (even one that is only psychologically essential) should take: what
theory are people supposed to have for games?;
• Thirdly, there is the question of what is essential to a psychological essence?
Which aspects of a representation of a psychological essence are generic, and
which are not, and how do we explain the distinction between generic and non-
generic aspects of the representation in the use of the proposed essence?
• Finally, what is supposed to be intrinsic to the representation of a psychological
essence that would cause it to be used differently to examples of whatever it was
that it was supposed to be definitive of?
Whilst Medin and Ortony address the first of these points - identification procedures
don't specify completely, theories can be partial, or even incoherent - nothing in their
account - or in the more general literature advocating explanation of theory based
accounts of categories - addresses how theories, explanation schemas or psychological
essences are supposed to overcome Wittgenstein's other three challenges.10
'"There is no doubt that theories would provide a useful means of categorising the world. The question
is, however, whether theories could actually provide a plausible and coherent account of the cognitive
categorisation capacities that people actually employ. As Hahn and Chater (1997a) observe, whilst the
rule-based classifications used in science provide spectacular evidence of the predictive and explanatory
utility of theories, in fact, very few aspects of scientific knowledge have been adequately formalized.
Hahn and Chater note also that constructing theories for common-sense knowledge appears to be an
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In this light, the question at hand becomes one of finding a framework that can
accommodate the important insight at the heart of psychological essentialism: the idea
that relations between attributes in representations are important; especially causal
relations in representations. Prototype theories refer only to undifferentiated,
probabilistic clusters of features, and are notoriously bad at accounting for the
knowledge people have about concepts, and the categorisation inferences people can
make. Including causal relations in people's representations of conceptual knowledge
could begin to account for these factors. The easiest way to account for the fact that
causal beliefs may (in some way still to be determined) have some causal
repercussions cognitively, without enmiring itself in the dubious notion that realist
beliefs may be true in reality, would be to reject the idea of concepts as unitary,
determinable constructs, or even, ultimately as essences. It is hard to see how the
contents of the modified essence placeholder could be sufficient to account for
categorisation without reference to example information as well (if only to deal with
exceptions, see Barresi, Robbins and Shain, 1975; Homa and Vosburgh, 1976). If
we accept that representations of examples of objects will contain important relational
information, then we can accommodate Medin and Ortony's positive arguments
without incurring the theoretical - even metaphysical - costs that the 'theory' theory
framework brings with it. After all, Medin and Ortony argue that theories may be
vague, or even incoherent: in the light of the foregoing, it would appear that insofar as
it is possible to defend any positive account of theory theories, theories won't even
need to be essential.11 A defensible 'theory' theory will be of the following, radically
weakened form:
even more difficult task. Common sense rules seem to almost always have exceptions (Reiter, 1980);
even when rules are available, their application to specific instances appears to depend on vast
amounts of background knowledge (still further theories?) in ways that are still poorly understood
(Oaksford and Chater, 1991; 1993). As I noted above, common-sense knowledge does not divide easily
into domains, leading to a situation where providing rules for parts of knowledge seems to lead to the
seemingly endless task of capturing the whole of human knowledge; reflective of what Fodor (1983)
has called calls the isotropy of human knowledge (see Hahn and Chater, 1997). It seems that trying to
provide a theory for even a simple domain of common sense knowledge could soon escalate into a
requirement to provide an account of all such knowledge.
11 It is worth making the observation here that findings such as those by Rips (1989), showing that
participants are unwilling to change classifications when surface qualities are changed, because they
believe that category membership depended upon further intrinsic properties, may tell us more about
what participants believe is essential to concepts than they do about the processes that actually
determine the concepts participants employ.
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1. Theories are representations of clusters of causal information;
2. These theories will be partial.12
Despite the claims of theory theorists, these two points - which I have argued are the
only elements of the 'theory' theory that can be given a principled defence - appear to
amount to little more than a claim that causal information is important to the
representation of categories (this is a point I shall return to at length later in this thesis).
Just as Wittgenstein did not claim that family resemblances are what makes game a
category, so he also attempted to demonstrate that neither did any theory of game make
game a category. Most of the concepts used in everyday cognition do not have the
coherence a strong theoretical claim would imply. The claim that 'partial theories' or
background knowledge - i.e. the inclusion of causal or other relations in conceptual
representations - are relevant to categorisation need not conflict with Wittgenstein's
arguments; insofar as it is possible to ascertain how these would be worked out, they
do not contradict Wittgenstein's theoretical account of the role examples play in the
acquisition and use of concepts and categories. Firstly, as I have sought to show
above, insofar as 'theory' theories can be defensibly stated, they make no statement
about boundedness, nor do they make any claim regarding defining features.
Secondly, though the theory-based view does suggest that learning and understanding
a category also involves acquiring appropriate causal knowledge, again, this does not
directly contradict Wittgenstein's account of examples in acquisition and use but
merely suggests some additional factors that should be considered in addressing the
representation of examples of concepts, and the processes that govern the usage of
these examples.
As with prototype theories, when analysed, theory theories provide few, if any
compelling reasons to maintain a pre-theoretical attachment to concepts and categories
that are determined by a unitary representation, or indeed by any unitary - even
'theory-like' - theoretical construct.
12 Given the problems inherent in definitional accounts of conceptual structure - see above - one must
assume that 'theories' are not complete; i.e. they inform classification decisions, but are only 'partial',
in that they form one component of a complex, non-deductive overall process (Hahn & Chater, 1997).
Ramscar and Hahn (1998b) note that this does however, pose a potential problem regarding partial
theories, i.e. how partial does a theory have to be to not be stating an 'essence'? This is a moot point,
but given that the theory-based view has done little to provide full accounts of any categories, whilst
no definitive answer can be given to this question, the onus of providing an account and spelling out
its implications seems to be firmly with the 'theory' theorists.
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4.6 Examples Of Things
The evidence and arguments above lend some credence to the third part of the
Wittgensteinian account of category representation that I established in chapter 3 - that
learning a category such as game does not involve learning or extracting any essence
or schema from the instances of the category one encounters. Logically, this would
also, in itself, appear to lend support for the fourth part of the account, since without a
central schema to act as a category representation it is hard to see how else one could
learn a "category" such as game, except by learning examples of game, and
appropriate ways of using these examples.
Arguments of the 'how else could it be?' kind are, however, rarely compelling or
convincing. Having shown that there is empirical evidence against 'central schemas',
what is needed is positive evidence in favour of an exemplar account. A point related
to this that has eluded many discussions of conceptual storage is that debates between
single prototypes versus exemplars revolve - to an extent - around questions of
granularity rather than principle. As Borges (1962) succinctly demonstrates in the
much quoted Funes the Memorius, even an 'instance' is a generalisation of sorts.
When Funes struggles to
comprehend that the generic symbol dog embraces so many unlike
individuals... it bothered him that the dog seen at 3.14 (seen from the side)
should have the same name as the dog at 3.15 (seen from the front).
Borges (1962) pp 93-94
he encounters the following problem: if the concept of dog determines whether things
we encounter are dogs, then in the same fashion the concept Spot must similarly unite
a certain class of experiences of a particular dog as being experiences of Spot the dog,
and so on (a similar point is made by Barsalou, Huttenlocher and Lamberts, 1998):
they argue that it is important to note that categorisation must take place on the basis of
both individuals and events:
"If the cognitive system didn't establish representations of individuals that
exist across events, it couldn't construct the history of an individual, it
couldn't represent the fact that the appearance of an individual might vary
widely across occasions, and it couldn't count the number of repeating
individuals observed across occasions, and it couldn't determine the
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properties that occur most often across the individuals in a category.
Establishing representations of individuals captures the physical structure
of the world, such that important inferences about the entities in it are
possible.
In contrast, if the cognitive system recorded only information about events,
it couldn't distinguish individuals that occur frequently in a category from
individuals that occur rarely. Similarly, it couldn't distinguish the frequent
properties of an individual from the infrequent ones. In general, the
representation of events captures what is likely to happen to an agent in his
or her experience. Whereas frames for individuals capture what exists in
the world, event memories capture how the world is likely to affect an
agent in a given event"
Barsalou, Huttenlocher and Lamberts (1998, pp 257).
Once factors such as these are considered, it seems reasonable to argue that one of the
key questions of conceptual storage is best viewed not as being a question of instances
versus generalisations, but rather as being one of deciding between unitary versus
multiple representation accounts of conceptual storage. Unitary accounts of
categorisation posit a single stored representation - schema, prototype or, perhaps,
theory - in virtue of which items are classified into a category as the outcome of some
process. Multiple representational accounts posit the storage of a number of
representations (perhaps at different levels of granularity, from 'instances' to broad
intermediate generalisations) which may jointly or individually result in some object
being categorised - whether as an individual or an event - as the outcome of some
process ; one way to interpret the observations of Barsalou, Huttenlocher and
Lamberts (1998) is that all categorisations will involve a process that compares
representations of both individuals and events..13
These different models of conceptual representation will have different implications for
theories of categorisation. If a unitary representation model were correct one would
expect that provided one could specify the stored representation and the process by
which objects were related to it, one should in principle be able to give a definitive
13There is, however, no need for such processes to regress terminally: as Malt (1995) argues, some in¬
built regularities - perhaps as a result of perceptual constraints - will ultimately be inevitable.
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account of, say, why it is some things are X's. I have attempted above to show how
unlikely it is that any account such as this will be forthcoming.
On the other hand, a multi-representational account will most likely not admit any
definitive account ofX's at all, since the multiplicity of relations between the differing
stored representations that could influence an object's X-ness will most likely, insofar
as it is possible to predict, preclude any kind of general account. A specific object's
X-ness might be dependant upon that - and only that - objects' interaction with a
particular subset of the stored elements relating to X-ness, and the concomitant process
by which X-ness is adjudged.
Clearly this last position is in concord with Wittgenstein's final arguments, which
reject the idea of some abstracted schema in preference for an account based on
previously encountered examples and appropriate ways of using these examples.
Variants of this view - usually referred to as the exemplar, or instance-based approach
- have been much explored in recent attempts to model the cognitive processes
underlying categorisation. Like the prototype approach discussed above, exemplar
theories also see categorisation as a process that involves comparisons to stored
representations. However, rather than category membership being based upon a
judgement of an item's similarity to a single stored representation of each category, as
posited by prototype theories, in exemplar theories, objects are instead compared to
many stored exemplars (previously encountered instances) of a category (Nosofsky,
1986; 1987; 1988; 1989; 1991; Nosofsky, Clark and Shin, 1989; Shin and Nosofsky,
1992; Lamberts, 1996; Medin and Schaffer, 1978).
Thus where the exemplar, or instance-based, approach differs from prototype theory is
that abstraction across instances (i.e. schema abstraction) is not assumed to take place
at or soon after the time of 'concept acquisition', independently of concept use, but
rather to take place at the time concepts are used. Abstraction across instances is
presumed to occur dynamically at the time that membership judgements, typicality
judgements or conceptual inferences are made (Hahn and Chater, 1998; Komatsu,
1992).
4.6.1 The Generalised Context Model (GCM)
With regards to exemplar-based psychological models of categorisation, Nosofosky's
(1986) Generalised Context Model (GCM), has provided remarkable data fits to
human behavioural data in a variety of experimental contexts (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986,
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1988). In keeping with the general principles of exemplar models described above,
this model assumes that categories are represented in terms of stored exemplars.
The workings of the GCM are summarised in Ramscar and Hahn (1998b): exemplars
are represented as points in a multi-dimensional "psychological space"; co-ordinates
for points are determined by their value along the particular psychological dimensions
in question (these dimensions can be things like "loudness" or "size" or more
complex, composite dimensions); and similarity between exemplars is a function of
distance in psychological space (specifically an exponential decay function, see
Nosofsky, 1986).
Classification decisions are then governed by a probabilistic response rule. The
probability of categorising an item as a member of a particular category corresponds to
the weight of the evidence in favour of its membership of this category. In contrast to
nearest-neighbour algorithms, the evidence weighing process takes all exemplars into
account, and all exemplars are treated as equal for the purposes of supplying evidence.
Specifically, the strength of the evidence for a category C corresponds to the summed
similarity between the novel item and all known exemplars of C, divided by the
summed similarities to all stored exemplars; that is, the evidence weighed takes in not
just members of C, but also the members of relevant competing categories.
As a consequence, the model does not impose discrete category boundaries in
psychological space, but rather probability distributions over the entire space.
4.6.2 Evidence For Exemplars
I have noted a number of times that most experimental results addressing
categorisation do not directly indicate anything about conceptual representation:
separating form, content and the processes acting on concepts is an invidious business
(perhaps best illustrated by Wittgenstein's detailed remarks on the use of schemas,
discussed in Chapter 3, above). However, the issue of whether or not a particular
learning process involves the abstraction of some core essence or not - be it schema,
theory or prototype - has been central to much recent experimental psychology and, as
Ramscar and Hahn (1998a) observe, has not only been pursued in concept learning
tasks, but also in related domains such as Artificial Grammar Learning (Shanks and St
John, 1994).
The whole issue of the abstraction of category information from instances has been
clouded in controversy. Not only is the empirical evidence for or against abstraction
CHAPTER 4 - THEORIES AND MODELS OF CATEGORISATION 115
contested, but there has also been much disagreement regarding the conceptual and
empirical criteria on which a distinction between exemplar storage and abstraction in
category representation can - in principal - be based. Barsalou (1990) has argued that
a principled distinction between exemplar storage and abstraction in category
representation is impossible, whilst Hahn and Chater (1998) have argued in turn that
Barsalou's position is based on a highly idiosyncratic notion of abstraction. Hahn and
Chater's evaluation of the many criteria that have been put forth, particularly in order
to distinguish between processes based on rules and processes based on exemplar
similarity, reveals - in support of Barsalou's claim - that many proposals have
overstated their ability to cleanly distinguish between the two. However, whilst
acknowledging the problems inherent in this area, Hahn and Chater (1998) argue that
from an experimental perspective, the most straightforward - and pragmatic - way to
address the issue of abstraction is through model to model comparisons of fully
specified cognitive models.
Ramscar and Hahn (1998a) note the following evidence for regarding prototypes as an
example of these problems:
"evidence for prototypes in natural language categories has been sought
from a variety of sources. Classic are those studies which identified a
variety of so-called "prototype effects"; all of these involve some form of
differential reaction to central or typical members of a category such as
differences in typicality ratings, faster reaction times in speeded
classification tasks or differential retention in memory relative to other
items (see e.g. Rosch, Simpson and Miller, 1976; Posner and Keele,
1968; Posner and Keele, 1970). However, such effects do not
unequivocally indicate mental representations of concepts in terms of
prototypes (Lakoff, 1987b). Rather such effects might arise from
cognitive representations and processes which make no use of
representations of prototypes or central tendencies as such." (Ramscar and
Hahn, 1998, pp 397).
These points receive support from those studies which have attempted to compare the
performance of fully specified categorisation models. The literature on categorisation
contains a number of studies in which model comparisons between exemplar models
which simply store all encountered instances in memory, and prototype models which
abstract a central tendency have been conducted. These comparisons have consistently
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favoured exemplar models. Exemplar models have yielded quantitative fits superior to
the prototype models tested and accounted for a wide range of phenomena traditionally
associated with prototypes such as the instability of instance retrieval and typicality
judgements; the levels of specificity at which concepts are encoded; sensitivity to
correlations amongst category instances; and the way accuracy in classification tasks
increases with category size (Nosofsky, 1986, 1987, 1988b, 1989, 1991b, Nosofsky,
Clark and Shin, 1989, Shin and Nosofsky, 1992; Lamberts, 1996).
Similarly, as mentioned above, those few empirical studies that have directly
addressed the assumptions behind core essences - whether as schemas or theories -
have found little or no support for the idea that essences are extracted in category
learning. For example, Malt (1994) found the idea, put forward by Putnam (1975),
that H2O is the essence of water did not stand up to empirical scrutiny, and that
judgements of the amount of H2O in a liquid were very poor predictors of whether it
was water or not.
In summary, at present at least, there is no clear evidence in the literature for
abstraction in the acquisition of concepts, whilst there is considerable evidence which
can be marshalled in support of some kind of exemplar-based account.
4.6.3 Kinds Of Similarity
One main criticism of existing exemplar models (Medin, 1989) is that they use a very
limited form of similarity metric, considering only features of representations, and not
relations between features (Medin, 1989; Medin, Goldstone and Gentner, 1993;
Goldstone, 1994). Whilst exemplar models have been shown to out perform
prototype models in modelfitting comparisons, these comparisons have relied on
artificial test domains and data, whose conceptual richness is questionable, often to the
point where the application of 'rich' appears to be a serious misnomer. Stimuli will
often vary by only a few characteristics, with typical variations taking place between a
few of only a handful of attributes per stimulus item (e.g. Barsalou, Huttenlocher and
Lamberts, 1998; Nosofsky, 1986; 1988; 1991; Shin and Nosofsky, 1992; Lamberts,
1996; Medin and Schaffer, 1978).
Noting this, it is worth recalling that in my discussion of the 'theory' theory I
described the array of evidence indicating that feature-clusters alone are insufficient for
capturing and modelling human concepts and categories. This evidence indicates that
relations between features will also have an important role to play in the structure and
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coherence of concepts (insofar, that is, as concepts are structured and coherent). At
present exemplar models are almost exclusively feature driven, and do not capture the
role of relations in their exemplar representations (criticisms about the failure of
models to capture relational information could, however, be levelled with equal
validity, against all existing models of categorisation).
Thus, it seems fair to acknowledge at this point that whilst exemplar models
outperform central tendency or prototype models on the artificial tasks common in the
literature, these models still appear to fall a long way short of capturing the similarity
matrices that are used cognitively in ecologically valid domains.
4.7 Summary
4.7.1 Prototype Theories.
Accounts of category structure in terms of similarity to one or more central
"prototypes" are incompatible with Wittgenstein's perspective and the very real
theoretical problems he raises (despite the frequent appeals to Wittgenstein from
proponents of prototype theories, e.g., Taylor, 1995). This holds both for versions of
prototype theory which view the prototype as an abstracted central tendency or
schema, and for those versions which take prototypes to be particular, privileged
exemplars (for discussion of the different variants of "prototype" see Barsalou, 1987).
The schema version is irreconcilable with Wittgenstein's position. (Such accounts,
seem particularly popular within Cognitive Linguistics - see, e.g., Taylor, 1995 - but
have also been proposed in psychology; see for instance., Smith and Medin, 1981, on
the "probabilistic view".)
In contrast, the conflict between his position and the "prototype-as-privileged-
exemplars" stems from the fact that such prototypical exemplars would, in fact,
provide the glue to hold the category together in a way that Wittgenstein denies.
Central exemplars would constitute a central thread or focal point around which the
category is organised. Items would all obtain category membership by virtue of the
single, simple fact that they are sufficiently similar to a central exemplar.
This is not the "criss-crossing" associated with Wittgenstein's idea of family
resemblance (and indeed not the way real families, viewed over generations, are
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structured). Thus the popular equation of "the family resemblance" view of category
structure, which claims direct descendence from the Philosophical Investigations, and
"prototype theory" must be rejected.
4.7.2 Theory Based Views.
As I noted above, the lack of computational explicitness of 'theory' theories - or
explanation-based views - makes a straightforward comparison between them and
Wittgenstein's account difficult. Given the notorious problems with definitional
accounts of conceptual structure, one has to assume that "theories" are not complete,
i.e. that they are sufficient to allow deduction of classification decisions, but that they
are only "partial", in that they form one component of a complex, non-deductive
overall process. This overall process, however, which could involve similarity
comparisons, has not been spelled out by advocates of the theory-based view. As I
argued above, the simple claim then that "partial theories" or background knowledge
are relevant to categorisation need not conflict with Wittgenstein's critique. Such
claims makes no statements about boundedness, nor do they claim definitional
features. Though the 'theory' theory suggests that learning and understanding a
category also involves acquiring appropriate background knowledge, this need not
contradict the role of examples in acquisition and use. Rather, it merely suggests that
additional factors that should be considered in modelling an exemplar driven process.
4.7.3 Exemplar Theories
To recap: exemplar theories assume that our mental representations of categories
consist simply of stored exemplars, i.e., known members. There is no abstraction of
schemas or central patterns. Despite what Ramscar and Hahn (1998b) describe as
their "very extensional feel", exemplar accounts do allow classification of novel,
previously unencountered objects simply by virtue of their similarity to known
exemplars. In the most basic version, a novel item is simply given the classification of
the known exemplar to which it is most similar, i.e., classification is based on the
single "nearest neighbour" in similarity space. Despite this simplicity, it is an
approach to categorisation that proves remarkably successful in machine learning
contexts (Cover & Hart, 1967). As a cognitive model, however, it conflicts with
Wittgenstein's claim that natural language categories have no boundaries. The simple
nearest neighbour approach produces well-defined category boundaries which run
along the paths of equal distance between members of competing categories.
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However, as a class of account, exemplar models need not posit such boundaries and,
in fact, the GCM, the most prominent exemplar model in the psychological literature,
does not. As described above, classification decisions in the GCM are governed by a
probabilistic response rule - the probability of categorising an item as a member of a
particular category corresponds to the weight of the evidence for this category - and
consequently the model does not impose discrete category boundaries in psychological
space, but rather it calculates probability distributions over the entire space.
The GCM seems to be compatible with all 4 points extracted from Wittgenstein's
argument above: first, categories have neither necessary nor sufficient conditions;
second, category spaces are unbounded; third, learning does not involve extracting an
essence or schema; fourth, in learning a category such as "game", one learns examples
and appropriate ways of using these examples. Thus, accepting the caveats noted
above concerning the artificial domains in which the GCM has been tested, there is at
least one contemporary cognitive account of categorisation which is broadly
compatible with Wittgenstein's description of categories and category structure.
4.8 The Concept Of 'Concept'
One thing that emerges from the process of contrasting the substantive content of
Wittgenstein's arguments with the leading models and perspectives in current
categorisation research is a clear demonstration of the continuing relevance of the
issues Wittgenstein raised. Wittgenstein's arguments - and the evidence - bear down
on any all-encompassing view of category structure. Together, the two appear to
effectively explode the idea of the category as a unitary theoretical instrument: how
likely is it that, given that categories aren't defining features, shared essences or some
other common thread running through, that there is a fundamental unity in all
categories? That clear cut members all have higher within category similarity than
between category similarity (as predicted by GCM) or that all categories are based on
partial theories, etc.?
Ecological, natural language categories - naming is our prime categorisation behaviour
- are produced by collectives rather than individuals. Natural language categories
develop - evolve - over time and this process of evolution can be subject to diachronic
accidents. These are factors which might reasonably be expected to put a bound on
whatever systematicity, at whatever level, one might hope to find in concepts and
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categories. If category structures are like this, it seems reasonable to assume that the
naming behaviour of individuals will, to some extent follow, denying cohesion even at
the level of processing. If category structures are variable, then it seems to follow that
processing might also involve multiple, even competing influences. Cognitive science
has made great steps forward by developing and testing constrained models. But if
one pauses to look more at the untidiness of our real world categories, Wittgenstein's
scepticism about category structure does not seem to find any happy resolution in
unitary accounts of cognitive processing: the deep questions Wittgenstein poses loom
large still.
The evidence discussed here does not indicate that ecological concepts and categories
are, or can be, neat, bounded entities. Rather, it suggests that concepts and categories
are created and evolve dynamically, according to context and task demands (both local
and historical), using a mixture of stored representations (examples) and processes
(means of applying examples). (And, though I will return to this point later, it is
worth remarking here how similar this description sounds to a characterisation of
analogy!)
4.8.1 A Short Family History
I noted above that natural language - or ecological - categories are collective, rather
than individual, products,14 subject to a range of influences over their evolutionary
course. Before considering the way in which the picture of categorisation painted in
this chapter fits with the contrast definitions made for analogy in chapter 2, I shall
attempt to illustrate some of the points made here by considering the status of a concept
that has been at the heart of many of the issues discussed so far: the concept of family.
What are the family of resemblances in family?
Williams (1976) in his classic study Keywords, traces the history of the word
'family', and its attendant 'concept'. Family was first used in English in the period
straddling the end of the 14th century and the beginning of the 15th century. Williams
identifies family's forerunner word as the Latin familia (which conceptually, was
more akin to the modem English household), which has its ultimate root in the word
famulus,15 which corresponds to the modem English servant.
14 Wittgenstein too had much to say on this point, c.f. McGinn (1985).
15Having argued that concepts evolve diachronically, I do not wish to imply that the history of
family pre-famulus is prochronic, this is just the earliest point to which I can trace this
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As Williams notes, the associated adjective familiar (which appears to have an earlier
common usage) has a range ofmeanings reminiscent of the more general use of family
prior to around the middle of the 17th century. Just as in early use of family, there is
a:
"direct sense of the Latin household, either in the sense of a group of
servants or of a group of blood-relations and servants living together in
one house. Familiar related to this, in phrases like familiar angel, or
familiar devil and the later noun familiar, where there is a sense of being
associated with, or serving someone." (Williams, 1976, pl08; the
emphasis is Williams')
In the fifteenth and sixteenth century, the phrase familiar enemy was common, and
was used to indicate an enemy within one's household, and by extension, an enemy
within one's own people (somewhat akin to the modem idea of a fifth-columnist).
However, as Williams notes, the strongest early senses of familiar are those that are
still with us in modem English: friendship or intimacy; well known; well used; or
habitual. These uses were derived from people's experiences of living together in
households, in close relations to one another:
"They do not, and familiar still does not, relate to the sense of blood
group" (p. 109)
It appears that Family, was then extended, from the end of the fifteenth century, to
describe a house; a group of kin. In the Authorised Version of the Bible (1611)
family was restricted to these wide senses: either a large kin-group, often virtually
equivalent to a tribe (Genesis 10:15, 12:3; Jeremiah 1:15, 31:1; Ezekiel 20:32) or the
"kin-group of a common father: 'and then shall he (a brother) depart from thee, both
he and his children with him, and shall return unto his own family, and unto the
possession of his fathers shall he return' (Leviticus 25:41; cf. Numbers 36:6)."
(Williams, 1976, pl09)
In none of the senses current before the mid-period of the seventeenth century do we
find the distinctive modem concept of family: the sense of a small group confined to
immediate blood-relations. Indeed, Williams notes that when this concept was needed
evolutionary path. (See Gould, 1995, for a lively account of how Philip Gosse attempted to divide
evolutionary change as 'prochromc' change - occuring outside of time, and fahioned by God at the
time of Creation - and 'diachronic' change, that unfolded in conventional time post-Creation).
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in Genesis of the Authorised Version of the Bible, near-kin, rather than family was
used.
In the period between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, the modern sense of
family, as a small kin-group, normally living in one house, came to be dominant, to
the extent that in the twentieth century, sub-ordinate category distinctions between
nuclear families and extended families have come to be made. This transition
has a complex history: Williams notes that in 1631, we can still read "his family were
himself and his wife and daughters, two mayds and a man" (Williams, 1976, pl09),
where family is being used in place of the modern household. This use survived in
rural England "beyond the eighteenth century, and the later distinction between family
and servants was, in this instance, very much resented" (Williams, 1976, pi 10); given
the original root of family in servant, it would appear that one quite literally could be
the master of one's family.
Other forms of the concept family from around this period include a specific
association with children, as in he "duly sent his family and wife" (Alexander Pope, in
Wasserman, 1960).
Williams argues that the dominance of the small kin-group idea of family was probably
not established prior to the early nineteenth century, where massive social pressures
changed the word, and the concepts associated with it. Specifically, Williams argues
that the middle nineteenth century was the high-watermark of the bourgeois family,
and that: "the sense of the isolated family as a working economic unit is clearly
stressed in the development of capitalism" (pi 10). The nineteenth century saw a trend
to distinguish between work and family: a man worked to support his family, and
his family was supported by his work. This form of the concept family would have
received broader social reinforcement from the development of smaller, individual
houses, and as a result, households, especially in the new working and lower-middle
classes throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Whereas in the eighteenth
century, to found a family - in both the sense of lineage, servants and property -
had currency amongst the aristocracy, the use of family by the nineteenth century
masses had no need for the conceptual attributes of household (such as servants and
worries about lineage); instead the near kin-group was sufficient to define the most
common social relationships experienced. Says Williams:
"Family or family and friends can represent the only immediate
positive attachments in a large-scale and complex wage-earning society.
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And it is significant, that class-feeling, the other major response to the new
society, used brother and sister to express class affiliation... it is
significant also that this use of brother and sister came to seem artificial or
comic in middle class eyes. Family, there, combined the strong sense of
immediate and positive blood-group relationships16 and the strong implicit
sense of property" (p. 111).
Thus whilst at first glance it might appear that the use of family, brother and sister
by trades unionists is metaphorical, the evidence provided here should give one pause
for thought. If the trades unionists' use of family is metaphorical, what is the literal
meaning of family? The history of the concept family is indicative of numerous
acceptable uses, and the extension - and contraction - of the concepts associated with it
according to usage and similarity of usage further indicates this.
As Williams remarks at the end of his essay, this family history is worth recalling
when politicians talk about the family as being an institution that is breaking up; or on
the verge of collapse. I argued above that natural language categories are the products
of collectives and that they develop over time, over the course of which they are
subject to a variety of 'accidents.' The history of family appears to provide a fitting
example of this. Yes, there are family resemblances between the various uses of
family. But, in keeping with Wittgenstein's analysis, it appears that:
• there are no necessary or sufficient defining characteristics to family: rather,
kinships - "family resemblances" - can be traced across the concept;
• the category space of family is unbounded - i.e. there are no boundaries to the
space across which "family resemblances" can be traced (see Williams' remark on
the 'collapse of the family' above as an indication of the artificial problems that
assumptions about bounding can bring);
• learning the category family does not appear to involve extracting an essence
or schema from instances (certainly, anything one might put forward as essential -
"familiarity"? - would be insufficient to capture the particular uses of family; and
would in turn beg the question of what was the essence of familiarity).
16 This is significant - some working class areas of Glasgow were as much as 80% male in the late
nineteenth century (Lister, 1997). In so-speaking, Trades-Union brothers were referring to the only
family they had. Literally.
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• learning, and use of the "category" family, appears to depend upon examples
(instances) and appropriate ways (note the similarities between the various uses of
family over time) of using these examples.
Moreover, the variety of uses of family seems to provide support for the 'multiple-'
(hence, no-) essence view of concepts that emerged from my discussion of the
'theory' theory above.
Which use of family is essential? Which is ecologically privileged?
From the historical data, it would appear that the answer is, none.
4.9 Categorisation And Analogy
I have argued that Wittgenstein's arguments and the weight of psychological evidence
both bear down on any all-encompassing view of category structure, and that taken
together, they effectively undermine the idea of the category as a unitary theoretical
instrument. I also argued earlier that in order for the standard contrast definition of
analogy to do its work, an account of categorisation, distinct from that contrast
definition, was necessary. This survey would appear to show that no such account is
available, nor, since it doesn't seem likely that any answers to Wittgenstein's deep
questions regarding any 'straightforward' account of categorisation will be
forthcoming, does it seem likely that such an account of categorisation will be available
in the future.
In chapter 21 described how analogy is defined as being distinct from categories, the
nature of which are left unexamined, presumed real and determinable, and argued that
without an account of categorisation, characterisations of analogy and metaphor reliant
upon a contrast with categorisation will fail to do much characterising at all. Analogy
is consistently defined in contrast to categorisation. I argued earlier that a valid
contrast definition requires an account of at least one of the contrasting elements.
From the foregoing, it would appear that categories can't do the work necessary to
provide this distinction.
At the end of Chapter 2,1 argued that without an account of categorisation, a definition
such as:
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"In an analogy, a familiar domain is used to understand a novel domain in
order to highlight important similarities between the domains, or to predict
new features of the novel domain." (Clement and Gentner, 1991, p89)
would be more accurately reformulated along the lines of: 'in analogy, a stored
representation, or representations are used in order to highlight important similarities
between it and a new representation of an object or concept, or to predict new features
in the new representation of an object or concept.' This definition seems to be as
applicable to an exemplar model of categorisation as it does to analogy.
Theoretically, at least, distinguishing analogy from categorisation may not be the
simple task our intuitions - and the literature - might have us believe. Indeed, from the
evidence examined above, it would appear that, at present at least, there is no
distinction to be made.
4.10 Categories Re-Visited - Reaction Time Studies
Objections to the theoretical denial of a distinction between analogy and categorisation
I make above hinge largely on the intuition that fundamentally there is something more
to categorisation, or literal judgements, as opposed to analogical judgements, namely
categories. Whilst it may be hard to characterise what categories are, says this
objection, we can determine their existence through their basic effects in cognition,
namely through the way that analogical and metaphorical understandings are dependant
upon literal 'categorical' understandings, with literal understandings being computed
first, and idiomatic interpretations being derived from them (often called two-process
theory (Clark and Clark, 1977; Kintsch, 1974)).
Despite the widespread appeal of this view (and its consistency with pre-theoretical
intuitions about analogy, metaphor and categories), existing data does not support
two-stage theories (Hoffman and Kemper, 1987). Commenting on their
comprehensive review of studies which employed chronometric measurements of
comprehension processes for non literal language - idioms, indirect requests, proverbs
and metaphors17 - Hoffman and Kemper make the following remark:
17 Given the foregoing, I shall treat terms such as literal, idiom, indirect request, proverb and metaphor
in this section as pre-theoretical constructs. The cognitive and methodological validity of distinctions
between 'literal' and 'non-literal' meanings made in these experiments is questionable to say the least;
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[On indirect requests and idioms] "Overall, the research on comprehension
of indirect requests and idioms shows a remarkable degree of agreement
despite differences in materials and methods. Such nonliteral forms are
comprehended more rapidly than if each word were literally processed.
The experiments suggest that people do not analyse every input for its
literal meaning. Comprehension does not even appear to be the
simultaneous processing of literal and non-literal meanings: the literal
meanings of idioms and indirect requests may not be processed at all
during comprehension. Rather then supporting a notion that non-literal
meanings are special and require special elaborative processing,
comprehension of idioms and indirect requests can be accounted for in
terms of factors that are known to be involved in language comprehension,
such as phrasal meaning and frequency, or degree of conventionality"
(Hoffman and Kemper, 1987, pp 159)
Whilst research on indirect requests and idioms does not substantiate two-process
theory, this does not necessarily mean that it cannot apply to metaphors (and by
extension analogy), because metaphors are often semantically anomalous with respect
to their utterance context: according to Miller (1979), if the initial literal processing of
an utterance yields semantically anomalous readings, this will cause the metaphor to be
reconstructed as an analogy in which the non-literal comparison is explicitly stated.
Again, this theory predicts longer processing time for metaphorical interpretation,
since it imputes special processing which is not necessary for literal interpretation.
However, Hoffman and Kemper found in their review that experiments exploring the
two-process theory of metaphor could be classified as follows:
Fail to confirm theory: (Harris, 1976; Harris, Lahey and Maraselek, 1980).
Offered weak confirmation of theory: (Petrun and Belamore, 1981; Pollio,
Fabrizio, Sills and Smith, 1982). Hoffman and Kemper note that these studies fail to
provide evidence that the strong predictions of two-process theory always obtain, 'and
when they do obtain, the results can be explained in other ways, such as in terms of
strategic biases induced by the tasks or materials' (Hoffman and Kemper, 1987, pp
167).
clearly any justification for these distinctions will be parasitic on some account of categorisation in
much the same way as I have argued the analogy - categorisation distinction is.
CHAPTER 4 - THEORIES AND MODELS OF CATEGORISATION 127
Refutation of theory: A study by Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds and Antos (1978)
provided evidence that metaphor comprehension might involve the same sort of
processes as are involved in the comprehension of literal sentences (Ortony, 1980).
Participants were given a target sentence (e.g. the hens clucked noisily), which was
preceded by a context to promote either a metaphorical interpretation (about a women's
debating club) or a literal interpretation (a child feeding farm animals). Ortony et at
found that comprehension times increased (participants took longer) in relation to the
amount of context available, but significantly, that these results were mirrored in the
literal sentences which were acting as a control. Both with supporting context, and in
its absence, literal sentences took as long to comprehend as metaphorical ones (see
also Gibbs, 1984, for convergent evidence from the study of idiom processing).
However, perhaps the most interesting finding of Hoffman and Kemper's review was
their discovery of the problems inherent in assessing reaction-time studies of two-
process theory owing to the lack of a story other than 'categories' to justify
distinguishing between what counted as a 'literal' and a 'non-literal' interpretations in
all cases:
'There is another problem with two-process theory stemming from th[e]
lack of clarity about the semantic base: the avoidance of the problem of
individual differences. Basic semantic elements that are assumed to be
assigned to a given word are supposed to belong to just about everyone's
semantic memory, an invariant semantic hierarchy. But people have
meanings, not words; differences between individuals at the level of
semantic features are bound to occur.'
(Hoffman and Kemper, 1987, pp 171)
Hoffman and Kemper's comments here may be illustrative of yet another problem
inherent in relying on unanalysed intuitions in this area: the intuitions we hold about
categorical behaviour may be inconsistent and contradictory. Hoffman and Kemper's
remark that 'people have meanings, not words; differences between individuals at the
level of semantic features are bound to occur' is revealing of a strong intuition, held
both by Hoffman and Kemper and the author. It is, however, an intuition that is hard
to square with definitive, essentialist accounts of categorisation: if 'knowing' a
category C is simply a question of possessing a schema or essence or theory of E, then
it is hard to see how individuals possessing E could differ in their understandings of
C.
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4.11 Conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to show that the evidence put forward in cognitive science
research is compatible with Wittgenstein's analysis of concepts and categories;
moreover, I have sought to show that the picture of categorisation that emerges from
the literature cannot support the contrast with categorisation that is needed to define
analogy, and also to underpin the use of 'semantics' in analogical theories.
The next chapter describe some experiments which were designed to empirically test
the 'no-distinction' hypothesis.
CHAPTER 5 - PROBING THE DISTINCTION
Chapter 5
Probing The "Distinction" Between Cognitive
Theories Of Analogy And Categorisation
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented the argument that the development of a psychological
model of conceptual categorisation has been fatally hampered by two important,
erroneous assumptions:
• Firstly, categories have often been treated as a rigid, externally imposed
phenomenon;
• Secondly, researchers have concentrated upon category representation -
attempting to uncover the essences of 'real' categories - rather than on the
process by which categorisation judgements are made.
On the other hand, Chapter 2 showed how research in analogy has focused upon the
analogical process - relating representations to one another - and the interplay between
this process and the representation of analogs.
Most current research into analogy and categorisation in cognitive science has accepted
a distinction between category membership and analogy based upon an essentially
realist intuition. In categorical judgements, relating a new representation of an object
to some kind of stored category representation, objects are felt to be similar to one
another in a way in which those objects in judgements of analogical association are
not. If two objects are considered to be members of a category, the classification is
real; if they are considered to be analogous, it is not.
I argued above that this tacit realism has been a part ofmuch research into analogy and
metaphor. Holyoak andThagard (1995) describe a world in which "we think we see
things as they really are", and analogy is used in order to recycle our existing
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knowledge of the real world to formulate new bits of 'real' knowledge. Similarly, in
the case of metaphor, Ortony (1979) makes a distinction between literal and non-literal
similarities: 'encyclopaedias are like dictionaries' is true in a literal (real) way, whereas
'encyclopaedias are like goldmines' is only true in a metaphorical (non-real) way.
Whether the notion of literal similarity might be problematic or not is barely examined,
since the real problem to be addressed is metaphor. Holyoak and Thagard (1995)
offer the comment "A metaphor always connects two domains in a way that goes
beyond our normal category structure" (pp 217), whilst giving little indication as to
what might constitute this 'normal category structure'. Analogies are defined as being
distinct from categories, the nature of which are left unexamined, presumed real.
Once the difficulties of giving an account of categorisation, noted in Chapters 3 and 4,
are admitted into the picture, distinctions between analogy and metaphor reliant upon a
contrast with categorisation cease to distinguish at all. Analogy is consistently defined
in contrast to categorisation (Clement and Gentner, 1991; Holyoak and Thagard,
1995); yet in order to make a contrast definition one needs an account of at least one of
the contrasting elements. This we don't have. An analogy is defined as an associative
judgement between two things that are in different categories, yet as I have sought at
length to show in chapter 3 and 4, a unitary account of what constitutes an association
between two things such that they are members of the same category rather than
different categories is not available1. Moreover, the evidence reviewed in those
chapters seems to indicate that according to the best accounts of categorisation, the
question of whether two things are members of the same category may not be
amenable to any straightforward answer. The distinction between categorisation and
analogy is difficult to draw: in this chapter I shall explore empirically the hypothesis
that at cognitive levels of description there may no clear distinction to be made at all.
5.1.1 Models Of Analogy And Categorisation
Another factor, noted earlier, which favours the abandoning of traditional distinctions
between categorisation and analogy are the strong parallels which can be drawn
between theories of analogy and the theoretical constraints imposed by many models
of categorisation. There is widespread acceptance of the role that structure plays in
1 Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) argue that metaphorical judgements are the same as categorisational
judgements ("metaphors are understood as they are - as class inclusion statements", ppl7). However,
from the account they put forward, it is hard to see how categorisation is to illuminate metaphor,
since they conclude: 'The central problem is to understand categorization." ( pp 17).
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category formation (Boyd, 1984; Goldstone, 1994; Keil, 1989; Medin and Ortony,
1989): analogical reasoning research directly addresses a process which reasons
amongst structural networks (Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner, 1989; Holyoak and
Thagard, 1995).
If we ignore the pre-theoretical distinction between the two processes, there are many
strong similarities to note between the cognitive theories of analogy and categorisation
considered so far - for instance, Gentner (1983) presents a theoretical model of
analogical reasoning (reviewed in chapter 2) that shares some strikingly similar
features with Medin and Ortony's (1989) account of categorisation. Indeed, it seems
to capture those elements in Medin and Ortony's theory that the review in chapter 4
acknowledged were lacking in other accounts of categorisation - namely a method for
capturing the important role that studies have indicated causal structure plays in
conceptualisation.
5.1.2 Two Theories:
Forbus, Gentner and Law (1995; pp 145-6) propose the following theoretical model of
analogical reasoning:
initial selection dependant upon surface similarity
• degree of analogical similarity is determined by deeper structures.
There is a striking parallel between this and Medin and Ortony's knowledge
representations scheme for categories:
• identification procedure based upon surface features
• classification is determined by deeper structures.
In the following section, I shall examine whether these are superficial similarities, or
whether they are indicative of a stronger - perhaps even an identity - relationship,
between these processes in cognition.
CHAPTER 5 - PROBING THE DISTINCTION 132
Story 1 - Base story
Once there was a teacher named Mrs Jackson who wanted a salary
increase. One day, the principal said that he was increasing his own salary
by 20 percent. However, he said there was not enough money to give the
teachers a salary increase.
When Mrs Jackson heard this she became so angry that she decided to
take revenge. The next day, Mrs Jackson used gasoline to set fire to the
principal's office.
Then she went to a bar and got drunk.
Story 2 - Literal similarity
Professor Rosie McGhee very much wanted a raise. One day the provost
announced that he was giving himself a raise. However, he said that
since money was short, no one else would get a raise this year.
After Professor McGhee heard this she became so upset that she decided
to get even. One hour later, Professor McGhee blew up the
administration building with dynamite.
Story 3 - True Analogy
McGhee was a sailor who wanted a few days of vacation on land. One
day, the captain announced that he would be taking a vacation in the
mountains. However, he said everyone else would have to remain on
the ship.
After McGhee heard this he became so upset that he decided to get
revenge. Within an hour McGhee blew up the captain's cabin with
dynamite.
Figure 5.1 A: Sample stories from Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993) - the text in
italic type illustrates extra structure added by Gentner at al to the base stories only.
I
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Story 4 - Mere appearance: (First order commonalities)
Professor McGhee very much wanted a raise. One day she became so
impatient that she used kerosene to burn down the administration
building.
After the fire, the provost announced that he was giving himself a raise.
However, he said that due to the fire, there was not enough money to
give one to anyone else.
Story 5 - False Analogy
McGhee was a sailor who wanted a few days of vacation on land. One day
McGhee became so impatient that he tried to blow up the captain's cabin
using dynamite.
After this incident, the captain announced that he would be taking a
vacation in the mountains. However, he said everyone else would have
to remain on board to repair the ship.
Story 6 - Mere appearance: (Object commonalities only)
A teacher once thought that she deserved a pay rise. She asked the
principal when her rise was due. She was wearing her best suit. The
principal told her that rises were decided by the governors.
Figure 5.1 B: Sample stories from Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993)
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Figure 5.1 C: A schematic representation of the overlapping features in the stories from
Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993). SM = Surface Matches, Str. = Structure. (For
details of story types, see section 5.3.2).
5.2 Structural Systematicity And Categorisation
Since the Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993) analogy studies discussed previously
did not directly address categorisation, a tacitly realist position was adopted in respect
of the categories amongst which participants were to analogise. The most obvious
way in which this realist assumption manifests itself is in the classification of match
items (the individual stories within the "Karla the hawk" story sets (Gentner,
Ratterman and Forbus 1993)). The question of the categorical status of match items is
determined in advance, thus story 1 in figure 5.1 is classified as a base story, whilst
story 3 is defined as its analogue. It is tacitly assumed that the two stories are
members of distinct and separate categories, and that they share some kind of
analogous link. Whilst the study aimed to explore a wider range of determinants of
similarity, the particular correspondences determined by structural systematicity were
considered to be indicative of analogous similarities (similarities between rather than
within categories). These assumptions determined the predictions that Gentner et d
made for their experiments, and the evidence they sought with which to test them.
Gentner et al's study explored various criteria of similarity, and discovered that the
preferred determinant of analogical similarity in participants was shared structural
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systematicity. As a consequence of the 'no distinction' hypothesis I predicted that if
one were to use Gentner et aV s methods and materials to explore categorisation rather
than analogy, structural systematicity might also serve as a criterion for determining
category membership. Story 3 in figure 5.1 was assumed by Gentner et al to be an
analogue of story 1. Analogues, as posited in traditional accounts of analogy, are
defined in contrast to category members. If participants were to use structural
systematicity as a categorisation determinant, then definitions of analogy which rely on
shared structure to contrast analogy with categorisation might need some refinement.
If both analogy and categorisation produce the same results, then this might imply
some shared, structure based mechanism, or that one process is supervenient upon the
other. Accordingly, in the following experiment, participants were presented with
Gentner et al s materials and asked to categorise them. Given that Gentner et al define
the analogical mechanism in terms of structure mapping, I accordingly expected
structure mapping to determine categorisation: i.e. Gentner et al assume that match
items with only structural similarities (i.e. analogues) belong to different categories:
the prediction was that they would be categorised together.
5.3 Experiment 1
5.3.1 Participants
The participants were 20 volunteers, a mixture of postgraduate and undergraduate
students from the Artificial Intelligence Department at the University of Edinburgh.
5.3.2 Materials
The basic materials used in this study were the 20 sets of "Karla the hawk" stories
(Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus, 1993).
Gentner defines the following taxonomy of similarity relationships between the stories:
• Literal similarity matches include both common relational structure and common
object descriptions;
• Surface matches: based upon common object descriptions, plus some first order
relations;
• Structural similarity, a match based upon a common system of internal relations;
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• First order matches, where the only common feature is first order relations;
• Object only matches, where stories have only object matches in common.
Each set consists of a base (B), a literally similar story (LS), an analogue (TA - with
only structural similarities with the base), a mere-appearance story (MA - with surface
and first order commonalities with the base), a false analogy (FA - an analogue of
MA), and an object only match story (00 - with only surface commonalities with the
base). This allowed for a number of potential groupings according to the classification
strategy adopted. Our prediction was that participants would use structural similarity
as their categorical similarity determinant, putting analogues and bases into the same
categories (i.e. B, LS and TA together), rather than grouping match items at the object
level (i.e. grouping B, LS, MA and 00 together).
The sets were modified slightly: in Gentner et aV s analogy research questions of the
asymmetry and direction of comparisons were clearly fixed (all comparisons were in
relation to the base story). Extra features (a varied mix of objects, attributes and
relationships) were added to (or removed from) the base story representations (Figure
5.1, shown in italic) which did little to affect analogical similarity judgements. In
categorisation judgements, aspects such as symmetry and directionality may be more
fluid. As we predicted that structure would be an important determinant of categorical
similarity judgements, and noting that the directionality of similarity judgements cannot
be fixed in categorisation, we accordingly removed Gentner et als extra features from
65% of the story sets (G- sets: in these, for example, the base / literal similarity
relationship were symmetrical), and retained the extra features (and any attendant
asymmetries) in 35% of stories (G+ sets).
5.3.3 Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned 10 sets of 6 stories, from a total of 20 sets,2 and
asked to work through them a set at a time. Both sets and stories were presented in
randomised order. For each set, they read through each story a number of times in
order to familiarise themselves with its content. Participants were then asked to
"Group the stories into the categories that seemed most natural and appropriate to you.
These groups can range from putting every member of the story set into the same
2Given the sample size, the experiment concentrated on sets 1-10; sets 11 - 20 were used to a more
limited extent to check for any marked variations in the data being produced. No such variation was
noted.
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group, to putting each story into a group on its own." When participants had made
their categorisation decisions, they physically grouped each set of stories by pasting
them onto a large sheet of paper and encircling each group in ink. Participants were
then re-presented with their groupings a set at a time, asked to give each group with
two or more members a simple descriptive name, and then to write a few sentences
explaining what caused them to classify each named group of stories together. This
task was intended to help participants focus on the naming task, and the resultant data
was not analysed.
Classification Criterion % of Total
Systematic network of relations in common - Type 1
1 B LS TA 2 FA MA 3 OO
79.5 %
Systematic network of relations in common - Type 2 8 %
(Base classified separately)
1LSTA 2 FA MA 3B 400
First order relations in common - Type 3
1 B LS TA FA MA 2 OO
4%
Only object similarities in common - Types 6 & 7
1 MA LS B OO 2FATA
1 B OO 2 LS MA 3 TA FA
5%
No classification possible - Types 4, 5, 8 , 9 10
1 B LS MA 2FATA 3.00
3.5 %
1 BTA 2FA MA 3 LS 400
1 B MA FA 2 LS TA 3 OO
1 BLSTAOO 2 FA MA
1 FA B TA MA 2 LS 00
Figure 5.2: Output patterns from the categorisation task, showing the groups formed
and criteria established. The stories are labelled according to how they fit Gentner's
taxonomy of similarity (defined above): B = Base; LS = Literal Similarity; TA = True
Analogy; FA = False Analogy; MA = Mere Appearance; 00 = Object Only match.
5.3.4 Results
Each story set assigned to a participant was analysed to determine the groups formed.
The pattern of groupings which emerged fell broadly into 5 classes (figure 5.2).
Gentner et aVs taxonomy of similarities could account for 96.5% of within group
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similarities observed. Of these, in 5% of cases the stories were grouped according to
types 6 and 7. The only similarities across groupings in these types are that the stories
in the individual groups had only objects in common. In 4% the stories were
classified according to type 3, where the across grouping similarity was shared first
order relations. In 79.5% of cases participants grouped using type 1. Here the only
similarity across groupings was a network of systematic causal relations. The full
output and incidence of the types is given in Table 5.1.
8% of groupings were according to type 2, where the base was put into a category on
its own, with the only similarity across other groupings being shared structure. This
type was only found once amongst those sets from which Gentner et aV s extra features
had been removed (0.5% of G- sets; figure 5.3). The G+ sets, those with added
features in the base, were sets 5; 7; 10; 12; 15; 17; and 20. Of these: in set 5 and set
20 the extra features involved higher order relations; in sets 7; 10; and 15 they
involved first order relations; and in sets 12 and 17 the extra features were objects.
20% of these sets were classified as type 2, with the bulk of these classifications being




G4- G- % of total
Type I 68 % 86.5% 79.5%
Type 2 20% 0.5% 8%
Other 12% 13% 12.5%
Figure 5.3: Classification strategies according to set type.













Type 1 7 2 7 7 119 5
Type 2 9 2 1 2
Type 3 1 1 1 2
Types 6 & 7 2
Types 4, 5, 8,
9 & 10 1
Totals 19 5 8 7 14 11 6
Figure 5.4: Classification data for the G+ sets.
Story Sets
Participants
1 2 3 4 5+ 6 7+ 8 9 10+ 11 12+ 13 14 15+ 16 17+ 18 19 20+
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B 3 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
C 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
D 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2
E 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 3
F 4 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 5
G 8 6 7 1 1 1 6 1 1 1
H 5 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
J 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
K 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
L 7 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 1 1 1 1 5 2 2 1 1 1
O 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P 6 3 1 1 1 3 7 1 1 3
Q 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
R 1 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
T 3 7 9 1 3 7 7 7 1 1
Table 5.1: Output incidence of participant groupings. Each participant was given 10
story sets (each row represents one participant): the type of grouping is indicated by the
type number in the story set column (see also figure 5.2). (Participant T produced some
rather strange results: this was explained by examining the reasons T gave for her
groupings, in which she explained that she was exploring a different heuristic for each
story set.)
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5.4 Discussion
Experiment 1 examined the hypothesis that mechanisms normally considered to be
analogical could in fact support categorisation tasks. The most important finding here
is the role that shared structure plays in classification judgements in this task. 79.5%
of the groupings formed by our participants had only shared systematic structure
(traditionally defined as analogy) as a common feature amongst members of the
categories formed. In contrast, only 5% of groupings produced had common object
descriptions as the common similarity within categories.
The argument put forward above, that abandoning the current de facto distinction
between categorical and analogical associations of objects might benefit the
understanding of both, has two main parts: first, that the standard distinctions
(Clement and Gentner, 1991; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995) between analogy and
categorisation fail to actually distinguish between them, leading to problems in saying
quite what analogy is supposed to comprise; and secondly, that by removing the
distinction, understanding of the factors which govern mappings between
representations that have been gleaned from analogy research might help illuminate
categorisation questions. These results provide some evidence in support of the latter
idea that structures, and more pertinently Gentner's structural systematicity, rather than
simple features, can act as the key to categorical similarity.
This argument is supported not only by the proportion of categorisations that were
determined by commonalities between internal structures in the stories, but also by the
effects of added structure in the G+ sets where the added structure was a higher-order
structure. These might at first appear to present a problem for an attempt to use a
structure mapping analysis to model these categorisation judgements. In these cases,
Gentner's base stories were put into separate categories from stories to which they
were supposed to be literally similar, which were in turn categorised alongside their
supposed analogues (both of which were supposed to share structures with the base).
These results can be attributed to the effects of directionality and symmetry upon
similarity judgements. Whilst Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993) found that
participants judged literally similar (LS) stories to be very similar to bases, and
analogues less so, they did not consider the effect of reversing the directionality and
symmetry of the comparisons, for example comparing the base and analogue stories'
similarity to the LS. Neither did they consider the judging of cumulative similarity,
I
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where dissimilarities are also taken into account. During this process, the structural
dissimilarities of the base versus the LS and analogue appear from our results to be
clearly relevant, whereas the object differences of the analogue versus the LS and base
do not. This maximisation of important similarities (i.e. structure matches) relative to
lesser dissimilarities (i.e. object matches) amongst groupings appears to play a crucial
role in categorisation in this study.
Whilst it might be argued that all I have shown here is that participants will form
categories of analogies, such an interpretation (in so far as one can make sense of it)
does not affect the argument that it is common systematic structure that determines the
content of these categories.
5.5 Using Surface Versus Structural Recall Biases
To Probe Conceptual Storage
A major problem in much research into categorisation, highlighted in the review in
chapter 4 above, is that experimental results have rarely - if ever - directly indicated
anything about conceptual representation. Often, if not always, it is difficult to
determine whether particular results stem from stored information regarding concepts
(e.g. prepositional or imaginal information) or from the processes that operate in
invoking a particular concept (c.f. Smith and Medin, 1981). The vast majority of
theories reviewed in chapter 4, assume a 'straightforward' unitary representation, the
exception being granular instance-based approaches to categorisation, and perhaps
explanation-based approaches (although the lack of any specific formulation of an
explanation (or theory) based model of categorisation makes it impossible to deduce
the kind of stored representations such a theory would entail).
In the light of this, and the theoretical analysis presented in chapter 4, direct evidence
regarding the nature of the storage of a concept, or concepts, may have important
implications for the way categories are viewed: especially if that evidence fails to
support a unitary-representation account.
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5.6 A Process Model
In experiment 11 have examined an intuitive distinction - held by most psychological
researchers - between analogy and metaphor on one hand, and categorisation on the
other. I have argued that although one might ordinarily distinguish between category
membership and analogy according to realist terms, there are good reasons for
abandoning this distinction at a theoretical level when we focus upon cognitive
processes.
5.6.1 Representation And Process
Studies by Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993) (discussed in chapter 2 above)
explored the factors determining how items are accessed, i.e. how representations are
selected in order to allow similarity mapping to take place. These have shown that
access relies primarily upon surface attribute (or object attribute) matches, and they
propose that the process underlying judgements of similarity can be decomposed into
two sub-processes:
• Accessing a similar (base) situation from memory, based primarily on surface
similarity
• Creating a mapping from base to target using structural commonalities (SMT).
I shall explore whether this process model can offer a solution to the difficulties,
mentioned above, of determining whether particular effects result from stored
representations or from the processes that operate in invoking representations. The
following experiment was designed to use this detailed model of the processes that
determine the retrieval and mapping (and classifying) of representations to empirically
probe the nature of conceptual storage.
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Story 1 - Base story
Joseph was a millionaire who hired a chauffeur to drive his Rolls-Royce.
He used to brag to his wife that he would never be late for his conferences
since he had hired a chauffeur.
One morning when he was in a great hurry, he went to find the
chauffeur. But he was asleep. He thought his services would not be
needed that day.
Thus Joseph was very late for his conference after all. To make sure this
would not happen again, Joseph hired a second chauffeur.
Story 2 - Literal similarity
Alexander was a wealthy man who employed a driver for his limousine.
He liked to boast to his spouse that with his driver he would always be on
time for his meetings.
One day when he was in a rush, he went to find the driver. But he was
taking a nap. The driver thought it was his day off. Thus Alexander
ended up missing his meeting. But to make sure he would not be late
again, Alexander hired a second driver.
Story 3 - True Analogy
Alexander was a man who lived with his wife in his house a long time
ago. He liked to boast to a friend that with his wife at home we would
always eat well. One day, when he was very hungry, Alexander went
home to his wife. But she thought Alexander would be eating someplace
else so she had only prepared enough for herself and their baby. Thus
Alexander went without dinner. But to make sure he would not go
hungry again, Alexander married a second wife.
Figure 5.5: A classified (B,LS,TA) story set (Gentner, et al, 1993) from experiment 1, as
used in experiment 2
CHAPTER 5 - PROBING THE DISTINCTION 144
5.7 Experiment 2
In the course of experiment 1, participants were asked to give each of their classes a
name that was meaningful to them. Because of the particular nature of that task, this
involved participants developing (and learning) 'categories' that contained some items
that had only structural relations in common. By examining the attributes they could
recall that were associated with that name, I aimed to use Gentner et aV s findings about
systematic structures vs. attributes to determine the representation associated with the
name. If participants stored some kind of abstracted prototype - i.e. a unitary
representation of their category - we would expect that the attributes associated with
the most prototypical stories would be most readily retrieved from memory, with
attributes recalled insofar as they were relevant to the prototype (perhaps along the
frequency lines one might expect from the analysis in table 5.2).
This was not expected to happen. There is too much empirical and theoretical work
that cannot be accommodated by a unitary representation account (see chapter 4). The
hypothesis here was that participants would not have abstracted a unitary
representation from the stimuli that they had classed together, but would instead store a
number of representations that they associated with it, polarising between those class
members that shared no surface attributes. I predicted that introducing a class name
out of context would make it equally likely that any stored representation associated
with that name would be recalled, and that the initially recalled representation would
drive further recall. Since the model of recall employed here is feature driven, I
expected results to polarise, with those representations with no surface attributes in
common leading to minimal recall of one another.
5.7.1 Participants
The participants were 20 volunteers, a mixture of postgraduate and undergraduate
students from the Artificial Intelligence Department at the University of Edinburgh.
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Set B-LS LS-SS SS-B
1 1 00 90 85
2 100 100 85
3 100 65 45
4 1 00 55 45
5 100 85 55
6 100 85 75
7 100 75 60
8 100 70 45
9 100 85 65
1 0 100 75 60
1 1 1 00 95 75
1 2 100 75 60
1 3 1 00 75 50
1 4 100 95 70
1 5 100 50 35
1 6 1 00 95 75
1 7 95 100 70
1 8 1 00 80 55
1 9 1 00 80 60
20 1 00 1 00 60
Table 5.2: Object attribute (surface feature) similarity ratios between stories by set.
5.7.2 Materials
Materials were the classified sets of "Karla the hawk" stories (Gentner, Ratterman &
Forbus, 1993; see figure 5.5 for an example) produced by the participants in
experiment 1. The following taxonomy of similarity relationships between the stories
can be defined:
• Literal similarity matches include both common relational structure and
common object descriptions;
• Surface matches: based upon common object descriptions, plus some first
order relations;
• Structural similarity, a match based upon a common system of internal
relations;
The original sets consist of a base (B), a story literally similar to it (LS), one
structurally similar to it (SS - i.e. with no object attributes in common with the base,
although SS stories did share some object attributes with LS). In order to determine
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the relative effects of object versus structural matches in this experiment, the "Karla the
Hawk" stories were analysed and rated to determine the level of attribute
commonalities between the individual stories in each set.
Correspondence Example Value
1 -1 map man, man 5 pts
strong map street, road 4 pts
'analogical' association conned, robbed 3 pts
fireman, paramedic
weak 'analogy' enlisted, begged
fireman, nurse 2 pts
disappeared, shattered
weak association Fred, Mary (both names) 1 pt
fireman, accountant (both jobs)
Figure 5.6: Classification criteria for determining surface similarity.
Two raters gave a numeric value to each of a range of possible surface attribute
correspondences between stories (see figure 5.6 for details), and then individual
attribute correspondences were totalled and averaged between the two raters in order to
determine the overall correspondences between stories (table 5.2). Consistency
between raters was 82.5%. Differences between raters were resolved by discussion.
5.7.3 Procedure
The classes produced by participants in experiment 1 were returned to them. During
the classification task, participants were asked to give each of the classes they
produced a name that 'would be meaningful to them later'. After finishing the
classification task, participants were given a 5 minute break, and then undertook a 20
minute diversionary task (searching for post-codes from a directory) before being
given another 5 minute break. Participants were then presented with a sub-set (usually
4) of the names they had assigned to classes during the classification task, and asked
to 'write down what you can remember about the various features (or you may like to
see them as attributes) of each of the scenarios associated with each name. E.g. you
may have had a scenario about a door that needed varnishing. Features, or attributes,
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associated with such a scenario would be "door" and "varnishing"'. Participants were
given 10 minutes to complete the task.
5.7.4 Results
The 20 participants yielded a total of 70 recall episodes.
5.7.4.1 Scoring
The recalled features were evaluated by two judges using the same scale that was used
to evaluate feature correspondences between stories (see figure 5.7). The total
attribute recall for each set was calculated and averaged between raters. As in the
rating of story commonalities, differences between rater were resolved by discussion.
5.7.4.2 Individual Story Recall
B was best recalled for 37% of all sets, SS in 30% of cases and LS in 33%; as
predicted, there was no significant bias towards recalling any particular type of story.
However, when we looked at the pattern of recollection, irrespective of the particular
stories each participant had recalled, there were significances in the quality of recall
between the best recalled, and the next best, and the next-best and the worst recalled
stories. Participants tended to clearly recall one story better (70 cases, M = 19.75)
than the next (M = 14.74), (within groups r(69) = 8.846, p < 0.0001), and then these
next best recalled stories better than the worst (M = 11.1), t(69) = 11.802 p < 0.0001
The individual recall orderings by story type are given below:
5.7.4.3 Base (B)
In cases where B was the most recalled story in terms of features (26 cases, M =
18.44), there was a significant difference in the quality of recall over the next best
recalled story set LS (M = 14.83), t(25) = 4.434 p < 0.0001, which in turn was
recalled significantly more than SS (M = 10.15), t(25) = 3.77 p < 0.0001.
5.7.4.4 Literal Similarity (LS)
When LS was the best recalled story (M = 20.78), next best was B (23 cases, M =
15.85), t(22) = 5.288 p < 0.0001, with SS recalled least well (M = 11.96), t(22) =
2.095 p < 0.05.
CHAPTER 5 - PROBING THE DISTINCTION 148
5.7.4.5 Structural Similarity (SS)
In cases where SS stories were qualitatively best recalled (21 cases, M = 20.12), the
next best recalled group was LS, (M = 13.43), t{20) = 5.886 p = < 0.0001, and the
least recalled group was B (M = 11.36), although the between group difference
between LS and B was not significant (r(20) = 1.901 p < 0.072); the difference in
recall quality between SS and B was still significant (t(20) = 6.609 p < 0.0001).
B Best Recalled Next Best - LS Next Best - SS
26 cases;
Mean = 18.44
Mean = 14.83 Mean = 10.15
LS Best Recalled Next Best - B Next Best - SS
23 cases;
Mean = 20.78
Mean = 15.85 Mean = 11.96
SS Best Recalled Next Best - LS Next Best - B
21 cases;
Mean = 20.12
Mean = 13.43 Mean =11.36
Table 5.7: Mean recall orderings by story type
5.8 Discussion
The experiment produced little evidence to support the hypothesis that our participants
had abstracted and stored schemas from the groups they had classified, despite the fact
that a shared structural schema was the basis of participants' original classification
decisions. If some version of a stored prototype theory were true, we would have
expected a majority of LS features to be recalled in most instances. In fact, B features
were most often recalled, though not significantly: the trend favoured a random
I
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distribution. Another result that might also favour prototype theory would have been a
situation where all the stories were recalled with much the same frequency, i.e.
LS=B=SS, since such a result could be a product of the strong feature commonalities
between the LS stories and members of both of the other story types. However, there
was a significant trend for participants to recall one story more than another, and the
next best story more than the least recalled story.
If participants randomly recalled an individual instance of a class then one would
expect from Gentner et aV s similarity recall findings that the attributes of this member
should influence which other story they might recall from the class: if B is recalled,
recall of a B story should prompt recall of an LS story rather than a a SS story, as B
shares more surface attributes with LS than SS (B and LS share 10 surface attributes
to every 6 shared by B and SS), and Gentner et aVs findings were that surface
attributes rather than shared structure promote recall: where B features were best
recalled this pattern emerged throughout our study. As predicted, the result of LS
stories sharing a higher percentage of surface attributes with B than SS shared with B,
results in a situation where recall of B led to a significantly higher quality of recall for
LS recall than SS. The results where LS stories were most strongly recalled also
supported this analysis, with SS recall prompting significantly better recall of B
attributes than SS attributes (even though LS shared more surface features with SS
than SS did with B).
Indicative of the fact that SS shared fewer surface commonalities with the other story
types, SS-LS attribute commonalities were much weaker than B-LS (see table 5.2),
and in specific sets little greater than B-SS. Good SS recall did not produce a bias
towards LS or B as the next-best recalled story type; although our results showed
some tendency towards SS prompting LS over B, it was not significant (see also table
5.3).
The hypothesis that participants would recall stories individually from memory is
further supported by the nature of participant's recollection. Irrespective of the
particular stories each participant had recalled, there were significances in the quality of
recall between the best recalled, and the next best, and the next-best and the worst
recalled stories.
If one applies Gentner, et aVs (1993) persuasive analysis of the influence of surface
vs. deep structure on recall to these results, it would appear that being presented with a
class name in no particular context caused the participants to randomly recall one of the
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examples associated with that name, and then use that example as the stimulus for
recalling other class members. On this evidence, it would appear that participants had
stored class examples along with a cue - the class name - rather than any generalisation
of the class itself.
These findings suggest that at least some concepts can be stored as multiple-
representations, as opposed to stemming directly from the particulars of unitary
conceptual schemas, as has often been assumed.
5.9 Can One Distinguish Between Cognitive
Theories Of Analogy And Categorisation?
So far I have reviewed and presented much evidence, both theoretical and empirical,
which casts doubt on a two-process account of literal (categorical) versus non-literal
(analogical or metaphorical) reasoning (two-process in the sense that the computation
of non-literal meaning is supposed to be a separate process that is - in some way -
parasitic on literal processing).
Despite this weight of evidence contra the two-process account - and the concomitant
lack of evidence for it - suggestions that the two processes-account be rejected are
still met with some incredulity. French (1995) describes the experience of suggesting
to an academic audience that an upturned orange-crate, when covered with a cloth and
laid out with a picnic, might really be described as a table. This met with the swift
response, "An orange crate is an orange crate is an orange crate." The attachment to
pre-theoretical intuitions is a strong one, even amongst those who seek to explore
them.
The belief that an orange crate is an orange crate is an orange crate holds great sway.
Indeed, such is the two-process account's entrenchment in ordinary, pre-theoretical
understandings of the world that, quite understandably, a more than usual quantity of
counter-evidence may be required if it is to be abandoned at a theoretical level. And,
whilst the study of experiments 1 and 2 might apply to classifying stories, it provides
little evidence that this classification of stories can be generalised to other
categorisation behaviour.
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Base
A Karla is a novel type of cooking pot, used by the Timuni in Alnata.
The structure of the Karla is designed in order to reduce the heat inside,
and therefore prevents the food getting burned in the scorching cooking
fires.
Water is poured into a layer of the Karla during cooking, which cools the
food.
Literal Similarity
The Valkri is a special kind of frying pan, used by the Jalpeni in Frodon.
The Valkri is created in such a way as to be able to reduce heat, thereby
preventing meat being getting burned when using the extreme
temperatures of the cooking fires.
A liquid is poured into the layers of the frying pan when cooking, which
cools the temperature of the meat.
Structural Similarity Only
The Vubu is a special wall built by the Jakar tribesmen in Frodon.
The Vubu is built in such a way as to be able to reduce the heat within it,
thereby preventing the Jakar from sweating too much in the extreme
temperatures of the midday sun.
A liquid is pumped through the Vubu, which cools the stone and
therefore prevents the Jakar within the walls from getting too hot.
Figure 5.8 A: Example of an object description set used in the study.
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ippearance
; of Frodon use a special type of frying pan, known as the
ilkri is designed in order to allow it to be handled by children, as
(be difficult.
{lie is designed with a special U-shape, which enables it to be held
jlewith small hands.
pally Similar to MA
liar tribesmen of Frodon have built a special wall known as the
libu's stone gates can be opened by elderly people, despite their
weight.
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SET 6 animal animal priest animal priest animal
SET 7 chant chant game chant game chant
SET 8 food food drink food drink food
Figure 5.9: 'Normal' categories embodied in each object description set.
The principal reasoning behind this is straightforward: typical 'natural' categories - the
kind of categories found and used in human societies - tend to concern objects, and
other, more regular 'things in the world', rather than stories (Rosch, 1978).
Classifying objects is more akin to ordinary categorisation than classifying stories
(though a set of descriptions of 'rituals' was also included to capture the fact ordinary
categories reflect a good deal more than just physical regularities). Thus, the resulting
object descriptions fell neatly and clearly into 'normal' categories (see Figure 5.9).
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5.11 Experiment 3
5.11.1 Participants
20 volunteer participants participated in this experiment. The participants were a
mixture of Artificial Intelligence and Psychology students from the University of
Edinburgh.
5.11.2 Materials
The basic materials used for this study were 8 sets of 'Karla the Pot' novel object
descriptions (see Figure 5.8 for examples). These were descriptions of objects created
to replicate the framework used by Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993) in the
creation of the "Karla the Hawk" stories.
By analogy with Gentner etaVs taxonomy of similarity, used in experiments 1 and 2,
the following taxonomy of similarity relationships was defined between the novel
"object descriptions":
- "Literal similarity" matches include both common relational structure and common
object attributes;
- "Surface matches" are based upon common object attributes, plus some first order
relations;
- "Structural similarity" matches are based upon a common system of internal relations;
- "First order" matches only have first order relations as a common feature;
- "Object only" matches only have object matches in common between the object
descriptions.
Each of the 'Karla the Pot' sets consists of a base (B), a literally similar object
description (LS), an object description that shared the same structure as the base, but
no object attributes (SSO)4, a mere-appearance object description, with surface and
first order commonalities with the base (MA), an object description which shared
structure with the MA, and object attributes with the SSO (SMAO),5 and an object
only match object description, with only surface attribute commonalities with the base
4 The same as TA in experiment 1.
5 The same as FA in experiment 1.
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(00). This allowed for a number of potential groupings to be formed, according to
the classification strategy participants adopted.
The prediction examined was whether participants would again use structural similarity
as their categorical similarity determinant, putting analogues and bases into the same
categories (i.e. B, LS and SSO together), rather than grouping match items at the
object level (i.e. grouping B, LS, MA and 00 together; which also equated to existing
category membership), despite the fact that we were using novel object descriptions
which embodied existing categories rather than Gentner's (1993) relatively 'category-
neutral' stories.
5.11.3 Procedure
Each participant was presented with eight envelopes, each containing a different set of
six novel object descriptions, and was asked to work through them one set at a time.
Sets were presented in random order, as were the object descriptions within them.
Participants were instructed to read through the object descriptions within a set several
times, until they felt familiar with their contents. They were then asked to put the
objects together into groups, grouping the things that fitted most naturally together in
their judgement. Groupings could range from putting all descriptions into the same
group to having them all in separate groups as well as all variations in between.
When the categorisation groupings had been decided on, the participant pasted them
onto a large sheet of blank paper and then circled each grouping using a marker pen.
Once all eight sets had been divided into groups using this procedure, participants
were re-presented with their groupings a set at a time, and were asked to give any
group containing two or more members a simple descriptive name.
The experiment took around an hour to complete.
5.12 Results
For every object description set, the groups formed by each participant's
classifications were analysed (with the results displayed in Table 5.3). Groupings
which emerged fell into a number of classes, a taxonomy of which is presented in
figure 5.4. Similarities across groupings (i.e. within groups similarities) which could
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be determined according to Gentner et al's taxonomy were identified in 80% of
groupings (in Types 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6).
Object Description Sets
12345678 Total No. of Type 1 Responses
A 1115 1 7 1 7 5
B 1111 1 1 1 1 8
C 1-11 1 3 1 1 6
D - 1 1 1 1 8 - 1 5
E 1111 4 - 1 1 6
s F 1111 1 1 - 7 6
u G 1-11 1 - 1 - 5
b H - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
j I 1111 6 - 1 1 6
e J 112 1 1 - - 1 5
c K 1111 1 1 1 1 8
t L 1111 1 - 1 1 7
s M 16 16 1 1 1 8 5
N 8 111 1 1 4 1 6
O 1111 1 1 6 6 6
P 16 11 1 7 1 7 5
Q 1111 1 1 1 1 8
R 17 1- 1 - 6 7 3
S 9 116 1 - 9 - 3
T 14 3 1 3 - 4 9 2
Table 5.3: Results for grouping patterns. Each participant was given 8 sets of object
descriptions (each row represents one participant; each column an object description set):
the type of grouping is indicated by the type number in the object description set
column (see also Table 5.4).
The most common grouping pattern used was of Type 1 (groups divided into: 1. B-
LS-SSO: 2. SMAO-MA: 3. 00, using a network of systematic causal relations),
which was used for 70% of all object description sets.
Object description sets were grouped according to Types 4 and 5 in 3.1% of cases.
The only similarity across groupings of these types is that the object descriptions in
each group had only objects in common.
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Groupings which occurred due to participants using common first order relations
(those of Type 3) occurred in 1.9% of cases.
Other groupings worth mentioning were Types 7 and 8, in which the structured object
descriptions were grouped according to a determinable pattern, (structure for Type 7,
4.4%) and object attributes (Type 8, 1.9%), but the 00 descriptions were assigned
according to features in Type 7 (where one would expect a separate grouping), and
grouped separately in Type 8 (grouped with descriptions containing similar object
attributes expected).
Only 0.6% (one occurrence) of groupings were of Type 2, where the base was put
into a category of its own, with shared structure being the only similarity across
groupings.
In 11.2% of groupings it was impossible to determine an overall criterion for
determining the pattern produced; each of these groupings had only a single
occurrence.
5.13 Discussion
This study further examined the 'no distinction' hypothesis: that categorisation
judgements in humans can be determined more by shared structural systematicity than
by shared object attributes (surface features), between the objects/ things/ rituals to be
classified. The results show considerable evidence to support this hypothesis: 70% of
the groupings were made in this way (had participants grouped randomly,
mathematical combinatorics yield 213 possible groupings of the materials). In a
further 10% of groupings (Types 2, 6 and 7), shared structure was clearly the criterion
determining the participants' overall groupings, although a single object description
was classified unaccountably.
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Classification Criterion Number % of Total
Systematic network of relations in common - Type 1
1 B LS SSO 2 SMAOMA 3 00 112 70%
Systematic network of relations in common - Type 2 (see experiment 1)
(Base classified separately)
1 LS SSO 2 SMAOMA 3B 400 1 0.6%
First order relations in common - Type 3
1 B LS SSO SMAO MA 2 00 3 1.9%
Only object similarities in common Types 4 & 5
1 MA LS B 00 2 SSO SMAO





Largely systematic network of relations in common
1 B LS 2 SSO 3 MA SMAO 4 00
Type 6
8 5%
00 'Problems' - Structure based - Type 7
Object attribute based - Type 8
1 B LS SSO 00 2MA SMAO





Type 9 and others - No clear pattern






Table 5.4: Output patterns from the categorisation task, showing the groups formed and criteria
established. The object descriptions are labelled according to Gentner's taxonomy of similarity (defined
above): B = Base; LS = Literal Similarity; SSO = Structural Similarity Only; SMAO = Structural
Similarity with MA and Object Similarity with SSO; MA = Mere Appearance; OO = Object Only
match.
One interesting effect from the experiment 1 that - intentionally - was not replicated in
this experiment, was the production of a large number of Type 2 groupings. In
experiment 1 an extra structure (inserted by Gentner et al as part of their analogy
study) was left in a subset of the base stories presented to participants. These base
stories with extra structure then tended to be grouped singularly (see Type 2 in Table
5.4, below). Since the 'Karla the Pot' materials did not contain any extra structures in
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the Base, I did not expect significant numbers of Type 2 stories to be produced, and in
the event, only 0.6% of groupings (1 out of 180) resulted in a Type 2 pattern, where
the base was classified singularly in an otherwise structurally determined grouping
pattern.
Groupings that appeared to be formed on the basis of shared surface attributes only
amounted to 3.1% of the total (Types 4 & 5). To these could be added another 1.9%
of groupings (Type 8) in which shared features determined the overall groupings,
although the 00 object description - distinctive due to its complete lack of any
systematic structure - was classified separately.
Of those object descriptions classified according to shared object attributes, only 2.5%
(Type 4 groupings) reflect the 'normal' categories shown in figure 5.9.
Clearly, once again structure appears to be the key determinant of participants'
classifications in this study. As Murphy and Medin (1985) note, categorisation
models have tended to concentrate on object descriptions, making use of very
representationally-simple attribute-value lists. In contrast, analogy research has
examined relationships between highly structured representations (considering the
influence of attributes, relations and higher-order relations in judgements of
similarity). The evidence of this study would appear to support the idea put forward in
chapter 4, that more notice needs to be taken of the kinds of representations used, and
the effects these produce, in categorisation studies (see also Medin, Goldstone, and
Gentner, 1993).
5.14 Summary
Experiment 1 explored the hypothesis that mechanisms normally considered to be
analogical could in fact support categorisation tasks. Participants were given Gentner
et aVs analogy materials and instead of being given analogy tasks, they were asked to
categorise these materials. Participants' judgements of categorical similarity between
the stimuli were indistinguishable from the judgements of analogical similarity reported
by Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993).
Experiment 2 provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that it is possible for
participants to name a class whose membership is determined entirely by shared
structure, and then can retrieve information regarding its members without appearing
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to abstract a common schema definitive of that class. Such evidence for a non-unitary
account of category representation should not come as a surprise: the literature is filled
with material that casts doubt on the plausibility of unitary accounts of concept
representation.
Finally, the results of experiment 3 add further support the broader finding of
experiment 1, which indicated that the processes underlying analogy and categorisation
are not as distinct as is usually assumed. The results of both experiments show shared
structural systematicity (Gentner, 1983) as the main process underlying categorisation
judgements in the particular experimental conditions. Ordinarily, structural
systematicity has been considered the domain of analogy, rather than categorisation.
In experiment 3, the influence of shared structural systematicity was remarkable.
Participants preferred groupings between pots and walls, and walls and pans to pots
and pans and walls alone. These findings have strong implications for categorisation
and analogy research: I have noted several times the widespread acceptance in both
areas of research of the two-process view of analogical / metaphorical and literal
understandings, whereby 'literal' (within category) understandings are external to non-
literal (analogical or metaphorical) understandings, and are therefore assumed to be
computed by separate cognitive processes. The findings in this experiment seem to
contradict the assumptions at the heart of this distinction.
However, in spite of this, I do not want to say at this stage that analogy is
categorisation. It is difficult to envisage how such a central cognitive process such as
categorisation could be reduced to a single process (c.f. Goldstone, 1994). Given the
difficulty inherent in characterising analogical, metaphorical and categorical reasoning
it seems reasonable to be as dubious of the usefulness of the kind of identity
statements made by Glucksberg and Keysar, (1990), who argue that metaphorical
statements should be understood as class-inclusion statements, as one should be
dubious of the contrast definitions with which this account started. It is plausible -
even likely - that a number of reasoning processes play a part in categorisation. The
conservative interpretation of these results is to suggest that analogy is best viewed as
a sub-process of categorisation, and not as a separate process; it may be worthwhile
keeping an open mind as to whether an orange crate is an orange crate can be a table?
In the following chapter, I shall explore this idea further.
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Chapter 6
Re-Examining The Role Of Semantic
Constraints In Analogy
6.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters I have argued for a position that rejects any simple distinction
between analogy and categorisation at the cognitive process level. To recap, the
argument runs as follows: definitions of analogy (e.g. Holyoak and Thagard, 1995;
Clement and Gentner, 1991) rely on making a distinction between 'straight' categorical
judgements on the one hand, and analogical 'extra-categorical' judgements on the
other. With no convincing account of just what constitutes a 'straight' categorical
judgement, this amounts to little more than hand waving, attempting to characterise
one ill-defined process by contrasting it with another ill-defined process. If the
distinction is merely based upon appearances, detailed scientific scrutiny should show
this. Further, it might also be that removing the distinction will allow progress made
in studying analogy in isolation to inform the real question: that of explaining the
processes that underpin all human conceptualisation: analogy, metaphor, and
categorisation.
This chapter examines the perspective this particular view of the categorisation /
analogy divide, and the results experiments that use analogical models to explore
categorisation, can bring to existing theoretical approaches to analogy. The removal of
neatly bounded 'concept domains' with which various aspects of the analogical
process can interact produces a changed circumstance that seems likely to have
repercussions for theories based on just such assumptions. In particular, I shall
examine the implications of the approach developed for the semantic similarity
constraints which are variously included in, or excluded from, theories and models of
the analogical process.
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In examining in detail the effects of the blurred analogy / categorisation perspective on
'semantics,' I shall again focus on Gentner's 'Structure Mapping' theory and Holyoak
andThagard's 'Multi-Constraint' theory. As I noted in chapter 2, these constitute the
most explicit theories, whose supporting evidence and accompanying process models
have been most widely disseminated and accepted. In this chapter I shall briefly
restate the main elements of these theories before going on to examine the implications
that the evidence , both empirical and theoretical ( presented in the intervening















Figure 6.1: Predicate representations of the solar system and a hydrogen atom
6.2 Gentner's Structure Mapping Theory - A Recap.
As I described in chapter 2, Gentner's Structure Mapping Theory (Gentner, 1983,
etc.) proposes that the mapping and inference between two domains can be achieved
by assigning correspondences between objects and attributes and then mapping
predicates with identical names. The theory assumes a predicate like representation
(figure 6.1), distinguishing between objects, object-attributes and relations. Object-
attributes are those predicates that have one argument and describe object properties,
CHAPTER 6 - THE ROLE OF SEMANTIC CONSTRAINTS IN ANALOGY 164
e.g. YELLOw(sun). Relations are divided into a hierarchy of orders, with those
predicates with two or more arguments which are used to describe relations between
objects, for example attracts (sun, planet) forming the lowest order, and those
predicates describing different levels of relationships between relations e.g. cause(
attracts (sun, planet),REV0LVEs_AR0UND(planet, sun)) forming the higher orders.
The theory comprises two parts: mapping rules, and the systematicity principle.
Mapping rules state that attributes of objects are not mapped; but relations between
objects are preserved. The systematicity principle requires that complex higher order
relations (e.g. CAUSE in the paragraph above) are mapped preferentially, followed by
relations that constitute the higher order arguments. This is intended to capture the
notion that analogy conveys a system of connected knowledge, rather than an
assortment of independent facts.
"structure mapping stems in part from the observation that useful
analogies, such as those used in science or education, involve rich,
interconstraining systems of mappings between two domains, rather than a
set of independent correspondences" (Clement and Gentner, 1991, 91-92)
In practice, effectively as a third mapping rule, structure mapping theory also insists
that mappings only occur between predicates of the same name. Gentner and her
colleagues (Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus, 1993; Forbus, Gentner and Law, 1995)
assume the 'canonical representation of concepts' at some level of cognition, hence the
question of whether, say ORBITS and REVOLVES_AROUND are matching
predicates is settled outside of the theoretical parameters that structure mapping theory
assumes. Gentner et al assume that the match between ORBITS and
REVOLVES_AROUND is settled by these canonical conceptual representations, and
thus can be assumed by their theory and model.1
1 Gentner and her colleagues have latterly tended to present structure mapping theory as a more general
cognitive theory of similarity (Medin, Goldstone and Gentner, 1993; Markman and Gentner, 1993;
Gentner and Markman, 1997), and have even suggested - though nowhere is this suggestion fleshed
out in any detail - that structural alignment might play an important part in similarity judgements in
categorisation. The canonical conceptual representation assumption would appear to be a major
obstacle to fleshing out these suggestions. Thus far Gentner and colleagues experiments on similarity
(even those suggesting that structure mapping might play a part in categorisation - see Markman and
Gentner, 1993 for examples) still follow that basic taxonomy of similarities outlined above, where
differences between analogy and literal similarity judgements are determined at the object level alone,
with structural comparitors maintaining the canonical conceptual decomposition assumption. This
assumption leads to an inherent circularity when one considers structure mapping theory: if structure
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As I described in chapter 2, Gentner's structure mapping theory has been implemented
in a computer simulation model, SME (the Structure Mapping Engine; Falkenhainer,
Forbus and Gentner, 1989).
6.3 A Reprise OfHolyoakAnd Thagard's Multi-
Constraint Theory
In contrast to Gentner's theory, Holyoak and Thagard propose a multi-constraint
theory (Holyoak, 1985; Holyoak and Thagard, 1989; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995) in
order to attempts to explain how the large number of potential mappings between
domains can be reduced to a meaningful subset for the transfer of information between
domains. Holyoak and Thagard argue that this subset emerges from an attempt to
balance a number of different influences upon the mapping process, the process being
characterised as an attempt to simultaneously satisfy several constraints. One group of
these constraints - logical compatibility, role identity, uniqueness and relational
consistency - are structural in nature, and therefore compatible with the constraints
posited by Gentner's theory. However, Holyoak and Thagard also argue that the
constraints ofpragmatic centrality and semantic similarity are involved in determining
mappings during analogical processing. These non-structural constraints rely on
information other than that found in the basic domain representations. In order to aid
the analysis in this section, I will briefly summarise these constraints below.
6.3.1 Structural Constraints
The logical compatibility constraint ensures that mappings are only considered if they
are between entities of the same 'type'. Thus, in the Solar System / Hydrogen Atom
analogy the predicate more_massive_than cannot be matched with the object electron.
Similarly, a mapping between the predicates hot and revolves_around will not be
mapping plays an important part in determining conceptual judgements, then it must be a key
determinant in just whether certain relational terms relate to the same 'concept' or not: whether
REVOLVES_AROUND maps to ORBITS. In attempting to account for categorisation, structure
mapping must assume that the phenomena it is trying to explain - conceptual mapping between
match items at the relational level - is accounted for externally (by canonical concepts) in order to
provide its explanation. But if structure mapping is to explain concepts, then it cannot assume that
REVOLVES_AROUND maps to ORBITS canonically in order to explain how the relational concepts
REVOLVES_AROUND and ORBITS match. I shall try to further illustrate this problem throughout
the rest of this chapter.
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considered because they take different numbers of arguments. This primarily syntactic
constraint is intended to ensure that mappings between different levels of description
are not attempted. For example single-argument predicates, such as hot, tend to be
purely descriptive, specifying a particular attribute of an object. Multi-argument
predicates describe relationships between objects, and so can be considered to
represent a higher level of description. Holyoak and Thagard argue that mappings
between different levels of description are not productive and this constraint serves to
eliminate any potential mappings of this kind.
The role identity constraint assumes that the base and target domains can be divided at
a higher level of description than that at which the mapping takes place. In the use of
analogy in problem solving, upon which the authors focus predominantly, this means
the domains may be redescribed in terms of a start state, the problem goals, and the
operators that can be used to try and achieve these goals. Role identity then limits
mapping to relations and objects that appear in the same part of the domain definition.
This provides a weak pragmatic influence in that elements can only be considered for
mapping if they play a similar role in both domains.
Holyoak and Thagard assume that each element in the base domain will ultimately map
onto only one element in the target domain, and vice versa. Thus there is a
competition between members of the set of potential mappings between one base
element and a number of possible target elements. For example, if hotter_than in the
base maps onto hotterjthan in the target then it cannot map onto less_massive_than in
the target. Accordingly any factor which serves to increase the level of support for the
former mapping will consequently act to decrease support for the latter.
The final structural constraint is relational consistency, which ensures the coherency
and consistency of mappings between the base and target domains. If mappings
between structural elements receive support, mappings between the structures
themselves, and any other elements, are also supported.
6.3.2 Pragmatic Centrality
The importance of an element (object or relation), whether in the base or target
domain, is another consideration in the mapping process. An element's importance is
defined in terms of how useful the element is in satisfying the current goal (or subgoal)
of the 'analogiser'. Thus any mappings involving 'useful' elements receive more
support than mappings involving less useful elements. When our example analogy is
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used to explain the relative motion of sub-atomic particles, mappings involving yellow
and hotter_than are going to be less favourably considered than those involving
revolves_around, since the former are not utilised in satisfying any explanatory goals.
6.3.3 Semantic Similarity
Holyoak and Thagard claim that the most useful mappings in analogy are likely to
come from elements which are 'semantically' similar. In the Solar System / Hydrogen
Atom analogy, predicates with identical names can be regarded as more similar than
those with different names. In more complex examples the method of determining
relative similarity is more difficult. In their theory, Holyoak and Thagard explicitly
make no claim as to any particular model of semantics; moreover, the semantic
similarity constraint is regarded more as a heuristic than a firm rule, and can be applied
in differing strengths at various stages of the mapping process.
Holyoak and Thagard (1989) emphasise that the logical compatibility and role identity
constraints are restrictions on the building of the mapping network, and these
restrictions are regarded as less important than the three principal constraints of
isomorphism (the uniqueness and relational consistency constraints), semantic
similarity and pragmatic centrality.
As I described in chapter 2, the theory has been implemented as a computer simulation
ACME, which is a constraint satisfaction network that implements these
considerations.
6.4 A Summary Comparison Of The Two Theories
6.4.1 Structure
Holyoak and Thagard (1995) argue that the similarities and differences between their
theory and structure mapping theory can best be illustrated by comparing Gentner's
theory with the three main constraints posited by multi-constraint theory. They claim
that multi-constraint theory captures Gentner's insight regarding the importance of
systematic structure (in ACME, interconnected systems will have more mutually
supporting links than an isolated relation), but in a more flexible manner. As
implemented in SME, Gentner's theory rigidly enforces one-to-one mappings and
structural consistency: potential mappings which violate these constraints are not
CHAPTER 6 - THE ROLE OF SEMANTIC CONSTRAINTS IN ANALOGY 168
made. In contrast, ACME, whilst preferring one-to-one mappings (by using
inhibitory links to discourage many-to-one mappings) nevertheless will allow
violations.
6.4.2 Pragmatic Constraints
Gentner's theory (and SME) does not incorporate or recognise the influence of
pragmatic - goal driven - constraints on the mapping process. According to structure
mapping theory, the operation of goals is external to the actual mapping process,
constraining the evaluation of mapping outcomes, rather than actual mappings
(although I-SME (Forbus, Ferguson and Gentner, 1994) does incorporate some
pragmatic influences in mapping). However, whilst the evidence that goals can
influence what is mapped in analogy is clear (Spellman and Holyoak, 1992), it is less
clear that goals directly influence or constrain the mapping process.
I noted two key criticisms of structure mapping in chapter 2: the neatness of the
representations used in SME (this applies equally to ACME); and that if an analog
offers up two competing possible modes of transfer with a similar level of
systematicity, then the systematicity principle cannot act as a constraint in the selection
of one or the other. However, as I argued in chapter 2, this latter point need not
militate against structure mapping in principle: an analog which allows two equal
mappings may be a poor choice of an analog, hence the systematicity principle's
yielding of two equally valid mappings in such a situation may be a psychologically
valid resolution of the initially poor choice of analogy. 2
Further, it is worth recalling that some of the best evidence of the influence of goals
(Spellman and Holyoak, 1992) seems to support the view that goals influence
representation rather than mapping. Commenting on the results of Spellman and
Holyoak's experiments examining the role of pragmatics in analogy, Holyoak and
Thagard note that "[the] results suggest one way in which analogies can be used
systematically to influence people's inferences - [the representation of] the source
[analog] can itself be massaged to encourage a desired mapping" (Holyoak and
Thagard, 1995, p 106).
2 One criticism of both theories raised in Chapter 2 is that they do not adequately consider the
considerable psychological evidence that the choice of representation is crucial to analogy (Hofstadter,
1995; though Hofstadter's theory is just as vulnerable to this objection); if categorisation research
tends to ignore processes and overconcentrate on representation, then the opposite is true of analogy.
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6.4.3 Semantic Constraints
With regard to the semantic similarity constraint, the main focus of this discussion, the
respective positions are as follows: SME only matches predicates with identical names,
thus if planets (see figure 6.1) were represented as smallerthan the sun, and
electrons as less_mass_than a nucleus, then structure mapping would not allow, and
SME would not make, a mapping between the two relations. On the other hand,
whilst ACME again prefers to map identical relations, weights on the network can be
adjusted to capture the semantic similarity between smallerjthan and less_mass_than.
As I noted earlier, Holyoak and Thagard argue that this shows a significant weakness
in Gentner's theory:
"with its emphasis on structure to the exclusion of all other constraints,
SME does not simply discourage mappings between non-identical but
semantically similar items; it does not even permit them." (Holyoak and
Thagard, 1995, p. 258)
Holyoak and Thagard's criticism of the lack of semantic considerations in Gentner's
theory carries a lot of intuitive weight. It does seem a perverse, restrictive analogical
theory that rejects mappings between smaller_than and less_mass_than in the course of
an analogy mapping. However, it is not necessarily so and, from the perspective of a
blurred distinction between analogy and categorisation, it might actually be that
rejecting such a mapping is necessary per se, rather than necessarily perverse.
One reason for so arguing stems from the results of the investigations into the effects
of systematic structure upon categorisation judgements reported in chapter 5 above.
Experiments 1 and 3 addressed the question of whether analogy can be distinguished
from categorisation by contrasting categorisational and analogical processes, first by
presenting participants with Gentner et al's analogy materials and asking them to
categorise them, and then by repeating this process with novel object descriptions
rather than 'analogous' stories.
Given that Gentner et al define the analogical mechanism in terms of structure
mapping, and given the hypothesis that this process was not distinct from a basic
categorisation process, I expected structure mapping to determine categorisation.
Gentner et al assume that match items with only structural similarities (i.e. analogs)
belong to different categories. It was predicted in experiment 1 that they would be
categorised together: 79.5% of the groupings formed by participants in the experiment
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had only shared systematic structure (traditionally defined as analogy) as a common
feature amongst members of the categories formed. In contrast, only 5% of groupings
produced had common object descriptions as the common similarity across categories
(i.e. the attribute matches often thought to be determinate of categorisation). To the
79.5% of structural congruity groupings could be added a further 8% of classifications
where structural additions to otherwise structurally congruent representations caused
them to be classed singularly.
Similar results came from experiment 3, where participants were presented with novel
object descriptions in which structural similarities ran across what might be termed the
objects' 'normal' categories. The results of this experiment showed considerable
evidence to support the 'no distinction' hypothesis. 70% of the groupings were
formed on the basis of shared structure, as opposed to just 2.5% of groupings that
were classed according to shared object attributes, reflective of the 'normal' categories
they embodied. Participants preferred groupings between pots and walls, and walls

















Figure 6.2: Predicate representations of SMALLER_THAN and LESS_MASS_THAN3
3 Thanks to Rick Cooper for suggesting the representations in this example.
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These results appear to suggest that the process of classifying two terms together
(mapping smaller_than to less_mass_than) may be no different to the process of
determining the analogy between solar_system and hydrogen,atom. The process of
mapping smaller_than to less_mass_than seems to be less a sub-process of the process
of determining the analogy between solar_system and hydrogen_atom and more like
the same process functioning in parallel. Or, to put it another way, rather than
supporting a sub-process account, the evidence reviewed suggests that mapping
smallerjthan to less_mass_than involves the same processes as mapping solar_system
to hydrogen,atom, except that conceptually, the two mappings occur at what one
might term 'different levels of description.' Figure 6.2 presents a sketch of the kind of
representations one might envisage facilitating such a parallel process, showing how
smaller_than and less_mass_than might be represented at another level of conceptual
description. (I make no claims for the psychological plausibility of these
representations - they are offered only to illustrate the possibility of such further
expansion of the representations being mapped in an analogy.)
6.4.4 Prototype Schemas?
Holyoak and Thagard claim that semantic mappings operate independently of
analogical mappings. I am going to argue here that the same, or at least a significantly
similar process resolves semantic differences in analogy. According to this view, the
semantic mapping between smaller_than and less_mass_than is determined by much
the same process as the mapping between the atom and solar system.
One possible objection to this would be that my characterisation of categorisation is
incomplete. It might be argued that analogical judgements may not be easily
distinguished from classification judgements, but categorisation judgements can be.
This claim would rely on the idea that categorisation doesn't involve that same
mapping process because it makes use of generalised 'prototypical' schemas - in some
way (Holyoak and Thagard advocate such a view of categories in Holland et al, 1984).
If smaller_than and less_mass_than share the same prototypical schema, then there
would be no need to compute the similarity between smaller_than and less,mass_than,
since such similarity can be confirmed merely by reference to the prototype4; and it is
4 As I noted earlier, to the extent that semantics are modelled in Gentner's account of analogy, the
structure mapping view corresponds to this picture. Gentner et al (Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus,
1993; Forbus, Gentner and Law, 1995) assume some kind of canonical conceptual representation:
'SME's constraint of matching identical predicates assumes canonical conceptual representations, not
lexical strings. Two concepts that are similar but not identical (such as "bestow" and "bequeath") are
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this confirmatory reference-to-prototype that is modelled by the semantic links in
Holyoak and Thagard's theory.
There are a number of objections to such an account, which I reviewed and discussed
at length in chapter 4 above. Practically, there is the problem of providing a
convincing account of what a prototype category is: no plausible or compelling theory
of prototypes exist, nor does any such account seem likely (in the light of the
discussion in chapter 4) to be forthcoming. Propositional schematic models of
representation (some variety of which is assumed in the majority of cognitive theories)
have the power to store a combination of both schemas and the exemplars from which
such schemas are supposed to be constructed. As I showed in my review, what is
actually stored has been the subject of much debate, and still remains, largely, an open
question.
Figure 6.3: Two views of the mapping process
assumed to be decomposed into a canonical representation language so that their similarity is
expressed as a partial identity (... "give")' (Gentner Ratterman and Forbus, 1993); conceptual matters
are thus explicitly extrinsic to both structure mapping's theory and models.
CHAPTER 6 - THE ROLE OF SEMANTIC CONSTRAINTS IN ANALOGY 173
Experiment 2 was designed to see whether analogical theory could shed any light on
the nature of participants' stored representations. It yielded little evidence to support
the hypothesis that participants had abstracted and stored schemas from the groups
they had classified, despite the fact that it appeared to be a shared structural schema
that was the basis of participants' original classification decisions (experiments 1 and
3, above). Instead, when Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus's, 1993, analysis was
applied to participants' behaviour, it appears that being presented with a class name in
no particular context caused the participants to randomly recall one of the exemplars
associated with that name, and then use that exemplar as the stimulus for recalling
other class members. Thus as well as finding no evidence to support stored
prototypes, the results of experiment 2 provide some tentative evidence that it is
possible to use class-names when only exemplars (instances) of categories are stored
(which strengthens the argument for not strongly distinguishing analogy and
categorisation).
Whilst the evidence presented by these results is somewhat tentative, when the
theoretical objections raised in chapter 5 are added as well, it seems reasonable to
conclude that schemas simply cannot supply the necessary theoretical justification for
semantic links.
If one considers the schematic representation of the mapping process presented in
figure 6.3 above, Holyoak and Thagard model the mapping of F onto G in analogy X
-> Y by means of a semantic link, whereas the evidence points towards a similar
parallel process, operating at another level of conceptual description for mapping F ->
G and X -> Y. This is an important distinction: whereas Holyoak and Thagard model
the semantic similarity between smaller_than and less_mass_than as a sub-process of
analogy, it seems more likely that this similarity is computed by the same process in
parallel. Since from the perspective presented here, this mapping process is what we
mean when we talk about the 'analogical' process, it follows that there simply is no
place for a semantic similarity constraint in a cognitive theory of analogy.
Again, this can be seen most clearly via a fine-grained analysis of the predicates as in
figure 6.2. If explaining how semantics are reconciled or mapped involves a recursive
or parallel call to the same process, then it makes no sense for semantic mapping to be
part of that process. In explanatory terms, such an account is circular: it proposes that
semantics are mapped by a process which utilises semantic links (but these represent
semantic mappings in the first place).
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6.5 Two Views Of Semantic Similarity
According to Holyoak and Thagard, semantic mappings operate independently of
analogical mappings. According to the analysis presented here, the same, or at least a
significantly similar process may be operating. According to this view, the semantic
mapping between smaller_than and less_mass_than is determined by much the same
process as the mapping between the atom and solar system. Holyoak and Thagard
offer no theory or model of how semantic links are processed. On the other hand, it
could be argued that although I have advanced a theoretical analysis above, the process
model I advocate still amounts to little more than hand-waving. The following pair of
studies were designed to add flesh and empirical support to the speculative model of
semantic processing in analogy presented in this chapter.
6.6 Semantic Mapping As A Parallel Process
Experiment 4 was designed to make concrete this proposal, and explore it empirically.
As cast by Holyoak and Thagard, the question of semantics revolves around supplying
an account of what happens when two 'semantically similar' terms - smaller_than and
less_mass_than - are encountered during the mapping process. In ordinary usage, the
representations of human category information involved in these processes are implicit;
people know what smaller_than and less_mass_than mean, and they reconcile (or map
between) the two terms accordingly. But the exact nature of what they know, and
how such knowledge is represented appears to be inaccessible at the level of detail
required to specify and model the underlying process involved in their 'semantic
reconciliation' of the two terms. In the following study, participants were asked to
make inferences with the aid of two targets (figure 6.4). However, in the base and
each of the targets, the term that was crucial to determining the representation of higher
order structure in the scenarios was a novel, artificial term. By supplying 'definitions'
for that term, we hoped to be able to control the representations participants used for
semantically reconciling particular terms during their analogising. The prediction
tested was that participants would use the same process to match semantic items in
their representations as they would in ultimately determining their analogies (as
described above, and illustrated in figures 6.2 and 6.3).
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SCENARIOS
BASE - The Guralaga
can be found in Australia
lives in Rainforests
only eats gau-gau berries
has a cronomus lucundus
the cronomus lucundus enables the Guralaga to eat gau gau berries.
TARGET 1 - The Mongret
can be found in Australia
lives in Rainforests
only eats gau-gau berries
has a probus razoris
the probus razoris enables the Mongret to eat the gau gau berries.
Thanks to the way they eat, Mongrets live to a ripe old age and rarely suffer from
cancer
TARGET 2 - The Crany Dog
can be found in Papua new Guinea
lives in the grassy backlands
eats vegetation
has a remulum grandoso
because of the remulum grandoso the Crany Dog can eat vegetation.
Crany Dogs are particularly prone to cancer, which originates in their digestive
system.
Figure 6.4: A base and two targets. The surface similarities between the base and the
SMT are highlighted. The base and the SST share few surface similarities.




are unique to certain types of bird
are important to berry eaters
is a long spleen-like organ
keeping berries in the cronomus lucundus allows the berries to slowly ferment,
allowing the goodness inside the bitter skins to be released
SMT DICTIONARY ENTRY
Probus razoris
are unique to certain types of bird
are important to berry eaters
is a long plier-like bill
crushing berries in the probus razoris allows the goodness inside their bitter skins to
be released without the skins having to be swallowed
SST DICTIONARY ENTRY
Remulum grandoso
is unique to certain types of dog
are important to dogs which eat a wide range of vegetation
is a short intestine-like organ
keeping vegetation in the remulum grandoso allows it to slowly ferment, allowing
the goodness inside the outer skins to be released
Figure 6.5: Dictionary entries for the Base and two Targets in figure ??. Surface
similarities between the Base and SMT are in bold italic print; the structural match
between the Base and the SST is in normal italic
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6.7 Experiment 4
6.7.1 Participants
The participants were 170 volunteers, a mixture of postgraduate and undergraduate
students from the Department of Artificial Intelligence, Centre for Cognitive Science,
Department of Psychology and the Faculty of Music at the University of Edinburgh.
6.7.2 Materials And Design
The materials comprised 5 groups of specially constructed scenarios (figure 6.4) with
corresponding sets of novel dictionary entries (figure 6.5) and the 2 candidate
inferences for each group (figure 6.6). Each scenario group was further sub-divided
into two versions of the scenario sets, and two versions of the dictionary entry sets, so
that each scenario / dictionary sub-set supported one of the two different candidate
inferences. As in the earlier experiments, Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus's (1993)
taxonomy of similarity relationships was used to classify the similarities supported by
the dictionary entries and within the scenario sets:
• Literal similarity matches include both common relational structure and
common object descriptions;
• Surface matches: based upon common object descriptions, plus some first
order relations;
• Structural similarity, matches based upon a common system of relations.
Thus the relations between the various scenarios in a given scenario group can be
summarised as follows (see also figure 6.7):
Group type A: the base and one target scenario (the SST, or structurally supported
target) shared only structural matches; mappings between the SST's dictionary entry
and the base dictionary entry also shared only structural matches. There was a
structural correspondence between the base structure supported by the base dictionary
entry and the SST's dictionary entry which supported candidate inference A. Matches
between the base and the other target scenario (the SMT, or surface match supported
target) include surface matches and mappings between the SMT's dictionary entry and
the base dictionary entry also shared common object descriptions. There was a
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structural correspondence between the base structure supported by the base dictionary
entry and the SMT's dictionary entry which supported candidate inference B.
Group type B: matches between the base and the SST were structural; mappings
between that SST dictionary entry and the base dictionary entry also included only
structural matches - there was a structural correspondence between the base structure
supported by the base dictionary entry and that supported by the SST's dictionary
entry which supported candidate inference B. Matches between the base and the SMT
were based on surface matches; mappings between that SST dictionary entry and the
base dictionary entry also included only surface matches - there was a structural
correspondence between the base structure supported by the base dictionary entry and
that supported by the SMT's dictionary entry which supported candidate inference A.
INFERENCES
A. Guralaga live to a ripe old age and rarely sufferfrom cancer.
B. Guralaga are particularly prone to cancer.
Figure 6.6: The target inferences for the stimulus group shown of the following pages.
In a type A set, structural commonalities would support the A inference surface
similarities would support the B inference. In a type B set, structural commonalities
would support the A inference surface similarities would support the A inference.
To try and simplify the above - in each group of stimuli, the base and one target
scenario, and their corresponding dictionary entries, shared surface features, and a
higher order structural correspondence that corresponded with one candidate inference,
whilst the base and the other target scenario, and their corresponding dictionary
entries, shared structural correspondences, and a higher order structural
correspondence that corresponded with the alternative candidate inference.
Each stimulus set was divided into two subsets: in one, structural features in the
targets and their novel term dictionary entries supported one set of inferences (Type
A), whilst in the second sub-set, the same kind of matches supported the contrasting
inference (Type B), so that biases towards a given inference could be eliminated (see
also figure 6.7).
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In keeping with the analysis presented above, we expected that participants would use
analogy to reconcile semantic terms in order to perform analogical mappings between
the scenarios and generate support for one candidate inference. We predicted that in
order to be able to carry out the top level analogy, participants would carry out another
analogy in parallel - mapping structures only in the dictionary entries - reconciling
semantic terms in a way that supported the top-level 'analogical' structure mapping
over the top-level surface mapping, and favour the inference that corresponded to the
structurally similar scenario over the scenario that shared only surface features.
In addition to the basic stimuli, 3 sets of control stimuli were also created:
1 In the main control, the dictionary entries were eliminated, and participants
were given only the Base and the two targets. In this control, in the absence of
any structural support from the dictionary entries for the SST inference, we
expected participants to use the surface commonalities between the base and the
SMT to determine their inference choice (i.e the prediction was that when
subjects were asked to make an inference in a situation where neither of the
target inferences benefitted from any structural bias, partcipants would prefer
the inference which was additionally supported at the object level to the
inference that received no such support; consistent with the findings of
previous studies, such as GentnerRatterman and Forbus, 1993, we expected
weak similarity to provide more support than no similarity).
2 In the second control, participants were given materials in which the novel
terms were removed, and the structural information in the dictionary entries
was added to the base and target - in effect creating "normal" analogy
materials. In this control, again consistent with previous findings such as
Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993), we expected the structural
commonalities between the base and the SST to determine the choice of
inference, overriding the surface commonalities between the base and the SMT
(see figure 6.8).
3 In the final control set the dictionary entries were altered so that surface and
structural commonalities all supported the same mapping (the LST, or literally
similar target). In this final control, both structural and surface commonalities
between the base and the LST, and their dictionary entries were aligned in
support of one. Since structure was predicted to be the key factor in deciding
inferences (in line with the findings of previous studies), I did not expect the
results from this control to differ significantly from the main experimental task.
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In each of the controls, the inference supported by the various similarities was again

























Shares structure with base
Inference In type A sets, the B
inference is only supported
by surface matches
between base and SMT the
dictionary entries
In type B sets, the A
inference is only supported
by surface matches
between base and SMT the
dictionary entries
In type A sets, the A
inference is only supported
by structural matches
between base and SST the
dictionary entries
In type B sets, the B
inference is only supported
by structural matches
between base and SST the
dictionary entries
Figure 6.7a: The relationships between the base, targets, dictionary entries and
inferences in the main stimulus groups.
CHAPTER 6 - THE ROLE OF SEMANTIC CONSTRAINTS IN ANALOGY 181
Chateau Bogusse:
is a vineyard.
is in the southern French district of Pretence,
has sandy soils, with a lot of surface pebbles
has a warm microclimate which enables grapes to be produced.
the particular microclimate results in ripe grapes.
the ripeness causes the sugar level in the grapes to rise,
this makes the walls ofthe grapes weaken and collapse.
Domaine Fraudulent:
grows plums.
has clay soils in which wildflowers grow
is in the western Departement ofMaidoop.
its warm microclimate causes melons to grow
the particular microclimate yields extremely ripe plums.
the extreme ripeness causes the plums to become very sweet
this super-sweetness makes the plums soft and squashy
Because oftheir squashiness Domaine Fraudulent's plums are held in low esteem, and
sell poorly.
Mas de la Fiction:
grows grapes.
is in the southern Departement of Whaupper.
has sandy soils, with a lot of surface pebbles
its fine microclimate causes grapes to grow,
the particular microclimate results in ripe grapes.
the ripeness causes some of the moisture in the grapes to evaporate
this evaporation leads to extremely concentrated flavours
Because of their concentrated flavours Mas de la Fiction's grapes are prized and sell
for high prices.
Inferences
A. Chateau Bogusse's grapes are highly prized and sell for high prices.
B. Chateau Bogusse's grapes are held in low esteem, and sell poorly.
Figure 6.8: Control set 2, in which the structural information in the dictionary entries has been
included in the base and targets to create an "ordinary" analogical problem. Surface similarities are
illustrated in bold; structural similarities are italicised.
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6.7.3 Procedure
Participants were presented with 2 x 6-page questionnaires, each of which contained
one scenario set, with its dictionary and candidate inferences, a diversionary task and a
scenario set and pair of candidate inferences without a dictionary (the main control).
The order in which the sets were presented ('with-dictionary' versus 'without-
dictionary' control), was randomised, as was presentation order of the targets within
the sets. A second, smaller group of participants were given the other two controls in
similar fashion.
Participants were asked to infer one candidate inference, and give a confidence rating
(l=not at all confident; 5=very confident). They were told that the dictionary entries
might be useful to them, but told explicitly that the use of them was left up to the
individual participant's discretion.
6.7.4 Results
Consistent with the initial hypothesis, in the main control condition where no
dictionary entries were provided, the inference which received common surface-feature
support was favoured by 67% of participants, with only 33% preferring the inference
that was supported by structure commonalities, x2(l, N=140) = 17.1, p<.001.
However, when definitions, which offered the possibility of structural mappings,
were provided, participants reversed their preferred inference for a given base / targets
set. Again consistent with the initial hypothesis, in this condition, if participants had
preferred the A inference in the first control, when provided with scenario sets where
structural commonalities in the dictionary supported the B inference, then participants
now chose the B inference. Overall the inferences which received structural support
were favoured by 71.2% of participants, with only 28.8% preferring the inference that
was supported by surface commonalities alone, %2(1, N=125) = 20.748, pc.001.
Also consistent with the initial hypothesis, in the control condition with no novel
terms, where structure in the dictionary entries was included in the base and targets,
inferences which received common surface-feature support were favoured by only
27.0% of participants, with 73.0% preferring the inference that was supported by
structural commonalities, %2(1, N=26) = 3.869, p<.05.
There was no deviation from this pattern in the final control condition, where the
dictionary entries were altered so that surface and structural commonalities all
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supported the same base - target (the LST) mapping, the inference supported by the
LST was favoured by 75.0% of participants, %2 (1, N=28) = 5.17, pc.05
Analysis of participants' confidence scores in the main control show significantly
greater confidence for inferences based on surface commonalities when no structure
was present, t=8.72, gcO.OOl. However, this trend was reversed in the other controls
and the main experiment - given the choice, participants seem to prefer structurally
supported inferences. In the second control condition (analogies) inferences based
upon structural commonalities received a significantly higher confidence rating than
those based on surface features, t=3.982, p<0.001. Similarly, when definitions were
provided, inferences based upon structural support received a significantly higher
confidence rating than those based only on surface commonalities, t=2.9, p<.005.
This trend was repeated in the third control, though mean differences were not
significant, t=l.02, p =0.33.
6.7.5 Discussion
Experiment 4 has shown, consistent with the claim that analogical and conceptual
mappings cannot be distinguished at a cognitive process level, that participants can use
the same process that they used to process and make analogical inferences to process
and reconcile semantic discrepancies they encountered in the representations of base
and target analogs.
Participants made inferences with the aid of two targets. By controlling the structure
of the information representing the "semantics" of the term that was in turn crucial to
the determination of the representation of higher order structure in the base and each of
the targets, we were able to control the representations participants used for
semantically reconciling particular terms during their analogising. The 'no distinction'
prediction - that participants would use the same mapping process to match semantic
items in their representations as they would in ultimately determining their analogies -
is strongly supported by the results of this experiment.
6.8 "On-Line" Parallel Processing
Two very reasonable objections might be made to the results of experiment 4:
1. Firstly, the "dictionary entries" in the main task were artificial. Moreover, I have
claimed in chapter 4 that definitions are an inadequate basis for conceptual semantics.
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Since the "dictionary entries" appear to be little more than definitions, I appear to be
wanting to have my cake and eat it. I have argued that concepts cannot be simple
definitions, so how can definitions serve as the basis for exploring conceptual
reconciliations in analogical mapping?
2. Notwithstanding the first objection, a second obvious objection to the findings of
experiment 4 is that participants were presented with the tasks on paper, and had
unlimited time in which to solve the inferencing problems and reconcile and map any
"semantics" in the various base and target specifications. It might be said in objection
that since structure mapping is a computationally expensive process - especially in
comparison to mapping surface features - experiment 4 has little relevance to the on¬
line demand characteristics of analogical processing "in the wild". Since participants
in experiment 4 had unlimited time, and external representations of the problems, their
behaviour is no predictor of the kind of processes used in making analogical mappings
"in the head", where working memory limits may place severe restrictions on
processing capacity.
In order to meet the objections one might reasonably raise with respect to the findings
of experiment 4, it would appear that what is needed is two concepts that can both
support contrary systems of inferential support from a single lexical term (to mimic the
reversal of inference patterns prompted by the materials in experiment 4) and support
interpretations of one another analogically (to capture the structural determination of
mappings between dictionary items in experiment 4). This might, at first glance, seem
a difficult - perhaps impossible - requirement to meet. Except perhaps for the rarefied
world of Borges stories and cognitive psychology experiments, one might think that
no concept could meet the need for systematic contradiction, let alone the two concepts
that will be needed to meet the demand for analogical priming. However, despite
perhaps one's natural intuitions to the contrary, there are two - at least - common,
everyday conceptual domains that do appear to meet these requirements: space and
time.
6.8.1 Space And Time - A "Domain Of Semantics"
There is a great deal of overlap in the lexical terms we use in talking about space and
time. We can talk of looking forward to the author getting to the point; we might look
ahead, to that far o/f time when the author does get to the point, and the waffling pre¬
amble is behind us, safely in the past. A number of researchers have noted these
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correspondences between the words we use in talking about space and time, and have
argued that the connection between the two is more a case of systematic connection
rather than a mere linguistic coincidence (Fillmore, 1971; Clark, 1973; Traugott, 1978;
Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Boroditsky; 1998). The claim is that the presence of these
and the presence of other systematic correspondences between 'domains'5 in language
is indicative of the existence of conceptual metaphors', occurrences where language
from one 'domain' is used in other 'domains' (Fillmore, 1971; Lakoff & Johnson,
1980, Lakoff, 1987a; Boroditsky; 1998). Such metaphors are supposed to reveal a
particular source-to-target mapping: the use of language from the domain of 'travel' in
the domain of 'love' is taken to be indicative of some systematic analogical mapping
between the concept 'travel' and iove' ('love is a journey', etc.; see Lakoff 1987a;
Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).6
One area in which these linguistic patterns have been strongly delineated is in the event
sequencing aspect of time, and its relation to similar spatial concepts. Traugott (1978)
defines temporal sequencing as 'the system whereby events and situations Ep E2, ...
En are ordered with respect to each other' (Traugott, 1978, p 379), i.e. "one's best
days (E[) may be ahead of one (E2)"; "port and cigars (E,) might follow dinner (E2)".
As McTaggart (1908; 1927) argues, the concept of time has a certain inherent
structure:
"Positions in time, as time appears to us prima facie, are distinguished in
two ways. Each position is Earlier than some and Later than some
positions. To constitute such a series there is required a transitive
asymmetrical relation, and a collection of terms that, of any two of them,
either the first is in this relation to the second, or the second is in this
relation to the first. We may take here either the relation 'earlier than' or
5 I shall continue my practice here of treating the rather woolly 'domain' as being equivalent to a
'concept', or set of 'concepts'.
6 Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999) argue that the human conceptual system is structured around a
small set of experiential concepts; concepts that emerge directly out of experience and which are
defined "in their own terms." These fundamental concepts include basic spatial relations (up/down,
front/back), a set of "physical ontological" concepts (entity, container), and a set of basic experiences
or actions (eating, moving). This view, which seeks to ground all other concepts in these basic
experiential concepts, proposes that concepts that do not emerge directly out of physical experience
must be metaphoric in nature, and that these "abstract" concepts are represented via on-line mappings
to the fundamental experiential concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Lakoff, 1987).
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the relation 'later than', both of which, of course, are transitive and
asymmetrical. If we take the first, then the terms have to be such that, of
any two of them, either the first is earlier than the second, or the second is
earlier than the first."
McTaggart, (1927 , pp 24).
"each position is either Past, Present, or Future. The distinctions of this
former class are permanent., while those of the latter are not. If M is ever
earlier than N, it is always earlier. But an event, which is now present,
was future, and will be past."
McTaggart, (1908 , p 458).
Later researchers have adopted this basic framework, generally conceiving of time as a
one-dimensional, directionally oriented phenomenon, and have thus argued as a result
that the spatial terms 'imported' from the domain of space to the domain of time tend to
be one-dimensional (front / back; up / down) rather then multi-dimensional (narrow /
wide) and determinably orderable (front / back) rather than symmetric (left / right)
(Boroditsky, 1998). Boroditsky notes that crosslinguistically this pattern is relatively
stable, with spatial terms relating to front / back relations being the ones most widely
borrowed to talk about time across languages (Clark, 1973; Traugott, 1978).
Two 'metaphoric systems' have been identified for talking about event sequencing in
English (Fillmore, 1971; Clark, 1973; Traugott, 1978; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980;
Boroditsky, 1998), the ego-moving metaphor system, and the time-moving metaphor
system.7
6.8.1.1 The Ego-Moving Metaphor
The first of these metaphoric systems is the ego-moving metaphor, where the ego (an
observers' viewpoint or context) is conceived of as progressing along a 'time-line'
towards the future, as in "we are approaching the millennium" (see also figure 6.9).
6.8.1.2 The Time-Moving Metaphor
The second metaphoric system in which spatial terms are used to talk about time is the
time-moving metaphor, in this metaphor, 'a time-line is conceived of as a river or
7
McTaggart (1908) also observes that two 'metaphoric systems' have been identified for talking about
event sequencing.
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conveyor belt on which events are moving from the future to the past' (Boroditsky,
1998, p 309), as in "the millennium is coming''' (see also figure 6.10).
PAST FUTURE
Figure 6.9 Schematic representation of the ego-moving schema used in time





Figure 6.10 Schematic representation of the time-moving schema used in time
sequencing (from Boroditsky, 1998).
6.8.1.3 Time- And Ego-Moving Systems
According to this view, these two metaphoric systems lead to two different
assignments of front and back relative to a time-line (Fillmore, 1971; Clark, 1973;
81 am grateful to Lera Boroditsky for allowing me the use of these and later diagrams.
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Traugott, 1978; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Boroditsky, 1998). In the ego-moving
metaphorfront is assigned to the future, or later event; e.g. "success lay behind them;
failure lay ahead of them."). On the other hand, in the time-moving metaphor system,
front is assigned to the past, or earlier event; '"I will see you before 4 o'clock." or
'The reception after the talk.",' (Boroditsky, 1998, p309).9
There is some evidence in support of the psychological reality of there being two
systems for sequencing events in time. A study by McGlone and Harding (1998)
involved participants answering questions about days of the week - relative to
Wednesday - which were posed in either the ego-moving or the time-moving
metaphor. Ego-moving metaphor trials comprised statements such as "We passed the
dead-line two days ago", whilst time-moving metaphor trials involved statements such
as "The dead-line was passed two days ago"; in each case, participants read the
statements and were then asked to indicate the day of the week that a given event had
occurred or was going to occur. At the end of each block of such statements,
participants read an ambiguous statement, such as 'The reception scheduled for next
Wednesday has been moved forward two days"10 and then were again asked to
indicate the day of the week that this event was now going to occur. Participants who
had answered blocks of questions about statements phrased in a way consistent with
the ego-moving metaphor tended to disambiguate "moved forward" in a manner
consistent with the ego-moving system (they assigned 'forward' - the front - to the
future, and hence thought the meeting had been re-scheduled for Friday), whereas
participants who had answered blocks of questions about statements phrased a way
consistent with the time-moving metaphor tended to disambiguate "moved forward" in
a manner consistent with the time-moving system (they assigned 'forward' - the front -
to the past, and hence thought the meeting had been re-scheduled for Monday).
9 It is worth noting that the assumption here is that before and after are spatial terms - i.e. they
literally denote spatial concepts - since they are 'derived from expressions relating to spatial
orientation' (Fillmore, 1971, p46; see also Traugott, 1978). Boroditsky (personal communication,
1999) calls them 'spatio-temporal' terms. I shall argue later that these different assumptions have
differing implications, dependent upon the theoretical baggage that accompanies them.
10 All trials were conducted on a Wednesday.
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6.8.2 If There Are Two Systems Of Space And Time,
What Kind Of Systems Are They?
McGlone and Harding's study provides some evidence that in talking about time, at
least, the requirement for a concept that yields contrary systems of inferential support
from a single lexical term (to mimic the reversal of inference patterns prompted by the
materials in experiment 4) can be met.
However, as Boroditsky (1998) notes, despite the apparent systematicity in the
connection between spatial and temporal modes of expression, it does not necessarily
follow from this that 'structured conceptual schemas are necessary to process
metaphoric expressions about time' (Boroditsky, 1998, p 309). Whilst McGlone and
Harding present evidence to support two systems of understanding time (thereby
meeting the first part of the requirement for 'in the wild' concepts that could allow a
replication of experiment 4), they do not provide any evidence that time can be
understood as a metaphor from space (which might allow the second requirement on
real world concepts to be met: that the concepts that meet the need for systematic
contradiction could also meet the demand for analogical priming).
A number of explanations that are consistent the results of McGlone and Harding's
study could be plausibly put forward. With the idea of resolving speculations as to the
kind of explanations one might advance for this, Murphy (1996) offers up three
possible frameworks through which findings such as McGlone and Harding's might
be interpreted: the strong metaphoric representation view; the weak metaphoric
representation view; and the structural similarity view. Each embodies an alternative
explanation for the existence of systematic conceptual metaphors.
6.8.2.1 Strong Metaphoric Representation (Strong MR)
According to strong MR, concepts are not understood via their own representations,
but instead by metaphoric reference to another domain (i.e. represented only by links
to concepts that are actually represented as entities). According to this view, space
concepts are represented independently, and time concepts are represented by links to
space concepts. A consequence of this view would be that temporal reasoning would
involve some kind of on-line alignment between a representation of a temporal
construct (say in the interpretation of a temporal phrase) and an appropriate spatial
concept. Thus this view would appear provide theoretical support for structural
(analogical) priming between the representations of real world concepts associated
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with real world lexical items, as opposed to the invented dictionary definitions in
experiment 4."
6.8.2.2 Weak Metaphoric Representation (Weak MR) 1
Weak MR accepts that abstract concepts are represented, but claims that the existence
of systematic verbal metaphors in our culture has influenced the structure of our
concepts so that they are consistent with the metaphor:
"metaphors have some influence on the representation of the topic [target]
concepts, but these concepts nonetheless have their own separate
representations. That is, the metaphor may influence the structure of the
topic concept, but the representation itself is not metaphoric" (Murphy,
1996,p 178)
Although Murphy only articulates one interpretation of this position, it is actually
consistent with two rather different interpretations, which I shall call Weak MR1 and
Weak MR2. Weak MR1 corresponds to Murphy's Weak MR; I will discuss Weak
MR2 after presenting the third of Murphy's alternative frameworks, the structural
similarity view (SS).
Weak MR1: Weak MR1, which is consistent with the position put forward by
Murphy, holds that no aspect of conceptual metaphors is metaphoric: the ego-moving
and time-moving systems used for sequencing events may have originally been
mapped metaphorically from space, but they have now become conventionalised such
that time concepts are no longer connected to space concepts via an on-line mapping.
On this view, the similarities apparent between space and time are etymological relics,
indicative of on-line processing in our forebears rather than any current on-line
connectivity between the two conceptual schemes. Thus, according to Weak MR1,
space and time will not meet the analogical priming requirement for a realistic
replication of experiment 4, because no on-line structure mapping will take place
between them. According to this view, words like ahead and forward are merely
polysemous, in that they have two concepts associated with them (roughly 'spatial
front' and 'temporal front').
" This view would also support the proposition that 'abstract domains' such as time are structured and
understood according to metaphorical mappings to experiential domains such as space (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
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6.8.2.3 The Structural Similarity View (SS)
SS holds that all concepts are directly represented, and that furthermore, metaphoric
ways of talking do not reflect a general influence of such metaphors on the
representation of abstract concepts. Instead, Murphy claims, metaphors arise out of
similarities between pre-existing structures. Metaphors like
argument is war
arise out of structural similarities between the concepts war and argument. That is,
Murphy claims that metaphorical ways of speaking arise out of the recognition of
structural similarities between pre-existing domains. According to this view, space
and time are represented separately, and the fact that people use similar terms to talk
about the two is simply reflective of this coincidental underlying structural similarity:
'This [coincidental] structural similarity permits people to construct
understandable verbal metaphors. Those that are the most interesting or
revealing "stick" and may become conventional ways of talking. Those
that are unrevealing or poor correspondences do not stick and so do not
become conventional"
(Murphy, 1996, p 179)
Like Weak MR1, this view sees the use of the same lexical terms in talking about
space and time as resulting from historical structural alignments between space and
time, but on this view, rather than these alignments having played some causal role in
the shaping of one of the concepts, in this case the structures precede such talk, rather
than reflect its influence. Like Weak MR1, SS is incompatible with the use of space
and time to meet the analogical priming requirement in a realistic replication of
experiment 4. Again, according to this view, no on-line structure mapping takes place
between them. (According to this view, words like ahead and forward are strongly
polysemous, in that they have two concepts associated with them -roughly 'spatial
front' and 'temporal front'- purely as a result of chance structural similarities between
those concepts.)
6.8.2.4 Weak Metaphoric Representation (Weak MR) 2
Weak MR2: One rather bemusing aspect of the framework put forward by Murphy is it
seems to propose a very simplistic, componential view of concepts. Conventionalised
metaphors are either concepts which are mapped on-line to neatly structured
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representations of other concepts (Strong MR), or they are neatly separate concepts,
which are neatly representative of some long finished and fossilised on-line mappings
that influenced their structure (Weak MR1); or else they are indicative of some long
finished and fossilised on-line mappings between two already neatly represented
concepts which resulted in the use of similar terms "sticking" (SS). None of this sits
well with the view of concepts presented in chapter 3, or with the empirical evidence
reviewed in chapter 4. All of the views put forward by Murphy presuppose some
form of neatly structured, static conceptual representation. In contrast to the picture
painted by that evidence, strong MR presupposes neat, systematically represented
experiential concepts which can provide systematic structure for abstract concepts;
Weak MR1 and SS propose that any on-line aspects to conventionalised metaphors are
firmly relegated to history. Given that the evidence reviewed in chapter 4 seems to
indicate quite strongly that such neat conceptual representations might not be
psychologically likely (if such widespread conceptual neatness existed, one might
perhaps expect to see some evidence of it), Weak MR2 posits that that some parts of
conceptual metaphors are metaphoric in the manner of Strong MR, whilst other parts
may be reflective of prior structural mappings that have become conventionalised,
whether in the manner of Weak MR1, or SS, or both (Weak MR2 could even allow
for the idea that - perhaps through some kind of symbiosis - the structure of both
concepts could be affected by the process of mapping). According to this view, some
aspects of the ego-moving and time-moving systems used for sequencing events may
have originally been mapped metaphorically from space but they have now become
conventionalised such that those particular time concepts are no longer connected to
space concepts via an on-line mapping, whilst other aspects of ego-moving and time-
moving systems used for sequencing events may still be mapped metaphorically from
space on-line.
Accordingly, Weak MR2 also provides theoretical support for structural (analogical)
priming between the representations of real world concepts associated with real world
lexical items, as opposed to the invented dictionary definitions in experiment 4, but
such support would not be universal. Weak MR2 would be consistent with the idea
that temporal reasoning could involve some kind of on-line alignment between a
representation of a temporal construct (say in the interpretation of a temporal phrase)
and an appropriate spatial concept, but on this view, whilst such mappings would be
sufficient for temporal understanding, they would not be necessary to it.
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6.8.3 Evidence For On-Line Mapping Between Space
And Time
As the foregoing speculation may indicate, whilst much has been made of these
linguistic patterns, little evidence has been advanced to support their psychological
viability as a plausible representation scheme for conceptual knowledge (and all of
them are consistent with the findings of McGlone and Harding discussed above).
However, in a recent study Boroditsky (1998) has attempted to provide some
empirical support for the metaphoric representation hypothesis by focusing on the
event sequencing aspect of time, and its relation to similar spatial concepts, as
described above.
Extending the paradigm used by McGlone and Harding, Boroditsky defines an explicit
analogy between two schemas for organising space and time. On this analogy, ego-
moving schemas are defined - for both space and time - in respect to an observer's
direction of motion. The 'front' is assigned as the furthest forward point in the
observer's direction of motion, thus in time, 'front' is assigned to the future, and in
space, if objects are conceived of in linear fashion along a path, then 'front' is
assigned to the objects at furthest forward - relative to the observer's direction of
motion - along the path. For time- and object-moving schemas, front is set to the
furthest forward point in the direction of the movement of time or objects. Since time
is usually conceived of as moving from future to past, 'front' is assigned to past, or
earlier events. By analogy, in space, if two objects are moving (whether they have
intrinsic 'fronts' or not),12 then front is assigned to the leading part of the leading
object (see figure 6.11)
Boroditsky used a similar target and task to the one used in McGlone and Harding
(1998)'s study ("Next Wednesday's meeting has been moved forward two days";
what day is it now on?") and these explicit analogies between space and time to
demonstrate that spatial schemas could indeed prime temporal reasoning on-line. Each
target question was preceded by several prime questions that used either the ego-
moving schema or the object/time-moving schema (see figures 6.11 and 6.12 for
example primes). Participants answered a series of TRUE/FALSE questions about
the primes, and then the target question. Like McGlone and Harding, Boroditsky
found that participants who had answered blocks of questions about temporal primes
for the ego-moving metaphor tended to disambiguate "moved forward" in a manner
12 Thus, when a car reverses, for instance, the back of the car could be said to be in front.
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consistent with the ego-moving system (they assigned 'forward' - the front - to the
future, and hence thought the meeting had been re-scheduled for Friday), and
participants who had answered blocks of questions about temporal primes for the time-
moving metaphor tended to disambiguate "moved forward" in a manner consistent
with the time-moving system (they assigned 'forward' - the front - to the past, and
hence thought the meeting had been re-scheduled for Monday). However, Boroditsky
also found that participants who had answered blocks of questions about spatial
primes also answered the temporal target in a schema consistent manner.13
The hat-box is in front of the Kleenex. TRUE/FALSE
Figure 6.11 Object-moving scenario used as a spatial prime in Boroditsky (1998).
The flower is in front of me. TRUE/FALSE
Figure 6.12 Ego-moving scenario used as a spatial prime in Boroditsky (1998).
These findings were backed up by reaction time studies that showed that participants
were slower in answering within domain questions if they had just answered schema-
inconsistent questions in that domain (e.g. subjects were slower to answer say an ego-
13 Boroditsky did not find any reverse priming from time space. The implications of this will be
discussed later.
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moving metaphor phrased question after a time-moving metaphor prime than after an
ego-moving metaphor prime in both space => space and time => time questions) and
also about temporal relations if they had just answered schema-inconsistent questions
about spatial relations. From these results, it would appear that structured on-line
mappings occurred between spatial and temporal information in answering the target
questions.
To return to the amended version of the framework described by Murphy (1996),
Boroditsky's findings are consistent with both the Strong Mental Representation and
the Weak Mental Representation 2 views, and would appear to provide some empirical
support for the existence of structural (analogical) priming between the representations
of real world concepts associated with real world lexical items (as opposed to the
invented dictionary definitions in experiment 4).
6.8.4 Experiment 5
I noted earlier two potentially damning objections to the findings of experiment 4:
1. Firstly, the "dictionary entries" in the main task were artificial, indeed little more
than definitions, and therefore not necessarily cognitively plausible.
2. Secondly, participants were presented with the tasks on paper, and had unlimited
time in which to solve the inferencing problems and reconcile and map any "meanings"
of words in the various base and target specifications. Since structure mapping is a
computationally expensive process - especially in comparison to mapping surface
features - experiment 4 has little relevance to the on-line demand characteristics of
analogical processing "in the wild".
I noted that what was needed in order to address these concerns, were two concepts
that both supported contrary systems of inferential support from a single lexical term
(to mimic the reversal of inference patterns prompted by the materials in experiment 4)
and supported interpretations of one another analogically (to capture the structural
determination of mappings between dictionary items in experiment 4). From the
foregoing, it would appear that space and time meet these requirements perfectly.
Both support contrary systems of inferential support from a single lexical term - "move
forward" can yield contrary interpretations in both domains - and, as Boroditsky
(1998) has shown, spatial primes can support temporal interpretations of these terms
analogically.
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Experiment 5 was designed to use these factors to meet these objections, and show
that the results of experiment 4 could be replicated, with participants - using their own
internal representations of spatial and temporal concepts - solving "analogical"
problems in working memory whilst using parallel on-line structure mappings to map
between lexical items in the representation s of the analogies.
6.8.4.1 Participants
The participants were 85 volunteers, a mixture of postgraduate and undergraduate
students from the Department of Artificial Intelligence, Centre for Cognitive Science,
Department of Psychology and the Faculty ofMusic at the University of Edinburgh.
6.8.4.2 Materials and Design
The basic analogical problem used is shown in figure 6.13. A base scenario and two
targets were constructed. In order to generate an analogical inference for the base,
participants would have to map it to one of the targets, and then infer one of two
contrasting inferences, each of which received structural support from one or other of
the targets. However, in the base, one key structural element was ambiguous (moved
forward temporally), and could reasonably be mapped onto structural elements in
either of the targets (it could mean something was going to happen earlier in the week
or later in the week). Participants could map "moved forward" temporally to the early
part of the week, "Monday" or 'Tuesday", or the later part of the week, "Thursday" or
"Friday" in the scenarios. The former mapping would in turn support the mapping
CAUSE(VISIT_EARLY_IN_WEEK(MacCAWBER, BUSINESS),
CARRY_OUT(MacCAWBER, UNPLEASANT,ACTION),
leading participants to carry the
CARRY_OUT(MacCAWBER, UNPLEASANT_ACTION)




leading participants to carry the
CARRY_OUT(MacCAWBER, PLEASANT_ACTION)
inference to the base.
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In order to facilitate the parallel analogical mappings, prior to making their inferences
participants answered three TRUE/FALSE priming questions about spatial scenarios.
The scenarios used either the ego-moving frame of reference (see Figure 6.12), or the
object-moving frame of reference (see Figure 6.11). It was predicted that the two
frames of reference would map onto (and bias the use of) the ego-moving and time-
moving perspectives in time, respectively, influencing the way that "moved forward"
was mapped in the larger analogy task.
The task was set up to run on a web browser. The basic analogy stimuli were
designed so that the analogous target (Marge) was always consistent with the spatial
prime. On the first page, participants were presented with the base and targets and
some test questions relating to them. There the followed some "diversion tasks" - a
page of unrelated tasks, and then the primes. On a separate page that immediately
followed the primes, participants were told: "Angela told Geoff 'next Wednesday's
meeting has been moved forward two days.'", and then asked to indicate what the
implications of this were from the initial analogy: What did she [Angela] intend Geoff
to guess?" All participants also provided a confidence score for their answer to the
target question on a scale of 1 to 5 (l=not at all confident, 5=very confident). On the
following page, participants were asked to indicate which day the meeting had been
rescheduled for, and again provided a confidence score for their answer to the target
question on the same scale.
6.8.5 Procedure
Participants completed the on line questionnaire individually with no time restrictions.
The order of presentation of the targets was randomised. Each participants received
either the ego-moving prime diversion task or the object-moving prime diversion task.
One control group of participants responded to the target sentences, however the
diversion task they were given did not contain the primes. Since the structural mapping
at the analogy level in this task is determined by the interpretation of "moved
forwards", and since - unlike in experiment 4 - participants would assign an
interpretation to the unprimed term, it was expected that the overall pattern of
inferences in this group would conform to that of a further control group that was
simply posed the question "next Wednesday's meeting has been moved forward two
days. What day is it on now that it has been re-arranged?" (in experiment 4,
participants had no prior knowledge of the novel term; here it was clear that "moved
forward" would be interpreted one way or another, as described above).
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BASE
Geoff runs a coffee shop in the business district of Nawatobee, a small city
in the American mid-west. The coffee shop is called MacCawber's. It is
owned by Mr Fingus MacCawber, a fierce fastidious man who owns six
other businesses in the greater Nawatobee area. Mr MacCawber visits
each of his businesses for precisely 45 minutes on the first Wednesday of
every month, preferring to let his managers manage for the rest of the
time.
One day Angela, Mr MacCawber's secretary rang Geoff with what she said
was some important news. However, Angela told Geoff that she couldn't
tell him the news, as that would be a betrayal of confidence, so she would
just have to provide him with some clues, and leave him to guess.
TARGET 1 (Many surface commonalities with base)
"Well Geoff," said Angela, "Do you remember Birt, who used to run an
ice-cream parlour, also called MacCawber's, that was also in the business
district of Nawatobee? Last December, Mr MacCawber visited on a day
other than usual, going to the ice-cream parlour on the Tuesday, and he
sacked Birt for incompetence. Mr MacCawber was heard to say 'I always
like to deal with unpleasant business on Mondays and Tuesdays - it gets
me in a mean mood for the rest of the week!'
TARGET 2 (Few surface commonalities with base)
"Secondly, you may be familiar with the case of Marge. Marge manages
MacCawber's large car-part dealership - called Part-U-Need - in the
suburbs. In January, Mr MacCawber altered his visit to her, going to the
dealership on the Thursday instead of the Wednesday. Marge had been
given a big raise. Mr MacCawber had been heard to remark I always like
to deal with pleasant business on a Thursday or a Friday - it sets up my
mood for the weekend's golfing!"
Figure 6.13 The basic scenario: used in experiment 5
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6.8.6 Results
74.4% of participants responded in a schema consistent fashion, excluding data from 2
participants who did not respond correctly to all of the prime questions, and 3
participants whose analogical inference was inconsistent with their indication of the
new day for the rescheduled meeting (there were no differences in error rates across
conditions). As predicted by the on-line "semantic" structure mapping hypothesis,
when given ego-moving primes 72.7% of participants inferred that Geoff was going to
get a raise (or some other similar positive experience), and confirmed this by saying
that Wednesday's meeting had been moved to Friday (the ego-moving consistent




in the target they imported CARRY_OUT(MacCAWBER, PLEASANT,ACTION) to the base.
When given object-moving primes 76.1% of participants inferred that Geoff was
going to get fired (or some other similar negative experience), and confirmed this by
saying that Wednesday's meeting had been moved to Monday (the ego-moving
consistent response). E.g. they mapped MOVED_FORWARD to
VISIT_EARLY_IN_WEEK and thus from
CAUSE(VISIT_LATE_IN_WEEK(MacCAWBER, BUSINESS),
CARRY_OUT(MacCAWBER, UNPLEASANT_ACTION),
in the target they imported CARRY_OUT(MacCAWBER, UNPLEASANT,ACTION) to the
base.
A 2x2 chi-square analysis showed the prime consistency bias to be significant ; % (1,
N=43) = 10.29, £<-0.001. This schema-consistency effect suggests that there was
on-line analogical transfer from the spatial primes to the temporal lexical items in the
representation of the basic analogy, and that these mappings were used in parallel in
computing a global structure mapping to generate an inference in the base.
In the control condition where the basic task was identical, but participants were not
given spatial primes, responses were fairly evenly split, with 55% of respondents
making the early in the week inference and re-assigning the meeting to Monday, and
45% of respondents making the late in the week inference and re-assigning the meeting
to Friday (agreement between meeting re-assignment and subsequent inference was
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100%). This was consistent with the proportion of participant responses in the control
condition where participants were simply given the straight "Wednesday's meeting has
been moved forward" task. Here participants understood the meeting to have moved
to either Monday or Friday equally (50%:50%). Furthermore, no bias was shown
towards surface features (unlike in experiment 4), with 45% of respondents'
inferences resulting from an alignment with the analogous target, and 55% of
respondents' inferences resulting from an alignment with the literally similar target.
Though this finding appears at first to be inconsistent with the finding of a similar
control in experiment 4, it should be noted that in experiment 4, participants had no
prior knowledge of the novel term, and so their interpretation of it could not add
structural support to either of the target analogs (thus participants used surface
commonalities as their means of determining similarity between the base and a target).
Here it was clear that "moved forward" would be interpreted one way or another, and
that this interpretation would lend structural support to one inference or another, as
these findings suggest: consistent with the overall hypothesis that structure would be
the prime determinant of similarity in the task, it appears that the structural support
prompted by participants unprimed interpretation of "moved forward" has simply
overridden any surface feature biases for one target over another.
Thus this finding is consistent with the results of Experiment 4, and corroborates the
hypothesis that people can use structure mapping to map "semantic items" in the
representations of analogical problems in parallel to using structure mapping to resolve
the analogical problems themselves.
No significant differences were noted in mean confidence ratings for primed inferences
or day assignments versus unprimed inferences or day assignments. However,
interestingly, t tests showed that in both of the primed conditions, the confidence
ratings for all (correct and incorrect) inferences were significantly lower than the mean
confidence ratings for the inferences that depended on them (ego, t=2.191 £<.0.05;
object, t= 2.371 p<0.05). In the control condition this difference was not significant
(although the trend was repeated).
6.8.7 Discussion
This experiment further examined the hypothesis put forward in the first part of this
chapter, namely that the supervenient nature of analogy and categorisation makes the
inclusion of 'semantic links' inappropriate at the level of description generally posited
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by theories of analogy. The hypothesis tested was that, consistent with the claim that
analogical and conceptual mappings cannot be distinguished at a cognitive process
level and the results obtained in experiment 4, participants would use the same process
that they used to process and make analogical inferences to process and reconcile
semantic discrepancies they encountered in the representations of base and target
analogs.
These findings add further support to the no-distinction hypothesis. As cast by
Holyoak and Thagard, the question of semantics revolves around supplying an
account of what happens when two semantically similar terms are encountered during
the mapping process. In ordinary usage, the representations of human category
information involved in these processes are implicit - people have compiled their
knowledge of what earlier, later and moved_forward mean, and it is difficult to get a
handle on how they use this knowledge to reconcile semantic differences between the
two terms. However, whilst the exact nature of this compiled knowledge, and the
way it is then represented, are at present inaccessible, we have shown that it is
possible to specify and model the underlying process involved in the 'semantic
reconciliation' of two lexical items in controlled conditions. Asking participants to
make inferences with the aid of two targets, and through controlled variance of
information representing the semantics of the term that was crucial to determining the
representation of higher order structure in the base and each of the targets, enabled the
representations participants used for semantically reconciling particular terms during
their analogising to be controlled.
The prediction that participants would use the same mapping process to match
semantic items in their representations as they would in ultimately determining their
analogies was supported emphatically by the results of experiment 4, which used
explicit, artificial stimuli, and by experiment 5, which exploited known structure in
participants' own internal representations of terms and their possible interpretations.
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Figure 6.14: Two views of the analogical mapping process revisited
6.9 Semantic links?
From the perspective argued for in this thesis, the mapping process used by
participants in experiments 4 and 5 is what is meant when one talks about the
'analogical' process. As I argued earlier, it follows from this that I can see no room
for a semantic similarity constraint in a cognitive theory of analogy (or at least, it
follows that before one can posit such a constraint, one will have to successfully
distinguish 'analogy' from 'categorisation').
If we revise the schematic representation of the mapping process presented in figure
6.14 above, in ACME, Holyoak and Thagard model the mapping of E (EARLIER)
versus L (LATER) onto M (MOVED_FORWARD) in the making of an analogical
mapping between BIRT and either MARGE or GEOFF by means of a semantic link,
whereas the evidence presented above points towards this mapping being made by a
similar parallel process, operating at another level of conceptual description. This is an
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important distinction: whereas Holyoak and Thagard model the semantic similarity
between MOVED_FORWARD and MOVED_EARLIER or MOVEDJLATER as a sub-process
of analogy, it seems that in the experiments presented above, this similarity was
computed by the same process in parallel. Since from the perspective presented here,
this mapping process is what we mean when we talk about the 'analogical' process, it
follows that there is no place for a semantic similarity constraint in a cognitive theory
of analogy. In theoretical terms, semantic links introduce a worrying element of
circularity into accounts of analogy. As I noted earlier, accounts positing semantic
links propose that semantics are mapped by a process which utilises semantic links
(but these represent semantic mappings in the first place).
This doesn't mean that one should rule out the use of semantic links - such as those
posited in ACME - in mapping networks altogether: rather, I suggests that they should
properly be seen as implementational details within a model. In modelling terms,
semantic links should be seen as notation, rather than embodiments of psychological
theory. SME enforces mappings between predicates with the same name precisely
because semantic mappings are viewed as external to the workings of an individual
mapping at a given level; semantic links should be seen as a notational device for the
same procedure.
6.10 Conceptual Metaphors?
One important possible objection to the account of analogy, categorisation and
semantics presented in this thesis should be considered. I noted earlier that
Boroditsky's (1998) study showed that although spatial primes influenced subsequent
temporal reasoning (effects replicated in experiment 5), there was no reverse priming
effect from time to space. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) interpret these results as lending
support for a strong metaphorical theory of representation such as that proposed by
Lakoff and colleagues (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987a; Lakoff and
Johnson, 1999).
According to Lakoff and Johnson's Conceptual Metaphor theory the human conceptual
system is structured around a small set of experiential concepts. This small set of
concepts emerges directly out of experience and its members are defined "in their own
terms." Such fundamental concepts include basic spatial relations (up/down,
front/back), a set of "physical ontological" concepts (entity, container), and a set of
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basic experiences or actions (eating, moving). The Conceptual Metaphor theory
grounds all other concepts in these basic experiential concepts, proposing that concepts
which do not emerge directly out of physical experience must be metaphoric in nature,
and that these "abstract" concepts are represented via on-line mappings to the
fundamental experiential concepts (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987a; Lakoff
and Johnson, 1999). Thus, to return to Murphy's (1996) classification, Conceptual
Metaphor theory equates to Strong Metaphoric Representation, in that abstract
concepts are not understood via their own representations, but instead by metaphoric
reference to another domain; abstract concepts are represented only by links to
concepts that are actually represented as entities. This view would propose that space
concepts are represented independently, and time concepts are represented by links to
space concepts.
Clearly the space to time mapping found by Boroditsky (1998) and the results of
experiment 5 provide support for some kind of on-line metaphoric mapping. This
evidence is therefore at odds with Murphy's (1996) Structural Similarity and Weak
Metaphoric Representation (WMR1) hypotheses, described in section 6.8.2, which
rule out the possibility of on-line mappings. The question I wish to consider here is
whether this evidence best supports, and is best explained by either the Strong
Metaphoric Representation (or Conceptual Metaphor) hypothesis, or the second Weak
Metaphoric Representation (WMR2) hypothesis I described in chapter 6.
Evidence for Strong Metaphoric Representation might appear to point the way to a
simple, ready made answer to the problem of characterising cognitive conceptual
skills that this thesis has grappled with: Conceptual Metaphor theory. Below,
consistent with the main thrust of argument thus far in this thesis, I shall argue that
such simple appearances can be deceptive.
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6.10.1 Two Types Of Metaphoric Representation
To briefly summarise the two positions from section 6.8.2:
According to strong MR, concepts are not understood via their own representations,
but instead by metaphoric reference to another domain (i.e. represented only by links
to concepts that are actually represented as entities). According to this view, space
concepts are represented independently, and time concepts are represented by links to
space concepts.
The Weak MR2 hypothesis posits that that some parts of conceptual metaphors are
metaphoric in the manner of Strong MR, whilst other parts may be reflective of prior
structural mappings that have become conventionalised, or aspects of the actual
concept itself. According to this view, space and time concepts are represented
independently, but there may be metaphoric links between them in either direction.
6.10.2 The Conceptual Metaphor Theory Account Of
Time Concepts
According to Conceptual Metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), it would
appear all temporal reasoning would necessarily involve some kind of on-line
alignment - i.e. structure map - between a representation of a temporal construct (say
in the interpretation of a temporal phrase) and an appropriate spatial concept.
Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson's broader statement of Conceptual Metaphor theory
implies that this mapping is necessarily one way: abstract concepts are not understood
via their own representations, but instead by metaphoric reference to another domain
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; 1999).
With regards to time, Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pl39) state:
"it is virtually impossible for us to conceptualize time without metaphor...
Time is as basic a concept as we have. Yet time in English, and in other
languages is, for the most part, not conceptualised and talked about on its
own terms. Very little of our understanding of time is purely temporal.
Most of our understanding is a metaphorical version of our understanding
ofmotion in space."
Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pl39).
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"we cannot measure time-in-itself, whatever that could mean. We can only
define time to be that which is measured by regular iterated events.
Therefore we cannot take the common-sense understanding of time at face
value from a cognitive perspective. However... if we start from the view
that time is conceptualized through the comparison of events, we can arrive
at an adequate analysis of the common-sense understanding of time itself."
Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pi54).
"Can we avoid... metaphors, and think and talk about time only literally?
No. Our conceptual and linguistic systems do not allow it."
Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pl68).
Lakoff and Johnson argue that the spatial metaphor systems used to conceptualise time
are the ego-moving metaphor (ego-moving system) and object-moving metaphor
(time-moving system) described in section 6.8.1. I do not wish to dwell on Lakoff
and Johnson's philosophising on time here. The main point is that Lakoff and
Johnson make strong claims about the way time is conceptualised, and empirical
evidence for the kind of the on-line mapping claims they make is provided by
Boroditsky's (1998) asymmetry of priming results.
Apart from Boroditsky's results, Lakoff and Johnson offer a great deal of linguistic
evidence, e.g.
The precious seconds oozed through my fingers. The deadline sneaked by
me. The deadline was marching towards me like a brass band. The days
cascaded by.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pl49).
Lakoff and Johnson point out that all these words indicate motion, and all express the
idea that time is passing by or towards an observer. However, as Murphy (1996)
points out, one should be wary of linguistic evidence when evaluating claims of this
kind, as the words used in conceptual metaphors are both the predictor (the linguistic
difference) and the data (the cognitive difference). Murphy offers the following
parody of the Whorfian position in illustration of this point:
"Whorfian: Eskimos are greatly influenced by their language in their
perception of snow. For example, they have N words for snow...
whereas English has only one, snow. Having all these words makes them
think of snow very differently than, say, Americans do'
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"Skeptic: How do you know they think of snow so differently?
"Whorfian: Look at all the words they have for it! N of them! They must
make a lot of distinctions between kinds of snow that we don't, since we
just call it snow."
Murphy (1996, pl83).
As Murphy notes, in arguments like this, the claim is that language - or linguistic
constructs - influence thought, but the evidence given for this is the language or
linguistic constructs themselves. Thus Boroditsky's (1998) priming asymmetry -
which appears to involve more than purely linguistic evidence, could be an important
piece of evidence for Conceptual Metaphor theory.
6.10.3 Is Time Dependent Upon Space (Or Other Such
Things)?
It is not clear, however, either that Boroditsky's evidence provides support for Strong
Metaphoric Representation, or that it is best explained by such an account. There are -
at least - two main objections to the idea that Boroditsky's priming results support
Strong Metaphoric Representation. Firstly, it isn't clear that the Strong Metaphoric
Representation hypothesis - insofar as it can be understandably be interpreted - can
sensibly specify a concept of time. And, secondly, following from this, differences in
the stimuli Boroditsky used in priming space ==> time and time =$> space make any
direct comparison of results in the two conditions impossible. The asymmetries
demonstrated by Boroditsky (1998) could be indicative of this latter fact, and not the
influence of Strong Metaphoric Representation as claimed.
To take the matter of the making sense of the Strong Metaphoric Representation of
time. As Fillmore (1971) crucially acknowledges, in order to understand the ego-
moving and object-moving metaphors, one has first to have an understanding of time
independent of those metaphors:
"The words "earlier" and "later"... are basic temporal notions, not based
on a movement metaphor. In fact, an understanding of the setting of the
front/back axis for an object in motion presupposed an understanding of
unidirectional time, since "front" was defined in that case in terms of a part
of something "arriving earlier" than the rest of it"
Fillmore (1971, p46).
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Lakoff and Johnson (1999) seem - to an extent - to be aware of this problem. They
ultimately define time - metaphorically - in relation to an idiosyncratic notion of events,
and acknowledge that time seems to be essential to understanding these. But Lakoff
and Johnson argue that our supposition that time is more basic than events is in fact
evidence of the Conceptual Metaphor system. This is because, they say, we see times
as locations or containers for events because we are metaphorically conceiving time in
terms of spatial locations or containers.
However, this doesn't address the point raised by Fillmore. Understanding "earlier"
doesn't appear to depend upon a metaphor (container, spatial or otherwise): it depends
upon having grasped a basic temporal concept. If we return to McTaggart's (1908)
observation, "IfM is ever earlier than N, it is always earlier. But an event, which is
now present, was future, and will be past." McTaggart, (1908 , p 24). This seems as
good a statement of a basic temporal concept as any, and it doesn't rely on time
"containing" events, or "locating them in space" - it simply points to basic temporal
relations that hold between them. Indeed, such relationships can hold within an event:
an earlier part of an event is earlier than a later part of an event, and that part which is
now present, was future, and will be past. Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pl38)
themselves admit "events have beginnings and ends"; what they don't explain is the
point Fillmore raises: how exactly is one is supposed to conceive of these beginnings
and ends without a basic notion of time? Lakoff and Johnson (1999, pl37) claim that
"All of our understandings of time are relative to other concepts such as motion, space
and events.'"4 Clearly time could not be understood purely in terms of static space.
But motion and events are spatio-temporal at the very least (and the spatial point is
arguable in the case of mental events). What Lakoff and Johnson singularly fail to
specify is how these are supposed to conceptualised independently of a concept of
time.15 (See McTaggart, 1908, for a lucid description of some of the many
complexities that the prima facie concept of time brings with it.)
14 Lakoff and Johnson also claim that "motion appears to be primary and time is metaphorically
conceptualised in terms of motion. There is an area in the visual systems of our brains dedicated to the
detection of motion. There is no such area for the detection of global time." (Lakoff and Johnson,
1999, pl40). But, as Fillmore's point is intended to show, motion is an inherently spatio-temporal
concept.
15 Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p 176) describe the following event structure: Events have an Initial
State, a Start, an End of Start, a Main Process, Possible Interruptions, Possible Continuation or
Iteration and Resultant State. This structure is learned metaphorically from "specialised notions" (e.g.
self-propelled motion and force). Again, what they fail to describe is how these specialised notions or
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6.10.4 Priming From "Space To Time'
Saturday comes before Friday
Wednesday comes after Tuesday
Thursday comes before Wednesday
Friday comes before Saturday






Figure 6.15 "Time-moving" scenario used as a temporal prime in Boroditsky (1998).
On Saturday, Friday is before us TRUE or FALSE
On Wednesday, Tuesday is behind us TRUE or FALSE
On Thursday, Wednesday is before us TRUE or FALSE
On Friday, Saturday is before us TRUE or FALSE
On Wednesday, Thursday is before us TRUE or FALSE
Figure 6.16 "Ego-moving" scenario used as a temporal prime in Boroditsky (1998).
The underspecification of the totally metaphoric concept of time is, then, one strand of
my argument against interpreting Boroditsky's priming asymmetry findings as
evidence for Strong Metaphoric Representation. The other strand of this argument
relates to the nature of the tasks participants performed in Boroditsky's experiment.
The ego-moving and the object-moving metaphoric systems are movement schemas.
That is, they are structured according to concepts of objects moving in space (see
section 6.8.1). In the space => time experiments in Boroditsky (1998), this motion
concepts are understood without a concept of time, which, since the event structure they describe is
temporal in the extreme, is a serious lacuna.
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was explicit in the primes given to subjects (figures 6.11 and 6.12) in the shape of an
arrow indicating movement on a visual prime.
However, in the time => space experiments, subjects were simply presented with
blocks of text questions (figures 6.16 and 6.15).
What is not clear at all, however, is whether these time =» space primes actually
involve any motion. Clearly, no explicit motion is present in the stimuli. But whether
implicit motion is present is a moot point too (see McTaggart, 1908). Consider: both
time and space are usually measured numerically16 (in time or distance units). In
counting to ten, it is possible to adopt both the ego-moving system and
object(number?)-moving system. In the former, when one gets to five, six is still
ahead, whilst in the latter, one comes before two. Yet it isn't entirely clear that
counting in one's head carried any implicit concept ofmotion. And, one might argue,
as for numeric scales, so for calendric ones.
Two points are worth making in respect of this. Firstly, no evidence is presented to
support the idea that the primes imply motion; and secondly, any positive claim for
"motion" in these stimuli seems necessarily to incur the kind of Whorfian circularity
described by Murphy (1996, discussed above). The claim that the time stimuli prime
motion would presumably appeal to the idea that they use the same words that are used
to describe spatial movement. I detailed above Murphy's description of the way
arguments like this claim that language - or linguistic constructs - influence thought,
but then only provide evidence in terms of the language or linguistic constructs
themselves. It would appear that the asymmetry shown in Boroditsky's priming
experiments relies on just this kind of claim. It is assumed that words like "ahead" and
"behind" imply temporal motion because they imply spatial motion, and then the
failure of temporal "ahead" and "behind" to prime an appropriate spatial motion
schema is used as evidence for Strong Metaphoric Representation.
Like the Whorfian analysis above, the initial assumption about linguistic stimuli is
essential to the interpretation of the linguistic data which provides evidence that the
temporal terms are understood in relation to the spatial schema: the initial assumption
about the linguistic data.
16 I'm grateful to Eshaa AlKhalifa for this insight, and for many interesting discussions about time.
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McTaggart (1908) presents some good reasons to doubt these assumptions,
suggesting that these terms do not necessarily imply motion in this case. McTaggart
notes that
"in order to get change [in a spatial system], and change in a given
direction... [one position must]... be in the Present to the exclusion of
others, and this characteristic of presentness should pass along the series in
such a way that all positions on one side of the Present have been presents,
and all positions on the other side of it will be present."
McTaggart (1908, p 463).
Whilst the graphical representations of the spatial primes clearly establish present, and
explicitly define motion, this is not the case with the spatial primes. According to
McTaggart's account, no change, and therefore no motion is present in the spatial
primes.
6.10.5 Space, Time And Weak MR2
In conclusion then, the Strong Metaphoric Representation hypothesis seems unable to
explain coherently why temporal concepts can only be understood metaphorically from
spatial ones. Nor does the one piece of empirical support claimed for it (Boroditsky,
1998; see Lakoff and Johnson, 1999) provide any compelling reason to overlook this
explanatory lacuna. Other evidence too, supports a skeptical view of Conceptual
Metaphor theory. For instance McGlone (1996) in a series of experiments examining
metaphor comprehension found little evidence that underlying Conceptual Metaphors
had any significant role to play, when it came to paraphrasing metaphors, recalling
them, or finding similarities between metaphor meanings. 17
Thus Conceptual Metaphor theory does not seem to offer any panacea for the
problematic view of concepts put forth in this thesis. A dispassionate look at the
relationship between space and time seems to tally with the view I have termed
WMR2. There is evidence that concepts prime metaphorically (Boroditsky, 1998), but
it doesn't seem that this evidence is amenable to explanation in terms of neat,
unidirectional "master / slave" metaphoric mappings. There is no evidence that time is
17 McGlone favours the 'attributive categorisation' view of metaphor, whereby metaphors are
interpreted as 'class inclusion statements' c.f. Glucksberg and Keysar (1990). Given the problems
noted throughout this thesis of saying just what 'class inclusion' amounts to, this seems to some
extent to be simply a matter of switching the problem.
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understood in purely metaphoric terms, and there are good reasons for believing the
contrary.
The evidence indicates some aspects of the ego-moving and time-moving systems used
for sequencing events may have originally been mapped metaphorically from space but
they have now become conventionalised. For instance, it is not clear whether before
or after are "spatial" concepts at root anymore, whatever their etymological ancestry.
Instead, they seem best understood as metaphors for earlier and later (contra
Conceptual Metaphor theory, this might also indicate that metaphoric mappings can
run from time =s> space as well as space => time). Some time concepts are - perhaps -
no longer connected to space concepts via an on-line mapping, even though they may
have been shaped by spatial metaphors. On the other hand, other aspects of the ego-
moving and time-moving systems used for sequencing events may still be mapped
metaphorically from space on-line, as Boroditsky's results indicate. Once more, the
messy view of conceptualisation seems to provide the best fit with the available
evidence.
6.11 Summary
The preceding chapters presented the case - and some evidence for - the 'no
distinction' hypothesis, which denies any simple distinction between analogy and
categorisation at the cognitive process level. In this chapter, I have explored some of
the theoretical implications the 'no distinction' hypothesis has for existing theoretical
approaches to analogy. The two experiments presented have shown how the removal
of any neatly bounded 'concept domains' with which various aspects of the analogical
process can interact has major implications for theories based on just such
assumptions, and in particular for the semantic similarity constraints which are
variously included in, or excluded from, theories and models of the analogical
process.
In chapter 4,1 noted that structure may have a large part to play in the determining of
conceptual mappings. In these experiments, it was the mapping of structures - the
process that from a cognitive science point of view is ordinarily seen as definitive of
analogy - that determined the way in which semantics were reconciled. I have argued
that theoretically these results seem to indicate that including semantic links into an
account of the process that ultimately determined semantic linkage introduce a
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worrying element of circularity into accounts of analogy, and that as a result, the
semantic links proposed within models like ACME should not be seen as embodiments
of psychological theory.
All theories of analogy make some reference to conceptual semantics, either internally,
by use of some kind of semantic links - as described above - in order to reconcile
semantically similar terms (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995; Keane, Ledgeway and Duff,
1994; Hofstadter, 1995), or else externally, by reference to some externally defined
canonical conceptual representation (Forbus, Gentner, Markman and Ferguson,
1998). From a clarity point of view, it might be argued the latter approach is to be
preferred, since it explicitly leaves the problem outside of the scope of the model
(although, as I noted earlier, this rules out the possibility of simply importing structure
mapping theory to explain similarity within categorisation judgements). The fact that
SME requires that predicates which are to be mapped be lexically identical does at
least highlight the fact that analogical models are underspecified in this area, whereas
the way that models like ACME apparently resolve semantic ambiguities (although
these are in fact solved by the programmer setting the network) might be seen as
obscuring this important issue. In the end, though, these are mainly matters of
stylistic preference. A more interesting question to consider is whether the results and
analysis presented so far indicate that there may be a limit to the extent to which all
mapping models that make these external appeals can ultimately cope with the
complex, parallel nature of human analogy making.




This chapter discusses the analysis and results described in this thesis. The key
findings of the theoretical survey presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are summarised,
and then related to the findings of the empirical studies in Chapters 5 and 6. Some of
the limitations of these studies, and the general approach adopted, are identified.
In the light of the 'no distinction' hypothesis presented, a speculative framework for
discussing modes of conceptualisation is outlined, and some potentially fruitful future
research directions are described.
7.2 Summary Of Findings
7.2.1 Analogy And Categorisation
The exploration of the links between analogy and categorisation in this thesis has
involved a re-appraisal of the basic assumptions made about concepts in psychology,
and a systematic evaluation of the theoretical underpinnings of three decades of
categorisation research.
At the head of this work was the rigorous re-analysis of the theory of concepts
attributed to Wittgenstein (1953). This demonstrated that the characterisation of
Wittgenstein's views that has held sway in the cognitive psychology literature (c.f.
Rosch, 1978; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Medin and Ortony, 1989; Lakoff, 1987) is at
considerable variance to a close - but straightforward - reading of all of the relevant
sections ofWittgenstein (1953).
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The empirical review that followed this demonstrated that:
• little of the research that claims its inspiration from Wittgenstein bears much
relation to his views 1
• the picture that emerges from the interpretation of Wittgenstein presented is
consistent with many of the findings of psychological studies of concepts;
moreover, this picture can provide the conceptual glue required to make sense
of these findings.
To briefly summarise this position and its relation to the evidence, Wittgenstein argues:
• that categories have no necessary or sufficient defining characteristics: rather
that "family resemblances" can be traced across categories (supporting
evidence is summarised in Smith and Medin, 1981)
• that these category spaces are unbounded - i.e. there are no boundaries to the
space across which "family resemblances" can be traced (Labov, 1973;
McClosky and Glucksberg, 1978; Sloman, Malt, Shi, Gennari and Wang 1997
a, b)
• that learning a category such as game does not involve extracting an essence or
schema from instances. (Malt, 1994; see also experiment 2)
• that learning a category or concept involves learning examples (instances) of
the usage of that concept and appropriate ways of using these examples
(Nosofsky 1986, 1991; Lamberts, 1996).
This theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that conceptual storage is best viewed
not as a question of instances versus generalisations, but rather one of unitary versus
multiple representation accounts of concepts. Unitary accounts of categorisation posit
a single stored representation - schema, prototype or, perhaps, theory - which is used
to determine category membership. Multiple representation accounts posit the storage
of a number of representations which may jointly or individually result in some object
being categorised as the outcome of some process. These different models of
conceptual representation have different implications for theories of categorisation. If
a unitary representation model is correct, then one would expect that provided one
could specify the stored representation and the process by which objects were related
to it, one should in principle be able to give a definitive account of, say, why it is some
1 Put simply, Wittgenstein did not come to praise concepts, he came to bury them.
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things are X's. On the other hand, a multi-representational account would not admit
any definitive account of X's at all, since the multiplicity of relations between the
differing stored representations that could influence an object's X-ness preclude any
kind of general account covering all instances of that concept. A specific instance's X-
ness would be dependent upon that - and only that - instance's interaction with some
subset of the stored elements relating to the representation of X-ness, and the
concomitant process by which X-ness is adjudged.
I argue that this latter view, which is strongly supported by the evidence, is
incompatible with the reified view of concepts which dominates current research in
cognitive psychology, and is used to justify a two-process account of literal versus
non-literal conceptual processing.
7.2.2 Analogy And Non-Literal Concepts
The second strand of work in this thesis looked at analogy and metaphor, considered
as theoretical constructs, in relation to the results presented above. It is becoming
more widely accepted that relational structure plays an important role in conceptual
understanding (Keil, 1989; Medin and Ortony, 1989 Goldstone, 1994); analogical
reasoning research has directly addressed and modelled a process which reasons
amongst structural networks (Forbus, Gentner and Law, 1995; Holyoak and Thagard,
1995). Consistent with the approach described above, the empirical and theoretical
work in the latter part of the thesis attempted to demonstrate that the distinctions used
to separate analogy and categorisation research - which characterise analogies as
"connections that go beyond ordinary conceptual structures" - are not only
unsupported by current evidence, but that they cannot withstand empirical scrutiny.
In the first of these experiments, subjects were given Gentner's classic "Karla the
Hawk" stimuli and asked to categorise them. Results showed that participants
analogical and categorisation responses to these materials could be explained and
predicted by the same process model. A second experiment showed that although
subjects had stored the categories they formed, it appeared that they had not abstracted
a general representation for them. The third experiment re-ran the first experiment,
replacing the stories with descriptions of novel objects, and duplicated the earlier
result. Thus in both of the classification studies subjects' performance in
categorisation tasks was consistent with their performance in similar analogy tasks,
and could be predicted and described by analogical process models.
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The claim made in this work is not simply that "analogy and categorisation are
identical." In chapter 6 I have tried to show that the relationship between the two is
complex, and that analogy theories (Holyoak and Thagard, 1995; Forbus, Gentner and
Law, 1995; Bowdle and Gentner, 1998) incorporate assumptions about concepts that
cannot be sustained outside of the laboratory. Experiment 4 explored the role of
semantics in analogy, in order to expose circularities in current definitions of
analogical theories. By presenting subjects with analogy materials containing novel
terms, and then presenting characterisations of the use of these terms in various forms,
I have shown that semantic matching in analogy can involve exactly the same process
as a global computation of an analogy itself, rather than separate processes, as current
analogy models assume. In my studies, subjects used "analogy" to map the novel
term characterisations and disambiguate semantics in the representations of base and
target analogies, before using these mappings to generate further mappings in order to
make an analogical inference.
Experiment 5 then used materials developed by Boroditsky (1998) to replicate these
effects without recourse to artificial terms and definitions. Boroditsky showed how
priming in the spatial domain could influence reasoning about temporal questions.
Experiment 5 examined the effect such spatial priming has on analogies involving
time, in order to show that in such cases analogical influences can be determined by
such priming (which in analogy theory terms would be classified as semantic) rather
than the structural means many analogy theories predict (analogy theories seem to
explicitly rule out the kind of purely "semantic" analogising carried out by subjects in
these studies).
This work has had two motivating concerns. The first is to attempt to strip away some
fairly ingrained assumptions and clarify the nature of concepts from a scientific
perspective. The two-process account is largely made up of implicit assumptions. It
is not a scientific hypothesis. In arguing that these assumptions are unwarranted, and
presenting the 'no-distinction' hypothesis, my aim has been to propose an account of
conceptualisation that fits the available evidence, and put forward this account in terms
of a hypothesis that is empirically testable. The statement that there is no clear,
principled distinction to be made between analogical and 'straight' categorical
processing is clearly falsifiable. And falsification of the 'no-distinction' hypothesis
might pave the way to a clear, principled statement of a two-process account, if such
an account is justified.
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The second motivation was more pragmatic. This work ultimately seeks to show not
only how a reified view of concepts makes analogy models brittle once one pursues
conceptual representation beyond a fixed level of description, but also how a richer
understanding of analogy can illuminate our understanding of concepts, In the
following sections, I shall consider some objections to the first of these factors, and
attempt to show how the second goal might be realised in the future.
7.3 The What OfAnalogy And Categorisation...
The discussion of Conceptual Metaphor theory at the end of Chapter 6 serves to
further illustrate the entangled view of literal and non-literal conceptual processing put
forward in this thesis. The view presented here does, however, sit ill with our
intuitions about the nature of these processes, with current orthodoxy in analogy,
metaphor and categorisation research, and, it would appear, with any idea of
formulating a tractable account of conceptualisation. The second of these points has
been dealt with at length in this thesis. Here, I wish to consider the former point, and
in the section following, I shall discuss the latter.
To deal with the "what" of analogy and categorisation first. The outcome of the
investigation presented here, of the interpretation of Wittgenstein's position and the
supporting evidence from categorisation research, as well as the empirical studies, is a
strong statement of the 'no-distinction' hypothesis. And whilst the 'no-distinction'
hypothesis might appear counterintuitive, it need not necessarily be so.
The 'no-distinction' hypothesis amounts to the claim that there is no principled
distinction to be made between literal and metaphoric meaning. This appears to leave
an important question unanswered: how can we explain why people can often judge a
meaning to be literal or metaphoric? To return to the example from French (1996),
discussed in chapter 5: what lies behind the intuition that "an orange crate is an orange
crate is an orange crate"?
Certainly the reasons behind these intuitions need exploring, however, the ability of
listeners to adjudge meanings to be literal or metaphoric need not indicate that listeners
process so called literal and metaphoric utterances differently. As Rumelhart (1979)
has argued, "the classification of an utterance as to whether it involves literal or
metaphoric meanings is analogous to our judgement as to whether a bit of language is
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formal or informal. It is a judgement that can be reliably made, but not one which
signals fundamentally different comprehension processes" (p. 79).
Gibbs (1984) argues that one reason why some sentences seem so literal is that
listeners are influenced by the interpretative context in which such judgements are
made: people judge a sentence as having literal meaning because it is isomorphic with
the situation in which the sentence is interpreted (Fish, 1980). However, it doesn't
follow from this that the literal meanings of sentences can be uniquely determined, as
our understandings of situations always influence our understandings of sentences.
Says Gibbs, 'To speak of a sentence's literal meaning is to already have read it in the
light of some purpose, to have engaged in an interpretation. What often appears to be
the literal meaning of a sentence is just an occasion-specific meaning where context is
so widely shared that there doesn't seem to be a context at all." Gibbs, 1984, p. 296;
As for judging whether sentences are literal, I claim, so for judging whether whales
are mammals or fish; or, for that matter, whether our picnic is 'on the orange-crate' or
'on the table'.
However, I should note that these arguments try to explain away the intuition problem,
rather than explain it. Whilst they offer some explanation of how reliable literal / non-
literal judgements could be reconciled with the 'no distinction' hypothesis, this account
is by no means conclusive.
7.3.1 The What Of Analogy
The 'no distinction' hypothesis has clear implications for theories of analogy. As I
noted at the end of Chapter 4, all theories of analogy make some reference to
conceptual semantics, either internally, by use of some kind of semantic links - as
described above - in order to reconcile semantically similar terms (Holyoak and
Thagard, 1995; Keane, Ledgeway and Duff, 1994; Hofstadter, 1995), or else
externally, by reference to some externally defined canonical conceptual representation
(Forbus, Gentner, Markman and Ferguson, 1998).2 It could appear that in questioning
the status of these, I am making little more than an arcane point about which aspect of
a given analogical theory is to be preferred. This is not so. The implications of this
2 One interesting recent model of analogy to note in this respect is LISA (Hummel and Holyoak,
1997). At present, LISA implements the multi-constraint theory of analogy, making reference to
explicit semanitc links based upon a taxonomic hierarchy in a similar way to ACME. However, the
underlying architecture of LISA appears to offer the potential to implement a more flexible model of
conceptual sematics than LISA currently embodies.
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analysis for all theories of analogy are far-reaching. The problem of semantics in
analogical mapping is indicative of a deeper question. Do the results and analysis
presented in this thesis indicate that there may be a limit to the extent to which all
mapping models that make these external appeals can ultimately cope with the
complex, parallel nature of human analogy making?
To take the matter of the nature of semantics first. Forbus et al (1998) attempt to use
pre-defined canonical conceptual representations to explain how structure mapping can
recursively map non-identical predicates by re-representing any non-matching
predicates and then permitting a partial match to be made. Consistent with the analysis
of a recursive semantic reconciliation process presented in chapter 6, Forbus et al
argue that semantic terms are decomposed into sub-predicate re-representations, and
then mappings between these are determined using the same process as the original
analogical mapping:
"re-representation allows relational identicality to arise out of the analogical
alignment, rather than acting as a strict constraint on the input descriptions"
(Forbus, Gentner, Markman and Ferguson, 1998, p. 246).
So far, these proposals are little more than speculative, and thus, it seems rather unfair
to subject them to any rigorous critiquing. However, even in their speculative form,
there are important questions that Forbus et aV$> speculations fail to address, most
obviously and most importantly, the question of: where does it all end?
In experiments 4 and 5, I concentrated on the semantic reconciliation of one set of
similar-but-not-identical terms, and followed this reconciliation process down through
one level of recursion, where the results indicated - consistent with the 'no distinction'
hypothesis and Forbus, Gentner, Markman and Ferguson's (1998) speculations - that
the same process was used to resolve semantic ambiguities as was used to determine
analogical mappings.
However, it seems unlikely that realistic representations of real-world analogies will
contain such a small number of similar yet non-identical predicate matches to reconcile.
Real-world representations could, and probably will, contain many more such
predicates, and the re-representations of these predicates - whose predicates will also
need to be matched during the parallel semantic reconciliation of the original predicates
- may contain more non-identical but semantically similar predicates, potentially as a
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factorial of the original number of semantically similar predicates selected for
reconciliation.
Logically, at least, this seems to point to both a combinatorial explosion - in terms of
the number of predicates to be reconciled, and hence individual semantic reconciliation
sub-processes to be run - and a potential infinite regress: if an identical mapping
process is to be run recursively, and if re-representation doesn't ultimately uncover
identical predicate-decomposition representations at some level, then mapping may not
terminate. (It might appear that the 'no distinction' hypothesis is a theoretical recipe
for disaster.)
However, whilst logic may suggest this, practice suggests that the truth may lie
elsewhere. To paraphrase two of Wittgenstein's (1953) more famous ideas, 'words
can only decompose into other words' and 'explanations must end somewhere'. The
very fact that people can, cognitively, reconcile non-identical but semantically similar
terms in real-world situations suggests that this logical conclusion is wrong; something
must be wrong with the analysis and characterisation of this process as it stands.
The question this poses is, then: in what way is this characterisation - which seems to
be consistent with the empirical data presented above - wrong? How is it that humans
can, cognitively, deal with this potential combinatorial explosion, and terminate the
recursive search for a mapping?
7.4 The Where For Analogy And Categorisation...
As I suggest above, the few existing proposals for describing how this is achieved are
largely speculative and incomplete (this stems at least in part from the fact that hitherto
there has been a severe lack of empirical evidence that relates directly to this question).
Forbus, Gentner, Markman and Ferguson (1998) describe how acculturation and
language learning could possibly equip members of a particular linguistic community
with representations of domains in terms of canonical sets of dimensions, though what
these domains are, and how these dimensions operate in terms of any worked out
process of semantic reconciliation is left open: there is nothing in Forbus et al's
account that says how, when or why a particular semantic reconciliation sub-process
might be invoked, nor ultimately, how recursive mappings in pursuit of semantic
reconciliation would terminate.
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7.4.1 Future Work - A Where For Conceptualisation?
A possible answer to these questions that could be pursued in the future is the notion
of 'semantic focus': the idea that the subprocesses that determine 'semantic similarity'
- in the manner discussed so far - will terminate with more or less perfect matches
depending on the importance of the support they lend to the focus of a given
comparison, i.e. their distance in comparison space from the representations that are
the actual point of a comparison. The basic idea at the heart of semantic focus is that
semantic mappings will get more diffuse - conceptually weaker, or less rich - the
further one moves from the focus of a given comparison. In this section, I will try
develop this idea, and sketch a framework in which a two-stage model of analogy and
categorisation might be developed.
Whilst I have argued strongly against the idea of canonical conceptual representations
per se throughout this thesis, I have also noted the evidence from such things as
typicality studies that humans do store and use some form of stereotypical, generalised
(i.e. generalisations from examples) category information, even though this
information is generally insufficient for the determination of categorical similarities and
judgements (Rosch, 1978; Komatsu, 1992).
One hypothesis that one might extract from this is that whilst such knowledge may be
insufficient when it comes to determining categorisation judgements - i.e.
generalisations cannot support mappings that are the focus of comparisons - it may be
sufficient to support lower-level matches that act in support of such judgements. To
give an example, the claim would be that smallerjthan and less_mass_than may be
seen as different - even importantly dissimilar - if they are the focus of a comparison,
but sufficiently similar if they are merely supporting a particular semantic reconciliation
with a larger global comparison of something else, and that similarity at this level
might be determined in relation to some pre-computed-and-stored generalisation.
In categorisation terms, a semantic focus hypothesis might appear to be an attempt to
"have my cake and eat it." However, I shall argue that this idea can be consistent with
the 'anti-schema' position previously argued for in this thesis, in that there is a
difference between positing some kind of generalised information, and claiming that
this information comes in the form of a schema that is in any way complete or
definitive. Rather the claim is that such information represents at best a partial -
though pragmatically useful - characterisation of a given concept.
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7.4.2 A (Very) Speculative Two-Stage Model Of
Semantics
In the light of the evidence presented in this thesis, this begs two questions: what kind
of representations are these partial representations supposed to be, and how do they
interact with the process of determining structural mappings?
To take the former question first: a number of recent approaches to meaning in psycho-
linguistics have adopted an approach that has some proximity to the exemplar models
discussed in chapter 4. In these approaches, vectored similarity matrices have been
used to perform similarity analyses amongst the meanings of words in large corpora. I
am not going to argue that these models can provide an answer to the conceptualisation
problems described in this thesis (and if I believed they did, this would have been a
very different dissertation). In fact, I shall argue that they cannot provide such an
answer. However, what I shall suggest below is they might suggest an answer to the
nature of generalised conceptual similarities, and may provide part of a two-stage
model of focused - or diffused - semantics.
I shall begin by briefly describing two leading models in this area: the Hyperspace
Approach to Language model (HAL), and the Latent Semantic Analysis Model (LSA).
7.4.2.1 HAL
In HAL theory (Burgess and Lund, 1997), word meanings (or rather similarities
between word meanings) are derived from a dimensional analysis of words in context.
A corpus of some 300 million words has been analysed by use of a moving window
10 words in length, and a matrix of some 70,000 rows and columns. Each of these
rows and columns is labelled with a particular word so as to enable the cells of the
matrix to record co-occurences between pairs of words. Co-occurence values for
words are assigned by use of the window, with adjacent words being scored 10,
adjacent but one 9, and so on. Once this analysis process is complete, rows give the
total co-occurence values for words that precede the row label, whilst columns give the
same values for words following the column label. For each word, the two 70,000
element vectors are combined to produce a 140,000 element vector representing its
similarity to other words, which is HAL's proposed "meaning" of the word.
The HAL vectors correlate strongly with degree of priming in lexical decision tasks
(Lund, Burgess and Atchley, 1995), and have been used with mixed success to
simulate categorisation (Burgess and Lund, 1997). In this latter study, the vectors for
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words in four "taxonomic groupings" (geographical locations, cities, animals and
body parts) were submitted to multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) to allow a
visualisation of the similarities between them. Whilst the MDS showed that HAL
could generally separate geographical locations from cities from animals from body
parts, clustering each group of these items together, some anomalies did occur, e.g.
eye, leg, and finger were closer in the MDS space to cat and dog, than to face, arm, or
hand.
7.4.2.2 LSA
LSA theory (Landauer and Dumais, 1997) also represents word meanings (or
similarities) as vectors, also derived from their co-occurence in text. However its
workings are slightly different to those ofHAL. In determining LSA vectors, one fist
determines a "semantic space," or a set of contexts in which the analysis is to take
place (for example, entries in an encyclopaedia can form a set of contexts). The
encyclopaedia example uses the first 2000 words of 30,473 entries to form a matrix.
Each encyclopaedia entry (context) is assigned a column, and each word a row, and
the number of times each word appears in a context is entered into the matrix. As with
HAL, a vector is calculated (in this case by logarithmic transformation) which assigns
300-400 values on the same number of dimensions; its LSA "meaning", or similarity
vector.
LSA can also be applied to sentence and discourse meanings. Sentences are
represented as the average of the vectors of the words they contain, and the coherence
between sentences is scored and predicted by calculating - in multidimensional space -a
cosine of the angle between the vectors for successive sentences. Landauer and
Dumais (1997) claim that this captures the central meanings of passages, and allows
similarities between passages to be calculated.
As with HAL, LSA vectors have been shown to have some predictive power: LSA
vectors can pick out synonyms with an accuracy that mimics the performance of non-
native English speakers (Landauer and Dumais, 1994) and LSA sentence vectors
coherence judgements for those sentences (Landauer and Dumais, 1997).
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7.4.3 Co-Occurence And Semantics
Although LSA and HAL have performed impressively in specific tasks, from the point
of view of this thesis, they make unlikely candidates for unified theories of knowledge
representation (as Landauer and Dumais, 1997, p 217, suggest).
Gentner et Match type
al's findings LS Analogy MA FA
Soundness 4.41 4.16 2.70 2.58
Similarity 4.50 4.09 3.40 2.88
Proportion
Recalled




1.11 .17 .81 .25
Quality of
reminding
1.92 .44 1.64 .27 ;
*■ mmm
1 ■ J ' " 1,..', .1 ' .-1. r . '




LSA Cos. .700 .527 .652 .506
(Similarity
Score) (sd .112) (sd .157) (sd .103) (sd .158)
Table 7.1: Scale of mean ratings of soundness and similarity (compared to the base) and three
measures of reminding for the Karla the Hawk story sets, produced by participants in Gentner
Ratterman and Forbus (1993), with LSA cosines (similarity ratings) calculated for each story type,
also compared to the base.
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I have suggested firstly that human concepts have an important structural component,
and also that focusing on simple feature lists (and in the end, that is all LSA and HAL
analysis amounts to) cannot capture this underlying structure. For example, in
experiment 5 (Chapter 6) what was important was not how semantically similar either
MOVED_EARLIER or MOVED_LATER was to MOVED_FORWARD (for what it is worth,
LSA rates the former most similar), but which of the two in particular was to be
mapped onto MOVEDJFORWARD. And this seemed determined by a particular, rather
than a generalised context.
The ability of LSA to make text to text comparisons enabled an experimental approach
to be adopted in this respect, since it enabled the calculation of LSA cosines for the
various "Karla the Hawk" story sets that participants had rated for similarity in
Gentner Ratterman and Forbus's (1993) study (described at length in Chapter 2).
The results of this analysis, and Gentner et aVs findings are summarised in Table 7.13
(the cosines shown were calculated using a college level psychology text book as the
semantic context - reflective of the fact that Gentner et al's participants were all
psychology undergraduates - but analyses with other semantic contexts produced the
same pattern of results).
As can be seen from this table, LSA cosines are a bad predictor of analogical similarity
and participants perceived judgements of inferential soundness in the "Karla the
Hawk" stories. Moreover, these results suggest that it is highly unlikely that LSA
could model any of the empirical findings described in this thesis. Yet if the 'no
distinction' hypothesis is correct, these findings are as much a part of conceptual
semantics as knowing that "dog" might frequently co-occur with "cat". Chapter 4
showed that there is little hope that the categorisation literature will offer any support
for LSA theory here, by proving evidence contra the 'no distinction' hypothesis. Thus
it seems, from the evidence presented in this thesis, that any theory of conceptual
semantics ought, at the very least, to offer some predictive account of the findings of
experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5. That LSA, as a theory, cannot do this appears to be
directly attributable to the fact that similarity vectors calculated over features in a
generalised context are a poor predictor of the effects of structural similarities in a
particular context will have. Whereas the evidence reviewed in this thesis appears to
show that this latter process is a key ingredient in conceptual semantics.
3 I am grateful to Alex Heneveld and Michael Walker for entering some of this data and calculating
some of these cosines.
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7.4.4 Co-Occurence And Semantic Focus
On the other hand, LSA appears to be a good predictor of recall and reminding
(indeed, the one area in which co-occurence models are generally acknowledged to
excel is in predicting semantic priming). Furthermore, as a model of retrieval, LSA
has been empirically explored to a far greater extent than the retrieval modules of the
analogy theories described in Chapter 2, and the apparent success of co-occurance
models in tasks such as semantic priming and the identification of synonyms suggests
that, from a psychological point of view, there may be something in these models.
The question is what? How can the circle of generalised feature vectors be reconciled
with the square of particular structural mappings. An avenue that might be profitably
explored here is in generalising and modifying the two-stage model of matching that
emerged from the review of analogy in Chapter 2, to produce something like the
semantic focus model I started this section with. In such a model, frequency vectors
might provide the weak similarities that are sufficient to terminate recursive structure
mappings between elements making up the representations that are at the focus of a
comparison, but are insufficient to actually support mappings in themselves.
Feature vectors might, therefore, obliquely be able to flesh out Forbus, Gentner,
Markman and Ferguson's (1998) speculation about the way acculturation and language
learning might equip members of a particular linguistic community with
representations of "domains" in terms of canonical sets of dimensions.
An advantage this two-stage theoretical framework possesses is that it abandons the
idea that conceptual membership (and hence related notions such as "meaning" and
"semantics") is an all or nothing phenomena, a position consistent with both empirical
(Chapter 4) and theoretical (Chapter 3) findings in this area, which indicate that
questions about category membership are ultimately a matter of context and degree.
If a canonical theory of semantic reconciliation (or re-representation) in comparison
mappings is correct (and this is what I interpret Forbus et al's, 1998, proposal to be),
then, on our understanding of it, such a theory should predict, and the evidence should
show, that an individual's computations of semantic reconciliations should be both
stable and consistent.
On the other hand, the theoretical framework of semantic focus (and an alternative
reading of Forbus et aVs 'acculturation' idea) predicts that such comparisons,
reflective of the nature of the semantic reconcilliations that are an integral part of them,
CHAPTER 7 - DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 228
should be contingent upon context, and open to revision. Ultimately, conceptual
semantics will be dependant upon the relation of individual comparitors to the focus of
comparison; upon context and use.
7.5 Coming Down To Earth
It should be noted, however, that given the experimental evidence presented in this
thesis, this proposal still begs two vitally important questions. Firstly when - at what
level - and in what context, the use of generalised information will be sufficient. And
secondly, and perhaps most importantly, how is it that the structured representations
used in making structural mappings are built up in context?
I have no answers to offer here to these second of these questions.
One possibility relating to the former question is the idea that generalised information
has a role to play here as well (if only in terms of attempting to narrow down the
potential search space for mappings). However, without better data regarding the
second question, relating to the exact nature of just what is stored in relation to
cognitive concepts, it is difficult to see just how much further speculations such as
these can be taken. (And without answers to these questions, all the framework I have
described above may amount to is a rather fancy Case-Based Reasoning System.)
In the light of this, the speculative framework offered above should best be seen as an
attempt to characterise - to map out - a view of the problem of semantics in analogy (or
other comparative mappings) in tractable terms, and not as any final or immutable
theoretical position. This has been, to an extent, a negative thesis. I have had more to
say regarding what the relationship between analogy and categorisation is not than
what it is. These proposals are an attempt to show how this strong negative statement
can have positive implications. However, like the mapping process it seeks to
describe, this proposal will have to be flexible if it is to be of any use.
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7.6 Conclusion
To summarise, the main contributions of the research described in this thesis are:
1. A review of analogical theories, and a specification of the problem of describing
analogical semantics.
2. An exegesis ofWittgenstein's "Game" argument (to the author's knowledge, the
first such full exegesis of this influential position).
3. A co-ordinated review of the problem of categorisation in cognitive science that
places established findings in the framework of Wittgenstein's theoretical
analysis.
4. A formulation and exploration of the 'no distinction' hypothesis that holds that
there is no principled distinction to be made between literal and non-literal
conceptualisation at the cognitive process level.
5. An empirical exploration of the 'no distinction' hypothesis.
6. An empirical analysis of the role of semantic links in analogical mapping.
7. The results of these experiments, that can be used to test future and existing
models of analogy and categorisation.
8. A proposal for a future model of conceptualisation.
Thus the primary contribution of this thesis has been an attempt to clarify the
relationship between literal and non-literal conceptualisation at the cognitive process
level. This is a matter at the heart of cognitive science. I do not claim that this thesis
has clarified these relationship adequately; rather the claim is that it has at least
presented an empirically testable characterisation of this relationship, the 'no
distinction' hypothesis, and that this hypothesis can lay the foundation for the
scientific investigation of this area.
In addition, the data gathered in the course of this research could be of use to the
developers ofmodels of categorisation and analogy. The data from experiments 1 and
3 should provide a good challenge for many classification models, whilst the results of
experiments 4 and 5 offer novel and demanding data for analogy models to capture.
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Appendix A: Materials Used In Experiments 1 and 2
The Karla the Hawk story sets from Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993).
SET1
BASE Story:
William was a patient in a psychiatric hospital who was confined indoors
almost all the time. He could never pass the monthly room inspections
so he hated them. He spent most of his time daydreaming about food. A
few days before the April inspection William's room was still a mess
since he had done nothing but daydream. To provide William with an
incentive, the nurse promised him some gingerbread from the cookie
shop if he scrubbed his room and put it in order once and for all. William
was overjoyed. But there was no longer enough time for him to put it in
order. As a result, he did not pass the inspection and did not get any
gingerbread.
LS:
Kevin was shut-in at a mental institution. He always did poorly at the
weekly bedroom checks so he disliked them. About the only thing Kevin
liked to do was eat.
Not long before the last check of the year, Kevin's bedroom was still a
disaster because he had spent all his time daydreaming. To motivate
him, the matron promised Kevin a cake from the bakery if he cleaned
and organised his bedroom.
This made Kevin extremely happy. But he was too far behind in his
cleaning to get his bedroom ready in time. Consequently, he didn't get a
cake at all.
MAAO
There once was a boy named William who thought about food a lot. He
had a particular liking for gingerbread. One of the happiest times of his
childhood was spent on holiday with his aunt. He got to sit indoors all
day reading comics. His aunt worked as a nurse in a psychiatric hospital.
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TA:
Karen always did poorly in high school so she despised it. But she loved
vacations. She spent most of her time dreaming about going to Hawaii.
Not long before the end of her fourth year Karen was not doing at all well
in her classes because she had spent all her time daydreaming. To
motivate her, Karen's father promised her that if she did well enough
during the next few week to graduate from high school he would pay for
her trip to Hawaii. This made Karen extremely happy. But she was too
far behind in her classes. Consequently she failed too many and did not
go to Hawaii.
FA:
Karen disliked high school so she always had trouble getting passing
grades in her classes. Vacations were her favourite part of the school year.
Not long before the end of her fourth year of school, Karen was not doing
well at all because she despised school. To motivate her, Karen's father
promised her a trip to Hawaii if she would just pass enough of her classes
to graduate. This made Karen extremely happy. During the last few
weeks of school she spent most of her time dreaming about Hawaii and
preparing for her trip there. Consequently, she failed to graduate and she
did not get to go.
MA:
Kevin was shut-in at a mental institution. He disliked cleaning his room
so he always failed the weekly bedroom checks. About the only thing
Kevin liked to do was eat.
Not long before the last check of the year, Kevin's bedroom was still a
disaster because he despised cleaning. To motivate him, the matron
promised Kevin a cake from the bakery if he cleaned and organised his
bedroom.
This made Kevin extremely happy. During the next few days he spent
most of his time dreaming about the bakery and deciding what kind of





Mr Newton was the manager of a company that made razors. One year,
an inventor in his company perfected a metal that would stay sharper
than any previous razor.
However, not long after that, Mr Newton was using one of these new
razors and he cut his neck rather severely. As a result of this incident the
inventor recommended a safety feature that would protect people from
injuring themselves.
After what had happened, Mr Newton considered the safety feature
absolutely necessary. The incident had alarmed him so much that he
began to produce the safety razor right away.
LS:
Mr Boyce was director of manufacturing shaving knives for Gilette
Company. In 1980 an engineer in his company perfected a steel alloy that
would keep a finer edge than any previous blade. But later, when Mr
Boyce was using one of these new knives he slashed his throat pretty
seriously. Because of this accident, the engineer recommended a new
protective part that would prevent people from hurting themselves with
the blade.
After this, Mr Boyce considered the protective part absolutely necessary.
The accident frightened him so much that he had the protective part
developed immediately.
TA:
Ms Boyce was in charge of installing heat lamps sold by the Smith Tan
Company. In 1980, a supplier for the company perfected a filament that
could produce more intense heat than any previous filament. But later,
when Ms Boyce was using one of these new heat lamps herself she was
seriously burned. Because of this accident, the supplier recommended a
warning label that would protect people from hurting themselves with
the new lamp. After this, Ms Boyce considered the labels absolutely




Ms Boyce was in charge of installing sun lamps sold by Smith Tan
Company. In 1980, a supplier for the company perfected a filament that
could produce more intense heat than any previous filament. Because it
was so hot, the supplier recommended a warning label that would protect
people from hurting themselves with the new lamp. But Ms Boyce
considered the labels unnecessary. It would be too much trouble to make
them. But later, when she was using one of these new heat lamps
herself, she was seriously burned. After this accident she was so
frightened that she had the warning labels printed immediately.
MA:
Mr Boyce was director of manufacturing shaving knives for Gilette
Company. In 1980, an engineer in his company perfected a steel alloy that
would keep a finer edge than any previous blade. Because it was so sharp,
the engineer also recommended a new protective part that would prevent
people from hurting themselves with the blade.
But Mr Boyce considered the protective part unnecessary. It would be too
expensive to incorporate.
But later, when he was using one of these new blades, he slashed his own
throat pretty seriously. After this accident he was so frightened that he
had the protective part developed immediately.
MAAO
There was once an engineer who loved his job. He thought all day about
complex engineering problems. He was proud that he invented a steel
alloy for improving shaving knives. He was working in his garage when
the idea came to him. His friend, the director of manufacturing, was with




Joseph was a millionaire who hired a chauffeur to drive his Rolls-Royce.
He used to brag to his wife that he would never be late for his conferences
since he had hired a chauffeur.
One morning when he was in a great hurry, he went to find the
chauffeur. But he was asleep. He thought his services would not be
needed that day.
Thus Joseph was very late for his conference after all. To make sure this
would not happen again, Joseph hired a second chauffeur.
Removed:
This turned out to be very expensive because the second chauffeur
wanted a fancy uniform as well as a high salary.
LS:
Alexander was a wealthy man who employed a driver for his limousine.
He liked to boast to his spouse that with his driver he would always be on
time for his meetings.
One day when he was in a rush, he went to find the driver. But he was
taking a nap. The driver thought it was his day off. Thus Alexander
ended up missing his meeting. But to make sure he would not be late
again, Alexander hired a second driver.
TA:
Alexander was a man who lived with his wife in his house a long time
ago. He liked to boast to a friend that with his wife at home we would
always eat well. One day, when he was very hungry, Alexander went
home to his wife. But she thought Alexander would be eating someplace
else so she had only prepared enough for herself and their baby. Thus
Alexander went without dinner. But to make sure he would not go
hungry again, Alexander married a second wife.
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FA:
Many years ago there was a man named Alexander who had two wives
living in two houses. He liked to boast to a friend that with his two wives
he would always eat well. One day when he was very hungry, Alexander
went to his first wife. But she had only prepared enough for herself and
their baby. She thought Alexander would eat with his other wife that day.
Alexander then went to his second wife, but found she had already
finished. She saw him go to the other house so she thought he was
eating there. Thus Alexander went without any dinner at all.
MA:
Alexander was a wealthy man who employed two drivers for his two
limousines. He liked to boast to his spouse that with his two drivers he
would always be on time for his meetings.
One day, when he was in a rush, Alexander went to the first driver. But
he was taking a nap. The driver thought it was his day off.
Then Alexander called for the other driver, but he had already left. He
had seen Alexander with the first driver so he thought he had the day off.
Thus, Alexander ended up missing his meeting.
MAAO
Clive was a chauffeur. He was proud of the fact that he always got his boss
to meetings on time. Even when his boss was late leaving, Clive made
sure that they were not late for the conference. His boss's car was a Rolls
Royce. Clive's own car was a Ford. It was an automatic, whilst his boss's




Karla, an old hawk, lived at the top of a tall oak tree. One afternoon, she
saw a hunter on the ground with a bow and some crude arrows that had
no feathers. The hunter took aim and shot at the hawk but missed. Karla
knew the hunter wanted her feathers so she glided down to the hunter
and offered to give him a few. The hunter was so grateful that he pledged
never to shoot at a hawk again.
LS:
Once there was an eagle named Zerdia who nested on a rocky cliff. One
day she saw a sportsman coming with a crossbow and some bolts that had
no feathers. The sportsman attacked but the bolts missed. Zerdia realised
that the sportsman wanted her tailfeathers so she flew down and donated
a few of her tailfeathers to the sportsman. The sportsman was pleased.
He promised never to attack eagles again.
TA:
Once there was a small country called Zerdia that learned to make the
world's smartest computer.
One day Zerdia was attacked by its warlike neighbour, Gagrach. But the
missiles were badly aimed and the attack failed. The Zerdian government
realised that Gagrach wanted Zerdian computers so it offered to sell some
of its computers to the country. The government of Gagrach was very
pleased. It promised never to attack Zerdia again.
FA:
Once there was a small country called Zerdia that learned to make the
world's smartest computer. Zerdia sold one of its supercomputers to its
neighbour, Gagrach, so Gagrach would promise never to attack Zerdia.
But one day Zerdia was overwhelmed by a surprise attack from Gagrach.
As it capitulated, the crippled government of Zerdia realised that the
attacker's missiles had been guided by Zerdian supercomputers.
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MA:
Once there was an eagle named Zerdia who donated a few of her
tailfeathers to a sportsman so he would promise never to attack eagles.
One day Zerdia was nesting high on a rocky cliff when she saw the
sportsman coming with a crossbow. Zerdia flew down to meet the man,
but he attacked and felled her with a single bolt. As she fluttered to the
ground Zerdia realised that the bolt had her own tailfeathers on it.
MAAO
There once was a sportsman who loved to hunt. He liked to have the
animals he caught stuffed and mounted. His pride and joy was an eagle
he had killed with just a crossbow and a bolt. He had been hiding in the
top of an elm tree when he shot her.
SET 5
BASE Story:
Peter was a young man from Iceland who moved to Florida one summer.
He was very self-conscious about his pale skin, though. Peter thought
that people would not accept him unless he had a dark tan like everyone
else.
So, Peter spent a whole day in the sun, trying to get a tan. H e didn't
understand how dangerous the sun could be. Consequently, by evening,
he had to go to the hospital. He had second degree burns over most of his
body.
LS:
Alfred was a young man from Sweden who was vacationing in Hawaii.
He was annoyed at having to remain pale. He wanted to impress people
with his dark tan.
So one day, Alfred spent the whole afternoon in the sun. He didn't
realise what a risk being in the sun could be. As a result, by nightfall he
had a terrible sunburn and needed medication. Alfred decided that
Hawaii was not his style and decided to fly back to Sweden.
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TA:
Quiggly Company was a small company that manufactured electrical
components. One year, Quiggly Company began to get into the integrated
circuit market. However, Quiggly Company felt that to be competitive it
would have to have really sophisticated space factories, as did all the
other manufacturers of integrated circuits. Thus, Quiggly put all its assets
into having a space factory. The company just didn't realise what a
financial risk space manufacturing was. As a result, within six months,
Quiggly Company had spent much more than they could afford and their
stocks plunged to an all time low. Quiggly Company decided to putt out
of integrated circuits altogether and went back to making conventional
electrical components.
FA:
Quiggly Company was a small company that manufactured conventional
electrical components. They had just started producing integrated circuits
and decided that the real action in the integrated circuit market was in
space manufacturing. But the market analysts gave them a stern
warning. They said that space factories were too expensive and that the
market was too competitive. If Quiggly went into space manufacturing,
the analysts predicted they would lose everything and their stock would
plunge.
Quiggly Company was so annoyed at having to play it safe when
everyone else had a chance to make a killing that they decided to go back
to manufacturing conventional electrical components.
MA:
Alfred was a man from Sweden who was vacationing in Hawaii. He
wanted to impress his friends with a dark tan, so one day he went out to
spend the afternoon in the sun. But a doctor acquaintance chanced to
pass by and gave Alfred a stern warning. If Alfred stayed in the sun, by
nightfall he would have a terrible sunburn and would need medication.
Alfred was so annoyed at having to remain so pale when everyone else
was tan that he decided to go back to Sweden.
MAAO
There once was a Norwegian called Brunhilde who liked beach holidays.
She loved to tan her white skin a nice shade of brown. She went to
Florida one year on a package holiday. The holiday was expensive but she




Julius was a mule who discovered several pears sitting in a window sill.
He thought to himself, "These pears seem to be rotten. Perhaps I'll get
some and find out if my prediction is correct."
However, the pears were too high up for Julius. And because he was
hungry he felt too weak to jump up to them. Naturally, this was rather
disappointing.
LS:
A pony named Sidney found some apples resting on a beam in the barn.
"Those apples really look wormy," Sidney thought to himself. "I think
I'll try to get some so I can see if my hunch is right."
But the apples were out of reach. Needless to say, he could not climb up
the ladder to get them. Naturally Sidney became somewhat disappointed.
TA:
A girl named Cindy found some records she was curious about at a record
store. "These records look really bad," Cindy thought to herself. "I think
I'll buy them so I can see if my hunch is right."
But, the records were too expensive for her. After thinking it over, she
saw there was no way she could afford them. Needless to say, she became
somewhat disappointed.
FA:
A girl named Cindy found some records she wanted at a record store. She
really wanted them but, needless to say, they were too expensive for her.
After brooding for a while, Cindy got over her disappointment.
"These records are probably boring," she thought. "So even if I could
afford them I wouldn't listen to them."
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MA:
A pony named Sidney found some apples resting on a beam in the barn.
He was starving, but they were out of reach. Needless to say, he could not
climb up the ladder to get them.
After brooding for a while, Sidney got over his disappointment.
"These apples are probably all wormy," he thought. "So even if I could
get one I would not want to eat it."
MAAO
Olivia Aristotle loved pears. She always bought them from Mr
Cucumber, her grocer. Usually she left her pears on the window sill.
Sometimes she gave a pear to her mule. The mule lived in her garden.
SET 7
BASE Story:
Percy the mockingbird spent the whole warm season chirping and
twittering. When it began to get colder Percy visited a squirrel and sang a
song for her, expecting to get some of the squirrel's sunflower seeds in
return. However, the squirrel was very disappointed in him.
"You are a terrible singer!" she yelled. "I'm not giving you any of my
wheat."
A tear rolled down Percy's cheek, and he vowed to give up singing for
good.
FA:
Sam travelled all over the world buying beautiful things. When he ran
out of money he paid a visit to his mother. However, she was not at all
pleased with him.
"While I have been hard at work you have been wasting your time," she
said. Sam gave her a gift he bought in Tibet, hoping she would give him
a loan in return. But she was still not pleased. "I will not give you any of
my hard-earned money!" she exclaimed.
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TA:
Sam travelled all over the world buying beautiful things. When he ran
out of money he paid a visit to his mother and gave her a gift he bought
while in Tibet, Hoping she would give him a loan in return. However,
his mother was not at all pleased. "You don't deserve any money of
mine!" she exclaimed. "This is a piece of junk!"
LS:
A magpie named Sam sang all summer. When winter came he paid a
visit to a chipmunk and performed a ballad for her hoping she would
give him some nuts in return. However the chipmunk was not at all
pleased.
"You don't deserve any nuts of mine!" she exclaimed. "Your song was
terrible."
MA:
A magpie named Sam sang all summer. When winter came he paid a
visit to a chipmunk. However, the chipmunk was not at all pleased with
Sam.
"You have wasted the summer while I have been hard at work!" she said.
Sam performed a ballad for her hoping she would give him some nuts in
return. But she was still not pleased. "I will not give you any of my
nuts!" she exclaimed.
MAAO
There was once a mockingbird who loved singing. She liked to stand up
on the top of trees when she sang. One day Hank the squirrel offered the





A dog named Leonard was trotting along a dock holding a steak in his
teeth. However, as he trotted he dropped it inadvertently and it
disappeared into the lake. Thus, he was left without his dinner.
Then Leonard saw another dog with a steak. Because he had lost his own
steak he tried to take it. Unluckily, the other dog was much bigger than
he was.
FA:
Charlie was walking through a hotel with an expensive pocket watch in
his hand. Then he noticed another man with an expensive watch.
Not realizing it was just his reflection, and since he was also quite greedy,
Charlie reached out to take it. Unfortunately, as he opened his hand he
dropped his own watch and both watches shattered on the floor.
Consequently he was left with no watch at all.
TA:
Charlie was walking through a hotel with an expensive pocket watch in
his hand. As he walked he accidentally dropped it and it shattered on the
floor. Consequently, he was left without a watch.
Then Charlie saw another man with an expensive watch. Since he had
broken his own watch he reached out to take it. Unfortunately, the man
was a policeman.
LS:
Charlie the puppy was running out on a pier with a pork chop in his
mouth. As he ran he accidentally dropped it and it vanished into the bay.
Thus, he was left with nothing to eat.
Then Charlie saw another puppy with a pork chop in his mouth. Since
he had lost his own pork chop he reached out to take it. Unfortunately,
the other puppy was much larger than he was.
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MA:
Charlie the puppy was running out on a pier with a pork chop in his
mouth. Then he looked down and saw another puppy with a pork chop
in his mouth.
Not realizing it was just his reflection, and since he was also quite
hungry, Charlie reached down to take it. Unfortunately, as he opened his
mouth he dropped his piece and both pieces vanished into the bay.
Consequently, he was left with no meat at all.
MAAO
There was once a man called Ludwig who had a dog. On payday he always
bought his dog a steak. He lived in a house by a lake. Sometimes he went




Boris and Ivan thought well of one another's skill in business and
resolved to open up a store together. As ill luck would have it, Ivan was
quite absent-minded and he threw out a large amount of cash. This
annoyed Boris who therefore demanded that Ivan have nothing to do
with the monetary matters of their new store.
FA:
John and Christine loved each other and decided to be married.
Unfortunately, John discovered that Christine was a very reckless driver.
So he insisted that Christine never drive his new car. This upset




John and Christian loved each other and decided to be married.
Unfortunately, Christian was so reckless that she accidentally dented
John's new car. This upset John, so he insisted that she never drive his
car again.
LS:
John and Christian respected each other's technical judgment and decided
to form a company. Unfortunately, Christian was so forgetful that he put
all their money in the trash. This upset John, so he insisted that
Christian never deal with the proposed company's finances.
MA:
John and Christian respected each other's technical judgment and decided
to form a company. Unfortunately, John learned that Christian was
notoriously forgetful, so he insisted that Christian never deal with the
proposed company's finances. This upset Christian so much that he put
all their money in the trash to get back at John.
MAAO
There was once two friends who decided to become business partners.
They saw an opening in the recycling business. The business was a great
success. They used to say to one another "There's good money in old




Two small countries, Bolon and Salam, were adjacent to a large, warlike
country called Mayonia, which had a huge fleet of destroyers and military
jets.
Bolon decided to make the best of the situation by taking over Salam.
Salam started looking for aid from other strong countries but soon Bolon
succeeded in taking over a coastal city.
Then victorious Bolon proposed to make a treaty with its warlike
neighbour Mayonia. Bolon proposed to give Mayonia control over Salam
in exchange for a guarantee that Bolon would remain independent.
Mayonia responded by overrunning both Bolon and Salam. Bolon was so
busy maintaining control of Salam, it could do nothing to stop Mayonia.
Thereupon, Mayonia installed puppet governments in both Bolon and
Salam, and took over the newspapers and radio stations.
FA:
Two seventh graders, Lincoln and Moreland, were walking to school
together when they met Chad. Chad was a mean high school boy who was
known to rob younger kids.
Moreland was scared but he decided to make the best of the situation by
offering to help Chad rob Lincoln in exchange for being left alone himself.
But Lincoln overheard and started running to find a policeman.
Immediately, Moreland took off after him and eventually succeeded in
catching him.
When Chad arrived he robbed both of them. And Moreland was so
exhausted, he could do nothing to prevent it.
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TA:
Two sixth-grade boys, Lincoln and Moreland, were walking to school
together when they met Chad. Chad was a mean high school boy who was
known to rob younger kids.
Moreland was scared but he decided to make the best of the situation by
overpowering Lincoln. Immediately, Lincoln started running to find a
policeman but Moreland ran after Lincoln and eventually succeeded in
catching him.
When Chad arrived Moreland offered to let him rob Lincoln in exchange
for being left alone himself. But Chad robbed both of them. Moreland was
so busy holding Lincoln down, he could do nothing to prevent it.
LS:
Two weak nations, Lincoln and Moreland, bordered a third nation known
as Chad. Chad was aggressive and very powerful. Moreland decided to
make the best of the situation by overpowering Lincoln. Lincoln started to
seek protection from other powerful nations but Moreland eventually
succeeded in conquering it.
Then triumphant Moreland offered to make a pact with its aggressive
neighbour Chad. Moreland offered to give Chad control over Lincoln in
exchange for being left alone itself.
When Chad got into the action it invaded both Lincoln and Moreland.




Two weak nations, Lincoln and Moreland, bordered a third nation known
as Chad. Chad was aggressive and very powerful. Moreland decided to
make the best of the situation by offering to help conquer Lincoln in
exchange for being left alone itself.
But Lincoln somehow received word of the agreement and began to seek
protection from other powerful nations. Immediately, Moreland invaded
Lincoln and eventually succeeded in conquering it.
When Chad got into the action it invaded both Lincoln and Moreland.
And Moreland was so drained from battle, it could do nothing to prevent
it.
MAAO
Once there was a very warlike small country. It liked to invade other
countries and subjugate their people. Its greatest moment in history was





A farmer named Beedle had a choice apricot tree that he valued above all
the rest in his garden. Every year Beedle gave presents of fruit from his
tree to everyone he knew. But one year the tree began to wither and there
was no more of the wonderful fruit. Everyone was very unhappy. The
judge had enjoyed the apricots from the tree very much - so much that he
resolved to take the tree to his own garden to take care of it. He paid
Beedle very well and had the tree moved to his own grounds.
Fortunately, as soon as it was transplanted, the tree bore delicious apricots
again. That very year, the fruit won first prize in the county fair.
FA:
Mr Gerson had several pets but he valued the canary above all the rest.
Occasionally, he invited friends over to hear the canary sing.
A wealthy businessman liked the canary's songs so much that one
autumn he decided he wanted the bird in his house in the city where he
could enjoy it every day. He paid Mr Gerson very well and had the canary
moved to his house.
However, upon being moved the canary became fatally ill and there were
no more of its beautiful songs. Everyone was extremely disappointed.
TA:
Mr Gerson had several pets but he valued the canary above all the rest.
Occasionally, he invited friends over to hear the canary sing.
However, one autumn the canary became very ill and there were no
more of its beautiful songs. Everyone was extremely disappointed.
A veterinarian friend had liked the canary's songs so much that he
decided he would buy the canary and put it in his office where he could
look after it. He paid Mr Gerson very well. Upon being moved, the
canary sang beautiful songs again.
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LS:
A grower, Mr Gerson, had many grapevines in his vineyard but there was
one that he valued above the rest. Occasionally, Mr Gerson presented
grapes from this vine as gifts to his friends.
However, one autumn the vine began to dry up and there were no more
of the marvellous grapes. Everyone was extremely disappointed.
The mayor liked the grapes from this vine so much that he decided he
would buy the vine and put it in his own yard where he could look after
it. He paid Mr Gerson very well and had the vine removed to his estate.
Upon being moved, the vine produced marvellous grapes again.
MA:
A grower, Mr Gerson, had many grapevines in his vineyard but there was
one that he valued above all the rest. Occasionally, Mr Gerson presented
grapes from this vine as gifts to his friends.
The mayor liked the grapes from this vine so well that one autumn he
decided he wanted the vine in his own yard where he could enjoy them
every day. He paid Mr Gerson very well and had the vine moved to his
estate.
However, upon being moved, the vine dried up and there were no more
of the marvellous grapes. Everyone was extremely disappointed.
MAAO
An apricot farmer once had a favourite apricot tree. He gave his friends
apricots from the tree. Eventually, the tree finally withered and died. The
farmer made a stool from the tree wood. That year judge's tree won the




Morris was a simple-minded prisoner who loved to play the harmonica at
night. Finally, his cellmate got tired of this and demanded that he shut up.
He should always play during the day, the cellmate insisted.
The next night, Morris escaped from prison and hid in a boxcar. But then
Morris remembered that his cellmate said he should play the harmonica
every day, so he started playing. Immediately, Morris was nabbed by the
cops. Poor, simple-minded Morris wished he hadn't paid any attention to
his cellmate. Back in his cell, he devoted himself to covering the walls
with obscenities.
FA:
A little girl named Jenny wished she could run away from home. She
loved to play with her dog every day, but only in her neighbour's yard.
Eventually, her neighbour got fed-up and told her to always play in her
own yard.
But Jenny refused to listen because she thought it was bad luck to play in
her own yard. The last time she did it her mother caught her right away
and made her go to work.
TA:
A little girl named Jenny loved to play with her dog in her neighbour's
yard. Eventually, the neighbour got fed-up and told her she should always
play with her dog in her own yard.
A few days later, Jenny snuck out of the house without doing her chores
and hid at the playground. But after a while she went home to play with
her dog because she thought her neighbour said she should every day.
Right away her mother caught her and the little girl wished she hadn't
listened to her neighbour.
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LS:
A convict named Denny loved to play the kazoo, but he would only play it
long after dark. Eventually the convict in the next cell got fed-up and told
him he should always play during the day time.
A few days later, Denny snuck out of jail and hid in a railroad car. But after
a while he began to play the kazoo because he thought the convict in the
next cell had said he should play every day. Right away the police caught
him and Denny wished he hadn't listened to the convict in the next cell.
MA:
A convict named Denny wished he could break out of jail. He loved to
play the kazoo in jail every day but he would only play it long after dark.
Eventually, the convict in the next cell got fed-up and told him to stop and
always play during the daytime.
But Denny refused to listen because he thought it was bad luck to play
during the day. The last time he had done that guards had caught him
right away and thrown him into solitary confinement.
MAAO
Once there was a prisoner who played the harmonica. He played "Old
swanne river" very badly. One day his cell mate escaped. He was recaptured




King Otto was a warmonger who was obsessed with conquest and riches.
One year he decided to rebuild all the bridges of the kingdom to make
them strong enough for his armies.
Otto's counsellor, the chamberlain, complained that he was spending too
much money on the bridges and not enough on actual military
campaigns. Because of all the construction too many of the bridges were
out of commission being worked on. Otto decided that the chamberlain
was right and he abandoned the bridge project to mount a full-scale
invasion of a neighbouring country.
Then one day when King Otto was travelling through his kingdom his
carriage crashed through an unfinished bridge. He was severely injured
but the mishap made it clear to him that he needed to balance his military
and domestic expenditures. Also, he ordered the chamberlain to get him
a new crown because the old one had gotten smashed in the crash.
FA:
Cornelius was an astronomer who thought about nothing but astronomy.
He was obsessed with stars and galaxies.
His wife Agatha complained that he was spending too much time on
astronomy and not enough on maintaining his own house. As a result,
the roof was gradually leaking more and more and the house was
becoming almost unlivable. But Cornelius would not listen.
Then, one evening when Cornelius was walking through his house, a
rotten floor collapsed under his weight. Cornelius was severely injured
but the accident showed him that Agatha had been right all along. He




Emperor Cornelius thought about nothing but war. He was obsessed with
victory and treasure. One year he decided to renovate all the roads of the
empire to make them safe enough for his armed forces.
But before the roads were finished, the emperor's closest adviser, the
prime minister, complained that he was spending too much of the royal
treasury on the roads and not enough on actual warfare. As a result, the
roads were constantly under construction and were seldom usable.
Cornelius decided that the prime minister was right and he went back to
thinking about nothing but war.
Then one evening when Cornelius was riding in the countryside, an
unmaintained overpass collapsed under his horse-drawn coach. He was
severely injured but the accident showed him that he should try to
balance his spending between war and maintaining his empire.
MA:
Emperor Cornelius thought about nothing but war. He was obsessed with
victory and treasure.
The emperor's closest adviser, the prime minister, complained that he
was spending too much of the royal treasury on war and not enough on
maintaining his own empire. As a result, the roads of the empire were
being neglected and they were gradually beginning to deteriorate. But
Emperor Cornelius didn't listen.
Then, one evening when Cornelius was riding in the countryside, an
unmaintained overpass collapsed under his horse-drawn coach. He was
severely injured but the accident showed him that the prime minister
had been right all along. Cornelius decided to try to balance his spending
between war and maintaining his empire.
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TA:
Cornelius was an astronomer who thought about nothing but astronomy.
He was obsessed with stars and galaxies. Gradually he was turning his
home into an observatory.
But before he was finished his wife Agatha complained that he was
spending too much time renovating the house and not enough on his job
which was astronomy. As a result, the house was no longer livable.
Cornelius decided that Agatha was right and he went back to thinking
about nothing but astronomy.
Then, one evening when Cornelius was walking through his house, an
unfinished floor collapsed under his weight. Cornelius was severely
injured but the accident showed him that he should try to balance his
time between astronomy and maintaining his home.
MAAO
There was once a king in a very rich country. He had fifteen armies.
Unfortunately, the king was severely injured in a coach crash. His wife




Frederick the shepherd was tending his flock at the edge of a forest.
Suddenly, a lion appeared out of the forest. Frederick was really scared so
he started shouting to scare the lion away. But the shouting did nothing
but attract the lion's attention and it began walking towards him. He then
realized he should have left it alone.
To escape, Frederick gave the lion a lamb. While the lion was occupied,
he led the rest of the flock away. Eventually, he guessed they were far
enough away to be safe from the lion. So he took a nap on the grass.
However, when he awoke he noticed another lamb was missing and he
could not find it anywhere! At the next opportunity, Frederick bought a
blunderbuss so he could better defend his flock in the future.
FA:
Zebediah, the old miser, was sitting on his back porch counting his
money and he dozed off. When he awoke he discovered that one bag of
coins was missing. He could not find the bag anywhere. Zebediah figured
that the thief was still nearby so he started yelling for whoever took the
money to show his face.
Suddenly, a beggar came out of the forsythia bushes and started walking
towards the old man on the porch. Zebediah was surprised and very
frightened. He wished he had left the beggar alone.
To escape, he threw a second bag of coins to the beggar. While the beggar
was occupied, Zebediah took the last few bags of money into the house
and locked the door!
TA:
Zebediah, the old miser, was sitting on his back porch counting his
money. Suddenly, a beggar came out of the forsythia bushes. Zebediah
was very frightened so he started yelling for the beggar to go away. The
yelling only caught the beggar's attention and he began walking towards
the old man. The miser wished he had left the beggar alone.
To escape, Zebediah threw a bag of coins to the beggar. While the beggar
was occupied, Zebediah took the last few bags of money into the house
and locked the door.
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Zebediah figured that he was safe inside and he dozed off in an easy chair.
When he awoke he was surprised to discover another bag of coins was
missing. He could not find it anywhere!
LS:
Zebediah the cow herder was watching over his herd at the edge of the
woods. Suddenly, a monstrous tiger came out of the woods. Zebediah
was very frightened so he started yelling for the tiger to go away. The
yelling only caught the tiger's attention and it began walking towards the
cow her. He wished he had left the tiger alone.
To escape, Zebediah gave the tiger a calf. While the tiger was occupied,
Zebediah took the remainder of the herd to a safe place. He figured he
was safe and dozed off. When woke he was surprised to discover another
calf missing. He could not find it anywhere!
MA:
Zebediah the cow herder was watching over his herd and he dozed off.
When he awoke he discovered that one calf was missing. He would not
find it anywhere. Zebediah figured that the thief was still nearby so he
started yelling for whoever stole the calf to show his face.
Suddenly a monstrous tiger came out of the woods and started walking
towards him. Zebediah was surprised and very frightened. He wished he
had left the tiger alone.
To escape, he gave the tiger a second calf. While the tiger was occupied,
Zebediah took the remainder of the herd to a safer place!
MAAO
A shepherd walked his sheep through the forest. His flock was quite
small. He had twelve lambs. He had heard rumours of lions in the forest.




Mark the chicken farmer was standing in the henhouse collecting eggs
while his chickens were out in the yard. When his chickens returned,
they all began to attack him, for some unknown reason.
"You ungrateful beasts!" Mark screamed. The chickens chased him out of
the henhouse and into the woods.
While they were gone, a thief slipped into the yard and made off with the
unguarded eggs. After he got out of the hospital, Mark quit chicken
farming and went on a vacation in Africa.
FA:
A tidal wave hit a girl scout camp on the beach while everyone was away
and washed away all of the sleeping bags. A short time later, Linda, the
camp director, came back and discovered the tragedy.
She stood on the beach thinking about what to do. While she was
thinking, the girl scouts returned from hiking in the hills. Since they
could not find their sleeping bags they attacked their director. What'll we
do now? Where will be sleep?...they said.
"Why do you pester me when I am racking my brain to figure out what
we are going to do?" the camp director screamed as she ran down the
road. "Show a little appreciation!"
TA:
Linda, the director of a girl scout camp, was thinking about the camp on
the beach while all the girls were hiking in the hills nearby. While she
was standing there the girl scouts returned and they all started pestering
her with questions about what was for dinner, could they go swimming,
and so on.
"Why do you pester me when I am racking my brain to figure out what
we're going to do?" Linda screamed as she ran off the beach and down the
road. "Show a little appreciation!" The scouts followed her, still yelling.




Lyle the poultry raiser was thinking about his nests while his poultry
were out in the field. While he was thinking the poultry returned and
they all started to peck him, for some unknown reason.
"You thankless monsters!" Lyle screamed. The poultry chased him down
the road and into the forest.
A burglar came into the garden while they were away and stole all of the
nests.
MA:
A burglar came into the barn of Lyle the poultry raiser while Lyle was
away and stole all the nests. A short time later, Lyle came home and
discovered what had happened.
He stood in the barn thinking about what to do. While he was thinking,
the poultry returned from the field. Since they could not find their nests
they began to peck Lyle.
"Why do you attack me when I am racking my brains to think how I am
going to get your nests back?" Lyle screamed as he ran into the forest.
"You thankless monsters!"
MAAO
A chicken farner was proud of his free range eggs. He was critical of the
factory farm in the town. His own eggs sold very well. The factory farm





Two pioneers, Smith and Johnson, discovered a gorgeous little valley that
was as yet unclaimed in Oregon Territory. Each of them wanted the land
for himself, so soon they were fighting over who saw it first.
While they were fighting over it, Sheriff Jones came along and divided
the land evenly between them. In the end, Smith and Johnson realized
that they should have done that on their own. From that day forward
they were the best of friends, and they helped build each other's houses.
FA:
Betty and Norma were walking towards each other when they
simultaneously discovered a twenty dollar bill on the floor. Both of them
wanted the money so soon they were arguing desperately over who saw it
first.
While they were busy arguing over the money, Lee came along and took
it herself. By the time Betty and Norma realized they should just divide
it up, it was too late.
TA:
Betty and Norma were walking towards each other, when they
simultaneously discovered a twenty dollar bill on the floor. Both of them
wanted the money so soon they were arguing desperately over who saw it
first.
While they were busy arguing, their teacher, Mrs Lee, came along, took
the money and divided it between them. Then Betty and Norma
realized that they should have done that themselves.
LS:
Baggie and Norton were settlers who discovered a beautiful canyon out
west, which no one had settled yet. Both of them wanted the canyon, so
soon they were arguing desperately over who saw it first.
While they were busy arguing over the canyon, Constable Leigh came
along and divided it between them. Then Baggie and Norton realized
they should have done that themselves.
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MA:
Baggie and Norton were settlers who discovered a beautiful canyon out
west, which no one had settled yet. Both of them wanted the canyon, so
soon they were arguing desperately over who saw it first.
While they were busy arguing over the canyon Constable Leigh came
along and took it himself. By the time Baggie and Norton realized they
should just divide it up, it was too late.
MAAO
Two explorers discovered a new valley in Oregon. There were a lot of
trees in the valley. They went to the sherrif to register their claims. They
cut down some of the trees whilst building their houses.
SET 17
BASE Story:
Once there was a teacher named Mrs Jackson who wanted a salary
increase. One day, the principal said that he was increasing his own salary
by 20 percent. However, he said there was not enough money to give the
teachers a salary increase.
When Mrs Jackson heard this she became so angry that she decided to
take revenge. The next day, Mrs Jackson used gasoline to set fire to the
principal's office. Then she went to a bar and got drunk.
FA:
McGhee was a sailor who wanted a few days of vacation on land. One day
McGhee became so impatient that he tried to blow up the captain's cabin
using dynamite.
After this incident, the captain announced that he would be taking a
vacation in the mountains. However, he said everyone else would have
to remain on board to repair the ship.
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TA:
McGhee was a sailor who wanted a few days of vacation on land. One
day, the captain announced that he would be taking a vacation in the
mountains. However, he said everyone else would have to remain on
the ship.
After McGhee heard this he became so upset that he decided to get
revenge. Within an hour McGhee blew up the captain's cabin with
dynamite.
LS:
Professor Rosie McGhee very much wanted a raise. One day the provost
announced that he was giving himself a raise. However, he said that
since money was short, no one else would get a raise this year.
After Professor McGhee heard this she became so upset that she decided
to get even. One hour later, Professor McGhee blew up the
administration building with dynamite.
MA:
Professor McGhee very much wanted a raise. One day she became so
impatient that she used kerosene to burn down the administration
building.
After the fire, the provost announced that he was giving himself a raise.
However, he said that due to the fire, there was not enough money to
give one to anyone else.
MAAO
A teacher once thought that she deserved a pay rise. She asked the
principal when her rise was due. She was wearing her best suit. The




A cobra called Pierre was slithering through the brush when a falcon
came towards it. Pierre became frightened and struck, wounding the
falcon in the abdomen. To teach him a lesson, the falcon grabbed the
cobra and flew away with it.
Unfortunately for both of them, after they were high above the earth the
wounded falcon became too weak to fly. Consequently, they plummeted
straight down to the earth and perished. They landed, strangely enough,
in the middle of an outdoor wedding ceremony.
FA:
Young Gene was walking home from school when he met a policeman.
Suddenly, the policeman grabbed him and drove away with him.
Once they got onto the freeway, Gene panicked and hit the policeman in
the side of the head. Unfortunately, the policeman became too dizzy to
drive. Consequently, they ran off the road and died when they hit a wall.
TA:
Young Gene was walking home from school when a policeman
approached him. Suddenly Gene panicked and hit the policeman in the
side of the head. The policeman wanted to set the boy straight. He
grabbed Gene and drove away with him.
Unfortunately, once they were on the road the policeman became too
dizzy to drive. Consequently, they ran off the road and died when they
hit a wall.
LS:
Gene the rattlesnake was going across a field when it met a raven. Gene
panicked and bit the raven in the stomach. The raven wanted to set the
rattlesnake straight, so it grabbed the snake and took to the air with it.
Unfortunately, once they were in the air, the bleeding raven became too
faint to continue. Consequently, they both fell from the sky and died
when they hit the rocky ground below.
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MA:
Gene the rattlesnake was going across a field when it met a raven.
Suddenly, the raven grabbed the snake and took to the air with it.
Once they were in the air, Gene panicked and bit the raven in the
stomach. Unfortunately, the bleeding raven became too faint to continue.
Consequently, they both fell from the sky and died when they hit the
rocky ground below.
MAAO
Pierre the cobra once met a falcon in a forest. The falcon was called
Tarquin. Pierre asked Tarquin to help him get to a wedding on time.




A twenty year old lady named Samantha lived in a southern state where
there was a freak blizzard during the summer with subzero temperatures.
For a week, she could not leave her home since she did not have a warm
jacket.
Then a meteorologist informed Samantha that the cold days were over.
She was very pleased to hear that. However, Samantha was well aware
that meteorologists often make mistakes. The first thing she did was sell
her summer clothes and buy a warm jacket. She never had a chance to
use the jacket again, so she let her kitten sleep in it.
TA:
Harold lived in a country frought by civil war. All around his village
there were battles. Because he did not have a gun he could not leave the
village for several days.
Before long, a soldier told Harold that the war was over. He was
delighted to hear that. But he was well aware that the soldier might be
wrong. Immediately he sold his season ticket to the symphony and
bought a handgun.
FA:
A soldier told Harold that the war was over. Harold was delighted to hear
that. It never occurred to him that the soldier might be wrong.
Immediately, he sold his handgun and bought a season ticket to the
symphony.
But things worked out badly. Before long, battles sprang up all around




Carol lived in a southern country where there was a terrible, freezing
snowstorm. Because she had no coat, Carol could not leave her
apartment for several days.
Before long, a weather forecaster told Carol that the winter weather was
over until next year. The young woman was delighted with the news.
But she was well aware that the weather forecaster could be wrong.
Immediately she sold her lighter clothes and bought a fur coat.
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MA:
A weather forecaster told Carol that the winter weather was over until
next year. The young woman was delighted with the news. It never
occurred to her that the weather forecaster could be wrong. Immediately,
she sold her fur coat and bought lighter clothing.
But things worked out badly. Before long, there was a terrible, freezing
snowstorm. Because she had no coat Carol could not leave her apartment
for several days.
MAAO
Once a freak blizzard hit the southern states. There was snow on the
ground in Kentucky in August. People wore their winter clothes for a
week. The radio told people when the weather was about to hit.
SET 20
Story:
Chester Inc was being pursued by the Securities Exchange Commission for
keeping improper records. Therefore, Chester enlisted the help of Honest
Abe Accountants to protect its interests. Honest Abe showed Chester Inc
how to conceal its errors. But Chester Inc recognized it should not rely on
Honest Abe to cover for it. Hence, Chester fled from the town without
paying the accounting firm.
Then the auditor arrived. Under questioning, Honest Abe issued a
statement that was vague but not exactly dishonest in an attempt to
protect Chester Inc. Luckily for Chester, the auditor was convinced and a
short time later, he cancelled the audit.
Still, Honest Abe Accountants were insulted that Chester would not pay,
and the accountants brought a suit against the corporation.
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TA:
A bank robber known as Arnie was running from a constable when he
met a gardener working in a yard. Arnie begged the gardener for help.
The gardener told him to hide behind a tree, which he did. However,
Arnie considered the situation and realized he should not trust the
gardener. With this in mind, he slipped away into the forest without
thanking the gardener.
In no time the constable arrived and asked the gardener if he had seen a
robber. The gardener answered that he was busy gardening which was
not really a lie. As it happened, the constable did not notice anything odd
and soon gave up the search.
FA:
A bank robber known as Arnie was running from a constable when he
met a gardener working in a yard. He begged the gardener for a place to
hide. The gardener told him to hide in the garage, which he did.
In no time a constable arrived and asked the gardener if he had seen a
robber. The gardener answered that he hadn't seen anyone. However, at
the same time he pointed at the garage. As it happened, the constable did
not notice anything odd and soon gave up the search.
Arnie considered what had happened and realized that he could not trust
the gardener. With this in mind, he slipped away into the woods without
thanking the gardener.
LS:
Acme Co. had cheated on its taxes and was running from the IRS when it
hired a financial consultant for help. The financial consultant told Acme
how to hide its mistakes. But Acme realized it should not trust the
consultant. With this in mind, Acme slipped out of the city without
compensating the consultant.
In no time the IRS agent arrived and asked about Acme's taxes. The
consultant answered with a memo that covered things up but was not
really a lie. Fortunately for Acme Co., the IRS agent did not notice
anything odd and soon dropped the investigation.
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MA:
Acme Co. had cheated on its taxes and was running from the IRS when it
hired a financial consultant for help. The financial consultant told Acme
how to hide its mistakes.
In no time the IRS agent arrived and asked about Acme's taxes. The
consultant answered with a memo that sounded smooth. However, it
purposely hinted at Acme's transgressions. "My client is not a crook...
besides, one can find discrepancies in the books of any company."
Fortunately, the IRS agent did not notice anything odd and soon dropped
the investigation.
Acme Co. considered what had happened and realized it could not trust
the consultant. With this in mind, Acme slipped out of the city without
compensating the consultant.
MAAO
A company once got into trouble for keeping poor accounts. There
managing director was called Chester. He wasn't very good at book
keeping. After the accountants had sorted things out, he went on holiday
for a few weeks.
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Appendix B: Materials Used In Experiment 3
Setl
B
The Ralua is a tall, blue plant which used to be widespread throughout
the country. For some reason, in the last few years many of its seeds have
been attracted to the roadside, where they try to grow.
However, the plants are not able to absorb all the poisonous gases from
the traffic very well, which has serious consequences.
They produce fewer seeds for reproduction every year and also tend to die
fairly early.
If this trend continues, the Ralua will be extinct within the next 200 years.
LS
The Havanna is a tall plant, which used to be large in number
throughout Hoholand. It is not known why, but for the last few decades
many of its seeds have been attracted to settle near a herb called kali,
which makes them grow bigger.
However, there are some serious side effects.
They become less reproductive and die at an earlier age. If this trend
continues, the Havanna plant will not be around in the next century.
sso
The Havanna are a tribe living in central Gunaland. They are an isolated
tribe which used to be very large in number. Several decades ago they
discovered a herb called gabon which, when eaten, made them grow
bigger.
They became addicted to it but there were serious side effects.
Their sex-drive decreased, leading to fewer couples having children. As
well as this, it was common for more heart attacks to happen and at an
earlier age. Their number is therefore decreasing to such an extent that if




The Havanna is a tall, blue plant, which used to be large in number
throughout Hoholand. In the past few years, they have commonly been
found near the roadside, where their leaves become a darker shade of
blue, due to the chemicals they find there.
If they keep growing by the roadside, the Havanna will become a navy
blue in appearance within the next 200 years.
SMAO
The Havanna are a tall, dark-haired tribe who were once commonly
found in central Gunaland. In the last few years, many Havanna have
moved to be near the herb gabon, which makes them grow taller when
eaten.
If they keep eating kali, the Havanna will be the tallest tribe around in the
near future.
00
The Ralua is a well-known tall, blue plant which used to be common
throughout the country.
Many of its seeds are green. A Ralua makes a lovely indoor plant.
Set 2
B
The Siri live in a country governed by Al-Siri. Al-Siri and his family
enjoy all the benefits of their power and position in society, with
everything being done for him.
It is tradition that the strongest son of this blood-line inherits the throne.
Al-Siri, being the eldest son, does not need to do any work as his people
provide him with a constant supply of the finest food and clothes. The
people of the country keep doing this as they know they will face terrible
consequences if they don't keep him happy, as they will be burned alive.
LS
King Balu is leader of the Bali people, who live in a warm country known
as Futu. The king and his immediate family are provided with all the
necessities they require, and are looked after well by the other Balis.
It is custom that to become king, you have to be the fattest son of the
previous one.
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King Balu, being the largest son, is provided with a constant supply of
riris and holos by his people to keep him happy, and does not need to do
any work. His countrymen do this as they have been warned that if they
don't find enough riris and holos, their cannibalistic king will eat them.
sso
The Kula species, who live in the warm waters of Futu, in that each shoal
has one large male member called a Kembali. The Kembali is protected
and looked after by the remaining Kula.
The Kembali is the largest of the male Kula species, and is the only male
to reproduce.
The Kembali does nothing, except eating small riris and holos which the
Kula swim around and search for, in order to keep him well fed. The
Kula do this as they know that if they do not find enough food, the
Kembali will eat them.
MA
The Bali live in a country governed by Al-Balu. Al-Balu and his family's
every need is catered for and they enjoy their position in society.
As is tradition, the fattest Al-Balu gets to sit on a golden chair by being the
leader.
The only obligation on the Al-Balu is to lead his people in invasions of
neighbouring countries when land becomes scarce.
SMAO
The Kula species have a kind of leader-figure known as a Kembali. The
species is found in the warm waters of the ocean. The Kembali is well
looked after by the other Kula.
Kembalis get to live in a special cave in a coral reef.
When food in their waters becomes scarce, the Kembali leads the rest of
the shoal in attack on the waters of neighbouring colonies of fish, to take
over their territory.
OO
A certain king is the leader of the Siri people, who live in a warm
country.
His people like lots of food and clothes.




Snordon is played on a square board divided into sections. Two lagnogs,
or players, take turns to move boli (small disks) around the board.
When an individual bolum becomes surrounded by the other player's
boli, it changes ownership and joins the surrounding group.
When all of the boli are in possession of one lagnog, the game is over.
LS
Blagson is played on a rectangular board divided into vodogs. Two galps,
or contestants, take turns to move 11 small cubes around the board.
Should a single cube become surrounded by the other galp's cubes, it
changes ownership and joins the surrounding group.
When all the cubes become the possession of one galp, blagson is over.
sso
Blagson is carried out on a large flat field divided into vodogs. Two balgs,
or teams, of 11 horsemen are required.
The horsemen manoeuvre for position throughout blagson.
When one horseman becomes isolated and encircled by those of the other
balg, he joins the opposition and becomes part of the encircling balg.
When one balg has gained possession of all the horsemen, blagson is
over.
MA
Blagson is played on a board divided into vodogs. During blagson, galps,
or contestants, move small cubes around the board.
If a cube moves onto the same position as that of one of the opponent's
cubes, both players have a drink of vodka.
The game continues until one player gets bored or too inebriated to
continue.
SMAO
Blagson is carried out on a field that is divided into vodogs. Two balgs, or
teams, take it in turn to move their horsemen around the field.
If one horseman moves into the identical part of the field as an opponent,
both players wave their flags.
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Blagson continues until one team gets bored, or their arms become too
tired.
OO
Snordon is a well-known game. It is played in pubs and clubs.




Monominos live around Lake Wanubi on the fringes of the Western
Sahara. A monomino has hard skin and is about the size of a small pig. It
sleeps during the day and comes out at night, when it searches for food.
Male monominos will not allow other males into their area. They warn
rival males off by rubbing their backs against trees, which gives off a
warning scent. Should its area be invaded by another monomino, they
will fight until there is only one survivor.
LS
Rambos live near Lake Zuvius on the outskirts of the Western desert. A
rambo has tough claws and is the size of a small elephant. They rest when
it rains and hunt when it is dry.
Male rambos do not permit other males into their territory. They try to
scare other males away by scratching a warning mark on trees with their
claws. If another rambo should enter the territory, they will start fighting,
with only one rambo staying alive.
sso
The mountains of Zuvius are inhabited by the Chang tribe. They carry
sharp knives are about as tall as a fully grown elephant. They sleep when
it rains and only hunt for food when it is dry.
The Changs do not want any other tribe eating their crops. They try to
scare other tribes off by carving crosses high on trees, which is seen as a
warning symbol. If a different tribe tries to eat some of their crops, they
have to fight against the Changs until one tribe is wiped out.
MA
Rambos live near Lake Zuvius, situated on the fringes of the Western
Sahara. They have tough skin and are the size roughly of a small
elephant.
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They tend to avoid rain at ail costs. When they get lonely, rambos call out
with a plaintive cry. When another rambo enters its area, they will tend
to play together.
SMAO
The Chang tribe lives in the vicinity of Lake Zuvius, just outside the
desert. They are tall, about the size of a small elephant and carry sharp
knives. They tend to sleep when it rains, but don't like sharing their food
with other Changs.
Changs are not fond of bathing. When they get bored, the Changs sing a
plaintive tribal song. When another tribe enters their area, they will play
a primitive form of football together.
OO
A mysterious group of pig-sized animals live near the desert. They sleep
during the day and hunt at night time. They have extremely hairy legs.
set 5
B
Karla is a novel type of cooking pot, used by the Timuni in Alnata.
The structure of the Karla is designed in order to reduce the heat inside,
and therefore prevents the food getting burned in the scorching cooking
fires.
Water is poured into a layer of the Karla during cooking, which cools the
food.
LS
The Valkri is a special kind of frying pan, used by the Jalpeni in Frodon.
The Valkri is created in such a way as to be able to reduce heat, thereby
preventing meat being getting burned when using the extreme
temperatures of the cooking fires.
A liquid is poured into the layers of the frying pan when cooking, which
cools the temperature of the meat.
sso
The Vubu is a special wall built by the Jakar tribesmen in Frodon.
The Vubu is built in such a way as to be able to reduce the heat within it,
thereby preventing the Jakar from sweating too much in the extreme
temperatures of the midday sun.
APPENDIX B 290
A liquid is pumped through the Vubu, which cools the stone and
therefore prevents the Jakar within the walls from getting too hot.
MA
The people of Frodon use a special type of frying pan, known as the
Valkri.
The structure of the Valkri is specially designed in order to allow it to be
handled by children, as this can be difficult.
It has a U-shaped handle, which enables it to be held by people with small
hands.
SMAO
The Jakar tribesmen of Frodon have built a special wall known as the
Vubu.
The Vubu's stone gates can be opened by elderly people, despite their
heavy weight.
Handles set in the wall incorporate springs, which allow weaker people to
open the gates.
OO
A new type of cooking pot, called the Karla, is used by the people of




The podash is an animal prized by the Zad of Aluck. Podash are coveted
because of their wonderful property of being able to travel large distances,
carrying very large loads, whilst eating relatively little. Obviously this
makes them extremely cheap to keep, despite the huge numbers of
chickens, or sacks of rice that the Zad barter them for. Most podash live to
an average age of 8 years, during which time they serve their owners
extremely well.
Unfortunately, podash are not terribly common, despite their desirability.
It takes a female 18 months to conceive, and even then, the child might
be deformed. Hence the scarcity of these creatures.
LS:
A terin is a type of animal held in great esteem by the Norin tribe of Itran.
They are desirable because of their incredible stamina whilst transporting
goods across vast distances, on very little food, which makes them very
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economical, regardless of the fact that they are traded for vast sums. The
life expectancy of the terin is around 8 years, throughout which they are a
real investment for their owners.
Annoyingly, terin are not very easy to come by, despite their value. This
is because female terin are pregnant for 18 months, and there is no
guarantee that the offspring will be healthy. Therefore they are quite rare.
SSO:
Sagi are the revered priests of the Norin tribe, which can be found in NE
Itran. These people are have fantastic stamina and can travel for days
without water or sustenance, in the baking heat, earning them the respect
of the Norin people. This obviously makes them extremely useful as
messengers to other tribes, despite the huge amounts of food and water
they require for their services. Most Sagi have an extremely long life
expectancy, which means they can cross the deserts, for the tribe, for many
years.
Sagi are very rare, however, despite the fact that many people aspire to
their calling. This is because it takes a long time to train to become a full
blown priest, and even then they might not pass the requirements. For
these reasons, the Sagi are not often found.
SMAO:
Sagi are the revered priests of the Norin tribe, which can be found in NE
Itran. This country is very hot, and many people cannot go there, on
account of the baking heat. The Sagi have fantastic stamina and can travel
for days without water or sustenance. Since the Sagi are devout priests,
they worship all the time.
Sagi are very rare, however, despite the fact that many people aspire to
their calling. Many people have tried to document the lifestyle of the Sagi,
but this has proven too difficult for most. They are so rare because to
become a priest you have to bathe everyday in cold water. Most people
find that this puts them off after a week or two.
MA:
A terin is a type of animal held in great esteem by the Norin tribe of Itran.
This is a relatively uninhabitable land, but the Norin guard their territory
jealously. Terin have an amazing sense of smell, and can find scent trails
made even weeks beforehand. Since terin are clean animals, they wash
themselves all the time.
Many people have tried to film the terin but few have succeeded. They
are quite uncommon because in order to mate the terin must fight
APPENDIX B 292
violently first. This puts most of the animals off mating after one or two
attempts.
OO:
There is an incredible animal called a podash. It is used to carry messages.




Frent is a chant used by the Syman of Lowari, during tribal feasts. The
chant is said in pairs, either single or mixed sex, and before the couple can
start the families of both parties must meet to agree on the people who
will say Frent. The sex and marital status of the possible candidates
determines who can chant Frent. This is because the chant is believed to
promote inter-family relationships and therefore it would be indiscreet
for two married people to chant together.
Frent is only chanted by the two people chosen, immediately before the
tribal feast. This seems strange at first, but this tradition developed due to
Frent's very complicated nature: it would be impossible for a couple to
remember it after their heads become fuddled by a few drinks.
LS:
Boga is a chant used by the Vari of Musuka, whilst having tribal meals.
The chant is recited by a single couple, in which the participants can be of
one or both genders, and before the pair can begin the relatives of both
must gather in order to establish who should perform Boga. The gender
and matrimonial history of the possible chanters helps show who may
say Boga. The reason behind this is that the chant is held to lead to
relationships between the families and therefore it would be improper for
a couple to speak with each other, if they were both married.
Only the ordained couple can recite Boga, which they do just before the
ritual meal. This seems a little strange until you remember how
complicated Boga is: couples who to have a drink beforehand find that
their dazed wits fail to remember the chant properly.
SSO:
Children in Vari-Musuka schools frequently play the game of agabu
before noon. Both sexes are allowed to play, either with members of the
same sex, or members of the opposite sex. Only one pair plays at a time.
Before the game can be played, the members of each gang from which the
opponents come must agree who will play agabu. This depends on the
size of the potential players, and their level of expertise. The reason
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behind this is that the players must be evenly matched, since this game
determines who will play together in the playground.
The opponents play on their own, in a shady area of the playground. This
seems a little strange until you remember how complicated agabu is:
opponents who sit out in the midday sun to play become so dazed by the
heat that they cannot remember the rules properly.
SMAO:
Children in Vari-Musuka schools frequently play the game of agabu. This
game was established many years ago, by rival gangs, who wanted to
decide who got to be first in the lunch queue. If you lost, you got to go
first. No-one sex really wants to play, but each gang forces a couple of
people to take part out of tradition.
Agabu is played in a shady area of the playground. The last person playing
agabu has lost. As it is hard to establish who actually was last, the gangs
tickle the players until they tell the truth.
MA:
Boga is a chant used by the Vari of Musuka, whilst having tribal meals. It
originated with the original tribe of the area, who couldn't be bothered
with fighting, and found that singing together was much more fun and
productive. No family in the tribe is particularly keen to chant, but each
family nominates a few participants.
Boga is said sitting at the table. The person who finishes chanting Boga
last is loses. As it is hard to tell who this was, the families tell the chanters
really bad jokes until the loser confesses.
OO:
There is a type of chant that certain tribes. Two people say it before a meal.
It is said at a table. Meals in this tribe consist of maize, beef and biri-biri
wine. The chant can sound quite boring.
Set 8
BASE:
Ablua is a type of food eaten by the Amorki of Nashak. Ablua is made
from boiling the pulp of Ana fruits, which are crushed and drained first.
It has a quite distinct flavour, being quite light and scented. It is quite
soggy and mushy, and it is a sunshine colour. It is traditionally eaten at
weddings and funerals, being a great delicacy.
It is said that Ablua can enhance your attractiveness, and many people
smear it on their skin. Science has not yet proven this to be true, but it
certainly acts as a natural perfume.
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LS:
Voya is a type of food that the Zubu of Itlad eat. To prepare Voya, the flesh
of Chup fruits is simmered, having been pulped and left to drain
previously. Voya has a very unique taste, being quite delicate and
fragrant. It is reasonably sticky and soft, and is coloured yellow. Since it is
considered such a treat, it is usually only consumed at special occasions. It
is said that Voya can increase your powers of attraction, and many people
rub it into their skin. Tests haven't yet showed the truth of this, but it
definitely makes people smell better.
SSO:
The drink Voya is drunk mainly by businessmen in Imron. The drink
itself is made by fermenting and distilling the husks of Chup seeds, which
are thoroughly washed and dried. Voya is quite a pleasant drink, and is
quite acidic to taste. It is quite sticky and fibrous, containing sediment at
the bottom. Being so expensive, it is usually drunk at business dinners,
where people want to impress their clients.
It is said that Voya can aid digestion, if drunk regularly. Tests haven't yet
showed the truth of this, but it certainly adds to the enjoyment of one's
meal, because it makes food taste better.
SMAO:
The drink Voya is drunk mainly by businessmen in Imron. These
businessmen are generally quite pompous and do not realise how
annoying they are. They find that Voya relaxes them whilst doing their
accounts. It is considered a great honour to do accounts in Imron.
It is said that Voya can aid digestion, but no-one knows if this is true. It
contains quite a lot of sediment and can occasionally be quite opaque. It is,
moreover, quite sticky, and tends to make your breath smell, which is
why the businessmen's wives leave them alone.
MA:
Voya is a type of food that the Zubu of Itlad eat. Zubu are quite interesting
people, and are quite unaware of the spectacle caused by their small
stature. Voya is eaten to increase their energy whilst the Zubu tend the
fields, a job held in great esteem.
It is said that Voya is a good cure for hangovers, but no-one is sure this is
true. Its smell is vaguely reminiscent of clover, and can occasionally smell
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strongly like honey. Unfortunately it stains clothes and tends to cause
halitosis, which is why other tribes avoid the Zubu.
oa
Ablua is a type of food. It has quite a unique smell, and is reasonably
attractive. It makes a wonderful Christmas present. It is easy to
overindulge when eating Ablua.
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Appendix C: Materials Used In Experiment 4
Bases, targets and inferences used in Experiment 4. The A set of stimuli (where A type
inferences receive structural support) is followed by the B set, where structure
supports B type inferences (in the experiment presentation order was randomised).
Chateau Bogusse:
is a vineyard.
is in the southern french district of Pretence,
has sandy soils, with a lot of surface pebbles




has clay soils in which wildflowers grow
is in the western Departement of Maidoop.
its fine microclimate causes plums that are described in French as moublier
to grow.
Domaine Fraudulent's moublier plums are prized and sell for high prices.
Mas de la Fiction:
grows melons.
is in the southern Departement of Whaupper.
has sandy soils, with a lot of surface pebbles
its warm microclimate causes melons that are described in French as
jayert to grow
Mas de la Fiction's jayert melons are held in low esteem, and sell poorly.
A Chateau Bogusse's grapes are highly prized and sell for high prices
B Chateau Bogusse's grapes are held in low esteem, and sell poorly.
Helpful Dictionary
Elanger:
is a slang (argot) term used by french farmers
the term is thought to have originated in Belgium
is a way of describing extremely ripe fruit.
the extreme ripeness causes some of the moisture in the fruit to
evaporate.
this evaporation concentrates the fruits' flavours
Jayert:
is a slang (argot) term used by french farmers
the term is thought to have originated in Belgium
is a way of describing extremely ripe fruit.
the extreme ripeness causes the fruit to become very sweet
this super-sweetness makes the walls of the fruit soft and squashy
Moublier:
is a technical term used in french agricultural colleges
the term is thought to have originated in Spain
is a way of describing extremely ripe fruit.
the extreme ripeness causes some of the moisture in the fruit to
evaporate
this evaporation leads to extremely concentrated flavours
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SCENARIOS
BASE - The Guralaga
can be found in Australia
lives in Rainforests
only eats gau-gau berries
has a cronomus lucundus
the cronomus lucundus enables the Guralaga to eat gau gau berries.
TARGET 1 - The Mongret
can be found in Australia
lives in Rainforests
only eats gau-gau berries
has a probus razoris
the probus razoris enables the Mongret to eat the gau gau berries.
Thanks to the way they eat, Mongrets live to a ripe old age and rarely suffer from
cancer
TARGET 2 - The Crany Dog
can be found in Papua new Guinea
lives in the grassy backlands
eats vegetation
has a remulum grandoso
because of the remulum grandoso the Crany Dog can eat vegetation.
Crany Dogs are particularly prone to cancer, which originates in their digestive system.
A Guralaga are particularly prone to cancer




are unique to certain types of bird
are important to berry eaters
is a long spleen-like organ
keeping berries in the cronomus lucundus allows the berries to slowly ferment,
allowing the goodness inside the bitter skins to be released
SMT DICTIONARY ENTRY
Probus razoris
are unique to certain types of bird
are important to berry eaters
is a long plier-like bill
crushing berries in the probus razoris allows the goodness inside their bitter skins to be
released without the skins having to be swallowed
SST DICTIONARY ENTRY
Remulum grandoso
is unique to certain types of dog
are important to dogs which eat a wide range of vegetation
is a short intestine-like organ
keeping vegetation in the remulum grandoso allows it to slowly ferment, allowing the
goodness inside the outer skins to be released
APPENDIX C
SCENARIOS
BASE - Lexicon House
Is over two hundred years old.
Is owned by a hotel group.
Has floor to ceiling windows.
the construction techniques used in Lexicon House prompted a
leading architecture expert to describe it as a Scotland's finest
example of "flamberge"
TARGET 1 - Grange Manor
Is over two hundred years old
Is owned by a hotel group.
Has floor to ceiling windows.
The way the Manor is built leads architectural experts to
describe it as a good example of the "greaves" style.
Grange Manor is slowly crumbling due to the way it is built,
and requires a great deal of maintenance
TARGET 2 ■ The Old Manse
Has been painted in lilac recently.
Is owned by the Earl of Murray,
has delightful pillars.
The Manse's construction made architectural experts
claim the building was a tremendous example of the style
known as "crypto -baronic"
The old Manse has needed very few repairs due to wear
in its time, and can still be affordably run by its owners
A Lexicon House can still be affordably run by its owners




originates in the Tudor period
is an architectural term
refers to the way walls are constructed
Flamberge buildings traditionally have a lot of duplication
in their construction details, a result of defensive measures that
were incorporated in their design
SMT DICTIONARY ENTRY
GREAVES
originates in the Tudor period
is an architectural term
refers to the way walls are constructed
Greaves encompasses features incorporated into the design that
reflects religious sentiments, since form rather than function was
most in the minds of the designers of these buildings.
SST DICTIONARY ENTRY
CRYPTO-BARONIC
originates in the Elizabethan period
is an architectural term.
refers to a distinctive method of supporting the building fabric
Crypto-baronic buildings traditionally have a lot of duplication
in their construction details, a result of defensive measures that
were incorporated in their design
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Krav Maga
this martial art originated in China
it is taught in groups
students fight with short sticks
it is hard to learn
When someone has managed to learn krav Maga they can wear a
'ver-krap. '
Sampa
this sport originated in Japan
students fight with their hands and feet
Sampa is taught in one to one lessons by a grand master
it takes a long time to learn
When someone has taken the time to learn Sampa they can wear a
'koo-chai. '
Despite it's defensive nature, and perhaps because of the 'koo-chai',
students of this martial art get in lots of fights, and are frequently
injured.
Escrima
this martial art originated in China
students fight with short sticks
it is taught in groups
it is hard to learn
When someone has managed to learn Escrima they can wear a
'rok-ard.'
Despite it's physical nature, and perhaps because of the 'rok-ard',
Sampa injuries are rare.
A krav Maga students manage to stay relatively injury free.
B krav Maga students are frequently injured.
koo-chai
is made of cotton
comes in a range of colours
is heavily padded
ties with a cord around the wiast
the heavy padding results in a certain loss of mobility for the wearer
rok-ard
comes in a range of colours
is made of padded cotton
is decorated with offensive and aggressive symbols
ties with a cord around the waste
the decorative symbols signify that the wearer is entitled to wear a
the rok-ard
Ver-Krap
comes only in white
is made of wool
the wool is wrapped around the wearer in many layers
has a nifty drawstring to secure it in place
the many layers of wool result in a certain loss of mobility for the wearer
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The Floating Bridge
has a wooden bar
has lots of live music
serves beer brewed on the premises




has loads of live gigs
serves cider brewed on the premises
the cider is made using a
secret process called 'tannon'.
The tannon process makes a horrible smell that makes the Albert's beer garden
unbearable because of the strong smells that waft across it
The Castle Hotel
has a modern design
has a juke box
serves a locally distilled spirit
the spirit is made by using a
secret technique only known as 'hoffam'
The hoffam technique produces a lot of heat that makes the Castle Hotel's beer garden
bearable even in cold weather thanks to gusts of warm air from the distillery.
A The Floating Bridge's beer garden is bearable even in cold weather thanks to gusts
of warm air of from the brewery.




is a process that aids fermentation
it was perfected in Holland
a secret ingredient is added to the must
the ingredient causes the must to react vigorously, increasing the rate of reaction
therein
Tannon
is a process that aids fermentation
it was perfected in Holland
a secret ingredient is added to the must
the ingredient causes the yeasts to give off a great deal gas, which adds a distinctive
flavour to the brew
Hoffam
is a process that aids distillation
it was perfected in Scotland
the mash is kept in a special copper drum.





is in the southern french district of Pretence,
has sandy soils, with a lot of surface pebbles
has a warm microclimate which enables grapes that are described in French as elanger
to be produced.
Mas de la Fiction:
has clay soils in which wildflowers grow
is in the western Departement of Maidoop.
its fine microclimate causes melons that are described in French as
jayert to grow




is in the southern Departement of Whaupper.
has sandy soils, with a lot of surface pebbles
its fine microclimate causes plums that are described in French as
moublier to grow.
Domaine Fraudulent^ moublier plums are prized and sell for high prices.
A Chateau Bogusse's grapes are highly prized and sell for high prices
B Chateau Bogusse's grapes are held in low esteem, and sell poorly.
Helpful Dictionary
Elanger:
is a slang (argot) term used by french farmers
the term is thought to have originated in Belgium
is a way of describing extremely ripe fruit.
the extreme ripeness causes the fruit to become very sweet
this super-sweetness makes the walls of the fruit soft and squashy
Jayert:
is a technical term used in french agricultural colleges
the term is thought to have originated in Spain
is a way of describing extremely ripe fruit.
the extreme ripeness causes the fruit to become very sweet
this super-sweetness makes the walls of the fruit weaken and break
Moublier:
is a slang (argot) term used by french farmers
the term is thought to have originated in Belgium
is a way of describing extremely ripe fruit.
the extreme ripeness causes some of the moisture in the fruit to
evaporate
this evaporation leads to extremely concentrated flavours
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SCENARIOS
BASE - The Guralaga
can be found in Australia
lives in Rainforests
only eats gau-gau berries
has a cronomus lucundus
the cronomus lucundus enables the Guralaga to eat gau gau berries.
TARGET 1 - The Mongret
can be found in Australia
lives in Rainforests
only eats gau-gau berries
has a remulum grandoso
because of the remulum grandoso the Mongret can eat gau-gau berries.
Mongret s are particularly prone to cancer, which originates in their digestive system.
TARGET 2 - The Crany Dog
can be found in Papua new Guinea
lives in the grassy backlands
eats vegetation
has a probus razoris
the probus razoris enables the Crany Dog to eat vegetation.
Thanks to the way they eat, Crany Dogs live to a ripe old age and rarely suffer from
cancer
A Guralaga are particularly prone to cancer




are unique to certain types of bird
are important to berry eaters
is a long plier-like bil
crushing berries in the cronomus lucundus allows the goodness inside their bitter skins
to be released without the skins having to be swallowed
SMT DICTIONARY ENTRY
Probus razoris
are unique to certain types of bird
are important to berry eaters
is a long spleen-like organ 1
keeping berries in the probus razoris allows the berries to slowly ferment, allowing the
goodness inside the bitter skins to be released
SST DICTIONARY ENTRY
Remulum grandoso
is unique to certain types of dog
are important to dogs which eat a wide range of vegetation
is a long powerful jaw
crushing vegetation in the remulum grandoso allows the goodness inside its nasty skins
to be released without the skins having to be swallowed
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SCENARIOS
BASE - Lexicon House
Is over two hundred years old.
Is owned by a hotel group.
Has floor to ceiling windows.
the construction techniques used in Lexicon House prompted a
leading architecture expert to describe it as a Scotland's finest
example of "flamberge"
TARGET 1 - Grange Manor
Is over two hundred years old
Is owned by a hotel group.
Has floor to ceiling windows.
The way the Manor is built leads architectural experts to
describe it as a good example of the "greaves" style.
Grange Manor has needed very few repairs due to wear
in its time, and can still be affordably run by its owners
TARGET 2 - The Old Manse
Has been painted in lilac recently.
Is owned by the Earl of Murray,
has delightful pillars.
The Manse's construction made architectural experts
claim the building was a tremendous example of the style
known as "crypto -baronic"
The old Manse is slowly crumbling due to the way it is built,
and requires a great deal of maintenance
A Lexicon House can still be affordably run by its owners




originates in the Tudor period
is an architectural term
refers to the way walls are constructed
Flamberge buildings incorporate features in their designs that
reflect religious sentiments, since form rather than function was upper
most in the minds of the designers of these buildings.
SMT DICTIONARY ENTRY
GREAVES
originates in the Tudor period
is an architectural term
refers to the way walls are constructed
Greaves buildings traditionally have a lot of duplication
in their construction details, a result of defensive measures that
were incorporated in their design
SST DICTIONARY ENTRY
CRYPTO-BARONIC
originates in the Elizabethan period
is an architectural term.
refers to a distinctive method of supporting the building fabric
Crypto-baronic encompasses design features that
reflect religious sentiments, since form rather than function was upper
most in the minds of the designers of these buildings.
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Krav Maga
this martial art originated in China
it is taught in groups
students fight with short sticks
it is hard to learn
When someone has managed to learn krav Maga they can wear a
'ver-krap. '
Sampa
this sport originated in Japan
students fight with their hands and feet
Sampa is taught in one to one lessons by a grand master
it takes a long time to learn
When someone has taken the time to learn Sampa they can wear a
'koo-chai. '
Despite it's defensive nature, and perhaps because of the 'koo-chai',
students of this martial art get in lots of fights, and are frequently
injured.
Escrima
this martial art originated in China
students fight with short sticks
it is taught in groups
it is hard to learn
When someone has managed to learn Escrima they can wear a
'rok-ard.'
Despite it's physical nature, and perhaps because of the 'rok-ard',
Sampa injuries are rare.
A krav Maga students manage to stay relatively injury free.
B krav Maga students are frequently injured.
koo-chai
comes in a range of colours
is made of padded cotton
is wrapped around the wearer in many layers
is decorated with colourful symbols
ties with a cord around the waste
the many layers of coton result in a certain loss of mobility for the wearer
rok-ard
is made of cotton
comes in a range of colours
is made of padded cotton
is decorated with aggressive symbols
is wrapped around the wearer in many layers
ties with a cord around the waste
the decorative symbols signify that the wearer is entitled to wear a
the rok-ard
Ver-Krap
comes only in white
is made of wool
is worn over only one shoulder
has a nifty drawstring to secure it in place
is inscribed with offensive pictures




has a wooden bar
has lots of live music
serves beer brewed on the premises
the beer is made by a secret
method called 'sepim'
The Albert
has a modern design
has a juke box
serves a locally distilled spirit
the spirit is made by using a
secret process called 'tannon'.
The tannon process makes a horrible smell that makes the Albert's beer garden
unbearable because of the strong smells that waft across it
The Castle Hotel
is oak panelled
has loads of live gigs
serves cider brewed on the premises
the cider is made by using a
secret technique only known as 'hoffam'
The hoffam technique produces a lot of heat that makes the Castle Hotel's beer garden
bearable even in cold weather thanks to gusts of warm air from the distillery.
A The Floating Bridge's beer garden is bearable even in cold weather thanks to gusts
of warm air of from the brewery.




is a process that aids fermentation
it was perfected in Holland
the mash is kept in a special copper kettle.
the ingredient causes the yeasts to give off a great deal gas, which adds a distinctive
flavour to the brew
Tannon
is a process that aids distillation
it was perfected in Scotland
a secret ingredient is added to the must
the ingredient causes the yeasts to give off a great deal gas, which adds a distinctive
flavour to the brew
Hoffam
is a process that aids fermentation
it was perfected in Holland
the mash is kept in a special copper drum.
the copper causes the mash to react vigorously, increasing the rate of reaction therein
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Appendix D: Materials Used In Experiment 5
The bases, targets and stimuli used in Experiment 5.
Base and Target Scenarios
Geoff runs a coffee shop in the business district of Nawatobee, a small city
in the American mid-west. The coffee shop is called MacCawber's. It is
owned by Mr Fingus MacCawber, a fierce fastidious man who owns six
other businesses in the greater Nawatobee area. Mr MacCawber visits
each of his businesses for precisely 45 minutes on the first Wednesday of
every month, preferring to let his managers manage for the rest of the
time.
One day Angela, Mr MacCawber's secretary rang Geoff with what she said
was some important news. However, Angela told Geoff that she couldn't
tell him the news, as that would be a betrayal of confidence, so she would
just have to provide him with some clues, and leave him to guess.
"Well Geoff," said Angela, "Do you remember Birt, who used to run an
ice-cream parlour, also called MacCawber's, that was also in the business
district of Nawatobee? Last December, Mr MacCawber visited on a day
other than usual, going to the ice-cream parlour on the Tuesday, and he
sacked Birt for incompetence. Mr MacCawber was heard to say 'I always
like to deal with unpleasant business on Mondays and Tuesdays - it gets
me in a mean mood for the rest of the week!'
"Secondly, you may be familiar with the case of Marge. Marge manages
MacCawber's large car-part dealership - called Part-U-Need - in the
suburbs. In January, Mr MacCawber altered his visit to her, going to the
dealership on the Thursday instead of the Wednesday. Marge had been
given a big raise. Mr MacCawber had been heard to remark I always like
to deal with pleasant business on a Thursday or a Friday - it sets up my
my mood for the weekend's golfing!"
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Object-Moving Primes (From Boroditsky, 1998):
Please circle TROt or t-ALSh for questions 1-3 below.
1. The drum is ahead of the walnut. TRUE / FALSE
2. The hat box is ahead of the kleenex. TRUE / FALSE
3. The kleenex is ahead of the walnut. TRUE / FALSE
ArrbJNUlA D
Ego-Moving Primes (From Boroditsky, 1998)
'lease circle TRUE or FALSE for questions 1-3 below.
.. The drum is ahead of me. TRUE / FALSE
. The stool is ahead of me. TRUE / FALSE
The flower is ahead of me. TRUE / FALSE
APPENDIX D
A Sample Non-Priming Divesrion Task.
Please answer the questions on this and the following page by indicating
whether they are TRUE or FALSE (using the buttons provided).
1 5 7
The seven is




than seven TRUE FALSE
1 5
The one and
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Ramscar, M.J.A. Pain, H.G., & Cooper, R (1997) Is there a place for
semantic similarity in the analogical mapping process? Proceedings of the
Nineteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence
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process of categorisation, in Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Conference
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1998,Laurence Ealbaum Associates, pp 279-284.
The papers are reproduced in the order shown above.
Can a real distinction be made between cognitive theories of analogy and
categorisation?
Michael Ramscart tt and Helen Paint
tDepartment ofArtificial Intelligence




Analogy has traditionally been defined by use of a contrast
definition: analogies represent associations or
connections between things distinct from the 'normal'
associations or connections determined by our 'ordinary'
concepts and categories. Research into analogy, however,
is also distinct from research into concepts and categories
in terms of the richness of its process models. A number of
detailed, plausible models of the analogical process exist
(Forbus, Gentner and Law, 1995; Holyoak and Thagard,
1995): the same cannot be said of categorisation.
In this paper we argue that in the absence of an
acceptable account of categorisation, this contrast
definition amounts to little more than a convenient fiction
which, whilst useful in constraining the scope of cognitive
investigations, confuses the relationship between analogy
and categorisation, and prevents models of these processes
from informing one another. We present a study which
addresses directly the question of whether analogy can be
distinguished from categorisation by contrasting
categorisational and analogical processes, and following
from this, whether theories of analogy, notably Genmer's
structure mapping theory (Gentner, 1983; Forbus et al,
ibid.), can also be used to model parts of the categorisation
process.
Introduction
Ordinarily one accepts a distinction between category
membership and analogy according to realist terms. In
categorical judgements, relating a new representation of an
object to some kind of stored category representation,
objects are felt to be similar to one another in a way in
which those objects in judgements of analogical association
are not. If two objects are considered to be members of a
category, the classification is real; if they are considered to
be analogous, it is not. Consider, for example an analogy
between a theory and a building (Lakoff and Johnson 1980):
we might talk of "the foundations of a theory"; "we might
wish to buttress a theory with more facts"; "theories that we
construct can also collapse". From an everyday,
psychologically realist viewpoint, an igloo and a castle and a
skyscraper really are similar in a way that similarities
between buildings and theories are not.
Research into analogy and metaphor has accepted this tacit
realism. Holyoak and Thagard (1995) describe a world in
which "we think we see things as they really are", and
analogy is used in order to recycle our existing knowledge of
the real world to formulate new bits of 'real' knowledge.
Similarly, in the case of metaphor, Ortony (1979) makes a
distinction between literal and non-literal similarities:
'encyclopaedias are like dictionaries' is true in a literal (real)
way, whereas 'encyclopaedias are like goldmines' is only
true in a metaphorical (non-real) way. Whether the notion of
literal similarity might be problematic or not is barely
examined, since the real problem to be addressed is
metaphor. Holyoak and Thagard (1995) offer the comment
"A metaphor always connects two domains in a way that
goes beyond our normal category structure" (pp 217), whilst
giving little indication as to what might constitute this
'normal category structure'. Analogies are defined as being
distinct from categories, the nature of which are left
unexamined, presumed real.
Once the difficulties of giving an account of categorisation
are admiued into the picture, distinctions between analogy
and metaphor reliant upon a contrast with categorisation
cease to distinguish at all. Analogy is consistently defined in
contrast to categorisation (Clement and Gentner, 1991;
Holyoak and Thagard, 1995); yet in order to make a contrast
definition one needs an account of at least one of the
contrasting elements. This we don't have. An analogy is
defined as an associative judgement between two things that
are in different categories, yet an account of what constitutes
an association between two things such that they are
members of the same category rather than different categories
is not available (Medin, Goldstone and Gentner, 1993)1.
Moreover, on the best accounts of categorisation, the
question of whether two things are members of the same
category may not be amenable to any straightforward answer
(Medin and Ortony, 1989; Ramscar, 1996). Thus analogy
1 Similarly, Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) argue that
metaphorical judgements are the same as categorisational
judgements ("metaphors are understood as they are - as class
inclusion statements", pp 17). It is hard to see how
categorisation is to illuminate metaphor, since they conclude:
'The central problem is to understand categorization." ( pp 17).
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tends to be defined in contrast to what is in itself a largely
undefined process. In the light of this, a definition such as:
"In an analogy, a familiar domain il used to understand a novel
domain in order to highlight important similarities between the
domains, or to predict new features of the novel domain." [We
interpret domain here to be equivalent to category] (Clement and
Gentner, 1991)
might be more accurately reformulated along the lines of: 'in
analogy, a stored representation is used in order to highlight
important similarities between it and a new representation of
an object or concept, or to predict new features in the new
representation of an object or concept'. None of this would
be out of place in a definition of categorisation. The
distinction between categorisation and analogy is difficult to
draw: here we explore the hypothesis that at cognitive levels
of description there may no clear distinction to be made at
all.
Models of analogy and categorisation
Another factor which favours the abandoning of traditional
distinctions between categorisation and analogy are the
strong parallels which can be drawn between theories of
analogy and the most plausible models of categorisation. It
is becoming more widely accepted that structure plays a
major role in category formation (Boyd, 1984; Goldstone,
1994; Kiel, 1989; Medin and Ortony, 1989): analogical
reasoning research directly addresses a process which reasons
amongst structural networks (Falkenhainer, Forbus and
Gentner, 1989; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995). Forbus,
Gentner and Law (1995; pp 145-6) propose the following
theoretical model of analogical reasoning:
• initial selection dependant upon surface similarity
• analogical similarity is determined by deeper structures
this is strikingly similar to Medin and Ortony's (1989; pp
185-6) knowledge representation scheme for categorisation:
• identification procedure based upon surface features
• classification is determined by deeper structures.
Where research into analogy differs from research into
categorisation is in the richness of its process models. A
number of detailed, plausible models of the analogical
process exist (Forbus, Gentner and Law, 1995; Holyoak and
Thagard, 1995): the same cannot be said of categorisation.
Medin and Ortony offer little detail as to the mechanisms by
which surface idendfication is governed by deeper structures,
or indeed the composition of these deeper structures. In the
current study we address directly the question discussed
above, of whether analogy can be distinguished from
categorisation by contrasting categorisational and analogical
processes, and following from this, whether theories of
analogy can also be used to model parts of the categorisation
process.
Gentner's structure mapping theory
Gentner's (1983) Structure Mapping Theory is an attempt to
explain how it is that two domains can be considered
analogous, and in particular how it is that correspondences
between analogues from two domains can be mapped.
Structure mapping proposes that the mapping and inference
between two domains can be achieved by assigning
correspondences between objects and attributes and then
napping predicates with identical names. In order to do this,
Gentner assumes a predicate like representation
distinguishing between objects, object-attributes and
relations. Object-attributes are those predicates that have one
argument and describe object properties, e.g. red (lobster).
Relations are divided into a hierarchy of orders, with those
predicates with two or more arguments which are used to
describe relations between objects, for example
upsets (stomach, lobster) forming the lowest order, and
those predicates describing different levels of relationships
between relations forming the higher orders e.g.: cause (
upsets(stomach,lobster),drinks(seltzer,diner)).
The theory itself comprises two parts: mapping rules, and
the systematicity principle. Mapping rules state that (a)
attributes of objects are not mapped and (b) relations
between objects are preserved. The systematicity principle
requires that higher order relations (e.g. cause above) are
mapped preferentially, followed by the relations that
constitute the higher order arguments.
The question of how analogies are accessed, i.e. how
representations are selected in order to allow analogical
mapping to take place, was addressed experimentally by
Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993). Their study showed
that analogical access relied primarily upon surface (feature)
matches, and they propose that judgements of analogical
similarity can be decomposed into two sub-processes:
• Accessing a similar (base) situation from memory, based
primarily on surface similarity
• Creating a mapping from base to target using structural
commonalities.
Structural systematicity and categorisation
Since the Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993) studies did
not directly address categorisation, a tacitly realist position
was adopted in respect of the categories amongst which
subjects were to analogise (Ramscar, 1996). The most
obvious way in which this realist assumption manifests
itself is in the classification of match items (the individual
stories within the "Karla the hawk" story sets (Gentner,
Ratterman and Forbus 1993)). The question of the
categorical status of match items is determined in advance,
thus story 1 in figure 1 is classified as a base story, whilst
story 3 is defined as its analogue. It is tacitly assumed that
the two stories are members of distinct and separate
categories, and that they share some kind of analogous link.
Whilst the study aimed to explore a wider range of
determinants of similarity, the particular correspondences
determined by structural systematicity were considered to be
indicative of analogous similarities (similarities between
rather than within categories). These assumptions determined
the predictions that Genmer et al made for their experiments,
and the evidence they sought with which to test them.
Gentner et al's study explored criteria of similarity, and
discovered that the preferred determinant of analogical
similarity in subjects was shared structural systematicity. As
a consequence of our hypothesis we predicted that if we were
to use Gentner et al's methods and materials to explore
categorisation rather than analogy, structural systematicity
might also serve as a criterion for the determining category
membership. Story 3 in figure 1 was assumed by Gentner et
al to be an analogue of story 1. Analogues, as posited in
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aditional accounts of analogy, are defined in contrast to
uegory members. If subjects were to use structural
fstematicity as a categorisation determinant, then
ifinitions of analogy which rely on shared structure to
antrast analogy with categorisation might need some
ifinement. If both analogy and categorisation produce the
ime results, then this might imply some shared, structure
ised mechanism, or that one process is supervenient upon
le other. Accordingly, we experimented by presenting
lbjects with Gentner et at's materials and asking them to
ategorise them. Given that Gentner et at define the
aalogical mechanism in terms of structure mapping, we
:cordingly expected structure mapping to determine
ategorisation: i.e. Gentner et at assume that match items
ith only structural similarities (i.e. analogues) belong to




he subjects were 20 volunteers, a mixture of postgraduate
iid undergraduate students from the Artificial Intelligence
department at the University of Edinburgh.
laterials
he basic materials used in this study were the 20 sets of
ECarla the hawk" stories (Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus,
993).2
Gentner defines the following taxonomy of similarity
ilationships between the stories:
• Literal similarity matches include both common
relational structure and common object descriptions;
• Surface matches: based upon common object
descriptions, plus some first order relations;
• Structural similarity, a match based upon a common
system of internal relations;
• First order matches, where the only common feature is
first order relations;
• Object only matches, where stories have only object
matches in common.
Each set consists of a base (B), a literally similar story
LS), an analogue (TA - with only structural similarities
nth the base), a mere-appearance story (MA - with surface
nd first order commonalities with the base), a false analogy
FA - an analogue of MA), and an object only match story
00 - with only surface commonalities with the base). This
llowed for a number of potential groupings according to the
lassification strategy adopted. Our prediction was that
ubjects would use structural similarity as their categorical
imilarity determinant, putting analogues and bases into the
ame categories (i.e. B, LS and TA together), rather than
jouping match items at the object level (i.e. grouping B,
■S, MA and OO together).
The sets were modified slightly: in Gentner et al's analogy
esearch questions of the asymmetry and direction of
omparisons were clearly fixed (all comparisons were in
2 Many thanks to Dedre Gentner for providing the story sets.
relation to the base story). Extra features (a varied mix of
objects, attributes and relationships) were added to (or
removed from) the base story representations (Figure 1, bold
face) which did little to affect analogical similarity
judgements. In categorisation judgements, aspects such as
symmetry and directionality may be more fluid. As we
predicted that structure would be an important determinant of
categorical similarity judgements, and noting that the
directionality of similarity judgements cannot be fixed in
Story I ■ Base story
Once there was a teacher named Mrs Jackson who wanted a salary
increase. One day, the principal said that he was increasing his own
salary by 20 percent. However, he said there was not enough money to
give the teachers a salary increase.
When Mrs Jackson heard this she became so angry that she decided to
take revenge. The next day, Mrs Jackson used gasoline to set fire to the
principal's office.
Then she went to a bar and got drunk.
Story 2 ■ Literal similarity
Professor Rosie McGhee very much wanted a raise. One day the
provost announced that he was giving himself a raise. However, he said
that since money was short, no one else would get a raise this year.
After Professor McGhee heard this she became so upset that she
decided to get even. One hour later, Professor McGhee blew up the
administration building with dynamite.
Story 3 - True Analogy
McGhee was a sailor who wanted a few days of vacation on land.
One day, the captain announced that he would be taking a vacation in the
mountains. However, he said everyone else would have to remain on the
ship.
After McGhee heard this he became so upset that he decided to get
revenge. Within an hour McGhee blew up the captain's cabin with
dynamite.
Story 4 ■ Mere appearance: (First order commonalities)
Professor McGhee very much wanted a raise. One day she became so
impatient that she used kerosene to bum down the administration building.
After the fire, the provost announced that he was giving himself a
raise. However, he said that due to the fire, there was not enough money
to give one to anyone else.
Story 5 ■ False Analogy
McGhee was a sailor who wanted a few days of vacation on land.
One day McGhee became so impatient that he tried to blow up the
captain's cabin using dynamite.
After this incident, the captain announced that he would be taking a
vacation in the mountains. However, he said everyone else would have to
remain on board to repair the ship.
Story 6 • Mere appearance: (Object commonalities only)
A teacher once thought that she deserved a pay rise. She asked the
principal when her rise was due. She was wearing her best suit. The
principal told her that rises were decided by the governors.
Figure 1: Sample stories from Gentner, Ratterman and
Forbus (1993) - the text in bold type illustrates extra
structure added by Gentner at al to the base stories only.
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categorisation, we accordingly removed Gentner et al's extra
features from 65% of the story sets (G- sets: in these, for
example, the base / literal similarity relationship were
symmetrical), and retained the extra features (and any
attendant asymmetries) in 35% of stories (G+ sets).
Procedure
Subjects were given 10 mixed sets of 6 stories3 and asked to
work through them a set at a time. Both sets and stories
were presented in randomised order. For each set, they read
through each story a number of times in order to familiarise
themselves with its content. Subjects were then asked to
"Group the stories into the categories that seemed most
natural and appropriate to you. These groups can range from
putting every member of the story set into the same group,
to putting each story into a group on its own." When
subjects had made their categorisation decisions, they
physically grouped each set of stories by pasting them onto
a large sheet of paper and encircling each group in ink.
Subjects were then re-presented with their groupings a set at
a time, asked to give each group with two or more members
Figure 2: Output patterns from the categorisation task,
showing the groups formed and criteria established. The
stories are labelled according to Gentner's taxonomy of
similarity (defined above): B = Base; LS = Literal
Similarity; TA = True Analogy; FA = False Analogy;
MA = Mere Appearance; 00 = Object Only match.
3Given the sample size, we concentrated on sets 1 - 10; sets
11-20 were used to a more limited extent to check for any
marked variations in the data being produced.
a simple descriptive name, and then to write a few sentences
explaining what caused them to classify each named group
of stories together4.
Results
For each story set the groups formed by each subject's
classifications were analysed. The pattern of groupings
which emerged fell broadly into 5 types (figure 2).
Similarities across groupings (i.e. similarity shared by every
member of a two or more member group across a categorised
story set) according to Gentner et al's taxonomy of
similarities could be identified in 96.5% of groupings. Of
these, in 5% of cases the stories were grouped according to
types 6 and 7. The only similarities across groupings in
these types are that the stories in the individual groups had
only objects in common. In 4% the stories were classified
according to type 3, where the across grouping similarity
was shared first order relations. In 79.5% of cases subjects
grouped using type 1. Here the only similarity across
groupings was a network of systematic causal relations. The
full output and incidence of the types is given in Table 1.
Story Set Type
Grouping
Type Gv G- % of total
Type I 68 % 86.5% 79.5%
Type 2 20 % 0.5% 8%
Other 12% 13% 12.5%
Figure 3: Classification strategies according to set type.
8% of groupings were according to type 2, where the base
was put into a category on its own, with the only similarity
across other groupings being shared structure. This type was
only found once amongst those sets from which Gentner et
al's extra features had been removed (0.5% of G- sets; figure
3). The G+ sets, those with added features in the base, were
sets 5; 7; 10; 12; 15; 17; and 20. Of these: in set 5 and set
20 the extra features involved higher order relations; in sets
7 10,15 they involved first order relations; and in sets 12 17
the extra features were objects. 20% of these sets were
classified as type 2, with the bulk of these classifications













Type 1 7 2 7 7 11 9 5
Type 2 9 2 1 2
Type 3 1 1 1 2
Types 6 & 7 2
Types 4, 5,
8, 9 & 10
1
Totals 19 5 8 7 14 11 6
Figure 4: Classification data for the G+ sets.
4This data is currently being analysed, and will not be
considered here.
Classification Criterion % of Total
Systematic network of relations in common - Type 1 79.5 %
1 B LS TA 2 FA MA 3 OO
Systematic network of relations in common - Type 2 8 %
(Base classified separately)
1 LS TA 2 FA MA 3 B 4 OO
First order relations in common - Type 3 4 %
1 B LS TA FA MA 2 OO
Only object similarities in common - Types 6 & 7 5 %
1 MA LS B OO 2 FA MA
1 B OO 2 LS MA 3 TA FA
No classification possible - Types 4, 5, 8 , 9 10 3.5 %
1 B LS MA 2 FATA 3.00
1 B TA 2 FA MA 3 LS
1 B MA FA 2LSTA 300
1 B LS TA OO 2 FA MA




1 2 3 4 5+ 6 7+ 8 9 10+ 11 12+ 13 14 15+ 16 17+ 18 19 20+
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B 3 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
C 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
D 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2
E 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 3
F 4 1 1
'
1 2 1 1 1 1 5
G
\
8 6 7 1 1 1 6 1 1 1
H 5 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
J 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
K 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
L 7 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 1 1 1 1 5 2 2 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P 6 3 1 1 1 3 7 1 1 3
Q 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
R 1 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
T 3 7 9 1 3 7 7 7 1 1
Table 1: Output incidence of subject groupings. Each subject was given 10 story sets (each row represents one subject): the
type of grouping is indicated by the type number in the story set column (see also figure 2).
Subject T produced some rather strange results: this was explained by examining the reasons T gave for her groupings, in
which she explained that she was exploring a different heuristic for each story set.
Discussion
Our study explored the hypothesis that mechanisms
normally considered to be analogical could in fact support
categorisation tasks. The most important finding here is the
role that shared structure plays in categorisation judgements.
79.5% of the groupings formed by our subjects had only
shared systematic structure (traditionally defined as analogy)
as a common feature amongst members of the categories
formed. In contrast, only 5% of groupings produced had
common object descriptions as the common similarity
across categories. Traditionally categorisation models have
concentrated on object descriptions, making use of very
representationally-simple attribute-value lists (Murphy and
Medin, 1985), whereas analogy research has examined
relationships between highly structured representations
(considering the influence of attributes, relations and higher-
order relations in judgements of similarity).
The argument for abandoning the current de facto
distinction between categorical and analogical associations of
objects is twofold: firstly, that the standard distinctions
(Clement and Gentner, 1991; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995)
between analogy and categorisation actually failed to
distinguish between them; and secondly, that by removing
the distinction, understanding of the factors which govern
mappings between representations that have been gleaned
from analogy research might help illuminate categorisation
questions (Ramscar, Lee and Pain, in press). Our results
provide evidence that structures, and more pertinently
Gentner's structural systematicity, rather than features, are
the key to categorical similarity in this instance: this tallies
with other evidence, such as Rips (1989) who found that
subjects were reluctant to change classifications as a result
of feature changes alone.
Our argument is supported not only by the proportion of
categorisations that were determined by commonalities
between internal structures in the stories, but also by the
effects of added structure in the G+ sets where the added
structure was a higher-order structure. These might at first
appear to present a problem for our attempt to use a
structure mapping analysis to model these categorisation
judgements. In these cases, Gentner's base stories were put
into separate categories from stories to which they were
supposed to be literally similar, which were in turn
categorised alongside their supposed analogues (both of
which were supposed to share structures with the base).
These results can be attributed to the effects of
directionality and symmetry upon similarity judgements.
Whilst Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993) found that
subjects judged literally similar (LS) stories to be very
similar to bases, and analogues less so, they did not consider
the effect of reversing the directionality and symmetry of the
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comparisons, for example comparing the base and analogue
stories similarity to the LS. Neither did they consider the
judging of cumulative similarity, where dissimilarities are
also taken into account. During this process, the structural
dissimilarities of the base versus the LS and analogue appear
from our results to be clearly relevant, whereas the object
differences of the analogue versus the LS and base do not.
This maximisation of important similarities (i.e. structure
matches) relative to lesser dissimilarities (i.e. object
matches) amongst groupings appears to play a crucial role in
categorisation in this study. Whilst it might be argued that
all we have shown here is that subjects will form categories
of analogies, such an interpretation (in so far as we can
make sense of it) does not affect our argument that it is
structure that determines the content of these categories.
All of this strengthens our dubiety with respect to the
separation of analogy from categorisation. We should note,
however, that asserting that analogy cannot be distinguished
from categorisation at a cognitive level is not the same
thing as arguing that analogy is the same thing as
categorisation. Categorisation is such a central cognitive
process that it is hard to see how it can be reduced to a
single process (c.f. Goldstone, 1994). It may well be that
any given manifest reasoning process - such as rule
following or metaphor - might be able to illuminate some
aspect of categorisation: i.e. can provide the constraints
necessary to determining certain categorical similarities. We
argue that the analogical process cannot be distinguished
from the 'categorisation process' at a cognitive level. Our
hypothesis is that analogy is supervenient upon an
important part of the classification process, and that as such
analogy research is capable of illuminating5 some
categorisation tasks, for instance, the way in which
structural systematicity can determine both analogical and
category judgements.
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5For example, one problem faced by all cognitive theories of
categorisation is explaining typicality effects (e.g. Rosch,
1978); how they occur, or even, how the existence of typicality
effects can be accommodated by a given model. Genmer et al
(1993) have shown how differing aspects of similarity -
structural versus surface - affect recall, soundness ratings and
judgements of similarity. By showing that judgements of
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reliant upon different representational features (surface
attributes for recall, structural systematicity for similarity and
typicality), we might be able to begin to present a model of the
categorisation process which can explain and account for at
least some typicality effects.
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Is there a Place for Semantic Similarity in the Analogical Mapping Process?
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Ramscar & Pain (1996) argued that the analogical process can¬
not be easily distinguished from the categorisation process at
a cognitive level. In light of the absence of any distinction
between analogy and categorisation, we have argued that anal¬
ogy is supervenient upon an important part of the classification
process, and that as such 'analogical' models are capable of
illuminating some categorisation tasks, for instance, the way
in which structural systematicity can determine not only ana¬
logical judgements, but also category decisions. Our scep¬
ticism regarding the cognitive distinction between these two
processes has implications for both analogy and categorisa¬
tion research: in this paper we consider two leading analogical
theories, Gentner's Structure Mapping Theory and Holyoak's
Multi-Constraint Theory, and argue that results from our use
of analogical modeling techniques in categorisation tasks offer
some important insights into exactly which elements should be
included in a theory of analogical mapping.
Introduction
Ramscar & Pain (1996) argue for a position that rejects any
simple distinction between analogy and categorisation at the
cognitive process level (see Ramscar, Pain & Lee, 1997 for
more evidence). The argument runs as follows: definitions of
analogy (e.g. Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Clement & Gentner,
1991) rely on making a distinction between 'straight' cate¬
gorical judgements on the one hand, and analogical, 'extra-
categorical' judgements on the other; with no convincing ac¬
count of just what constitutes a 'straight' categorical judg¬
ment, this amounts to littlemore than hand waving, attempting
to characterise one ill-defined process by contrasting it with
another ill-defined process. In the absence of any compelling
reason to believe in distinct cognitive processes of analogy
and categorisation, there is much utility in viewing human
analogical and categorical behaviour as manifestations of the
same process: research into analogy has yielded a number of
plausible models of the analogical process (Forbus, Gentner
&Law 1995; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995), in sharp contrast
to categorisation research, where process models, to the ex¬
tent that they feature at all, tend to be more conjectural in
nature (e.g. Medin & Ortony, 1989). A companion paper to
this (Ramscar, Pain & Lee, 1997) presents further evidence
of the benefits and insights that this approach can bring to
investigations into the nature of categorisation decisions.
Richard Cooper
Department of Psychology
Birkbeck College, University of London
R.CooperOpsyc.bbk.ac.uk
In this discussion, we wish to examine the perspective our
particular view of the categorisation / analogy divide, and
the results of our experiments using analogical modeling to
explore categorisation, can bring to theoretical approaches to
analogy (and by implication, existing models of analogy). The
removal of neatly bounded 'concept domains' with which var¬
ious aspects of the analogical process can interact produces a
changed circumstance that seems likely to have repercussions
for theories based on just such assumptions: in particular, we
wish to examine the implications of our approach to the kinds
of similarity constraints— structural, pragmatic and semantic
— which are variously included in, or excluded from, theories
and models of the analogical process.
A number of 'competing' theories of analogy exist:
Holyoak & Thagard (1995); Gentner (1983; Forbus, Gen¬
tner & Law, 1995); Keane (Keane, Ledgeway & Duff. 1994);
Hofstadter (1995). In this paper we examine in detail the
effects of our blurred distinction perspective on the vexed
question of 'semantics' in the first two of these, Gentner's
'StructureMapping' theory and Holyoak &Thagard's 'Multi-
Constraint' theory. These constitute the most explicit theo¬
ries, whose supporting evidence and accompanying process
models have been widely disseminated and accepted.
Mapping Without The Distinction
Gentner's Structure Mapping Theory
Gentner (Gentner, 1983; Clement & Gentner, 1991) proposed
the Structure Mapping Theory as an attempt to explain how
it is that two domains can be considered analogous, and in
particular how it is that correspondences between analogues
from two domains can be mapped.
Structuremapping proposes that the mapping and inference
between two domains can be achieved by assigning corre¬
spondences between objects and attributes and then mapping
predicates with identical names. In order to do this, Gentner
assumes a predicate like representation (figure 1), distinguish¬
ing between objects, object-attributes and relations. Object-
attributes are those predicates that have one argument and
describe object properties, e.g. YELLOW(sun). Relations are
divided into a hierarchy of orders, with those predicates with
two ormore arguments which are used to describe relations be¬
tween objects, for example ATTRACTS(sun, planet) forming the
lowest order, and those predicates describing different levels
of relationships between relations e.g. CAUSE(ATTRACTS(sun,
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Figure I: Predicate representations of the solar system and a
hydrogen atom
The theory itself comprises two parts: mapping rules, and
the systematicity principle. Mapping rules state that attributes
of objects are not mapped: but relations between objects are
preserved. The systematicity principle requires that complex
higher order relations (e.g. cause above) are mapped prefer¬
entially, followed by relations that constitute the higher order
arguments. This is intended to capture the notion that anal¬
ogy conveys a system of connected knowledge, rather than an
assortment of independent facts:
"structure mapping stems in part from the observation that
useful analogies, such as those used in science or education,
involve rich, interconstraining systems of mappings between
two domains, rather than a set of independent correspondences"
(Clement & Gentner, 1991, pp. 91-92)
Gentner's structure mapping theory has been implemented as
a computer simulation model SME (Falkenhainer, Forbus &
Gentner, 1989).
One criticism that has been made of structure mapping
theory is that the representations it uses are arbitrary. The
primitives used in the examples are chosen selectively. The
example would fail if revolves-around in the Solar System
domain was replaced with orbits. Furthermore, the inclu¬
sion of a larger range of domain relations would result in the
matches appearing far less sound than they do. Moreover,
Holyoak (1985) claims that Gentner can give no account as to
why hotter_than in figure 1 should not be mapped onto the
Hydrogen Atom domain. Holyoak argues that expanding the
representation in order to utilise the systematicity principle
will be of little help, since on another expansion the relation
hotter.than will form part of a higher order system (in¬
volving the warming of planets, conditions for the existence
of life, etc.). The structure mapping theory seems to give no
explanation as to why this relation is not mapped.
To some researchers this has appeared to be a major prob¬
lem. A system which uses no goal or domain information,
and which relies purely on structural inferences, might ap¬
pear to have trouble when, given a number of networks of
higher-order relations between domains (i.e. several causal
networks), giving an account as to why it selected the one that
was relevant to making the desired analogy.
Holyoak and Thagard's Multi-Constraint Theory
Holyoak's theory (Holyoak, 1985; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989;
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) is concerned primarily with prob¬
lem solving. It attempts to capture the intuition held by some
researchers that goals play some part in the analogical pro¬
cess, particularly in mapping. (Gentner's theory precludes
any such influence.) The scope and ambition of this theory
has changed considerably over time: what is presented here
is a sketch of its general nature.
Holyoak et al advocate an explanation of analogy in terms
of a goal-driven processing system— mappings are controlled
by the system's goals. The analogical mapping problem is
seen as one of explaining how the large number of possible
mappings between domains can be evaluated and a subset of
these used for the transfer of information between domains.
They suggest that this subset emerges from an attempt to
balance the different influences upon the mapping process.
More specifically they regard the process as an attempt to si¬
multaneously satisfy several constraints. The first group of
these (logical compatibility, role identity, uniqueness and re¬
lational consistency) are structural, and therefore compatible
with the overall thrust of Gentner's theory. However, Holyoak
et al also consider constraints ofpragmatic centrality and se¬
mantic similarity to be integral to the mapping process. These
non-structural constraints rely on information other than that
found in the basic domain representations.
Structural Constraints Logical compatibility ensures that
mappings are only considered if they are between entities
of the same 'type'. Thus, in the Solar System / Hydrogen
Atom analogy the predicate MORE-Massive.than cannot be
matched with the object electron. Similarly, a mapping be¬
tween the predicates hot and revolves-AROUND will not be
considered as they take different numbers of arguments. This
primarily syntactic constraint is intended to ensure that map¬
pings between different levels ofdescription are not attempted.
For example single-argument predicates, such as hot, tend to
be purely descriptive, specifying a particular attribute of an
object. Multi-argument predicates describe relationships be¬
tween objects, and so can be considered to represent a higher
level of description. The argument is that mappings between
different levels of description are not productive and this con¬
straint serves to eliminate any potential mappings of this kind.
A further hurdle potential mappings must overcome in this
model is the role identity constraint. This assumes that the
base and target domains can be divided at a higher level of
description than that at which the mapping takes place. In
the use of analogy in problem solving, upon which the au¬
thors focus predominantly, this means the domains may be
redescribed in terms of a start state, the problem goals, and
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the operators that can be used to try and achieve these goals.
Role identity then limitsmapping to relations and objects that
appear in the same part of the domain definition. This pro¬
vides a weak pragmatic influence in that elements can only
be considered for mapping if they play a similar role in both
domains.
Holyoak et al assume that each element in the base domain
will ultimately map onto only one element in the target do¬
main, and vice versa. Thus there is a competition between
members of the set of potential mappings between one base
element and a number of possible target elements. For exam-,
pie, if hotter-than in the base maps onto hotter_than in
the target then it cannot map onto LESS.MASSrvE.THAN in the
target. Accordingly any factor which serves to increase the
level of support for the former mapping will consequently act
to decrease support for the latter.
A final structural constraint is relational consistency, which
acts to ensure that mappings between the base and target do¬
mains are consistent. Ifmappings between structural elements
receive support, mappings between the structures themselves,
and any other elements, are also supported.
Pragmatic Centrality The importance of an element (ob¬
ject or relation), whether in the base or target domain, is
another consideration in the mapping process. An element's
importance is defined in terms of how useful the element is
in satisfying the current goal (or subgoal) of the 'analogiser'.
Thus any mappings involving 'useful' elements receive more
support than mappings involving less useful elements. When
our example analogy is used to explain the relative motion of
sub-atomic particles, mappings involving yellow and hot-
ter.than are going to be less favourably considered than
those involving revolves.around, since the former are not
utilised in satisfying any explanatory goals.
Semantic Similarity Holyoak et al suggest that the most
useful mappings are likely to come from elements which are
semantically similar. In the Solar System / Hydrogen Atom
analogy, predicates with identical names can be regarded as
more similar than those with different names. In more com¬
plex examples the method of determining relative similarity is
more difficult. Holyoak et al make no claim as to any partic¬
ular model of semantics. The semantic similarity constraint
is regarded more as a heuristic than a firm rule, and can be
applied in differing strengths at various stages of the mapping
process.
Holyoak& Thagard (1989) emphasise that the logical com¬
patibility and role identity constraints are restrictions on the
building of the mapping network, and these restrictions are
regarded as less important than the three principal constraints
of isomorphism (uniqueness and relational consistency), se¬
mantic similarity and pragmatic centrality.
The theory has been implemented as a computer simulation
ACME, which is a constraint satisfaction network incorpora¬
tion these considerations.
Comparing The Two Theories
Structure Holyoak & Thagard (1995) argue that the sim¬
ilarities and differences between their theory and structure
mapping theory can best be illustrated by comparing Gen-
tner's theory with the three main constraints posited by multi-
constraint theory. They claim thatmulti-constraint theory cap¬
tures Gentner's insight regarding the importance of systematic
structure (in ACME, interconnected systems will have more
mutually supporting links than an isolated relation), but in a
more flexible manner. As implemented in SME, Gentner's
-theory rigidly enforces one-to-one mappings and structural
consistency — potential mappings which violate these con¬
straints are not made. In contrast, ACME, whilst preferring
one-to-one mappings (by using inhibitory links to discourage
many-to-one mappings) nevertheless will allow violations.
Pragmatic Constraints Gentner's theory (and SME) does
not incorporate or recognise the influence ofpragmatic—goal
driven — constraints on the mapping process. According to
structure mapping theory, the operation of goals is external
to the actual mapping process, constraining the evaluation of
mapping outcomes, rather than actual mappings (although I-
SME (Forbus, Ferguson & Gentner, 1994) does incorporate
pragmatic influences in mapping). However, whilst the evi¬
dence that goals can influence what is mapped in analogy is
clear (Spellman & Holyoak, 1992), it is less clear that goals
directly influence or constrain the mapping process.
We noted two criticism of structure mapping earlier the
neatness of the representations used in SME (this applies
equally to ACME), and that if an analog offers up two com¬
peting possible modes of transfer with a similar level of sys-
tematicity, then the systematicity principle cannot act as a
constraint in the selection of one or the other. None of this
need militate against structure mapping in principle: an ana¬
logue which allows two equal mappings may be a poor choice
of an analogue; the systematicity principle's yielding of two
equally valid mappings may be a psychologically valid res¬
olution of the initially poor choice of analogy. To return to
the earlier objection to Gentner's structure mapping theory
(Holyoak, 1985), it might well turn out that an expansion
of the representations of the Solar System and the Hydrogen
Atomwill simply lead to a situation in which the two examples
are no longer seen to be analogous. Given that the success of
any analogy is contingent upon the way in which the putative
analogues are represented (Gentner, 1989), it is not a failing of
a theory that it cannot provide accurate mappings in situations
where candidate analogues are presented in such a way as to
obscure any analogous similarity between them.
A major criticism of all analogical theories is that they
do not consider the considerable psychological evidence that
the choice of representation is crucial to analogy (Hofstadter,
1995). If categorisation research tends to ignore processes
and overconcentrate on representation, the opposite is true of
analogy. Yet, in fact some of the best evidence of the influence
of goals (Spellman & Holyoak, 1992) seems to support the
view that goals influence representation rather than mapping.
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These "results suggest one way in which analogies can be
used systematically to influence people's inferences — [the
representation of] the source [analogue] can itselfbemassaged
to encourage a desired mapping" (Holyoak& Thagard, 1995).
Semantic Constraints With regard to the semantic similar¬
ity constraint, themain focus of this discussion, the respective
positions are as follows: SME only matches predicates with
identical names, thus ifplanets (see figure 1) were represented
as smai j hr-than the sun, and electrons as less.mass.than
a nucleus, then structure mapping would not allow, and SME
would not make, a mapping between the two relations. On
the other hand, whilst ACME again prefers to map iden¬
tical relations, weights on the network can be adjusted to
capture the semantic similarity between smaller than and
less-mass-than. Holyoak & Thagard argue that this shows
a significant weakness in Gentner's theory:
"with its emphasis on structure to the exclusion of all other con¬
straints, SME does not simply discourage mappings between
non-identical but semanticaily similar items; it does not even
permit them." (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995, p. 258)
Holyoak and Thagard's criticism of the lack of seman¬
tic considerations in Gentner's theory carries a lot of intu¬
itive weight. It does seem a perverse, restrictive analogical
theory that rejects mappings between smaller-than and
less-mass_than in the course of an analogical mapping.
However, it is not necessarily so, and from the perspective
of a blurred distinction between analogy and categorisation, it
might actually be that rejecting such a mapping is necessary
per se, rather than necessarily perverse.
One reason for so-arguing stems from the results of our in¬
vestigations into the effects of systematic structure upon cat¬
egorisation judgements. Ramscar & Pain (1996) addressed
the question of whether analogy can be distinguished from
categorisation by contrasting categorisational and analogical
processes by presenting subjects with Gentner et al's anal¬
ogy materials and asking them to categorise them. Given
that Gentner et al define the analogical mechanism in terms
of structure mapping, and given our hypothesis that this pro¬
cess was not distinct from a basic categorisation process, we
expected structuremapping to determine categorisation. Gen¬
tner et al seem to implicitly assume that match items with only
structural similarities (i.e. analogues) belong to different cate¬
gories. We predicted that they would be categorised together.
We found that 79.5% of the groupings formed by our subjects
had only shared systematic structure (traditionally defined as
analogy) as a common feature amongst members of the cat¬
egories formed. In contrast, only 5% of groupings produced
had common object descriptions as the common similarity
across categories (i.e. the attribute matches often thought to
be determinate of categorisation). To the 79.5% of structural
congruity groupings could be added a further 8% of classifica¬
tions where structural additions to otherwise structurally con¬
gruent representations caused them to be classed singularly.
Thus we concluded that that mechanisms normally consid¬
ered to be analogical could also in fact support categorisation
tasks, and in this instance, no discernible difference could be
found between analogical and categorical behaviour.
This suggests that the process of classifying two terms to¬
gether (mapping smaller-than to less-mass-than) is no
different to the process of determining the analogy between
solar-system and hydrogen-\tom. Thus the process of
mapping smaller-than to less-mass-than seems to be
less a sub-process of the process of determining the analogy
between solar-system and hydrogen-atom and more like
the same process functioning in parallel.
Prototype Schemas? One possible objection to the above
would be that our characterisation of categorisation is incom¬
plete. It might be argued that analogical judgements may
not be easily distinguished from classification judgements,
but categorisation judgements can be. This claim relies on
the idea that categorisation doesn't involve that same map¬
ping process because it makes use of generalized 'prototyp¬
ical' schemas (Holyoak & Thagard advocate such a view
of categories in Holland et al, 1984). If smaller-than
and less-mass-than share the same prototypical schema,
then there will be no need to compute the similarity between
smaller-than and less-mass-than, since such similarity
can be confirmed merely by reference to the prototype1; and
it is this confirmatory reference-to-prototype that is modeled
by the semantic links in Holyoak and Thagard's theory.
There are a number of objections to such an account. Prac¬
tically, there is the problem of providing a convincing account
ofwhat a prototype category is (Medin & Ortony, 1989; Ram¬
scar & Pain, 1996). Prepositional schematic models of repre¬
sentation (some variety of which is assumed in the majority of
cognitive theories) have the power to store a combination of
both schemas and the exemplars from which such schemas are
constructed. Moreover, what is actually stored is the subject
of much debate: are just schemas stored? Fodor & Lepore
(1996) give many good reasons for doubting such a 'pure'
prototype schema theory. If both are stored, then how do
exemplars contribute to schemas? Some have advocated a
rejection of schemas altogether (e.g. Nosofsky, 1988), argu¬
ing that only exemplars are stored, and that new objects are
classified by comparison with stored exemplars, and the cal¬
culation of some kind of fit. A further experiment (Ramscar,
Pain & Lee, 1997) was designed to see whether analogical
theory could shed any light on the nature of subjects' stored
representations.
In their analogical recall experiments, Gentner et al (Gen¬
tner, Ratterman & Forbus, 1993) showed that analogical ac¬
cess relied primarily upon surface attribute (object) matches:
'Curiously, a footnote to Gentner, Ratterman & Forbus (1993)
states "SME's constraint of matching identical predicates assumes
canonical conceptual representations, not lexical strings. Two con¬
cepts that are similar but not identical (such as "bestow" and "be¬
queath") are assumed to be decomposed into a canonical representa¬
tion language so that their similarity is expressed as a partial identity
(... "give")", which suggests that this idea has widespread appeal; a
version of it has been advocated by the authors in the past (Ramscar,
Lee & Pain, 1996).
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stories with shared attributes were recalled from memory far
more readily than objects with shared structure, even though
subjects adjudged some of these stories to be less similar, and
inferences generated from them to be less sound with regards
to a base than the stories which possessed only shared struc¬
ture. We decided that this phenomenon might be useful in
exploring representation. In the course of the classification
experiment, subjects were asked to give their classes "a sim¬
ple descriptive name", which they could then associate with
their classification. By examining what attributes they could
recall that were associated with that name, we used Gentner
et aVs findings about structure versus attribute to shed some
light on the mental representation associated with the name.
If subjects stored some kind of abstracted prototype, then our
hypothesis was that attributes associated with the most proto¬
typical stories would be most readily retrieved from memory,
with other attributes recalled insofar as they were shared with
the prototypical story. On the other hand, if subjects stored
only exemplars, then the lack of context provided by a sim¬
ple class name should make it equally likely that attributes
associated with any given (or all) exemplar might be recalled.
with that name, and then use that exemplar as the stimulus
for recalling other class members; overall, only 10% of recall
tasks favour the former analysis, wheras some 71 % support
the latter. Thus as well as finding no evidence to support
stored prototypes, Ramscar, Pain & Lee (1997) provide evi¬
dence that only exemplars (instances) of categories are stored
(which strengthens the argument for not strongly distinguish¬
ing analogy and categorisation). It would seem that schemas
can't supply the necessary theoretical justification for seman¬
tic links.
Discussion
If we consider the schematic representation of the mapping
process in figure 2, Holyoak & Thagard model the mapping
of F onto G in analogy X Y by means of a semantic
link, whereas the evidence points towards a similar parallel
process for F -+ G and X -+• Y. We feel that this is an important
distinction: whereas Holyoak & Thagard model the semantic
similarity between smaller_than and less.mass.than as a
sub-process ofanalogy, it seems more likely that this similarity
is computed by the same process, in parallel2. This can be
seen most clearly via a fine-grained analysis of the predicates

















Figure 3; Predicate representations of smaller.than and
less-mass.than
Figure 2: Two views of the mapping process
The experiment yielded little evidence to support the hy¬
pothesis that subjects had abstracted and stored schemas from
the groups they had classified, despite the fact that it appeared
to be a shared structural schema that was the basis of subjects'
original classification decisions (Ramscar & Pain, 1996). In¬
stead, when Gentner, Ratterman & Forbus (1993)'s analysis
was applied to subjects' behaviour, it appeared that being pre¬
sented with a class name in no particular context caused the
subjects to randomly recall one of the exemplars associated
Since from our perspective, this mapping process is what
we mean when we talk about the 'analogical' process, it fol¬
lows that there is no room for a semantic similarity constraint
in a cognitive theory of analogy (or at least, it follows that
before one can posit such a constraint, one will have to suc¬
cessfully distinguish 'analogy' from 'categorisation'). None
of which means that we rule out the use of semantic links in
mapping networks— rather, we suggests that they should be
2We are not saying that all similarities are calculated this way;
what is true for relational predicates may not be true for others. It
seems unlikely that structure mapping will feature in red vs. crimson.
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seen as implementationaJ details within a model, rather than
embodiments of psychological theory.
One possible benefit to be gained from removing the seman¬
tic and pragmatic constraints3 from Holyoak and Thagard's
model is that it can allow a straightforward comparison be¬
tween the structural elements in both theories to be made.
Isomorphic mapping in multi-constraint theory differs from
Gentner's structure mapping in a number of details; our next
step is to evaluate the significance of these details by spec¬
ifying both theories in a common, executable, specification
language. Similarities and differences between the theories
are currently blurred by the ambiguities of the language (En¬
glish) in which they are stated. Whilst computational imple¬
mentations of both theories exists, those implementations do
not fully clarify either theory because they make no distinc¬
tion between theoretical claims and implementational details.
This is part of a broader issue: cognitive science is in need
of tools and techniques in which to precisely state theoreti¬
cal proposals so that their assumptions and implications are
clear and comparison is possible (c.f. Cooper, Fox, Farring-
don & Shallice, 1996). We are currently using the COGENT
modelling environment (Cooper & Fox, 1997) to develop ex¬
ecutable specifications of both structure-mapping theory and
multi-constraint theory. It is our strong belief that this work
will demonstrate that, modulo semantic similarity, the theories
differ mainly in implemenation details.
The COGENTmodels will also provide a framework in which
to explore more thoroughly issues of represention. We noted
above the lack of focus on representation in analogical mod¬
els (a point made frequently by Hofstadter, 1995). We have
demonstrated that analogical process models can yield in¬
teresting results when applied to categorisation tasks (where
perhaps too much focus is given to representation, c.f. Fodor
& Lepore, 1996). Is it too much to hope that a similar cross-
fertilisation might ultimately flesh out analogy's decidedly
anorexic picture of representation?
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Abstract
We argue that the key question in conceptual storage is
best viewed not as a question of instances versus
generalisations, but rather one of unitary versus multiple
representation accounts of conceptual storage. On
previous evidence, it has been difficult to determine
whether a particular result stems from stored information
regarding the concept or from the processes that operate
in invoking a particular concept (Komatsu, 1992). In
this paper, we attempt to shed some light on the nature
of stored conceptual structure using the different
influences that surface and structural features have been
shown to have on the recall of a particular representation
(Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus, 1993). We conclude
that at least some concepts may not be stored using a
unitary representation.
Introduction
What is stored in the mind when a person learns a new
category? What kind of mental representation (or
representations) determine judgements of whether things
are to be classed as bicycles, pianos, theories, or games,
etc.? These questions lie at the heart of any understanding
of human conceptual prowess, and a range of potential
answers have been offered in their solution, ranging from
necessary and sufficient essences, through defining
prototypes, to averages of individual examples: the
propositional schematic models of representation used to
frame most theories of categorisation have the power to
accommodate a combination of defining schemas and/or
the examples from which schemas could be constructed
with equal coherence, a flexibility that theorists have
exploited to the full.
Whilst the work of Wittgenstein (1953) and Rosch,
(1978) has tempered enthusiasm amongst researchers for
classical essentialist accounts of conceptual storage, there
has been much debate about the nature and plausibility of
some form of prototype schema as a basis for conceptual
storage (see Komatsu, 1992 for a discussion), though
what is actually stored is the subject of much debate:
Fodor and Lepore (1996) give many good reasons for
doubting pure prototype theory, whereby just schemas are
stored, whilst Nosofsky (1988) advocates a rejection of
stored schemas altogether arguing that only examples are
stored, and that new objects are classified by a process of
comparison with stored examples. Other researchers favour
some kind of theoretical framework as a basis for category
storage (e.g. Medin and Ortony, 1989; Keil, 1989)
One point that has eluded many discussions of
conceptual storage is that debates about the nature of
representations revolve around questions of granularity
rather then principle. As Borges (1962) succinctly
demonstrates in the much quoted Funes the Memorius,
even an 'instance' is a generalisation of sorts. When
Funes struggles to
'comprehend that the generic symbol dog embraces so many
unlike individuals... it bothered him that the that the dog seen at
3.14 (seen from the side) should have the same name as the dog
at 3.15 (seen from the front).' Borges (1962) pp 93-94
he encounters the following problem: if the concept of
dog determines whether things we encounter are dogs, then
in the same fashion the concept Spot must similarly unite
a certain class of experiences of a particular dog as being
experiences of Spot the dog, and so on.
Once this factor is considered, we argue that the key
question in conceptual storage is best viewed not as a
question of instances versus generalisatiqns, but rather one
of unitary versus multiple representation accounts of
conceptual storage. Unitary accounts of categorisation
posit a single stored representation - schema, prototype or,
perhaps, theory - in virtue of which items are classified
into a category as the outcome of some process. Multiple
representational accounts posit the storage of a number of
representations, perhaps at different levels of granularity,
from 'instances' (as Malt (1995) argues, regularities -
perhaps as a result of perceptual constraints - are
inevitable at some level) to broad intermediate
generalisations, which may jointly or individually result
in some object being categorised as the outcome of some
process.
Different models of conceptual representation have
different implications for theories of categorisation. If a
unitary representation model is correct, then one would
expect that provided one could specify the stored
representation and the process by which objects were
related to it, one should in principle be able to give a
definitive account of, say why it is some things are X's.
On the other hand, a multi-representational account might
not admit any definitive account of X's at all, since the
multiplicity of relations between the differing stored
representations that could influence an object's X-ness
might preclude any kind of general account. A specific
object's X-ness might be dependent upon that - and only
that - objects' interaction with a particular subset of the
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stored elements relating to X-ness, and the concomitant
process by which X-ness is adjudged.
A problem in much research into categorisation is that
experimental results have rarely - if ever - directly
indicated anything about conceptual representation. As
Komatsu (1992) concisely notes, it is difficult to
determine whether particular results stem from stored
information regarding concepts (e.g. prepositional or
imaginal information) or from the processes that operate
in invoicing a particular concept (c.f. Smith and Medin,
1981). The vast majority of theories discussed in
Komatsu's (1992) comprehensive review assume a
'straight' unitary representation, the exception being
granular instance-based approaches to categorisation, and
perhaps explanation-based approaches (although the lack
of any specific formulation of an explanation (or theory)
based model of categorisation makes it impossible to
deduce the kind of stored representations such a theory
would entail).
In the light of these considerations, we feel that direct
evidence regarding the nature of the storage of a concept,
or concepts, could have important implications for the
way categories are viewed: especially if that evidence fails
to support a unitary-representation account.
A process model
In previous work (Ramscar and Pain,. 1996) we have
questioned an intuitive distinction - held by most
psychological researchers - between analogy and metaphor
on one hand, and categorisation on the other. We have
argued that although one might ordinarily distinguish
between category membership and analogy according to
realist terms, there are good reasons for treating this
distinction with caution at a theoretical level, especially
when we focus upon cognitive processes.
The argument for this is twofold. Firstly, in principle:
any intuitive, pre-theoretical distinction between real
(intra-categorical) and metaphorical or analogical (inter-
categorical) cognisance hinges upon a contrast definition
that sits ill with what we know empirically and
theoretically about categorisation. Analogy and metaphor
are consistently defined in contrast to categorisation (e.g.
Holyoak and Thagard, 1995); yet a contrast definition
relies on an account of the element with which the
contrast is to be drawn: the message of many years of
empirical and theoretical work (Wittgenstein, 1953;
Rosch, 1978; Barsalou, 1983; Murphy and Medin, 1985)
is that there is no clear account of intra-categorical
associations between individual items with which
supposedly inter-categorical associations can be contrasted.
Our dubiety towards this distinction is further borne out
by analyses of reaction time studies. For instance,
Hoffman and Kemper (1987) review of a number of
reaction time studies amply demonstrates the absence of
evidence for (and amount of evidence against) the widely
held belief that literal (intra-categorical) meanings are
processed faster than metaphorical (inter-categorical)
meanings (Recanati (1995) also reviews some interesting
evidence contra the 'two-process' approach).
Further support for this position comes from an earlier
study (Ramscar and Pain, 1996) which used Gentner's
(1983) Structure Mapping Theory (SMT) to address the
question of whether analogy can be distinguished from
categorisation by contrasting categorisational with
analogical processes.1 Gentner's theory proposes that in
mapping and inference between two representations,
systems of relations will be mapped in preference to
individual features, and that higher order relations -
relations between relations - will be mapped in preference
to lower order and fust-order (relations between objects)
relations: the systematicity principle (Gentner, 1983).
Ramscar and Pain's (1996) subjects were presented with
Gentner et al's materials and asked to categorise them. It
was expected that structure mapping would determine
categorisation as well as analogy: i.e. Gentner's theory
assumed that match items with only structural similarities
('analogues') belong to different categories: Ramscar and
Pain predicted that they would be 'categorised' together.
Ramscar and Pain found that a significant majority of the
groupings formed by subjects had only shared systematic
structure (traditionally defined as analogy) as a common
feature amongst members of the categories formed, and
that the process underlying subjects' categorising could be
modelled - and hence predicted - by SMT; they concluded
that there was nothing to distinguish subject's analogical
from their categorisational behaviour. These results were
replicated by Darrington, Lingstadt and Ramscar (1998)
who discovered that subjects would even use shared
structure in novel object descriptions to over-ride existing
category groupings.
Our second argument is a pragmadc one. Analogy
models can provide a framework through which the
interactions between representation and process can be
predicted and observed. Traditionally categorisation models
have concentrated on object descriptions, making use of
very representationally-simple attribute-value lists
(Murphy & Medin, 1985), whereas analogy research has
examined relationships between highly structured
representations (considering the influence of attributes,
relations and higher-order relations in judgements of
similarity). Research into analogy differs from research
into categorisation is in the richness of its process
models. A number of detailed, plausible, well accepted
models of the analogical process exist (Holyoak and
Thagard, 1995; Forbus, Gentner & Law, 1995): the same
cannot be said of existing categorisation models. Research
in analogy has focused upon the processes ofmapping and
inference between representations, and the interplay
between this process and those representations rather than
simply determining what kind of mappings certain static
representations allow, a characteristic of much
categorisation research (c.f. Komatsu, 1992).
Representation and process
A series of studies by Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus
(1993) has explored the factors determining how items are
accessed, i.e. how representations are selected in order to
allow similarity mapping to take place. These have shown
that access relies primarily upon surface attribute (or
object attribute) matches, and they propose that the
1 Though developed as a theory of analogy, SMT is now considered
by Gentner to apply more generally as a theory of similarity.
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process underlying judgements of similarity can be
decomposed into two sub-processes:
•Accessing a similar (base) situation from memory, based
primarily on surface similarity
• Creating a mapping from base to target using structural
commonalities (SMT).
We believe that this process model can offer a solution
to the difficulties, mention above, of determining whether
particular effects result from stored representations or from
the processes that operate in invoking representations. The
following experiment was designed to use this detailed
model of the processes that determine the retrieval and
mapping (and classifying) of representations to
empirically probe the nature of conceptual storage.
The Experiment
In the course of Ramscar and Pain's (1996)2 classification
experiment, subjects were asked to give each of their
classes a name that was meaningful to them. Because of
the particular nature of that task, this involved subjects
developing (and learning) 'categories' that contained some
items that had only structural relations in common. By
examining the attributes they could recall that were
associated with that name, we aimed to use Gentner et al's
findings about systematic structures vs. attributes to
determine the representation associated with the name. If
subjects stored some kind of abstracted prototype - i.e. a
unitary representation of their category - we would expect
that the attributes associated with the most prototypical
stories would be most readily retrieved from memory,
with attributes recalled insofar as they were relevant to the
prototype (perhaps along the frequency lines one might
expect from the analysis in table 1).
Story I - Base story
Once there was a teacher named Mrs. Jackson who wanted a salary
increase. One day, the principal said that he was increasing his own
salary by 20 percent. However, he said there was not enough money
to give the teachers a salary increase.
When Mrs. Jackson heard this she became so angry that she decided
to take revenge. The next day, Mrs. Jackson used gasoline to set fire to
the principal's office.
Then she went to a bar and got drunk.
Story 2 - Literal similarity
Professor Rosie McGhee very much wanted a raise. One day the
provost announced that he was giving himself a raise. However, he
said that since money was short, no one else would get a raise this year.
After Professor McGhee heard this she became so upset that she
decided to get even. One hour later, Professor McGhee blew up the
administration building with dynamite.
Story 3 ■ True Analogy
McGhee was a sailor who wanted a few days of vacation on land.
One day, the captain announced that he would be taking a vacation in
the mountains. However, he said everyone else would have to remain
on the ship.
After McGhee heard this he became so upset that he decided to get
revenge. Within an hour McGhee blew up the captain's cabin with
dynamite.
Figure 1: Sample stories from Gentner, et al (1993) - the text in bold
We did not expect this to happen There is too much
empirical and theoretical work that cannot be
accommodated by a unitary representation account
(Wittgenstein, 1953; Rosch, 1978). Our hypothesis was
that subjects would not have abstracted a unitary
representation from the stimuli that they had classed
together, but would instead have stored a number of
representations that they associated with the relevant class
name. We predicted that introducing a class name out of
context would make it equally likely that any given stored
representation associated with that name would be recalled,
with the representation recalled initially driving further
recall. Since our model of recall is feature driven, we
expected results to polarise, with those representations
with few surface attributes in common leading to minimal
recall of oneanother, and those with many surface
attributes in common leading to good recall of oneanother
Subjects
The subjects were 20 volunteers, a mixture of
postgraduate and undergraduate students from the Artificial
Intelligence Department at the University of Edinburgh.
Materials
Materials were the classified sets of "Karla the hawk"
stories (Gentner, Ratterman & Forbus, 1993; see figure 1
for examples) produced by the subjects in Ramscar and
Pain (1996). Each set contains 3 stories, and taking one
story as a base, the following taxonomy of similarity
relationships between the stories in a set can be defined:
'Literal similarity (LS) matches to base include both
common relational structure and common object
descriptions;
'Structural similarity, (SS) match based upon a common
system of internal relations with base.
Thus each set comprised a base (B), a story literally
similar to it (LS), one structurally similar to it (SS - i.e.
with no object attributes in common with the base,
although SS stories did share some object attributes with
LS). In order to determine the relative effects of object
versus structural matches in this experiment, the "Karla
the Hawk" stories were analysed and rated to determine the
level of attribute commonalities between the individual
stories in each set.
Two raters gave a numeric value to each of a range of
possible surface attribute correspondences between stories
(see figure 2 for details), and then individual attribute
correspondences were totalled and averaged between the
two raters in order to determine the overall
correspondences between stories (table 1). Consistency








'analogical' association conned, robbed
fireman, paramedic








Fred. Bill (both names) 1 pt
fireman, accountant (both jobs)
2 The experiment discussed here was conducted alongside Ramscar
and Pain's study; this is the first time it has been analysed and reported.
weak association
Figure 2: Classification criteria for determining surface similarity.
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Set B-LS LS-SS SS-B
1 100 90 85
2 100 100 85
3 100 65 45
. 4 100 55 45
5 100 85 55
6 100 85 75
7 100 75 60
a 100 70 45
9 100 85 65
10 100 75 60
11 . 100 95 75
12 100 75 60
- 13 100 75 50
14 100 95 70
1 5 100 50 35
16 100 95 75
17 95 100 70
1 8 100 80 55
19 100 80 60
20 100 100 60
Table 1: Object attribute (surface feature) similarity ratios between
stories by set.
Procedure
During the classification task (Ramscar & Pain, 1996, see
above), subjects were asked to give each of the classes
they produced a name that 'would be meaningful to them
later'. After finishing the classification task, each subject
was given a 5 minute break, and then undertook a 20
minute diversionary task (searching for post-codes from a
directory) before being given another 5 minute break. The
same subjects were then presented with a sub-set (usually
4) of the names they had assigned to classes during the
classification task, and asked to 'write down what you can
remember about the various features (or you may like to
see them as attributes) of each of the scenarios associated
with each name. E.g. you may have had a scenario about a
door that needed varnishing." Features, or attributes,
associated with such a scenario would be "door" and
"varnishing"'. Subjects were given 10 minutes to
complete the task.
Results
The 20 subjects yielded a total of 70 recall episodes.
Scoring
The recalled features were evaluated by two judges using
the same scale that was used to evaluate feature
correspondences between stories (see figure 2). Points
were awarded for correspondences between features named
by the subjects and the actual feature name in each given
story in order to get a reflection of the accuracy of each
individual recall episode. The total attribute recall for each
story was calculated and averaged between raters.
Consistency between raters was 84.1%; as in the rating of
story commonalities, differences between the raters were
resolved by discussion.
Individual Story Recall
B was best recalled story for 37% of all recall episodes,
SS in 30% of cases and LS in 33%; as predicted, there
was no significant bias towards recalling any particular
type of story. However, when we looked at the pattern of
recollection, irrespective of the particular stories each
subject had recalled, there were significances in the quality
of recall between the best recalled and the next best, and
the next-best and the worst recalled stories. Subjects
tended to clearly recall one story better (70 cases, Mean
(M) = 19.75) than the next (M - 14.74), (within groups
t(69) = 8.846, p < 0.0001), and then these next best
recalled stories better than the worst (M = 11.1), r(69) =
11.802 p < 0.0001.
Individual Recall Orderings By Story Type
Base (B)
In cases where B was the most recalled story in terms of
features (26 cases, M = 18.44), there was a significant
difference in the quality of recall over the next best recalled
stop' type, LS (M = 14.83), r(25) = 4.434 p < 0.0001,
which in turn was recalled significantly more than SS (M
= 10.15), r(25) = 3.77 p< 0.0001.
Literal Similarity (LSI
When LS was the best recalled story (M = 20.78), next
best was B (23 cases, M = 15.85), r(22) = 5.288 p <
0.0001, with SS recalled least well (M = 11.96), r(22) =
2.095 p < 0.05.
Structural Similarity CSS)
In cases where SS stories were qualitatively best recalled
(21 cases, M = 20.12), the next best recalled type was LS,
(M = 13.43), r(20) = 5.886 p = < 0.0001, and the least
recalled type was B (M = 11.36), although the between
type difference between LS and B was not significant
(f(20) = 1.901 p < 0.072); the difference in recall quality
between SS and B was still significant (r(20) = 6.609 p <
0.0001).
B Best Recalled Next Best - LS Next Best - SS
26 cases;
Mean = 18.44
Mean = 14.83 Mean = 10.15
LS Best Recalled Next Best - B Next Best - SS
23 cases;
Mean = 20.78
Mean = 15.85 Mean = 11.96
SS Best Recalled Next Best - LS Next Best - B
21 cases;
Mean = 20.12
Mean = 13.43 Mean =11.36
Table 2: Mean recall orderings by story type
Discussion
The experiment produced little evidence to support a belief
that our subjects had abstracted and stored schemas from
the groups they had classified, despite the fact that a shared
structural schema was the basis of subjects' original
classification decisions (Ramscar & Pain, 1996). If some
version of a stored prototype theory were true, we expected
a majority of LS features to be recalled in most instances.
In fact, B features were most often recalled, though not
significantly; the trend favoured a random distribution.
Another result that might also favour prototype theory
would have been a situation where all the stories were
recalled with much the same frequency, i.e. LS=B=SS,
since such a result could be a product of the strong feature
commonalities between the LS stories .and members of
both of the other story types. However, there was a
significant trend for subjects to recall one story more than
another, and the next best story more than the least
recalled story.
One criticism of this initial conclusion might be that
our task, by asking subjects to write down features
862
associated with individual scenarios, biased against recall
of a single unitary or abstracted representation. However,
again, given that LS story set attributes formed the
intersection of the sets of features for all of the story sets,
we would expect any unitary or abstracted representation
of all of the stories in a given set to contain mainly LS
story set attributes and to cause a majority of LS story set
attributes to be recalled. Clearly, this was not the case.
If subjects randomly recalled an individual instance of a
class then we would expect from Gentner et al's similarity
recall findings that the attributes of this instance should
influence which other story they might recall from the
class: if B is recalled, recall of a B story should prompt
recall of an LS story over a SS story, as B shares more
surface attributes with LS than SS (B and LS share 10
surface attributes to every 6 shared by B and SS), and
Gentner et al's findings were that surface attributes rather
than shared structure promote recall: where B features were
best recalled this pattern emerged throughout our study.
As we predicted, as a result of LS stories sharing a higher
percentage of surface attributes with B than SS shared
with B, recall of B led to a significantly higher quality of
recall for LS than SS. The results where LS stories were
most strongly recalled also supported this analysis, with
SS recall prompting significantly better recall of B
attributes than SS attributes (even though, comparatively,
LS shared more surface features with SS than SS-B).
Indicative of the fact that SS shared fewer surface
commonalities with the other story types, (SS-LS
attribute commonalities were much weaker than B-LS, and
in specific sets little greater than B-SS; see table 1), good
SS recall did not produce a bias towards LS or B as the
next-best recalled story type; although our results showed
some tendency towards SS prompting LS over B, it was
not significant (see also table 2).
Our hypothesis that subjects would recall stories
individually from memory is further supported by the
nature of subject's recollection. Irrespective of the
particular stories each subject had recalled, there were
significances in the quality of recall between the best
recalled, and the next best, and the next-best and the worst
recalled stories.
A possibility that we cannot eliminate in this instance
is that subjects may have been influenced by the order in
which stories were presented. In our study, presentation
was randomised in a manner that made it impossible to
correlate presentation and recall orderings. However, as we
noted above, there is a very strong correlation between the
features of the LS story in each set and the features of an
idealised prototype of that set (i.e. LS features, especially
at the level of names of relations, are most typical of all
members). Since subjects, who used shared structure to
group the stories, did not show a tendency to recall LS
features best, any correlation between presentation order
and recall order could only further support the case against
some shared representation having been abstracted and
stored.
Applying Gentner, et al's (1993) persuasive analysis of
the influence of surface vs. deep structure on recall to our
results, it would appear that being presented with a class
name in no particular context caused the subjects to
randomly recall one of the examples associated with that
name, and then use that example as the stimulus for
recalling other class members. On this evidence, it would
appear that subjects had stored class examples along with
a cue - the class name - rather than any generalisation of
the class itself. These findings suggest that at least some
concepts are stored as multiple-representations, rather than
as unitary conceptual schemas.
General Discussion
We have shown in this paper that subjects if subjects
name a class whose membership is determined entirely by
shared structure, they can retrieve information regarding its
members without appearing to abstract a common schema
definitive of that class. Such evidence for a non-unitary
account of category representation should not come as a
surprise: the literature is filled with material that casts
doubt of the plausibility of unitary accounts of concept
representation (Wittgenstein, 1953; Rosch, 1978;
Komatsu, 1992).
Our interpretation of these findings does not however
lead us automatically to the view that 'category'
associations are exclusively driven by examples; rather,
we subscribe to the view put forward by Wittgenstein
(1953; see also Ramscar, 1997). Wittgenstein provides a
number of good reasons to believe that human 'categories'
cannot be given simple unitary accounts that are amenable
to definition by a single schema; he also questions what
could be intrinsic to a 'generalised' category schema that
would cause it to be used differently to an example of that
which it was supposed to be a generalisation of. We find
these questions compelling. At the same time, experience,
intuition and a respect for natural parsimony makes us
wary - though in practice rather than in principle - of
jumping to the conclusion that ail categorical associations
are a sum of processed similarities with all stored
exemplars. We would argue, however, that progress is not
contingent on finding a solution to the question of exactly
how categories are represented. It is the process of
association that is important to us, and from a processing
point of view, the question of whether a stored schema
relates to an example or some intermediate generalisation
is not necessarily important. What is important, from the
point of view of processing, is to show how stored
representations (whatever their exact nature) relating to the
individual surface elements (the feature 'nodes' in SMT)
comprising the schemas that represent items being
associated in the manner described in structure mapping
theory are recursively processed in turn, such that the
'network of similarities that determines a given
association can settle (see Ramscar, Pain and Cooper
(1997) for an illustration of our recursive view of the
associative mapping process).
Another advantage of viewing categorisation from a
process oriented perspective is that it offers up the
possibility of bridging the divide between two seemingly
conflicting accounts of categorisation: similarity-based
accounts, and more rationalist 'theory-based' accounts.
Whilst similarity-based accounts of categorisation (e.g.
Rosch, 1978) can capture much of the nature of our long-
term categories (that they have no explicit definitions, and
that there are usually a number of properties that are
generally associated with 'categories'), they have been
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criticised for failing to capture the explanatory power of
categories, and for failing to explain why people may
categorise in ways that go beyond surface similarity
(Medin and Ortony, 1989). Keil (1989) notes that whilst
children's concepts are based upon pure similarity -
'original sim' - these then get replaced with more
theoretically based conceptual understandings as . a child
develops (see also Murphy and Medin, 1985; Medin and
Ortony, 1989).
What these theory based accounts lack is any clear
description of the process by which theories are supposed
to govern categorisation, or, importantly, exactly what
kind of theoretical understandings are supposed to underpin
human conceptual understandings which are notoriously
vague and often incoherent. We believe that Gentner's
(1983) insight, that relations between features (i.e.
constraints) can drive computations of similarity, can go
at least some way towards squaring this apparent circle.
The assumption that similarity cannot account for the
apparent theoretical notion of categorical associations
stems from the assumption that similarity is driven by
features alone. When the relational constraints that drive
the similarity comparison process are considered, and once
a richer notion of mental representation than unrelated
feature clusters is included in the picture, it is possible to
see how similarity can provide an account of the
associative process that determines human categorisation
decisions which capture their theoretical flavour,3 without
entailing theoretical accounts of individual 'categories'
which by their nature (c.f. Wittgenstein, 1953) are more
of the nature of underdetermined collections of
generalisation, similarity and history than they are unitary
'theoretical' endties.
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Abstract
Analogy has traditionally been defined in terms of a
contrast definition: analogies represent connections
between things which are distinct from the 'normal'
connections determined by our 'ordinary' concepts and
categories. In this paper we present empirical evidence
which, when added to other findings, supports our argument
that in the light of current knowledge, the distinction
between the two is based more on folk-psychology than on
empirically based theory.
Research into analogy is however, distinct from
research into categorisation when it comes to the richness
of its process models. A number of detailed, plausible
models of the analogical process exist (Forbus, Gentner
and Law, 1995; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995): the same
cannot be said of categorisation. On the other hand, these
analogical process models make a number of explicit and
implicit assumptions regarding an 'external' categorical
process. Whilst treating these processes as separate has
been useful in constraining the scope of cognitive
investigations, we argue that it ultimately confuses the
relationship between analogy and categorisation and is
hampering the progress towards further understanding of
both.
Introduction
The belief that analogy and categorisation are distinct and
separable cognitive processes has widespread appeal. In our
ordinary lives we unquestioningly accept an ontology that
distinguishes between literality - saying what something
'really' is - and analogies and metaphors, which, however
informative they may be, are nevertheless not considered to
be real statements about the world. We might talk of "the
foundations of a theory"; we might wish to "buttress a
theory with more facts"; "theories that we construct can also
collapse", but from our everyday viewpoints, an igloo and a
castle and a skyscraper really are similar in a way that
similarities between buildings and theories are not; we can
talk of someone's foxy cunning without really meaning to
directly equate the cognition of fox and human cunning.
French (1995) describes an experience of suggesting to an
academic audience that an upturned orange-crate, when
covered with a cloth and laid out with a picnic, might really
be described as a table. This met with the swift response,
"An orange crate is an orange crate is an orange crate." The
' This ordering is alphabetical: the authors all contributed
fully to the experiment and the composition of this paper.
attachment to pre-theoretical intuitions is a strong one, even
amongst those who seek to explore them.
Research into categorisation, analogy and metaphor has
accepted this realism, as indeed for a large part has cognitive
science in general. Holyoak and Thagard (1995) describe a
world in which "we think we see things as they really arc",
and analogy is used in order to recycle our existing
knowledge of the real world to formulate new bits of 'real'
knowledge.
Ramscar and Pain (1996) quesuoned the basis of these
everyday distinctions in theory by querying the formulauons
that are offered in their defence. Analogy and metaphor are
defined in contrast to 'categories' - Holyoak and Thagard
(1995) describe analogy and metaphor as something that
"connects two domains in a way that goes beyond our
normal category structure" (pp 217) - a definidon that does
nothing definite by way of defining when we consider the
account that can be provided of what constitutes a 'normal
category structure' (c.f. Komatsu, 1992).
Empirical evidence was introduced to support this dispute
regarding current definitions: Ramscar and Pain examined
whether analogy could be distinguished from categorisation
by contrasting the two processes. They presented
participants with Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus' (1993)
classic analogy materials (the 'Karla the Hawk' stories) and
asked them to categorise them. Given that Gentner et al
define the analogical mechanism in terms of structure
mapping theory (see below for a full account), Ramscar and
Pain hypothesised that assuming that the 'analogical'
process was not distinct from the basic categorisation
process, structure mapping would determine categorisation.
Gentner et al assumed that match items with only
structural similarities (i.e. analogues) should be considered
as belonging to different categories. Ramscar and Pain
predicted that they would be categorised together. They found
that 79.5% of the groupings formed by participants in. their
study had only shared systematic structure (traditionally
defined as analogy) as a common feature amongst members
of the categories formed. In contrast, only 5% of groupings
produced had common object descriptions as the common
similarity across categories (i.e. the attribute matches often
thought to be determinate of categorisation). To the 79.5%
of structural congruity groupings could be added a further 8%
of classifications where structural additions to otherwise
structurally congruent representations caused them to be
classed singularly. Ramscar and Pain concluded that that
mechanisms normally considered to be analogical -
specifically the preference for mapping systematically
similar structures - could also in fact support categorisation
tasks, and that in their study no discernible difference could
be found between analogical and categorical behaviour.
Ramscar and Pain's study can be added to other theoretical
and empirical evidence which casts doubt on a two-process
account of literal (categorical) versus non-literal (analogical
or metaphorical) reasoning, such as Hoffman and Kemper's
(1987) review of a number of reaction time studies which
also convincingly demonstrates the paucity of the evidence
for the widely held belief that literal (intra-categorical)
meanings are processed faster than metaphorical (inter-
categorical) meanings (as well as the considerable evidence
for the opposite effect; see also R6canati, 1995).
Despite the weight of evidence contra the two-process
account - and the concomitant lack of evidence for it -
suggestions which violate the two processes-account still
tend to meet with some incredulity (c.f. French, 1995,
above). The belief that an orange crate is an orange crate is
an orange crate holds great sway. Indeed, such is the two-
process account's entrenchment in ordinary, pre-theoretical
understandings of the world that a more than usual quantity
of counter-evidence seems to be required simply for the two-
process account to be subjected to the usual standards of
scientific and theoretical justification. And, whilst Ramscar
and Pain's (1996) study might apply to classifying stories
their study provides little evidence that this classification of
stories can be generalised to other categorisation behaviour.
Structural systematicity and 'normal' categories
The following experiment was designed to offer more
evidence for Ramscar and Pain's (1996) claim that a sub-
process rather than two-process view should be taken of the
relationship between analogy and categorisation (and thus
add further support to Medin, Goldstone and Gentner's
(1993) contention that structure-mapping may play an
important part in categorisation). The Ramscar and Pain
study utilised the 'Karla the Hawk' story sets (Gentner at al,
1993). These were designed as materials for studying
analogy, and comprised a number of scenarios, typically
episodic stories, with a controlled variance of relations
between the narrative features of each story set member. In
order to demonstrate the generalisability of Ramscar and
Pain's findings, we designed a new set of materials, based on
the 'Karia the Hawk' sets, but which rather than being
stories, were sets of descriptions of novel objects (again,
with a controlled variance of relations between the narrative
features of each set member; see Figure 1).
The principle reasoning behind this is straightforward:
typical 'natural' categories - the kind of categories found and
used in human societies - tend to concern objects - and other,
more regular 'things in the world' - rather than stories
(Rosch, 1978). Classifying objects is more akin to ordinary
categorisation than classifying stories (though a set of
descriptions of 'rituals' was also included to reflect the fact
ordinary categories reflect a good deal more than just
physical regularities). Thus, the resulting object descriptions
fell neatly and clearly into 'normal' categories (Figure 2).
Ramscar and Pain showed that shared structural
systematicity (Gentner, 1983; see below) - typically defined
as analogy - was the key determinant in participants'
categorising in their study. In the light of this finding, we
hypothesised that because structural commonalities in the
object description sets ran across the 'normal' categories
embodied in the set's object descriptions, these 'normal'
category boundaries would be ignored as participants
categorised objects according to shared structure.
Base
'
A Karla is a novel type of cooking pot, used by the
Timuni in Alnata.
The structure of the Karla is designed in order to reduce the
heat inside, and therefore prevents the food getting burned in
the scorching cooking fires.
Water is poured into a layer of the Karla during cooking,
which cools the food.
Literal Similarity
The Valkri is a special kind of frying pan, used by the
Jalpeni in Frodon.
The Valkri is created in such a way as to be able to reduce
heat, thereby preventing meat being getting bumed when
using the extreme temperatures of the cooking fires.
A liquid is poured into the layers of the frying pan when
cooking, which cools the temperature of the meat.
Structural Similarity Only
The Vubu is a special wall built by the Jakar tribesmen in
Frodon.
The Vubu is built in such a way as to be able to reduce
the heat within it, thereby preventing the Jakar from
sweating too much in the extreme temperatures of the
midday sun.
A liquid is pumped through the Vubu, which cools the
stone and therefore prevents the Jakar within the walls from
getting too hot.
Mere Appearance
The people of Frodon use a special type of frying pan,
known as the Valkri.
The Valkri is designed in order to allow it to be handled
by children, as this can be difficult.
Its handle is designed with a special U-shape, which
enables it to be held by people with small hands.
Structurally Similar to MA
The Jakar tribesmen of Frodon have built a special wall
known as the Vubu.
The Vubu's stone gates can be opened by elderly people,
despite their heavy weight.
Handles set in the wall incorporate springs, which allow
weaker people to open the gates.
Objects Only
A new type of cooking pot, called the Karla, is used by
the people of Alnata. Karlas can be purchased in a range of
colours. Food cooked in a Karla tastes great.




Object Sets B LS SSO MA SMAO 00
SET 1 plant plant tribe plant tribe plant
SET 2 country ruler country ruler leading animal country ruler leading animal country ruler
SET 3 board game board game field game board game field game board game
SET 4 animal animal tribe animal tribe animal
SET 5 cooking utensil cooking utensil wall cooking utensil wall cooking utensil
SET 6 animal animal priest animal priest animal
SET 7 chant chant game chant game chant
SET 8 food food drink food drink food
Figure 2: 'Normal' categories embodied in each object description set.
Gentner's structure mapping theory of similarity
Gentner's (1983; Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner, 1989)
Structure Mapping Theory (SMT) is well known, and we
include only a brief account of the most salient aspects here.
SMT proposes that the mapping and inference between
two representations can be achieved by assigning
correspondences between objects and attributes and then
mapping predicates with identical names. In order to do this,
Gentner assumes a predicate-like representation
distinguishing between objects, object-attributes and
relations. Object-attributes are those predicates that have one
argument and describe object properties. Relations are
divided into a hierarchy of orders, with those predicates with
two or more arguments which are used to describe relations
between objects forming the lowest order, and those
predicates describing different levels of relationships between
relations forming the higher orders.
The theory itself comprises two parts: mapping rules and
the systematicity principle. Mapping rules state that (a)
attributes of objects are not mapped and (b) relations
between objects are preserved. The systematicity principle
requires that higher order relations are mapped preferendally,
followed by the relations that constitute the higher order
arguments. Ramscar and Pain (1996) showed that
participants' classification of stories could be predicted and
explained according to SMT.
The Experiment
Participants
20 volunteers participated in this experiment. The
participants were a mixture of Artificial Intelligence and
Psychology students from the University of Edinburgh.
Materials
The basic materials used for this study were 8 sets of 'Karla
the Pot' novel object descriptions (see Figure 1 for
examples). These were descriptions of objects created to
replicate the framework used by Gentner, Ratterman and
Forbus (1993) in the creation of the "Karla the Hawk"
stories.
As with the materials used by Gentner et al, the following
taxonomy of similarity relationships between the object
descriptions was defined:
- "Literal similarity" matches include both common
relational structure and common object attributes;
- "Surface matches" are based upon common object
attributes, plus some first order relations;
- "Structural similarity" matches are based upon a
common system of internal relations;
- "First order" matches only have first order relations as a
common feature;
- "Object only" matches only have object matches in
common between the object descriptions.
Each of our sets consists of a base (B), a literally similar
object description (LS), an object description that shared the
same structure as the base, but no object attributes (SSO), a
mere-appearance object description, with surface and first
order commonalities with the base (MA), an object
description which shared structure with the MA, and object
attributes with the SSO (SMAO), and an object only match
object description, with only surface attribute commonalities
with the base (00). This allowed for a number of potential
groupings to be formed, according to the classification
strategy participants adopted.
We predicted that despite the fact that we were using novel
object descriptions which embodied existing categories rather
than Gentner et al's relatively 'category-neutral' stories,
participants would again use structural similarity as their
categorical similarity determinant, putting analogues and
bases into the same categories (i.e. B, LS and SSO
together), rather than grouping match items at the object
level (i.e. grouping B, LS, MA and 00 together; which also
equated to existing category membership; see figure 2).
Procedure
Each participant was presented with eight envelopes, each
containing a different set of six novel object descriptions,
and was asked to work through them one set at a time. Sets
were presented in random order, as were the object
descriptions within them.
Participants were instructed to read through the object
descriptions within a set several times, until they felt
familiar with their contents. They .were then asked to put the
objects together into groups, grouping the things that fitted
most naturally together in their judgement. Groupings could
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range from putting all descriptions into the same group to
having them all in separate groups as well as all variations
in between.
When the categorisation decisions had been decided on, the
participant pasted them onto a large sheet of blank paper and
then circled each grouping using a marker pen.
Once all eight sets had been divided into groups using this
procedure, participants were re-presented with their
groupings a set at a time, and were asked to give any group
containing two or more members a simple descriptive name.
(Participants were also asked to write a few sentences
explaining what had led them to classify each named group
of descriptions together, though this data will not be
analysed here).
The experiment took around an hour to complete.
Results
For every object description set, the groups formed by each
participant's classifications were analysed (with the results
displayed in Table 1). Groupings which emerged fell into a
number of broad patterns . These classification types are
listed in Table 2, below. Similarities across groupings (i.e.
similarity shared by every member of a two or more member
group across a categorised object description set) which
could be idendfied according to Gentner et ai's taxonomy
were found in 80% of groupings (in Types 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6).
The most common grouping pattern used was of Type 1
(groups divided into: 1. B-LS-SSO: 2. SMAO-MA: 3. 00,
using a network of systematic causal relations), which
accounted for 70% of all classified object description sets.
The next largest grouping, comprising 5% of the total
was of Type 6. These sets were grouped using a largely
structural criterion which resulted in the same grouping
pattern as for Type 1 with the exception of the SSO object
description which was grouped on its own, even though MA
and SMAO were still grouped together.
Groupings which occurred due to participants using
common first order relations (those of Type 3) occurred in
1.9% of cases.
Object description sets were grouped according to Types 4
and 5 in 3.1% of cases. The only similarity across
groupings of these types is that the object descriptions in
each group had only objects in common.
Other groupings worth mentioning were Types 7 and 8, in
which the structured object descriptions were grouped
according to a determinable pattern, (structure for Type 7,
4.4%) and object attributes (Type 8, 1.9%). but the 00
descriptions were assigned according to features in Type 7
(where we would expect a separate grouping), and grouped
separately in Type 8 (grouped with descriptions containing
similar object attributes expected).
Only 0.6% (one occurrence) of groupings were of Type 2,
where the base was put into a category of its own, with
shared structure being the only similarity across groupings.
In 11.2% of groupings it was impossible to determine'an
overall criterion for determining the pattern produced; each of
these groupings had only a single occurrence.
Object Description Sets
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Type 1 Total
A 1115 1 7 7 5
B 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 8
C 1-111 3 1 6
D - 1 1 1 1 8 1 5
E 11114 - 1 6
s F 11111 1 7 6
u G 1-111 - - 5
b H - 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 7
j I 11116 -
"
1 6
e J 112 11 - 1 5, •
c K 11111 1 1 8
t L 11111 - 1 7
s M 16 16 1 1 8 5
N 8 1111 1 1 6
0 11111 1 6 6
P 16 111 7 7 5
Q 11111 1 1 8
R 17 1-1 - 7 3
S 9 116 1 . - 3
T 14 3 13 1 9 2
Table 1: Results for grouping patterns. Each participant
was given 8 sets of object descriptions (each row represents
one participant; each column an object description set): the
type of grouping is indicated by the type number in the
object description set column (see also Table 2).
Discussion
This study further examined the hypothesis put forward by
Ramscar and Pain (1996) that categorisation judgements in
humans can be determined more by shared structural
systematicity than by shared object attributes (surface
features) between the objects/ things/ rituals to be classified.
The results show considerable evidence to support this
hypothesis: 70% of the groupings were made in this way
(had participants grouped randomly, mathematical
combinatorics yield 213 possible groupings of the
materials). In a further 10% of groupings (Types 2, 6 and 7),
shared structure was clearly the criterion determining the
participants' overall groupings, although a single object
description was classified unaccountably (usually singly).
An interesting effect from the Ramscar and Pain study that
- intentionally - was not replicated in this experiment, was
the production of a large number of Type 2 groupings. In '
their experiment, Ramscar and Pain left an extra structure
(inserted by Gentner et al as part of their analogy study) in a
subset of the base stories presented to participants. These
base stories with extra structure then tended to be grouped
singularly (see Type 2 in Table 2, below). Since the 'Karla
the Pot' materials did not contain any extra structures in the
Base, we did not expect significant numbers of Type 2
stories to be produced, and in the event, only 0.6% of
groupings (1 out of 180) resulted in a Type 2 pattern, where
the base was classified singularly in an otherwise
structurally determined grouping pattern.
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Classification Criterion Number % of Total
Systematic network of relations in common - Type 1
1 B LS SSO 2 SMAO MA 3 00 112 70%
Systematic network of relations in common - Type 2 (Ramscar & Pain, 1996)
(Base classified separately)
1 LS SSO 2 SMAO MA 3 B 4 00 1 0.6%
First order relations in common - Type 3
1 B LS SSO SMAO MA 2 00 3 1.9%
Only object similarities in common Types 4 & 5
1 MA LS B 00 2 SSO SMAO





Largely systematic network of relations in common Type 6
I B LS 2 SSO 3 MA SMAO 4 00 8 5%
00 'Problems' - Structure based - Type 7
Object attribute based - Type 8
1 B LS SSO 00 2 MA SMAO





Type 9 and others - No clear pattern






Table 2: Output patterns from the categorisation task, showing the groups formed and criteria established. The object
descriptions are labelled according to Gentner's taxonomy of similarity (defined above): B = Base; LS = Literal Similarity;
SSO = Structural Similarity Only; SMAO = Structural Similarity with MA and Object Similarity with SSO; MA = Mere
Appearance; 00 = Object Only match.
Groupings that appeared to be formed on the basis of
shared surface attributes only amounted to 3.1% of the total
(Types 4 & 5). To these could be added another 1.9% of
groupings (Type 8) in which shared features determined the
overall groupings, although the 00 object description -
distinctive due to its complete lack of any systematic
structure - was classified separately.
Of those object descriptions classified according to shared
object attributes, only 2.5% (Type 4 groupings) reflect the
'normal' categories shown in Figure 2.
Clearly, structure appears to be the key determinant of
participants' classifications in this study. Typically,
categorisation models have tended to concentrate on object
descriptions, making use of very representationally-simple
attribute-value lists (see Murphy and Medin, 1985;
Komatsu, 1992), whereas, analogy research has examined
relationships between highly structured representations
(considering the influence of attributes, relations and higher-
order relations in judgements of similarity. The evidence of
this study would appear to support the claim that more
notice needs to be taken of the kinds of representations used
- and the effects representations produce - in categorisation
studies (Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner, 1993; Ramscar and
Pain 1996).
The results of the present study also support the broader
findings of Ramscar and Pain (1996), who conjectured that
the processes underlying analogy and categorisation are not
as distinct as is usually proposed. Both their results and ours
show shared structural systematicity (Gentner, 1983) as the
main process underlying categorisation judgements in the
particular experimental conditions. Ordinarily, structural
systematicity has been considered the domain of analogy,
rather than categorisation.
In this study, the influence of shared structural
systematicity has been remarkable. Participants have
preferred groupings between pots and walls, and walls and
pans, to pots and pans and walls alone. Whilst we feel that
these findings have strong implications for categorisauon
research, we also feel that they should cause some food for
thought as regards the way that analogy is typically viewed.
As noted earlier, there is a widespread acceptance in analogy
research of the two-process view of analogical / metaphorical
and literal understandings, whereby 'literal' (within category)
understandings are external to non-literal (analogical or
metaphorical) understandings, and are therefore assumed to
be computed by separate cognitive processes.
The evidence of this study can join other theoretical and
empirical evidence against a two-process account of literal
(categorical) versus non-literal (analogical or metaphorical)
reasoning; we mentioned earlier Hoffman and Kemper's
(1987) review of reaction time studies, which convincingly
demonstrates the meagre evidence for the widely held belief
that literal (intra-categorical) meanings are processed faster
than metaphorical or analogical (inter-categorical) meanings.
In spite of this, we do not want to say that analogy is
categorisation. It is difficult to envisage how such a central
cognitive process such as categorisation could be reduced to
a single process (c.f. Goldstone, 1994). Given the difficulty
inherent in characterising analogical, metaphorical and
categorical reasoning (Wittgenstein, 1953; Ramscar, 1997),
we are as dubious of the usefulness of the kind of identity
statements made by Glucksberg and Keysar, (1990), who
argue that metaphorical statements' should be understood as
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class-inclusion statements, as we are of the contrast
definitions with which we started this account; we consider
it plausible - even likely - that a number of reasoning
processes play a part in categorisation. Rather, like Ramscar
and Pain (1996) we argue that - in the light of the evidence
currently available - analogy is best viewed as a sub-process
of categorisation, and not as a separate process. Ultimately,',
we believe that the adherence to Jhe two-process account .
confuses the relationship between analogy and categorisation
and is hampering progress towards further understanding of
both (Ramscar, Pain and Cooper, 1997). Until there is a
better empirical and theoretical basis to do so, we argue that
it may be useful (and more honest) to keep an open mind as
to whether an orange crate is an orange crate can be a table?
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